Peeka Veeraswamy Vs State of Karnataka

THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.8/2023 DATED 11.01.2023 REGISTERED BY VI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, MYSURU DISTRICT, RESPONDENT NO.1 FOR THE ALLEGED OFFENCES P/U/S 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) AND 3(1)(s) OF SC/ST (POA) ACT, AND SECTION 506, 504, 143, 149 OF IPC, QUA THE PETITIONER (AT ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC.,

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IN CRL.P NO. 1978/2023

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BETWEEN:

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RAJENDRA BABU B., S/O BALAKRISHNAN AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS R/O NO.2/90, ERIKKARAI STREET VALASAKKADU, KATTUMANNARKOIL CUDDALORE – 608 701

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TAMIL NADU. INCORRECTLY MENTIONED IN FIR AS RAJENDRA BABU ITC FACTORY EMPLOYEE MYSURU DISTRICT, KARNATAKA.

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...PETITIONER

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(BY SRI UDAY HOLLA, SENIOR ADVOCATE FOR SRI MANU P.KULKARNI, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA REPRESENTED BY SHO NANJANGUD POLICE STATION NANJANGUD SUB-DIVISON MYSURU DISTRICT – 571 301.

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J.SHIVAMURTHY S/O LATE JAVARAIAH AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS R/O NO.4253, 2^ND CROSS SHANKARAPURA, NANJANGUD TALUK MYSURU DISTRICT – 571 301

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KARNATAKA.

...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI VINAY MAHADEVAIAH, HCGP FOR R1; SRI ARJUN S., ADVOCATE FOR R2 (ABSENT))

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.8/2023 DATED 11.01.2023 REGISTERED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.1 ON THE FILE OF VI ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, MYSURU DISTRICT FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) AND 3(1)(s) OF SC/ST (POA) ACT, AND SECTION 506, 504, 143, 149 OF IPC, QUA THE PETITIONER (AT ANNEXURE-A); b. QUASH THE COMPLAINT DATED 11.01.2023, LODGED BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2 BEFORE THE RESPONDENT NO.1 POLICE, QUA THE PETITIONERS HEREIN (AT ANNEXUREB).

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THESE PETITIONS, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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ORAL ORDER

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Petitioners – accused Nos.1, 2, 4, 5 and 6 in Crl.P.No.1975/2023 and petitioner – accused No.3 in Crl.P.No.1978/2023 are before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.8/2023, pending before the 6^th Additional District and Sessions Court, Mysuru district, for the offences under Sections 504, 506, 143, 149 of the IPC and

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Sections 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes

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and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘the Act’ for short).

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Heard Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel for Sri Manu P. Kulkarni, learned counsel for petitioners and Sri Vinay Mahadevaiah, learned High Court Government Pleader for respondent No.1, in both the petitions. Sri Arjun S., learned counsel for respondent No.2 has remained throughout absent.

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This Court on 06.01.2026, had passed the following order:

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“ORDER ON I.A.No.1/2024 IN BOTH MATTERS

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The matter was called in the forenoon. There was no representation on behalf of the respondent-complainant who has filed an application seeking vacation of the interim order.

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The matter was passed over and again called in the afternoon session. The 2nd respondent is not present. Therefore, the application I.A.No.1/2024 seeking vacation of the interim order stands rejected.

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List this matter on 20.01.2026 for ‘admission’.

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Interim order subsisting will continue till the disposal of the petitions.”

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Learned counsel for respondent No.2 - complainant remained absent both in the forenoon and in the afternoon of 06.01.2026 and therefore, the matter was posted today, as a last chance. Even today, there is no representation on behalf of the complainant. Therefore, learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader for the State are heard.

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Facts adumbrated, are as follows:

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The petitioners are the office bearers of the ITC Limited, Agri Business Division. The petitioners had engaged the services of one Tejashwini Enterprises, which is an independent contractor, who was engaged for the purpose of deployment of its employees to one of the Units of ITC Limited, which is Green Leaf Tobacco Threshing Unit at Thandya Industrial Area, Nanjangud Taluk, Mysuru District (hereinafter referred to as ‘the company’ for short). An agreement to that effect is entered into between the Company and Tejashwini Enterprises. The agreement stood expired on 23.07.2016 and Tejashwini Enterprises withdrew its employees including the complainant from the Company’s Unit. After the closure of the agreement

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between the parties, respondent No.2 is said to have staged a Dharana in front of the Company on the score that he was removed from service. It transpires that, later a fresh agreement was then entered into for the next term between the same parties.

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After the agreement was entered into, two complaints come to be registered against respondent No.2 for assaulting one Vinoda B.G. and the employees of the Tejashwini Enterprises. The complaints then become crimes in Crime Nos.234/2016 and 241/2016 against respondent No.2, registered by the Company. Not stopping at that, the Company had to knock at the doors of the competent civil Court in O.S.No.588/2016 seeking an injunction against respondent No.2 not to enter the premises of the Company. The prayer seeking injunction was refused by the civil Court and the order of the concerned civil Court comes to be challenged before the appellate Court. In turn, the appellate Court grants injunction on 08.03.2017, in M.A.No.18/2016. Respondent No.2 then initiates proceedings before the Deputy Labour Commissioner, Mysuru, and the proceedings stood closed on an undertaking by

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respondent No.2 that he would render a good conduct bond to his employer.

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When things stood thus, after two years, respondent No.2 goes to the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement, Mysuru and registers a complaint on 29.03.2019 against the Company. Notice is then issued by the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement to the Company. There again a settlement is arrived at between the parties. It transpires that respondent No.2 was allegedly abused by accused Nos.7, 8 and 11. On this incident, respondent No.2 again files a complaint before the National Commission for Schedule Castes on 15.12.2022. National Commission for Schedule Castes issues a notice to the Company. After all these, respondent No.2 seeks to register a complaint before the jurisdictional Police for offences punishable under Sections 504, 506, 143 and 149 of the IPC and Sections 3(2)(va), 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (‘the Atrocities Act’ for short), which becomes a crime in Crime No.8/2023. The registration of the crime has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.

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Sri Udaya Holla, learned senior counsel for the petitioners would take this Court through the complaint to demonstrate that the complaint alleges an incident that has happened on 27.08.2021 and the complaint comes to be registered on 11.01.2023, 2 years after the incident. He would submit that, if factually abuses had been hurled or respondent No.2 was assaulted, it would not take 2 years for respondent No.2 to approach the jurisdictional police to register a complaint. More so, in the light of the fact that he had already agitated his rights before the Directorate of Civil Rights Enforcement and also National Commission for Scheduled Castes. Learned senior counsel submits that if this would be permitted, it would become an abuse of the process of the law.

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Learned High Court Government Pleader would submit that the matter is still at the stage of investigation. The offences alleged are the ones punishable under the Atrocities Act, which are clearly made out in the case at hand. If the offences are made out, it is for the petitioners to face trial and come out clean. He would submit that this Court should not

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interfere at this stage and permit investigation in the least to

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be continued.

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As observed herein above, there is no representation on behalf of the complainant throughout.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners and the learned High Court Government Pleader for the State and have perused the material on record.

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The afore-narrated facts and dates, linked in the chain of events are all a matter of record. It would not require reiteration, except the relation between the present petitioners and respondent No.2 - complainant. Respondent No.2 - complainant was an employee of Tejashwini Enterprises. He was also offered an employment in the Company. The contractual agreement changed and respondent No.2 was not permitted to work in the Company. Respondent No.2 was creating ruckus in the Company. Though cases filed by respondent No.2 against his employer or the Company were settled between them, on certain terms and conditions,

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respondent No.2, the complainant registers a complaint against

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the Company. The complaint reads as follows:

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“ನಂಜನಗೂಡು �ಾ��ಾಂತರ ಆರ�ಕ �ಾ�ಾ��ಾ�ಗಳ ಸ��ಾನ�ೆ�

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�ೖಸೂರು !ೆ" ನಂಜನಗೂಡು ಪಟ%ಣ ಶಂಕರಪ(ರ ಎರಡೇ �ಾ�, ಮೆ ನಂ.4253ರ3" 4ಾಸ5ರುವ !ೇ7 ಜವರಯ9ನವರ ಮಗ*ಾದ ;ೆ <ವಮೂ=> ?ಾದ ಾನು ಸ3"ಸುವ ದೂರು ಏೆಂದAೆ.

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BಾCD,

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Q*ಾಂಕ:11/01/2023 ತಮx 5™ಾCk ಸ•ಳ: ನಂಜನಗೂಡು ಸ|/98444783878.” (Emphasis added)

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As observed hereinabove, the complaint narrates the entire history of the litigations between them and an incident that happened on 27.08.2021. If the incident of hurling of abuses has happened on 27.08.2021, nothing stopped the complainant to immediately approach the jurisdictional police and register a complaint. The effect of hurling of abuses has taken 2 years to the complainant to register the crime. The complainant also does not narrate as to where and which place

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the hurling of abuses has taken. The hurling of abuses is neither in a public place nor a place of public view, it becomes very clear from the very complaint itself. Therefore, the offences under the Atrocities Act as is laid down against the petitioners is not even prima facie found in the case at hand. Permitting further investigation in the case at hand, would run foul of the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of HITESH

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VERMA v. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND¹ wherein the Apex

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Court holds as follows:

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“….

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“14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [ Swaran Singh v. State , (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] . The Court had drawn distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view ( sic ) [ Ed. : This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736 d-e , and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the

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1 (2020) 10 SCC 710

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public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”] . The Court held as under: (SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)

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“ 28 . It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaonsabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”

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(emphasis in original)

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15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the chargesheet, certain witnesses are named but it could not be

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said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [ Swaran Singh v. State , (2008) 8 SCC 435 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527] , it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.

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16. There is a dispute about the possession of the land which is the subject-matter of civil dispute between the parties as per Respondent 2 herself. Due to dispute, the appellant and others were not permitting Respondent 2 to cultivate the land for the last six months. Since the matter is regarding possession of property pending before the civil court, any dispute arising on account of possession of the said property would not disclose an offence under the Act unless the victim is abused, intimidated or harassed only for the reason that she belongs to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe.

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17. In another judgment reported as Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. [ Khuman Singh v. State of M.P. , (2020) 18 SCC 763 : 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1104], this Court held that in a case for applicability of Section 3(2)( v ) of the Act, the fact that the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste would not be enough to inflict enhanced punishment. This Court held that there was nothing to suggest that the offence was committed by the appellant only because the deceased belonged to Scheduled Caste. The Court held as under:

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“ 15 . As held by the Supreme Court, the offence must be such so as to attract the offence under Section 3(2)( v ) of the Act. The offence must have been committed against the person on the ground that such person is a member of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe. In the present case, the fact that the deceased was belonging to “Khangar” Scheduled Caste is not disputed. There is no evidence to

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show that the offence was committed only on the ground that the victim was a member of the Scheduled Caste and therefore, the conviction of the appellant-accused under Section 3(2)( v ) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act is not sustainable.”

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18. Therefore, offence under the Act is not established merely on the fact that the informant is a member of Scheduled Caste unless there is an intention to humiliate a member of Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe for the reason that the victim belongs to such caste. In the present case, the parties are litigating over possession of the land. The allegation of hurling of abuses is against a person who claims title over the property. If such person happens to be a Scheduled Caste, the offence under Section 3(1)( r ) of the Act is not made out.

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19. This Court in a judgment reported as Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra [ Subhash Kashinath Mahajan v. State of Maharashtra , (2018) 6 SCC 454: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 124] issued certain directions in respect of investigations required to be conducted under the Act. In a review filed by the Union against the said judgment, this Court in a judgment reported as Union of India v. State of Maharashtra [ Union of India v. State of Maharashtra , (2020) 4 SCC 761: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686] reviewed the directions issued by this Court and held that if there is a false and unsubstantiated FIR, the proceedings under Section 482 of the Code can be invoked. The Court held as under: ( Union of India case [ Union of India v. State of Maharashtra , (2020) 4 SCC 761: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 686], SCC p. 797, para 52)

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“ 52 . There is no presumption that the members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes may misuse the provisions of law as a class and it is not resorted to by the members of the upper castes or the members of the elite class. For lodging a false report, it cannot be said that the caste of a person is the cause. It is due to the human failing and not

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due to the caste factor. Caste is not attributable to such an act. On the other hand, members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes due to backwardness hardly muster the courage to lodge even a first information report, much less, a false one. In case it is found to be false/unsubstantiated, it may be due to the faulty investigation or for other various reasons including human failings irrespective of caste factor. There may be certain cases which may be false that can be a ground for interference by the Court, but the law cannot be changed due to such misuse. In such a situation, it can be taken care of in proceeding under Section 482 CrPC.”

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20. Later, while examining the constitutionality of the provisions of the amending Act (Central Act 27 of 2018), this Court in a judgment reported as Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India [ Prathvi Raj Chauhan v. Union of India , (2020) 4 SCC 727: (2020) 2 SCC (Cri) 657] held that proceedings can be quashed under Section 482 of the Code. It was held as under: (SCC p. 751, para 12)

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“ 12 . The Court can, in exceptional cases, exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the cases to prevent misuse of provisions on settled parameters, as already observed while deciding the review petitions. The legal position is clear, and no argument to the contrary has been raised.”

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21. In Gorige Pentaiah [ Gorige Pentaiah v. State of A.P. , (2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446] , one of the arguments raised was non-disclosure of the caste of the accused but the facts were almost similar as there was civil dispute between parties pending and the allegation was that the accused has called abuses in the name of the caste of the victim. The High Court herein has misread the judgment of this Court in Ashabai Machindra Adhagale [ Ashabai Machindra Adhagale v. State of Maharashtra , (2009) 3 SCC 789 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 20] as it was not

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a case about the caste of the victim but the fact that the accused was belonging to upper caste was not mentioned in the FIR. The High Court of Bombay had quashed the proceedings for the reason that the caste of the accused was not mentioned in the FIR, therefore, the offence under Section 3(1)( xi ) of the Act is not made out. In an appeal against the decision of the Bombay High Court, this Court held that this will be the matter of investigation as to whether the accused either belongs to or does not belong to Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe. Therefore, the High Court erred in law to dismiss the quashing petition relying upon later larger Bench judgment.

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22. The appellant had sought quashing of the charge-sheet on the ground that the allegation does not make out an offence under the Act against the appellant merely because Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste since the property dispute was not on account of the fact that Respondent 2 was a Scheduled Caste. The property disputes between a vulnerable section of the society and a person of upper caste will not disclose any offence under the Act unless, the allegations are on account of the victim being a Scheduled Caste. Still further, the finding that the appellant was aware of the caste of the informant is wholly inconsequential as the knowledge does not bar any person to protect his rights by way of a procedure established by law.

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23. This Court in a judgment reported as Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. [ Ishwar Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. , (2018) 13 SCC 612 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 818] held that there is no prohibition under the law for quashing the charge-sheet in part. In a petition filed under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court is required to examine as to whether its intervention is required for prevention of abuse of process of law or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court held as under : (SCC p. 618, para 9)

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“ 9 . Having regard to the settled legal position on external interference in investigation and the specific facts of this case, we are of the view that the High Court ought to have exercised its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC to secure the ends of justice. There is no prohibition under law for quashing a charge-sheet in part. A person may be accused of several offences under different penal statutes, as in the instant case. He could be aggrieved of prosecution only on a particular charge or charges, on any ground available to him in law. Under Section 482, all that the High Court is required to examine is whether its intervention is required for implementing orders under the Criminal Procedure Code or for prevention of abuse of process, or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. A charge-sheet filed at the dictate of somebody other than the police would amount to abuse of the process of law and hence the High Court ought to have exercised its inherent powers under Section 482 to the extent of the abuse. There is no requirement that the charge-sheet has to be quashed as a whole and not in part. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. The supplementary report filed by the police, at the direction of the Commission, is quashed.”

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24. In view of the above facts, we find that the charges against the appellant under Section 3(1)( r ) of the Act are not made out. Consequently, the chargesheet to that extent is quashed. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.””

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment observes that the provisions of the Atrocities Act is invoked only on the

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score of pending disputes between the parties only to wreak vengeance. The wreaking of vengeance is writ large in the

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case at hand, as several proceedings are taken up against the complainant by the Company and therefore, it is not improbable that wreaking of vengeance has led the complainant to register the said crime.

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Above all, the complaint is hit by gross delay. The Apex Court has time and again cautioned about the complaints entertained by the police and the petitions to be entertained by the Courts while answering it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., if the complaints are hit by delay. As the Apex Court holds, delay would cause embellishment to become a complaint, which in fact in the case at hand has become the complaint. The Apex Court in the case of CHANCHALPATI DAS v. STATE OF

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WEST BENGAL² has held as follows:

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“13. It cannot be gainsaid that the High Courts have power to quash the proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to prevent the abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Though the powers under Section 482 should be sparingly exercised and with great caution, the said powers ought to be exercised if a clear case of abuse of process of law is made out by the accused. In the State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy had held that the criminal proceedings could be quashed by the High Court under Section 482

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2 2023 SCC OnLine SC 650

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if the court is of the opinion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings are to be quashed.

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14. This Court, way back in 1992 in the landmark decision in case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (Supra), after considering relevant provisions more particularly Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. and the principles of law enunciated by this Court relating to the exercise of extra-ordinary powers under Article 226, had laid down certain guidelines for the exercise of powers of quashing, which have been followed in umpteen number of cases. The relevant part thereof reads as under:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

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15. In State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy this Court had observed that the Court would be justified to quash the proceedings if it finds that initiation or continuance of such proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of Court.

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16. As regards inordinate delay in filing the complaint it has been recently observed by this Court in Hasmukhlal D. Vora v. State of Tamil Nadu that though inordinate delay in itself may not be a ground for quashing of a criminal complaint, however unexplained inordinate delay must be taken into consideration as a very crucial factor and ground for quashing a criminal complaint.

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17. In the light of afore-stated legal position, if the facts of the case are appreciated, there remains no shadow of doubt that the complaint filed by the respondent-complainant after an inordinate unexplained delay of eight years was nothing but sheer misuse and abuse of the process of law to settle the personal scores with the appellants, and that continuation of such malicious prosecution would also be further abuse and misuse of process of law, more particularly when neither the allegations made in the complaint nor in the chargesheet, disclose any prima facie case against the appellants. The allegations made against the appellants are so absurd and improbable that no prudent person can ever reach to a conclusion that there is a sufficient ground for proceeding against the appellants-accused.

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18. Before parting, a few observations made by this Court with regard to the misuse and abuse of the process of law by filing false and frivolous proceedings in the Courts need to be reproduced. In the Court. In Dalip Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh it was observed that:

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“1. For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values of life i.e. “satya” (truth) and “ahimsa” (non-violence). Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth constituted an integral part of the justicedelivery system which was in vogue in the preIndependence era and the people used to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has become so intense that those involved in litigation do not hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the court proceedings.”

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19. In Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India it was observed as under:

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“191. The Indian judicial system is grossly afflicted with frivolous litigation. Ways and means need to be evolved to deter litigants from their compulsive obsession towards senseless and ill-considered claims.”

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20. We would like to add that just as bad coins drive out good coins from circulation, bad cases drive out good cases from being heard on time. Because of the proliferation of frivolous cases in the courts, the real and genuine cases have to take a backseat and are not being heard for years together. The party who initiates and continues a frivolous, irresponsible and senseless litigation or who abuses the process of the court must be saddled with exemplary cost, so that others may deter to follow such course. The matter should be viewed more seriously when people who claim themselves and project themselves to be the global spiritual leaders, engage themselves into such kind of frivolous litigations and use the court proceedings as a platform to settle their personal scores or to nurture their personal ego.

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21. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case and for the reasons stated hereinabove, we deem it appropriate to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants in the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, arising out of the FIR No. 33 of 2009 registered at Ballygunge Police Station, and quash the same.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In the light of the judgment in case of HITESH VERMA

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supra, I do not find any warrant to permit investigation into the offences under the IPC or under the provisions of the Atrocities Act, as also the judgment in the case of CHANCHALPATI DAS

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supra, I do not find any warrant to permit the investigation of

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any offence, as it is hit by inordinate unexplained delay. In that light, the petitions deserve to succeed and the impugned crime to be obliterated, for it to stop from becoming an abuse of the process of the law, and resulting in miscarriage of justice.

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