Dismissed¶147

Sri Deva Sagayam v. Smt Lakshmi

Karnataka HC30 Jan 2026RFA/1614/2010

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Maintainability of suit for bare declaration of title; proviso to Section 34 Specific Relief Act 1963; failure to challenge statutory vendor's (BDA) subsequent sale deed regularising prohibited alienation; locus standi of legal heirs of allottee; breach of lease-cum-sale agreement conditions; non-joinder of indispensable/necessary party; Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (2008) 4 SCC 594 applied; Article 58 Limitation Act 1963; amendment introducing time-barred declaratory and possession relief; relation back of amendments; effect of rejection of impleading application; Karnataka High Court RFA (DEC/POS); neutral citation NC: 2026:KHC:5287.

What did the court decide?

The plaintiffs clearly lack locus standi to seek a declaration of title; Point No.(i) is answered in the negative. ¶128

Sri Deva Sagayam Vs Smt Lakshmi — Specific Performance | Karnataka HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of absolute ownership and consequential relief of possession, in light of the rebuttal evidence demonstrating that BDA executed a fresh registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 on 08.09.1988. +2 more

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Court's answer

The plaintiffs clearly lack locus standi to seek a declaration of title; Point No.(i) is answered in the negative.

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Ratio / Principle

Once the BDA executed the registered sale deed (Ex.D.31) dated 08.09.1988 regularising the prohibited alienation, defendant No.1's title ceased to flow from the 1975 private sale deed and stands traced directly to the BDA, the statutory authority, original owner and competent vendor.

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Key takeaways

Even if the sale deed dated 05.03.1975 were declared void, the title flowing from the subsequent BDA sale deed dated 08.09.1988 remains unaffected; unless the BDA sale deed is specifically challenged and set aside, no effective or enforceable relief can be granted against defendant Nos.1 and 2.ratio¶91
The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 applies: the plaintiffs, though able to seek a declaration that the BDA sale deed is void, consciously omitted to do so, and a declaratory relief that does not effectively adjudicate rights or remove the real cloud on title is impermissible.ratio¶96

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Regular First Appeal by plaintiff No.3 against dismissal of a suit for declaration of title and possession concerning a site allotted to his father late B.Penchalaiah (allotment letter dated 01.02.1975; lease-cum-sale agreement dated 18.02.1975), which the allottee alienated to defendant No.1 by sale deed dated 05.03.1975. Held, dismissing the appeal: the plaintiffs consciously did not challenge the fresh registered sale deed dated 08.09.1988 executed by the Bangalore Development Authority in favour of defendant No.1 regularising the prohibited alienation, pursuant to which defendant No.1 conveyed the property to defendant No.2 on 11.11.1988. Once defendant No.1's title flowed directly from the BDA, the statutory authority and original owner, the plaintiffs lacked locus standi; the proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 bars a declaration that leaves the real cloud on title untouched; applying Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy, (2008) 4 SCC 594, a suit for bare declaration without setting aside the operative instrument is not maintainable, and non-joinder of the BDA is fatal. Alternatively, the declaratory relief was barred under Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the right to sue having accrued on the 05.03.1975 alienation, and the 2001 amendment could not relate back to save limitation; the ancillary relief of possession fell with it. Appeal and pending applications dismissed.

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NC: 2026:KHC:5287 RFA No. 1614 of 2010

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30^TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1614 OF 2010 (DEC/POS)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI. DEVA SAGAYAM S/O LATE SRI. B. PENCHALAIAH AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS R/AT NO.16, NEW MULTISTORIED BUILDING POTTERY ROAD, FRAZER TOWN BANGALORE-560005.

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…APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. R.B. SADASIVAPA, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. PRADEEP NAIK .K, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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Digitally signed by CHAITHRA A Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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SMT. LAKSHMI W/O SRI. P.D. DHANLAL MAJOR R/AT NO.34 SADASHIVA MUDALIAR ROAD MURPHY TOWN, ULSOOR CIVIL STATION BANGALORE-560008.

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SMT. N. RATHNAMMA W/O SRI. C. ABBU MAJOR R/AT NO.17, 6^TH CROSS L.B. SHASTRY NAGAR INDIRA NAGAR

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NC: 2026:KHC:5287 RFA No. 1614 of 2010

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HC-KAR

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2^ND STAGE BANGALORE.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. G. GAJENDRA VASU, ADVOCATE FOR R1; SRI. V.A. MOHAN RANGAM, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2; SRI. H.N. PRAKASH, ADVOCATE FOR R1 AND R2)

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THIS RFA IS FILED U/S 96 R/W, O-XLI-A AND XLI, R-1 & 2 OF CPC, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 21.04.2010 PASSED IN O.S.2842/1988 ON THE FILE OF THE I-ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BANGALORE DISMISSING THE SUIT FOR DECLARATION AND POSSESSION.

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THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR DICTATING JUDGMENT, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SACHIN SHANKAR MAGADUM

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ORAL JUDGMENT

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The captioned appeal is filed by the unsuccessful plaintiff No.3 assailing the impugned judgment and decree dated 21.04.2010 rendered in O.S.No.2842/1988 on the file of the I Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge at Bengaluru City.

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For the sake of brevity, the parties are referred

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to as per their rankings before the Trial Court.

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NC: 2026:KHC:5287 RFA No. 1614 of 2010

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HC-KAR

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Brief facts leading to the case are as under;

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Plaintiff No.3, along with his mother and two siblings,

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instituted the present suit seeking a declaration of title, consequential relief of permanent injunction and recovery of possession in respect of the suit schedule property. The plaintiffs sought to invalidate the title of defendant Nos.1 and 2 contending that the registered sale deed dated

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05.03.1975 obtained by defendant No.1 from late B.Penchalaiah, the original allottee of the site through the Bangalore Development Authority (for short 'BDA') is sham, fraudulent, and illegal.

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It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that late B. Penchalaiah, who was a Government employee, was allotted a site bearing No.1015/C situated at Binnamangala, II Stage Extension, Bengaluru–38 by BDA under allotment letter dated 01.02.1975 (Ex.D.5). Pursuant thereto, BDA executed a lease-cum-sale agreement dated 18.02.1975 (Ex.D.44) and possession of

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NC: 2026:KHC:5287 RFA No. 1614 of 2010

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HC-KAR

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the site was handed over to the original allottee on 20.02.1975. The total value of the site was Rs.3,467/-, which was payable by the allottee.

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The plaintiffs further contend that in violation of

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the conditions of allotment and the lease-cum-sale agreement, late B.Penchalaiah alienated the suit schedule property in favour of defendant No.1 under a registered sale deed dated 05.03.1975 for a consideration of Rs.4,000/-. The plaintiffs, being the legal heirs of the original allottee, have questioned the said alienation on the ground that their father was a drunkard and addicted to vices and that the defendants have brought into existence a fraudulent document. During the pendency of the suit, defendant No.1 further alienated the suit schedule property in favour of defendant No.2, who was consequently impleaded as a party to the proceedings.

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HC-KAR

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By way of amendment, the plaintiffs also sought

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an additional relief of declaration and recovery of possession in the year 2001.

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Defendant Nos.1 and 2 entered appearance and filed their written statements contesting the suit. The defendants, inter alia , contended that the suit is barred by limitation and that the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties, particularly the Bangalore Development Authority, which is the statutory authority that allotted and subsequently conveyed the site.

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Based on the rival pleadings, the Trial Court framed appropriate issues. Both parties led oral as well as documentary evidence in support of their respective cases.

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Upon appreciation of the materials on record, the

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Trial Court dismissed the suit by answering issue Nos.1 to 3 in the negative. The Trial Court held that the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the sale deed dated 05.03.1975 executed by late B.Penchalaiah in favour of defendant

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NC: 2026:KHC:5287 RFA No. 1614 of 2010

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HC-KAR

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No.1 was sham, nominal or unsupported by consideration.

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While answering Additional issue No.1 dated 05.03.2010 in the affirmative, the Trial Court held that defendant No.2 had successfully established that defendant No.1 possessed a valid and salable right. Further, while answering Additional Issue No.2, also framed on 05.03.2010, the Trial Court held that the suit is barred by limitation.

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Heard the learned counsel appearing for plaintiff No.3 and the learned counsel appearing for defendant Nos.1 and 2. This Court has carefully and independently reassessed the oral and documentary evidence placed on record.

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Upon such re-appreciation, the following points arise for consideration:

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(i) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to seek a declaration of absolute ownership and consequential relief of possession, in light of the rebuttal evidence adduced by the

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defendants demonstrating that BDA has executed a fresh registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 on 08.09.1988?

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(ii) Whether the judgment and decree of the Trial Court dismissing the suit on the ground of limitation suffer from perversity and call for interference by this Court?

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(iii) What order?

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Findings on Point No.(i) :-

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It is not in dispute that the suit schedule property is a site originally allotted by the City Improvement Trust Board in favour of late B.Penchalaiah, the father of plaintiff Nos.2 to 4, under an allotment letter dated 01.02.1975 (Ex.D.5), pursuant to which a leasecum-sale agreement came to be executed on 18.02.1975 (Ex.D.44). It is also an admitted fact that the said allottee alienated the suit schedule site in favour of defendant No.1 under a registered sale deed dated 05.03.1975.

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HC-KAR

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The material on record further discloses that on noticing the prohibited alienation effected during the subsistence of the lease-cum-sale period, the competent Authority, in exercise of its statutory powers, executed a fresh registered sale deed dated 08.09.1988 in favour of defendant No.1, thereby regularising the earlier transaction. Consequent thereto, defendant No.1 conveyed the suit schedule property in favour of defendant No.2 under a registered sale deed dated 11.11.1988. Defendant No.2 has thereafter put up construction over the suit schedule property after securing the requisite sanction from the competent authority.

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In the backdrop of these undisputed and significant factual developments, this Court deems it appropriate to extract the prayer sought in the plaint, which reads as under:

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"I. To declare that the sale deed dated 05.03.1975 (Five Three-One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Five) executed by the deceased

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HC-KAR

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B.Penchalaiah (husband of the 1^st plaintiff) and the (father of remaining plaintiffs) in favour of the defendant in respect of the suit schedule property i.e., at Annexure-H is sham, nominal and not supported by consideration and is illegal and invalid and fraudulent and not enforceable and that is does not convey any right title or interest in favour of the defendant and that it does not bind the plaintiffs in any manner.

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I(a). To declare that the plaintiffs are the absolute owners of the suit schedule property.

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I(b). To direct the defendants to deliver the vacant possession of the suit schedule property to the plaintiffs.

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II. For a consequential injunction restraining the defendant permanently from dealing with the suit schedule property in any manner either by alienating the same of meddling with it in any manner on the basis of the sale deed dated 05.03.1975 (Five-Three-One Thousand Nine Hundred and Seventy Five) i.e., at Annexure-H, in her favour.

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III. For the costs of the suit and such other reliefs as this Hon'ble Court deems fit to grant the same to the plaintiffs in the circumstances of the case in the interest of justice and equity."

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(Emphasis Supplied)

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HC-KAR

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On a careful reading of the prayer sought in the plaint, it is manifest that the plaintiffs have instituted the present suit essentially seeking a declaration that the sale deed dated 05.03.1975 executed by their father late B.Penchalaiah in favour of defendant No.1 is sham, illegal and void. Consequentially, they have sought a declaration of absolute ownership and recovery of possession. Significantly, while seeking such declaratory and consequential reliefs, the plaintiffs have consciously omitted to challenge the registered sale deed dated 08.09.1988 executed by the Bangalore Development Authority in favour of defendant No.1.

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The entire edifice of the plaintiffs’ case thus rests solely on assailing the private sale deed executed by their father. However, the plaintiffs have completely ignored the legal consequence and effect of the subsequent statutory conveyance executed by the BDA. Once the BDA executed a registered sale deed in favour of defendant No.1 under Ex.D.31, the source of title of

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HC-KAR

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defendant No.1 ceased to flow from the impugned private sale deed executed by the plaintiffs’ father. The title of defendant No.1 thereafter stands traced directly to the BDA, which is the statutory authority, original owner and competent vendor of the suit schedule property.

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In such circumstances, even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the earlier sale deed dated 05.03.1975 executed by the plaintiffs’ father is declared void, the title flowing from the subsequent sale deed dated 08.09.1988 executed by the BDA remains unaffected, intact and unimpeached. Therefore, unless the registered sale deed executed by the BDA is specifically challenged and set-aside in a manner known to law, no effective or enforceable relief can be granted either against defendant No.1 or against defendant No.2, who claims title through defendant No.1.

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The plaintiffs seek a declaration of title in themselves while deliberately omitting to seek a

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declaration invalidating the registered sale deed dated 08.09.1988 executed by the BDA in favour of defendant No.1. The proviso to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 squarely applies to the facts of the present case. When the plaintiffs were admittedly in a position to seek further and consequential relief namely, a declaration that the sale deed executed by the BDA is void or not binding, they have consciously omitted to do so. A declaratory relief which does not result in effective adjudication of rights and does not remove the real cloud on title is impermissible in law.

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So long as the registered sale deed executed by the BDA in favour of defendant No.1 remains valid and subsisting, the plaintiffs cannot claim any subsisting right, title or interest in the suit schedule property. Consequently, they lack locus standi to seek a declaration

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of ownership. It is also relevant to note that the plaintiffs’ father had only obtained an allotment and entered into a lease-cum-sale agreement, which had not culminated into

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an absolute conveyance in his favour. The records unequivocally reveal that in violation of the restrictions and conditions imposed under the lease-cum-sale agreement, the plaintiffs’ father alienated the property in favour of defendant No.1 thereby committing a clear breach of the terms of allotment.

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In view of these admitted and undisputed subsequent developments, the allegations made by the plaintiffs that their father was addicted to vices or that defendant No.1 obtained the initial sale deed by playing fraud are rendered wholly inconsequential and legally irrelevant. The decisive factor is the subsequent statutory conveyance executed by the BDA in favour of defendant No.1, which constitutes an independent and unimpeachable source of title.

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In light of the principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (Dead) by Lrs. and Others¹ , the plaintiffs’

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1 (2008)4 SCC 594

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claim of title clearly hinges upon the cancellation or invalidation of an existing instrument, namely the registered sale deed executed by the BDA. A mere suit for declaration of ownership without seeking to set-aside the operative instrument that vests title in the defendants, is not maintainable. Unfortunately, the Trial Court has failed to advert to this settled position of law and has embarked upon a detailed analysis of voluminous oral and documentary evidence, which was wholly unnecessary in the absence of maintainability of the suit itself.

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Even assuming that the application filed by the plaintiffs seeking impleadment of the Bangalore Development Authority was rejected, such rejection by itself does not absolve the plaintiffs of their statutory obligation to institute a comprehensive and properly framed suit seeking appropriate and effective reliefs. The rejection of an impleading application cannot be construed as a license to prosecute an otherwise inherently defective suit. The plaintiffs, being dominus litis , were required to

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mould their reliefs in a manner that would enable the Court to finally and effectively adjudicate upon the real controversy between the parties.

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When the plaintiffs were fully aware that the title of defendant No.1 emanates from a registered sale deed executed by the BDA, a statutory authority and the original owner of the property, it was incumbent upon them to institute a comprehensive suit challenging such statutory conveyance and to seek all consequential reliefs in accordance with law. In the absence of a challenge to the sale deed executed by the BDA, the reliefs sought in the present suit are illusory and incapable of enforcement. The rejection of the impleading application does not cure this fundamental defect; on the contrary, it reinforces the conclusion that the suit, as framed, is not maintainable.

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The plaintiffs could have availed remedies known to law by instituting a properly constituted suit impleading all necessary parties and seeking cancellation

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or declaration in respect of the operative instrument that

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vests title in the defendants. Having failed to do so, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to circumvent substantive legal requirements by continuing a truncated or piecemeal litigation. Courts of law do not grant academic or ineffective declarations. Therefore, notwithstanding the rejection of the impleading application, the plaintiffs were duty-bound to file a comprehensive suit seeking appropriate reliefs, and their failure to do so is fatal to the maintainability of the present suit.

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The statutory acts of the BDA cannot be indirectly nullified or rendered ineffective unless the sale

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deed executed by the BDA is directly challenged and the Authority itself is impleaded as a party. The non-joinder of the BDA, which is an indispensable and necessary party, strikes at the very root of the suit and is fatal. The plaintiffs’ contention that their application for impleadment of the BDA was rejected and that such rejection was affirmed by this Court, does not cure the fundamental

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defect in the plaint nor does it confer locus standi upon the plaintiffs.

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For all the aforesaid reasons, this Court holds that the plaintiffs clearly lack locus standi to seek a declaration of title. The allegations against the original allottee, late B. Penchalaiah, regarding his alleged vices are found to be wholly irrelevant and legally untenable in view of the subsequent statutory conveyance. Accordingly, Point No.(i) is answered in the Negative.

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Findings on Point No.(ii)

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The relief seeking declaration of ownership in favour of the plaintiffs on the basis of the lease-cum-sale agreement and the consequential relief of recovery of possession came to be introduced only by way of amendment in the year 2001. It is not in dispute that the registered sale deed executed by late B.Penchalaiah in favour of defendant No.1 is dated 05.03.1975. The plaintiffs were, therefore, fully aware of the alienation as

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early as in the year 1975. Even assuming that the plaintiffs initiated proceedings questioning the alienation in the year 1988, the declaration of title in themselves based on the lease-cum-sale agreement executed by the City Improvement Trust Board ought to have been sought within the period of limitation prescribed under the Limitation Act.

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A suit seeking declaration of title is governed by Article 58 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which mandates that such a suit must be instituted within three years from the date when the right to sue first accrues. In the present case, the right to sue, if any, accrued on the date of alienation, i.e., 05.03.1975, or at the latest, when the plaintiffs admittedly became aware of the said alienation. Having failed to seek a declaration of title within the prescribed period, the plaintiffs cannot be permitted to resurrect a time-barred claim by introducing such relief by way of amendment in the year 2001, nearly twenty-six years after the alleged cause of action arose.

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Equally, the consequential relief of possession is also barred by limitation. Once the declaratory relief itself is barred, the ancillary relief of possession cannot survive independently. The amendment seeking declaration of title

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and possession does not relate back so as to save limitation, particularly when the nature of the suit itself stands fundamentally altered and new substantive rights are sought to be asserted long after the expiry of the statutory period.

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In view of the findings already recorded by this Court while answering Point No.(i) on the issue of maintainability and locus standi , no further indulgence is warranted on the question of limitation. Accordingly, this Point also stands answered in the Negative.

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