Dismissed

Dr Debajyothi Mandal v. Fortis Hospital Limited

Karnataka HC30 Jan 2026RFA/2877/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Karnataka dismissed an appeal against the trial court's order rejecting a suit for reinstatement of a medical consultant. The bench held that contracts of personal service dependent on personal skill and mutual confidence cannot be specifically enforced under the Specific Relief Act, barring injunctions for reinstatement.

What did the court decide?

The appeal was dismissed and the trial court's order rejecting the plaint was confirmed. The plaintiff may seek damages if advised.

Dr Debajyothi Mandal Vs Fortis Hospital… — Contract and Commercial Disputes | Karnataka HC (2026)

¶1

¶2

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶3

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

¶4

DATED THIS THE 30^TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

¶5

BEFORE

¶6

THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

¶7

REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO.2877 OF 2025 (INJ)

¶8

BETWEEN:

¶9

DR.DEBAJYOTHI MANDAL SON OF LATE DR.PRABODH KUMAR MANDAL AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS RESIDING AT SUN CITY APARTMENTS FLAT NO.1001, BLOCK 17 IBBALURU SARJAPUR OUTER RING ROAD BENGALURU - 560 102

¶10

…APPELLANT

¶11

(BY SRI.DR.DEBAJYOTHI MANDAL, APPELLANT - PARTY-IN-PERSON)

¶12

AND:

¶13

FORTIS HOSPITAL LIMITED NO.14, CUNNINGHAM ROAD BENGALURU - 560 052. REPRESENTED BY

¶14

SRI.CHANDRASEKHAR R FACILITY DIRECTOR

¶15

DR.VIVEKANAND JAWALI CHAIRMAN

¶16

DEPARTMENT OF CARDIOVASCULAR SCIENCES

¶17

…RESPONDENT

¶18

(BY SRI.SHIRISH KRISHNA, ADVOCATE FOR R.1 AND R.2)

¶19

¶20

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶21

THIS RFA IS FILED UNDER SEC.96 OF CPC., AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 4.07.2025 PASSED ON IA NO.3 IN O.S.NO.6111/2023 ON THE FILE OF I ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, (CCH-02), BENGALURU CITY., ALLOWING THE IA NO.3 FILED UNDER ORDER 7 RULES 11(a) AND (d) R/W SEC.151 OF CPC., FOR REJECTION OF PLAINT AND ETC.

¶22

THIS APPEAL HAS BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 22.01.2026, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS PRONOUNCED THEREIN, AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

¶23

CAV JUDGMENT

¶24

Though this appeal is listed for admission, with the

¶25

consent of party-in-person and learned counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2, this matter is heard and reserved for judgment.

¶26

The captioned appeal is directed against the order dated 04.07.2025 passed in O.S.No.6111/2023 by the trial Court on I.A.No.3 filed by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Civil Procedure Code thereby rejecting the plaint.

¶27

¶28

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶29

For the sake of brevity, the ranks of the parties

¶30

are referred as they are ranked before the Trial Court.

¶31

Facts leading to the case are as under;

¶32

The plaintiff has instituted the present suit seeking a direction to the defendant–Hospital to reinstate him into service and to restore all attendant monetary benefits by way of a mandatory injunction, together with full back wages and consequential benefits.

¶33

The plaintiff, in the plaint, asserts that he is a qualified Cardiothoracic Surgeon with over six years of professional experience, having obtained a Post-Graduate M.S.Degree in General Surgery, and that he was felicitated by the American College of Cardiology in the year 2020. It is his specific case that the defendant–Hospital, represented by its Facility Director, Mr. Anand Angadi, and its Chairman, Dr. Vivekanand Jawali, being fully aware of his professional credentials and experience, held several rounds of discussions with him. Consequent upon such deliberations, the defendant offered the plaintiff

¶34

¶35

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶36

engagement as a Consultant in Cardiothoracic Surgery, pursuant to which an employment contract-cumappointment letter came to be executed by both parties on 26.05.2023.

¶37

The gist of the plaintiff’s grievance is the premature termination of his engagement, which, according to him, is in breach of the terms and conditions stipulated in the contract. The plaintiff contends that the unilateral termination of his services is contrary to Clause No.11 of the contract and amounts to rescission of contractual obligations without adherence to the agreed procedure. It is further alleged that the manner in which the termination was effected caused humiliation and injury to his professional standing, thereby necessitating institution of the present suit.

¶38

The defendant–Hospital, represented by its Facility Director and Chairman, upon service of summons, entered appearance and filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Sections 9 and 151 of the Code of

¶39

¶40

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶41

Civil Procedure seeking rejection of the plaint. The principal contention urged therein is that, even assuming the plaint averments to be true in their entirety, the reliefs sought are barred by law, inasmuch as the contract in question is one of personal service, determinable in nature, and expressly not an employment contract, and therefore incapable of enforcement through a civil court. It is contended that the suit is barred under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act and consequently not maintainable.

¶42

The Trial Court, after affording opportunity of hearing to both parties, by the impugned order, allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 and rejected the plaint. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff has preferred the present appeal.

¶43

This Court has heard the plaintiff-party appearing in person and the learned counsel appearing for the defendant. The records have been carefully perused, with particular emphasis on the averments made in the plaint.

¶44

¶45

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶46

Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the following points arise for consideration:

¶47

(i) Whether the Trial Court was justified in rejecting the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read with Sections 9 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the suit seeks enforcement of a contract of personal service barred under Sections 14(1)(b), 14(1)(c) and Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963?

¶48

(ii) What order?

¶49

Findings on Point No.(i) :-

¶50

Before this Court averts to the plaintiff's case, it would be apposite for this Court to advert to the pleadings and prayer sought in the plaint. The relevant paragraph of the plaint and the prayer sought in the plaint are extracted, which reads as under;

¶51

"9. The termination of clause No.11 of the contract, form 1 to 5 envisages and explicit reasons for immediate termination, but in case of the

¶52

¶53

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶54

plaintiff, the said clauses of termination are not mentioned in the "one-liner termination mail' dated 04.07.2023. Hence, the action of the defendants in terminating the services of the plaintiff from the said Hospital is one-sided, opposed to the principles of natural justice, illegal labour practice and also in gross violation of the termination clauses mentioned in Clause No.11 of the employment contract agreement dated 26.05.2023.

¶55

10.xxxxx.

¶56

11.xxxx

¶57

12. The plaintiff submits that it is very pertinent to note that the plaintiff had been residing and practicing in West Bengal and had been registered with the West Bengal Medical Council bearing 61899 dated 10.07.2006. In view of call from the defendants to joint the said hospital, the plaintiff was constrained to shift from West Bengal to Karnataka and got his name registered in the Karnataka Medical Council bearing No.161636 dated 09.07.2023 and the same is produced before the Honourable Court as Document No.8. In view of voluntary call from the defendants to the plaintiff to joint their hospital, the plaintiff was under the impression that the defendants wishes to have a long term association of 2 years as mentioned in the contract, and jointed the services and shifted his

¶58

¶59

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶60

base from West Bengal to Karnataka. Hence the subsequent developments by the defendants is abruptly terminating the services of the plaintiff without any notice or valid reasons is nothing but a breach of contract between the plaintiff and the defendants. The defendants of course have paid the plaintiff two months salary along with termination of services, but the plaintiff will not be disentitled to seek relief sought for in this suit. Hence, the plaintiff filed the present suit for the relief of seeking restoration of his services in the defendant hospital by reinstatement. Hence, the plaintiff is left with no other option than to file the present suit for the reliefs set out in the plaint.

¶61

13. The cause of action for the suit arose on 26^th day of May 2023, when the plaintiff was appointed by the defendants by signed contract, and on 12^th day of June, 2023, when the plaintiff joined the services in the said hospital as per the contract, and on 04^th day of July, 2023, when the plaintiff was terminated by "one-liner mail" by the defendants, and on 19^th day of July, 2023, when the notice seeking reinstatement was issued by the plaintiff, and subsequently on 5^th day of August 2023, when the defendants issued an untenable reply is well within jurisdiction of this Honourable Court.

¶62

¶63

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶64

PRAYER

¶65

Wherefore, the plaintiff prays that this Honourable Court may be pleased to pass a judgment and decree against the defendants in favour of the plaintiff as under:

¶66

a) Directing the defendants to reinstate the services of the plaintiff in the said hospital as he was appointed initially in the same rank/designation including financial benefits, by means of mandatory injunction with full back wages and consequential benefits.

¶67

b) And grant such other reliefs as this Honourable Court may deed fit to grant including cost of this suit, in the interest of justice and equity."

¶68

(emphasis supplied)

¶69

A conjoint reading of the plaint averments

¶70

unmistakably discloses that the plaintiff was engaged as a Consultant in the Department of Cardiothoracic Surgery at the defendant–Hospital. The defendant, upon entering appearance, has filed an application seeking rejection of the plaint, contending that the suit does not disclose any

¶71

10 -

¶72

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶73

cause of action and that the reliefs sought therein are expressly barred by law. The principal ground urged by the defendant is that the engagement letter relied upon by the plaintiff constitutes a contract of personal service, which is not specifically enforceable in view of the embargo contained under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

¶74

This Court has carefully perused the plaint averments as well as the engagement letter dated 26.05.2023. A plain and meaningful reading of the said engagement letter clearly establishes that the plaintiff was engaged purely in the capacity of a Consultant to render professional medical services to the defendant–Hospital and not as a regular employee. The nature of engagement, duties entrusted and the contractual framework governing the relationship unmistakably indicate that the contract is founded upon personal qualifications, skill and volition of the parties.

¶75

11 -

¶76

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶77

Before proceeding to examine the legal

¶78

consequences flowing from such engagement, this Court deems it appropriate to extract Clause 11(a) and Clause

¶79

11(b) of the engagement contract dated 26.05.2023, which read as under:

¶80

"11. TERMINATION

¶81

(a) This engagement shall be terminated by either party upon 2 month(s) prior written notice to the other.

¶82

(b) This engagement shall be terminated with immediate effect upon the occurrence of any of the following:

¶83

(i) Death of the engaging doctor;

¶84

(ii) Your providing false, inaccurate or

¶85

incomplete information to the Company regarding your background (including but not limited to your educational background), registration and/or previous engagement history;

¶86

(iii) Your conduct is considered by the

¶87

Company as detrimental to its interest or in violation of one or more terms of this engagement letter, code of conduct of the

¶88

12 -

¶89

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶90

Company or good medical practice guidelines or you fail to refuse to carry out your obligations herein;

¶91

(iv) Expiry of Registration certificate issued by Medical Council of India and/or State Medical Council as the case may be and the same being not renewed within stipulated period as prescribed in terms of any specific regulation or otherwise;

¶92

(v) Acceptance of consideration in cash from any patient (s) for providing medical services to them in terms of this Engagement Letter."

¶93

A plain reading of Clause 11(a) and Clause 11(b)

¶94

of the engagement contract unequivocally demonstrates that both parties were conferred with liberty to terminate the engagement by issuing notice in terms of the contract. It is an admitted position, as reflected from paragraph No.12 of the plaint itself, that the defendant exercised such contractual right and, in compliance with the terms of the agreement, paid two months’ service fee to the plaintiff in lieu of notice. On a holistic reading of the plaint

¶95

13 -

¶96

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶97

averments and the nature of reliefs sought, it clearly emerges that the duties undertaken by the plaintiff as a Medical Consultant necessarily involved personal skill, specialised professional expertise, clinical judgment, and independent discretion. Such engagement, by its very nature, rests upon mutual confidence, trust and volition of the parties. Consequently, this Court is of the considered view that the contract in question squarely falls within the prohibitions enumerated under Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

¶98

Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act expressly declares that contracts which involve performance of continuous duties that the Court cannot supervise, contracts which are dependent upon personal qualifications, skill, or volition of the parties, and contracts which are, by their very nature, determinable, cannot be specifically enforced. The present contract attracts all the aforesaid categories. Once the contract itself is rendered incapable of specific enforcement, the consequential relief of mandatory injunction directing reinstatement into

¶99

14 -

¶100

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶101

service is legally impermissible and wholly unsustainable in law.

¶102

The statutory bar contained under Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act operates with full force in the present case. The said provision categorically mandates that an injunction cannot be granted to prevent the breach of a contract, the performance of which would not be specifically enforced. When the substantive relief of enforcing continuation of service is barred by law, the ancillary or auxiliary relief of injunction necessarily collapses. A civil court cannot do indirectly what it is expressly prohibited from doing directly.

¶103

The law relating to contracts of personal service is no longer res integra . The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in

¶104

Jitendra Nath Biswas vs. Empire of India and Ceylon Tea Co. Ltd. and Another¹ , has authoritatively held that an employee of a private establishment, whose services are terminated, cannot seek reinstatement or back wages

¶105

1 (1989) 3 SCC 582

¶106

15 -

¶107

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶108

by instituting a civil suit, as a contract of personal service is not specifically enforceable. The remedy, if any, available to such a person lies only in a claim for damages. The consistent and settled judicial view is that Courts will not enforce private contracts of employment or professional engagement by granting reliefs of reinstatement or continuation of service.

¶109

The Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Neeru Rajput And Ors vs Punam Suri President Dav College² has further reiterated that an injunction directing continuation of employment or professional engagement cannot be granted in view of Section 14(1)(b) read with Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Courts have consistently recognized only limited exceptions to the aforesaid rule, namely: (i) employment under the State or its instrumentalities governed by c onstitutional or statutory safeguards, (ii) cases falling within the ambit of industrial or labour jurisprudence, and (iii) employment under a statutory body where termination is in violation of

¶110

2 CCP(S) No. 242/2025 in MA No. 32/2025

¶111

16 -

¶112

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶113

mandatory statutory provisions. Admittedly, the plaintiff does not fall within any of the recognized exceptions.

¶114

In the light of the authoritative pronouncements rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and various High Courts, which are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case, it becomes manifest that the plaintiff seeks reliefs which are expressly barred by statute. Even if every averment made in the plaint is assumed to be true, no decree for reinstatement or mandatory injunction could ever be granted. The suit, therefore, is clearly barred by law and does not disclose any cause of action warranting a full-fledged trial. In such circumstances, the Trial Court has rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the Code of Civil Procedure in rejecting the plaint at the threshold, thereby preventing abuse of the process of Court and avoiding needless protraction of civil litigation. This Court finds no infirmity or perversity in the impugned order. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the 'Affirmative'.

¶115

17 -

¶116

RFA No. 2877 of 2025

¶117

21. Point No.(ii) :- For the foregoing reasons,

¶118

this Court proceeds to pass the following;

¶119

ORDER

¶120

(i) The appeal is dismissed.

¶121

(ii) The order passed by the trial Court rejecting the plaint is hereby confirmed.

¶122

(iii) It is clarified that the rejection of plaint shall not preclude the plaintiff/Party-in-Person if so advised from seeking appropriate relief for damages in accordance with law subject to limitation.

¶123

(iv) No order as to cost.

¶124

SD/- (SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM) JUDGE

¶125

NBM

Dr Debajyothi Mandal v. Fortis Hospital Limited

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Dr Debajyothi Mandal v. Fortis Hospital Limited

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

A compact analysis

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

The New India Assurance Co., Ltd., Vs Ms. Krithika R .Kalyanpur

Sri K Srirangacharya Vs Government of Karnataka

Saravana M Pethi Vs Ilango M Pethi

Sreerag K D Vs State by Bellanduru Police

Ms. Rathna Vs State of Karnataka

Sri Deva Sagayam Vs Smt Lakshmi