Dismissed

Smt Padmavathi v. Smt Bhagya

Karnataka HC12 Feb 2026RFA/2328/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed a First Appeal against a decree dismissing a suit for declaration that a property was a public road and that the plaintiffs had acquired easementary rights by prescription. The Court held that plaintiffs failed to prove the property was a public road, as they were merely lessees who had vacated the dominant tenement, and the suit was barred by limitation due to prior litig

What the court decided

AI extract

Smt Padmavathi Vs Smt Bhagya — Property and Title | Karnataka HC (2026)

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 12^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 2328 OF 2025 (DEC)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. PADMAVATHI W/O LATE K.M RAMADAS AGED ABOUT 65 YEARS

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SRI. KIRAN. K.R S/O LATE K.M RAMADAS AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS

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SRI. JAYANTH.K.R S/O LATE K.M.RAMADAS AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS

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ALL ARE R/AT NO.03, 12^TH CROSS 1^ST D MAIN, NEAR GEETHANJALAI STORE KENGERI SATELLITE TOWN

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Digitally signed by AL BHAGYA Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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BENGALURU - 560 060.

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(BY SRI. P.N. RAJESHWAR, ADVOCATE)

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…APPELLANTS

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AND:

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SMT. BHAGYA AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

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SRI. NAGARAJA SHETTY AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS

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SMT. MANJULA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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SRI. MUKUNDA S/O H.V.LAKSHMANA SHETTY AGED ABOUT 51 YEARS

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NO. 1 TO 4 ARE R/AT NO.30 FORT KENGERI, BENGALURU SOUTH TALUK BENGALURU-560 060.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. T.P. VIVEKANANDA, ADVOCATE FOR C/R2 AND C/R4)

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THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 96 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 06.09.2025 PASSED IN O.S.NO.3217/2012 ON THE FILE OF THE XXIX ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU, DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR DICTATING JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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Captioned appeal is by the unsuccessful plaintiffs calling in question the judgment and decree rendered in O.S.No.3217/2012 wherein the plaintiffs' suit seeking the

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relief of declaration that schedule 'B' property is a public road and that original plaintiff has acquired easementary right by prescription is dismissed by the trial Court .

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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For the sake of convenience, the parties are

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referred to as per their rank before the trial Court.

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The facts leading to the case are as under:

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In the present suit, the plaintiffs assert that Schedule “A” property bearing Site No.22, formed in Survey No.95, was purchased by the grandfather of the original plaintiff, namely late Kittappa, under a registered sale deed dated 25.07.1956. It is further pleaded that the original plaintiff’s father leased the said property in favour of the original plaintiff under a registered lease deed dated 21.01.1976 and that ever since the year 1976, the original plaintiff has been running small-scale industrial units in the said premises.

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4. The plaintiffs further contend that abutting

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Schedule “A” property on the northern side, there exists a conservancy road, now described as Schedule “B” property. According to the plaintiffs, Schedule “B” property is the only means of ingress and egress to Schedule “A”

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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property. It is their specific case that Schedule “B” property constitutes a public road vested in the Town Municipal Council, Kengeri, and that the defendants have neither right nor title over the same. Alleging that the defendants are attempting to obstruct and close Schedule “B” property by treating it as part of Site No.30, thereby blocking access to Schedule “A” property, the present suit is instituted seeking declaration that Schedule “B” property is a public road and consequential declaration of easementary right by way of prescription.

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The defendants, on service of summons,

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entered appearance and filed their written statement stoutly denying the plaint averments. The defendants contend that the present suit is nothing but a continuation of the original plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt in an earlier round of litigation. It is pointed out that the original plaintiff had instituted O.S.No.693/1984 seeking injunction simpliciter not only against the present defendants but also against the Kengeri Town Municipal Council and the

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HC-KAR

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BBMP. According to the defendants, the local authorities in

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the earlier proceedings had unequivocally admitted that the disputed property, now sought to be described as a public road, is in fact Site No.30, which was lawfully allotted to the defendants’ father, late H.V. Lakshman Shetty, pursuant to a public auction conducted on 17.10.1971. The defendants further contend that though the original plaintiff had initially questioned the validity of the said auction and allotment, the challenge was abandoned by withdrawing the appeal in RFA.No.1132/2002. Having failed in the earlier litigation, the present suit is filed without impleading the local authorities. On these grounds, dismissal of the suit is sought.

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On appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the Trial Court answered Issue Nos.2 and 3 in the negative. Issue No.4 relating to limitation was answered in the affirmative and against the plaintiffs. Consequently, the suit came to be dismissed.

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HC-KAR

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Learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs,

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reiterating the grounds urged in the appeal, vehemently contended that the Trial Court failed to properly appreciate Rules 6, 8 and 12 of the Mysore Panchayats (Acquisition and Transfer of Moveable and Immoveable Property) Rules, 1960. He would submit that the alleged auction relied upon by the defendants is fundamentally flawed and that, in the absence of a proper conveyance deed executed by the local authority, the defendants cannot claim any right or title over Schedule “B” property by projecting it as Site No.30. Placing reliance on Exs.P-4 and P-6(a), learned counsel would contend that the existence

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of a conservancy road stands substantiated and that the findings recorded by the Trial Court while answering Issue Nos.2 and 3 warrant interference.

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Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the defendants supported the reasons and conclusions recorded by the Trial Court. He would contend that the validity of the public auction cannot be agitated at the

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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appellate stage without seeking appropriate relief specifically challenging the auction. Drawing attention to the prayer column in the plaint, he would submit that the plaintiffs have sought a declaration that Schedule “B” property is a public road and, consequentially, a declaration of easementary right by way of prescription. Taking this Court through the rebuttal evidence at Exs.D-1 to D-30, learned counsel placed reliance on Ex.P-6(a) to demonstrate that an 8 feet wide northern conservancy lane is clearly depicted in the sketch and that the plaintiffs are impermissibly stretching their claim beyond the said 8 feet. He would conclude by contending that the rebuttal evidence clinches the issue and clearly establishes that beyond the 8 feet northern conservancy lane, the plaintiffs cannot assert any easementary right over Site No.30, which was allotted pursuant to a public auction held in the year 1971.

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Heard the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and the learned counsel appearing for

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HC-KAR

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respondent Nos.2 and 4. This Court, being the final factfinding authority, has independently examined the pleadings and reassessed the oral and documentary evidence let in by both parties.

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The following points arise for consideration:

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(i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in holding

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that the plaintiffs have failed to establish that the suit Schedule “B” property constitutes a public road vested in the local authority and, consequently, in denying the relief of declaration of easementary right by way of prescription over Schedule “B” property?

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(ii) Whether the plaintiffs, being only lessees under a registered lease deed dated 21.01.1976 and not the owners of the dominant tenement, could have maintained a suit seeking declaration of easementary right by prescription without impleading the true owner, particularly when it is elicited in the cross-examination of

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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P.W.1 that the original plaintiff, as lessee, has vacated

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Schedule “A” property and is not in possession?

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(iii) Whether the Trial Court was justified in holding that the suit for declaration of easementary right is barred by limitation, having regard to the earlier litigation initiated in O.S.No.693/1984?

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(iv) What order?

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Findings on Point No. (i):

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Before this Court adverts to the core issue, this

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Court deems it fit to extract schedule of schedule 'B' property, since plaintiffs have asserted that they have no access to schedule 'A' property except schedule B property. The same is as under:

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" Schedule 'B'

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All that piece and parcel of 15 feet road formed in survey No.95 situated at Kengeri Town, Kengeri Bangalore South Taluk, Bangalore District measuring 16 feet East to West and about 300 feet North to South bounded on the :

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East by : Site Nos. 21 to 27 West by : Kengeri Junior College Property

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HC-KAR

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This Court also deems it fit to advert to the

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sketch marked at Ex.P6, which clearly depicts the location of schedule 'B' property. The sketch is as under and schedule "B" is marked in red portion by this Court while extracting Ex.P6 for better understanding of the lis :

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On a meticulous examination of Ex.P-6, this Court is of the considered view that the very edifice on which the plaintiffs have built their case stands considerably

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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weakened. A careful reading of Ex.P-6, which is the sketch relied upon by the plaintiffs themselves, clearly discloses that immediately to the north of Schedule “A” property there exists an 8 feet wide conservancy road. Towards the eastern side of Schedule “A” property, there is a 15 feet wide main road, and on the western side, there is yet another 15 feet wide road, which admittedly connects to the said eastern main road.

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When Ex.P-4 is read conjointly with Ex.P-6 and Ex.P-6(a), it becomes manifest that Schedule “A” property is provided with access on more than one side and, by no stretch of imagination, can be characterised as a landlocked property. The documentary evidence, on which the plaintiffs themselves place reliance, unequivocally demonstrates that ingress and egress to Schedule “A” property is available not merely from the northern side but also through the eastern and western roads. This factual position emerging from the plaintiffs’ own documents completely belies their categorical assertion that the

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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alleged Schedule “B” property is the only access available to Schedule “A” property.

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What assumes significance is that the redcoloured portion marked in the sketch, which the plaintiffs seek to project as Schedule “B” property and contend to be a public road, is not the 8 feet wide conservancy road abutting Schedule “A” property. On the contrary, the said red-coloured portion lies beyond the northern conservancy road. Therefore, even on the plaintiffs’ own showing, the disputed portion is distinct and separate from the admitted conservancy road abutting Schedule “A” property. This crucial distinction demolishes the plaintiffs’ attempt to portray the disputed portion as a public road forming part of their immediate access.

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In the light of the aforesaid documentary evidence, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to establish that Schedule “B” property constitutes a public road vested in the local

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HC-KAR

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authority. On the contrary, the defendants have placed on record cogent and convincing rebuttal evidence to demonstrate that the Kengeri Grama Panchayath had conducted a public auction, pursuant to which Site No.30 was lawfully allotted to their father. The evidence further discloses that possession of Site No.30 was delivered to the defendants’ father as early as in the year 1972 and that the katha was mutated in his name on 11.07.1972.

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Though the plaintiffs sought to contend that the said public auction was conducted in violation of the applicable Rules and Regulations, this Court finds that such a contention cannot be entertained in the absence of

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any substantive relief sought for setting aside or invalidating the auction proceedings. In the present suit, the scope of enquiry is confined to examining whether Schedule “B” property is a public road vested in the local authority. Once the defendants have successfully demonstrated that the disputed property is in fact a private site acquired through a public auction, and more

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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importantly, when the said factual position stood admitted by the Town Panchayath as well as the BBMP in the earlier round of litigation initiated by the original plaintiff, the plaintiffs’ assertion that Schedule “B” property is a public road becomes wholly untenable.

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Viewed from any angle, the evidence on record unmistakably establishes that the plaintiffs have access to Schedule “A” property through multiple roads and that the disputed portion does not constitute a public road. Consequently, the finding recorded by the Trial Court on this aspect does not warrant interference.

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Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the

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‘ affirmative’ .

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Finding on point No.(ii)

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During the course of trial, plaintiff No.1 examined as P.W.1, has admitted in unequivocal terms that the lease period has expired and original plaintiff has

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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vacated the premises. This Court deems it fit to advert to the relevant cross-examinations of P.W.1, the same are extracted as under:

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"……….In that unit, we manufacture small wooden packing box. It is true to suggest that, when I filed O.S.693/1984, I represented that, I am running a saw mill in this property. At that time, I have no approaching road to the saw mill. Now I am not running the saw mill. About 10 years back I stopped the saw mill business."

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[Emphasis Supplied]

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" . . . . . . . ಈಗ �ೕ�ೆ �ೇ�ದ ��ೕ �ೆಂಕ�ೇಶ�ರ �ಾ��ಂ� ವ�ವ�ಾರವನು� �ಾನು ಈ��ೆ ಕ ೆದ 05-10 ವಷ"ಗ�ಂದ ನ#ೆಸು%&ಲ( . )ಾ�ಾ ಎ - +ೆಡೂ�. ಆ0&ಯು ಕ ೆದ 05-10 ವಷ"ಗ�ಂದ 2ಾ3 ಇರುತ&)ೆ . �ೕ�ೆ �ೇ�ದ

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)ಾ�ಾ ಎ - +ೆಡೂ�. ಆ0&ಯ3( 6ೆ�ೆದು7ೊಂ8ದ9 25 �ಾ:" ಪವ< =ದು�> ಸಂಪಕ"ವನು� ಆ�ಾUÉÎ �ಾಪಸು? @ೕ8ದು9 ಇರುತ&)ೆ . �ೕ�ೆ �ೇ�ದ ಸಮಯದ3(

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�ೕ�ೆ �ೇ�ದ ��ೕ �ೆಂಕ�ೇಶ�ರ �ಾ��ಂ� ವ�ವ�ಾರದ ಪರ�ಾನBಯನು� ಸCತ �ಾನು DDಎಂE�ೆ �ಾಪಸು? Fಾ8ದು9 ಇರುತ&)ೆ . �ಾನು ಕ ೆದ 10 ವಷ"ಗ�ಂದ @ವೃ%&HಾBರುವIದJಂದ , HಾವI)ೇ 7ೆಲಸವನು� Fಾಡು%&ರುವIKಲ( .. . . . .. ."

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[Emphasis Supplied]

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"2002 Jಂದ 2012 ರ ಅವMಯ3( )ಾ�ಾ ಸ�ತು& 2002 ರ3( )ಾ�ೆ

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�ಾ�)ಾಗ Hಾವ Jೕ% ಇತು& ಅ)ೇ Jೕ% ಇತು& ಎಂದNೆ OಾPಯು �ಾನು 13

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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ವಷ"ಗ�ಂದ�ೂೕBಲ(ೆ , ಆ 7ಾರಣ ಏನು ಆB)ೆ ಮತು& �ೇB)ೆ ಎಂದು ನನ�ೆ �ೂ%&ಲ(ೆ ಎಂದು ಉತ&J0ರು6ಾ&Nೆ ."

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[Emphasis Supplied]

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". . . . . OಾP ಸ�ತಃ �ೇಳV6ಾ&Nೆ �ಾನು 2009 ರ3( )ಾ�ಾ ಸ�ತ&ನು�

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2ಾ3Fಾ8ರು6&ೕ�ೆ ೆ .. . . . ."

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[Emphasis Supplied]

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On a careful reading of the relevant portions of the crossexamination extracted hereinabove, this Court finds that the same unequivocally establishes that the original plaintiff entered into possession of Schedule “A” property only in the capacity of a lessee under a registered lease deed executed by his father on 21.01.1976. The plaintiffs have not traced or asserted independent title over Schedule “A” property. Their possession, therefore, was purely derivative and flowed exclusively from the leasehold arrangement.

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It is a settled principle of law that an easementary right by prescription is in the nature of a

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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permanent, heritable and appurtenant right, which enures to the benefit of the owner of the dominant heritage. Such

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a right cannot ordinarily be claimed or perfected by a person whose possession is limited, temporary or derivative, unless the true owner of the dominant tenement is before the Court. A lessee, whose right is circumscribed by the terms of the lease and whose possession is subordinate to the title of the lessor, cannot maintain a comprehensive suit seeking declaration of easementary right by prescription in his own right, particularly in the absence of the true owner.

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What assumes further significance is the categorical admission elicited in the cross-examination of P.W.1 that the original plaintiff has vacated the leased premises. Once it is admitted that the original plaintiff is no longer in possession of Schedule “A” property, the very substratum of the claim for declaration of easementary right stands eroded. The dominant tenement, for whose benefit the easement is alleged, is admittedly not in the

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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possession of the plaintiff, nor is the owner thereof impleaded as a party to the suit.

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In the absence of the true owner of the dominant tenement, any declaration of easementary right by prescription would be legally unsustainable and unenforceable. The suit, as framed, thus suffers from a fundamental defect of non-joinder of a necessary party and lack of locus on the part of the plaintiffs to assert a heritable easementary right.

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In view of these admitted and established facts, this Court finds no infirmity in the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court. Accordingly, Point No.(ii) is answered in the

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‘ negative ’.

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Finding on Point No.(iii):

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On the question of limitation, this Court finds no reason to take a view different from that of the Trial Court. The record placed before the Court unmistakably discloses

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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that the original plaintiff had earlier instituted a suit for injunction simpliciter in O.S.No.693/1984 in respect of the very same property and alleging obstruction to the very same access. The dismissal of the said suit clearly indicates that the alleged cause of action had crystallised as early as in the year 1984.

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Having suffered an adverse decree in the earlier proceedings, the plaintiff could not have revived or resuscitated a stale claim after an inordinate lapse of time by merely re-casting the relief and seeking a declaration of easementary right by prescription. The law is well settled that limitation is to be reckoned from the date on which the right to sue first accrues, and not from a subsequent or repeated assertion of the same grievance under a different legal garb.

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In the present case, the relief sought is one of declaration coupled with a claim of easementary right. The plaintiffs were admittedly aware of the alleged obstruction

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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and the denial of their asserted right even in the year 1984. Therefore, the present suit squarely attracts the bar of limitation. The liberty, if any, granted by this Court in RFA.No.1132/2002 to institute a fresh suit cannot be

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construed as extending, enlarging, or saving limitation, particularly when no liberty was reserved to revive a claim which had already become time-barred. Grant of liberty to file a fresh suit does not ipso facto wipe out the bar of limitation.

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Viewed thus, the finding recorded by the Trial Court on Issue No.4, holding that the suit is barred by limitation, is in consonance with settled principles of law and does not warrant interference at the hands of this Court.

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Accordingly, Point No.(iii) is answered in the

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‘ affirmative’ .

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NC: 2026:KHC:9106 RFA No. 2328 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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Finding on Point No.(iv):

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For the foregoing reasons, this Court proceeds

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to pass the following:

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ORDER

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The appeal is dismissed .

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Sd/(SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE

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ALB List No.: 1 Sl No.: 9

Smt Padmavathi v. Smt Bhagya

Case brief

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What the court decided

Smt Padmavathi v. Smt Bhagya

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