Smt. Dhanalakshmamma Vs State of Karnataka

SRI. KUMAR A.G. S/O GANGADHAR GOWDA, AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS, WORKING AT MACTO PRECISION COMPONENTS, BENGALURU. RESIDING AT NO.131, 8TH MAIN, 3RD PHASE, PEENYA INDUSTRIAL AREA, BENGALURU - 560 058.

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SRI.M.D. NATARAJA AGED ABOUT 46 YEARS, NO.144, GROUND FLOOR, IST CROSS, IST MAIN, BALAJI GARDEN LAYOUT, HURALI CHIKKANAHALLI, CHIKKABANAVARA, BENGALURU - 560 090.

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SMT. RAMYA A.G. W/O M.D. NATARAJA, AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS, NO.144, GROUND FLOOR, 1ST CROSS, 1ST MAIN, BALAJI GARDEN LAYOUT, HURALI CHIKKANAHALLI, CHIKKABANAVARA, BENGALURU - 560 090.

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…PETITIONERS

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(BY SMT. KEERTHI REDDY, ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY TURUVEKERE POLICE STATION, REPRESENTED BY STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT, BENGALURU - 560 001.

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POOJA M.M W/O.PRASANNA A.G., AGED ABOUT 31 YEARS, ANADAGU VILLAGE, MAYASANDRA HOBLI,

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TURUVEKERE, TUMUKURU - 572 221.

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…RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1; SRI. ANTONY IGNATIUS M.J. ADVOCATE FOR R2)

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR AND COMPLIANT IN CR.NO.36/2024 REGISTERED BY TURUVEKERE POLICE STATION PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE HONBLE SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND JMFC COURT, TURUVEKERE TUMAKURU DISTRICT FOR THE OFFENCE P/US/498-A, 504, 506, 149 OF IPC 1860.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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ORAL ORDER

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The petitioners - mother-in-law, father-in-law, brothers-

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in-law and sister-in-law stand before this Court calling in question registration of a crime in Crime No.36/2024 registered for offences punishable under Sections 498A, 504, 506 and 149 of the IPC.

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Heard Smt. Keerthi Reddy, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri. B.N. Jagadeesha, learned

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counsel appearing for respondent No.1, Sri. Antony Ignatius M.J., learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 and have perused the material on record.

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Facts adumbrated are as follows:

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Respondent No.2-complainant gets married to the son of the first petitioner - accused No.1 on 02.03.2015. Accused No.1 is not before the Court. It transpires that after about 8 years of matrimonial life, the relationship flounders. On floundering of the relationship, there are several proceedings instituted by the wife against the husband and family members, or the husband against the wife, the complainant herein. The issue relates to a complaint being registered on 07.02.2024 by the wife for the aforesaid offences, which becomes a crime in Crime No.36/2024. After the registration of the crime, it transpires that several other proceedings are instituted, which are not relevant for consideration of the issue, in the subject lis . The registration of the crime, has driven these petitioners to the Court in the subject petition, on a contention that there are no allegations that would touch upon the ingredients of the aforequoted offences.

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Learned counsel, Smt. Keerthi Reddy, appearing for the petitioners, would vehemently contend that a perusal at the complaint even would not indicate any offence that can become the ingredients of Section 498A of the IPC or any other offence that is alleged in the crime so registered. She would take this Court through the documents appended to the petition prima facie to demonstrate that the parents are not residing with the couple and therefore, did not interfere in the affairs of the marriage between the complainant and accused No.1. She would seek to place reliance upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case o f RAJESH CHADDHA V. STATE OF UTTAR

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PRADESH¹ to buttress her submission that dragging of the members of the family in a case under Section 498A of the IPC should not be entertained as the Apex Court has held so. She would seek quashment of the proceedings.

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Learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2complainant would however dispute the fact that the parents were not involved in the demand of dowry on the complainant and for the reason of such demand not being met, have meted

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1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1094

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out cruelty against the wife. He would also rely on the very complaint to contend that it is a matter of investigation in the least or a trial to be faced by these petitioners to come out clean and therefore, seeks dismissal of the petition.

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Learned Addl.SPP, apart from toeing the lines of the learned counsel appearing for the second respondent, would submit that against the husband, charges have been framed and the evidence is on and the charge sheet is not filed against these petitioners, as there was an interim order operating in the case at hand and therefore, investigation should be permitted to be continued against these petitioners and the petitioners also should come out clean in a full blown trial, as the trial is on against the husband. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the respective submissions made by the learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

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The facts noticed in its broad outline is not in dispute. The marriage between the two i.e., accused No.1 and

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the complainant happens on 02.03.2015, 8 years passed by and the relationship flounders. Floundering of the relationship leads the complainant to the jurisdictional police to register a complaint, which becomes a crime in Crime No.36/2024 for the afore-quoted offences. The moment the crime is registered, the petitioners are before this Court. This Court owing to the fact of no allegations found prima facie against the mother-in-law, father-in-law, brothers-in-law and sister-in-law of respondent No.2, granted an interim order of stay. This interim order is in operation even as on date. The issue now is whether the investigation should be permitted against these petitioners. Since the entire issue gets triggered from registration of the complaint, I deem it appropriate to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows:

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The complaint narrates the instances that have

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happened from 2015 till the date of registration of the crime. Insofar as the present petitioners are concerned, the allegation is the demand of dowry of 30 grams of gold and that not being met with, when was the demand, why was the demand and out of the demand not being met, what has happened as overt acts by these petitioners is nowhere indicated in the complaint or the entire complaint traverses the harassment meted out to the wife by the husband. The complaint undoubtedly notices the

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grave torture by the husband, but none against these

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petitioners. The petitioners are mother-in-law, father-in-law, brothers-in-law and sister-in-law of the complainant.

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Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that accused Nos.5 and 6 do not reside in the place of residence of the couple at all and they are also dragged into the web of proceedings without any rhyme or reason. In these circumstances, whether further investigation should be permitted to be continued against the members of the family i.e., mother-in-law, father-in-law, brothers-in-law and sister-inlaw is considered by the Apex Court in the case of MARAM NIRMALA v. STATE OF TELANGANA² , wherein the Apex Court has held as follows:

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“….. …..

¶86

12. The appellant(s) herein are the mother-in-law and father- in-law of respondent No. 2. They had filed a petition under Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the proceedings instituted against them in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda alleging offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 504 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.

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13. By the impugned order, the said criminal petition has been disposed of reserving liberty to the appellant(s)

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2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2913

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herein to seek discharge in accordance with law. Hence, this appeal.

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14. The case at hand pertains to allegations of cruelty and dowry demand made by the respondent No. 2 against the appellant(s) herein. A bare perusal of the FIR however, shows that the allegations made by respondent No. 2 are vague and omnibus inasmuch as there is an absence of any specific instance or occasion detailed with particulars wherein the appellant(s) demanded dowry from respondent No. 2 and on refusal of the same, subjected her to mental and physical cruelty. The only allegations levelled by respondent No. 2 against the appellants herein are that subsequent to the birth of her daughter, the conduct of her husband underwent a change, which is stated to have been on account of the alleged inducement exercised by the in-laws including the appellant(s) herein for the purpose of demanding additional dowry and that pursuant to the counselling conducted at the Women Police Station, Nalgonda, although the husband of respondent No. 2 and his family assured that she would be treated properly, they nevertheless continued to subject respondent No. 2 to mental and physical cruelty.

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15. We therefore find that the aforesaid allegations levelled against the appellant(s), even if taken at their face value, do not prima facie disclose the commission of the alleged offences so as to warrant the initiation of criminal proceedings.

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16. During the course of submissions, learned counsel for the appellant(s) brought to our notice the judgment of this Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana , (2025) 3 SCC 735 (“ Dara Lakshmi Narayana ”) as well as other judgments which squarely apply to this case. We have perused the same.

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17. This Court speaking through one of us (B.V. Nagarathna, J.) in Dara Lakshmi Narayana , while dealing with the issue of quashing of criminal proceedings instituted by the respondent wife therein against her husband and inlaws who were charged with offences punishable under

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Sections 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act, 1961, held as follows:

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“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a wellrecognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, Appellants 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of Appellant 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of Appellant 1 and Respondent 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

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xxx

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30. The inclusion of Section 498-A IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498-AIPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinised, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498-A IPC against the husband and his

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family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

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xxx

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31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498-A IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant, husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498-A IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

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xxx

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34. We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No. 82 of 2022 filed by Respondent 2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against Appellant 1 and his family members i.e. Appellants 2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within Category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal [ State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426]. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court's process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.”

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(underlining by us)

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18. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that the judgment of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana would apply. Hence, the impugned order of the High Court is set aside. The proceedings instituted

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against the appellant(s) in C.C. No. 338/2023 pending on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate (Prohibition and Excise offence) at Nalgonda stand quashed in relation to the appellants herein.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court, earlier to the afore-quoted

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judgment, in the case of RAJESH CHADDHA supra has held as

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follows:

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“…..

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7. Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the record, the question remains whether the High Court vide Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 whilst exercising its revisionary jurisdiction, was correct in upholding the conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 D.P. Act, 1961. In that respect, it is prudent to examine the statutory provisions, which are as under:

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“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

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3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— (1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act,

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gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more. Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in subsection (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,— (a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf : Page 12 of 26 Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act; (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf : Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act : Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.

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4. Penalty for demanding dowry.— If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees : Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”

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8. At the outset, an act of ‘cruelty’ for the purpose of Section 498A, corresponds to a willful conduct of such nature, that may cause danger to the life, limb and health of the woman, which is inclusive of the mental and physical health and the harassment caused to her, by coercing her to meet unlawful demands or impossible standards. Further, the demand for dowry in terms of Section 3 and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961 refers to both a direct or indirect manner of demand for dowry made by the

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husband or his family members. In order to meet the threshold of the offences under Section 498A IPC & Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, the allegations cannot be ambiguous or made in thin air.

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9. In the present case, the allegations made by the Complainant are vague, omnibus and bereft of any material particulars to substantiate this threshold. Apart from claiming that Appellant husband harassed her for want of dowry, the Complainant has not given any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. The allegations in the FIR, and the depositions of the prosecution witnesses suggest that on multiple occasions, the Complainant wife was ousted from the matrimonial house, and kicked and punched in the presence of her father, PW-2 herein and she was repeatedly tormented with dowry demands, and when she was unable to honor them, the Appellant and her family physically beat her up; whereas she has not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. It is alleged that the Complainant suffered a miscarriage, as she fell down, when the Appellant and her family who pushed her out of the house; however, no medical document from any medical institution or hospital or nursery was produced to substantiate the allegations.

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10. Upon carefully considering the record, we find that apart from the statements of PW-1 and PW-2, there is no evidence to substantiate the allegations of harassment and acts of cruelty within the scope of Section 498A of IPC, and Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. For this reason, we find merit in the submission of the learned Counsel for the Appellant, and are of the considered view that there is no material on record to establish the allegations of hurt or miscarriage, and of hurt and criminal intimidation in terms of Section 323 r/w 34 and Section 506 IPC respectively. The Trial Court has rightly held that evidence of the Complainant is the only strong evidence that she sustained injuries on various parts of her body due to the physical assault by the accused persons, and that there was no medical examination conducted by the Complainant, so as

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to prove that the miscarriage was a consequence of the physical assault.

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11. The Trial Court has indeed applied its judicial mind to the material on record whilst acquitting the Appellant and the co-accused parents-in-law for offences under Section 323 r/w 34 & Section 506 IPC. However, it appears that the Trial Court had passed the order of conviction of the Appellant under Section 498A IPC & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, merely on the possibility that the allegations and the depositions of the PW-1 corroborated by PW2, are true and correct. Although one cannot deny the emotional or mental torture that the Complainant may have undergone in the marriage, however a cursory or plausible view cannot be conclusive proof to determine the guilt of an individual under Section 498A & Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961, especially to obviate malicious criminal prosecution of family members in matrimonial disputes. In this respect, we also cannot ignore that the FIR dt. 20.12.1999 was registered after the Appellant had filed the Divorce Petition under Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 on 06.02.1999. In consideration thereof and that the Complainant had cohabited with the Appellant only for a period of about a year, it appears that the FIR registered by the Complainant was not genuine.

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12. In respect thereof, the High Court while exercising its revisionary jurisdiction ought to have examined the correctness of decision of the Trial Court in light of the material on record, which reveals nothing incriminatory against the Appellant to sustain a conviction under Section 498A IPC or Section 4 of the D.P. Act, 1961. Although we do not agree with the submission on behalf of the Appellant that the Impugned Order dt. 14.11.2018 was passed in absentia , however the High Court was well within its revisionary powers to discern whether an FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom were sustainable. In all certainty, it could have saved 6 years' worth of time for the Appellant, who has endured litigation for over 20 years as of today.

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13. Notwithstanding the merits of the case, we are distressed with the manner, the offences under Section 498A IPC, and Sections 3 & 4 of the D.P. Act,

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1961 are being maliciously roped in by Complainant wives, insofar as aged parents, distant relatives, married sisters living separately, are arrayed as accused, in matrimonial matters. This growing tendency to append every relative of the husband, casts serious doubt on the veracity of the allegations made by the Complainant wife or her family members, and vitiates the very objective of a protective legislation. The observations made by this Hon'ble Court in the case of Dara Lakshmi Narayana v. State of Telangana appropriately encapsulates this essence as under:

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“25. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a wellrecognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband's family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos. 2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No. 1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No. 1 and respondent No. 2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.”

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14. The term “cruelty” is subject to rather cruel misuse by the parties, and cannot be established simpliciter without specific instances, to say the least. The tendency of roping these sections, without mentioning any specific dates, time or incident, weakens the case of the prosecutions, and casts serious suspicion on the viability of the version of a Complainant. We cannot ignore the missing specifics

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in a criminal complaint, which is the premise of invoking criminal machinery of the State . Be that as it may, we are informed that the marriage of the Appellant has already been dissolved and the divorce decree has attained finality, hence any further prosecution of the Appellant will only tantamount to an abuse of process of law.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In the light of the law declared by the Apex Court, which is in reiteration or approval of the earlier judgments of the Apex Court, clearly observes that abuse of the process of law by dragging the parents of the husband or other family members without rhyme or reason must be nipped in the bud. Nipped in the bud would mean that investigation also should not be permitted to be continued against the family members unless there is a clear indication of any overt act in the complaint itself. The complaint is noted hereinabove. The complaint does not in any manner specify specific overt act by the parents i.e., the mother-in-law and father in law or other family members i.e., brothers-in-law and sister-in-law. In these circumstances, permitting further proceedings would run foul of

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the judgments rendered by the Apex Court as quoted hereinabove. In that light, the petition deserves to succeed.

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For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

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ORDER

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(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

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(ii) Proceedings in Crime No.36/2024 stand quashed qua the petitioners.

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(iii) The observations made in the course of this order is only for the purpose of consideration of the case of the petitioners under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and the same shall not bind or influence conduct of investigation against any other accused.

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Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

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JUDGE

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SJK List No.: 1 Sl No.: 5 CT:BHK

Smt. Dhanalakshmamma v. State of Karnataka

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Smt. Dhanalakshmamma v. State of Karnataka

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