Mr a Shafiulla Vs Directorate of Enforcement

¶1

1 -

¶2

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶3

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 19^TH DAY OF MARCH, 2025

¶4

BEFORE

¶5

THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA WRIT PETITION NO. 6783 OF 2025 (GM-RES)

¶6

BETWEEN:

¶7

MR. A. SHAFIULLA, S/O LATE. H.V. ABDUL WAHAB, AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS, EX-BRANCH MANAGER, AMANATH COOPERATIVE BANK, R/A NO. 53/1, MUNNISWAMAPPA ROAD, JC NAGAR, BENGALURU - 560 006, AADHAAR NO. 672111786801

¶8

Digitally signed by NAGAVENI Location: High Court of Karnataka

¶9

MR. K. HIDAYATHULLAH, S/O LATE AHMED HUSSAIN, AGED ABOUT 57 YEARS, EX-ASSISTANT ACCOUNTANT AMANATH COOPERATIVE BANK, R/A NO. 346, KHATIB STREET, PERIAPET, VANIYAMBADI, TAMIL NADU - 635 751.

¶10

…PETITIONERS

¶11

(BY SRI. ANOOP HARANAHALLI, ADVOCATE FOR SRI. SRINIVAS RAO S.S., ADVOCATE)

¶12

AND:

¶13

DIRECTORATE OF ENFORCEMENT, MINISTRY OF FINANCE, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, BANGALORE ZONAL OFFICE,

¶14

2 -

¶15

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶16

3RD FLOOR, "B" BLOCK, BMTC, SHANTHINAGAR, TTMC, KH ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 027, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPECIAL PROSECUTOR.

¶17

…RESPONDENT

¶18

(BY SRI. UNNIKRISHNAN M., ADVOCATE)

¶19

THIS WP IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA R/W SEC. 482 OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPECIAL C.C NO. 711/2023 ON THE FILE OF THE PRL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, BENGALURU FOR THE OFFENCES PUNISHABLE UNDER SEC 3 R.W.S 70 PUNISHABLE UNDER SEC 4 OF PMLA ACT, 2002 VIDE ANNX-A.

¶20

THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY HEARING, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

¶21

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

¶22

ORAL ORDER

¶23

The petitioners are before this Court, seeking the

¶24

following prayers:

¶25

"a. Issue a writ of certiorari and quash the entire proceedings in Special C.C No.711/2023, on the file of the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru for the offences punishable under section 3 read with section 70 punishable under section 4 of PMLA Act, 2002;- vide Annexure-A.

¶26

3 - NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶27

b. Grant such other relief/s that this Hon'ble Court deems fit in the facts and circumstances of the above case."

¶28

Heard Sri. Anoop Haranahalli, learned counsel

¶29

appearing for the petitioners, Sri. Unnikrishnan M., learned counsel appearing for the respondent and have perused the material on record.

¶30

This Court, on 10.03.2025, had observed as

¶31

follows:

¶32

"Heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners.

¶33

Learned counsel for the petitioners taking this Court through the order dated 13^th December 2024 seeks to demonstrate that the predicate offence against these petitioners is stand quashed.

¶34

In the light of the predicate offence being quashed against the petitioners, the offences under PMLA is naturally be tumbled down.

¶35

Learned counsel Sri P.Prasanna Kumar is directed to accept notice for the respondent.

¶36

Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners is directed to serve a copy of the petition papers upon the aforesaid learned counsel.

¶37

List the matter on 19.03.2025, in the `fresh matters list'."

¶38

4 -

¶39

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶40

It is clarified that the predicate offence was not

¶41

quashed, but the offences qua co-accused was quashed in W.P.No.18217/2024 and connected cases dated 13.12.2024.

¶42

This Court in the aforesaid writ petitions has held as follows:

¶43

"10. The afore-narrated facts are a matter of record. The only issue that falls for my consideration is: “Whether the proceedings in Special C.C.No.711 of 2023 as against the petitioners should be permitted to be continued?”

¶44

It is not in dispute that predicate offence relates to the period between 1985 and 12-12-2002. The Act comes into force on 17.01.2003. But, the acts of the petitioners are projected to be between the dates on which the Act was not in force. Therefore, as on the date of commission of offence, it was not an offence under the Act, as it was not in force. Later on, when the Act comes into force, the Directorate of Enforcement cannot exhume and make all predicate offences which have taken place prior to the Act coming into force to become an offence under the Act. The issue need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter.

¶45

This Court while answering an identical circumstance under the Black Money (Undisclosed Foreign Income and Assets) Imposition of Tax Act, 2015 has in the case of DHANASHREE RAVINDRA PANDIT v. INCOME TAX DEPARTMENT¹ , held as follows:

¶46

“….

¶47

12. It becomes germane, at this juncture, to consider where a legal fiction or a deeming fiction is created under section 72(c) of the Act or criminal liability under sections 50 and 52 could be imposed. The apex court in the case of Kumaran v. State of Kerala [(2017) 7 SCC 471; (2017) 3 SCC (Cri) 431; 2017 SCC OnLine SC 545.] considers what is deeming section or a legal fiction that is created and holds as follows:

¶48

“27. These two judgments make it clear that the deeming fiction of section 431 of the Criminal

¶49

1 2024 SCC OnLine Kar 58

¶50

5 -

¶51

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶52

Procedure Code extends not only to section 421, but also to section 64 of the Penal Code, 1860. This being the case, section 70 of the Penal Code, 1860, which is the last in the group of sections dealing with sentence of imprisonment for nonpayment of fine must also be included as applying directly to compensation under section 357(3) as well. The position in law now becomes clear. The deeming provision in section 431 will apply to section 421(1) as well, despite the fact that the last part of the proviso to section 421(1) makes a reference only to an order for payment of expenses or compensation out of a fine, which would necessarily refer only to section 357(1) and not section 357(3). Despite this being so, so long as compensation has been directed to be paid, albeit under section 357(3), section 431, section 70 of the Penal Code, 1860 and section 421(1) proviso would make it clear that by a legal fiction, even though a default sentence has been suffered, yet, compensation would be recoverable in the manner provided under section 421(1). This would, however, be without the necessity for recording any special reasons. This is because section 421(1) proviso contains the disjunctive ‘or’ following the recommendation of the Law Commission, that the proviso to old section 386(1) should not be a bar to the issue of a warrant for levy of fine, even when a sentence of imprisonment for default has been fully undergone. The last part inserted into the proviso to section 421(1) as a result of this recommendation of the Law Commission is a category by itself which applies to compensation payable out of a fine under section 357(1) and, by applying the fiction contained in section 431, to compensation payable under section 357(3).

¶53

28. As is well known, a legal fiction is not to be extended beyond the purpose for which it is created or beyond the language of the section by which it is created. For example, see Prakash H. Jain v. Ms. Marie Fernandes [(2003) 8 SCC 431.] at p. 438. However, once the purpose of the legal fiction is ascertained, full effect must be given, and it should be carried to its logical conclusion. This is clear from the celebrated passage in East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council [[1952] A.C. 109; [1951] 2 All ER 587.] : (AC pp. 132-33)

¶54

‘If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it. One of those in this case is emancipation from the 1939 level of rents. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs; it does not say that having done so, you must cause or

¶55

6 -

¶56

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶57

permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.’

¶58

29. The legal fiction enacted under section 431 is not limited to ‘the purpose of this Act’ unlike section 6A of the Central Sales tax Act, as was the case in Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(2004) 134 STC 473 (SC); (2004) 3 SCC 1.] , paras 32 and 76. Thus it is clear that the object of the legal fiction created by section 431 is to extend for the purpose of recovery of compensation until such recovery is completed — and this would necessarily take us not only to section 421 of the Criminal Procedure Code but also to section 70 of the Penal Code, 1860, a companion criminal statute, as has been held above.”

¶59

(emphasis supplied)

¶60

12.1. The apex court holds that a legal fiction or a deeming fiction should not be extended beyond the purpose of the Act for which it is created or beyond the language deployed in the enactment. In the case at hand what is given effect to under section 72(c) is a deeming section which creates criminal liability. It is a matter of record that all the facts that become the offences are alleged to have happened five years prior to the Act coming into force. It now becomes germane to notice article 20 of the Constitution of India which makes it a fundamental right to a person who would be convicted for an offence except for violation of law in force at the time of commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force. The first part of it is what becomes necessary to be noticed to the facts obtaining in the case at hand.

¶61

13. It is apposite to refer to the Constitution Bench judgment of the apex court in the case of Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh [(1953) 2 SCC 111.] . In the said judgment the apex court interprets article 20 of the Constitution of India. The facts obtaining before the Supreme Court are noticed at paragraphs 1 to 5. Based upon the said facts, the apex court holds as follows:

¶62

“17. This article in its broad import has been enacted to prohibit convictions and sentences under ex post facto laws. The principle underlying such prohibition has been very elaborately discussed and pointed out in the very learned judgment of Willes, J. in the well-known case of Phillips v. Eyre [[L.R.] 6 Q.B. 1.] at pp. 23 and 25 and also by the Supreme Court of USA in Calder v. Bull [1 L.Ed. 648 at p. 649; 3 US 386 (1798); 3 Dall. 386.] . In the English case it is

¶63

7 -

¶64

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶65

explained that ex post facto laws are laws which voided and punished what had been lawful when done. There can be no doubt as to the paramount importance of the principle that such ex post facto laws, which retrospectively create offences and punish them are bad as being highly inequitable and unjust. In the English system of jurisprudence repugnance of such laws to universal notions of fairness and justice is treated as a ground not for invalidating the law itself but as compelling a beneficent construction thereof where the language of the statute by any means permits it. In the American system, however, such ex post facto laws are themselves rendered invalid by virtue of article 1, sections 9 and 10 of its Constitution.

¶66

18. It is contended by the learned Attorney General that article 20 of the Constitution was meant to bring about nothing more than the invalidity of such ex post facto laws in the post-Constitution period but that the validity of the pre-Constitution laws in this behalf was not intended to be affected in any way. The case in Keshavan Madhava Menon v. State of Bombay [1951 SCC 16; 1951 SCR 228] has been relied on to show that the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Constitution have no retrospective operation, and that the invalidity of laws brought about by article 13(1) of the Constitution relates only to the future operation of the pre-Constitution laws which are in violation of the fundamental rights. On this footing it was argued that even on the assumption of the convictions in this case being in respect of new offences created by Ordinance 48 of 1949 after the commission of the offences charged, the fundamental right guaranteed under article 20 is not attracted thereto so as to invalidate such convictions. This contention, however, cannot be upheld.

¶67

19. On a careful consideration of the respective articles, one is struck by the marked difference in language used in the Indian and American Constitutions. Sections 9(3) and 10 of article 1 of the American Constitution merely say that ‘No ex post facto law shall be passed…’ and ‘No State shall pass ex post facto law.’. But in article 20 of the Constitution the language used is in much wider terms, and what is prohibited is the conviction of a person or his subjection to a penalty under ex post facto laws. The prohibition under the article is not confined to the passing or the validity of the law, but extends to the conviction or the sentence and is based on its character as an ex post facto law. The fullest effect must therefore be given to the act" actblocktype="" sectionno="" doi="" match="no">Indian Constitution the language used is in much wider terms, and what is prohibited is the conviction of a person or his subjection to a penalty under ex post facto laws. The

¶68

8 -

¶69

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶70

prohibition under the article is not confined to the passing or the validity of the law, but extends to the conviction or the sentence and is based on its character as an ex post facto law. The fullest effect must therefore be given to the act actual words used in the article. Nor does such a construction of article 20 result in giving retrospective operation to the fundamental right thereby recognised. All that it amounts to is that the future operation of the fundamental right declared in article 20 may also in certain cases result from acts and situations which had their commencement in the pre-Constitution period.

¶71

20. In R. v. St. Mary's, Whitechapel Inhabitants [[1848] 12 Q.B. 120; 116 ER 811.] at p. 814 Lord Denman, C.J. pointed out that a statute which in its direct operation is prospective cannot properly be called a retrospective statute because a part of the requisites for its action is drawn from a time antecedent to its passing. The general principle therefore that the fundamental rights have no retrospective operation is not in any way affected by giving the fullest effect to the wording of article 20. This article must accordingly be taken to prohibit all convictions or subjections to penalty after the Constitution in respect of ex post facto laws whether the same was a post-Constitution law or a preConstitution law. That such is the intendment of the wording used in article 20(1) is confirmed by the similar wording used in articles 20(2) and 20(3). Under article 20(2), for instance, it cannot be reasonably urged that the prohibition of double jeopardy applies only when both the occasions therefor arise after the Constitution. Similarly, under article 20(3) it cannot be suggested that a person accused before the Constitution can be compelled to be a witness against himself, if after the Constitution the case is pending.”

¶72

(emphasis supplied)

¶73

13.1. The facts before the apex court were that accused Nos. 1 and 2 were Minister for Industries and Secretary of Commerce and Industries in the Government of Vindhya Pradesh. An agreement had been entered into on August 1, 1936 for carrying on diamond mining operation for 15 years. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 therein are alleged to have obtained illegal gratification in a sum of Rs. 25,000 on April 11, 1949 and had also indulged in certain forgery of documents to favour the Syndicate. The allegations were the offences punishable under sections 120B, 161, 465 and 466 of the Penal Code, 1860. The trial court acquitted the accused. The appellate court convicted accused Nos. 1 and 2 for offences punishable under sections 120B and 161 of the Penal Code, 1860 and in addition accused No.

¶74

9 -

¶75

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶76

1 was convicted for the offences punishable under sections 465 and 466 of the Penal Code, 1860. The foundation for the said charge was an Ordinance that was brought into effect on September 11, 1949. The contention before the apex court was that it violated articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India as by the time the matter was before the apex court, the Constitution had come into force. The apex court holds that the alleged date of illegal gratification was April 11, 1949 and the Ordinance based upon which the accused were charged comes into effect as on September 11, 1949, five months after the alleged act. Therefore, the apex court declined to accept the contention that the Ordinance would be deemed to have come into effect from August 9, 1948 as depicted therein and the conviction must be sustained. The apex court holds that law must actually be in force on the date of commission of the offence and not deemed to be in force. It further holds that the object of article 20 of the Constitution is law in force, actually in force and not a law deemed to be in force. The apex court further holds that, if the deeming section is given credence and criminal law is affirmed, it would defeat the tenor of article 20 of the Constitution, as every post-facto law could be made retrospective. Therefore, the Constitution Bench upturns the conviction and acquits accused Nos. 1 and 2 on the ground that the provision would not pass muster of article 20 of the Constitution of India. The said judgment has stood the test of time.

¶77

14. The apex court, after the Act coming into force, in the case of Union of India v. Gautam Khaitan [(2020) 420 ITR 140 (SC); (2019) 10 SCC 108; (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 26; 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1342.] considering the tenor of the Act has held as follows (page 146 of 420 ITR):

¶78

“It could therefore be seen, that where no declaration in respect of the asset covered under the Black Money Act is made, such asset would be deemed to have been acquired or made in the year in which a notice under section 10 is issued by the Assessing Officer and the provisions of the Act shall apply accordingly.

¶79

The offences in respect of which sanction has been granted are under sections 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act, which read thus:

¶80

‘50. Punishment for failure to furnish in return of income, any information about an asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India.—

¶81

10 -

¶82

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶83

If any person, being a resident other than not ordinarily resident in India within the meaning of clause (6) of section 6 of the Income-tax Act, who has furnished the return of income for any previous year under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139 of that Act, wilfully fails to furnish in such return any information relating to an asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, held by him, as a beneficial owner or otherwise or in which he was a beneficiary, at any time during such previous year, or disclose any income from a source outside India, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine.

¶84

51. Punishment for wilful attempt to evade tax.—(1) If a person, being a resident other than not ordinarily resident in India within the meaning of clause (6) of section 6 of the Income-tax Act, wilfully attempts in any manner whatsoever to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to ten years and with fine.

¶85

(2) If a person wilfully attempts in any manner whatsoever to evade the payment of any tax, penalty or interest under this Act, he shall, without prejudice to any penalty that may be imposable on him under any other provision of this Act, be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and shall, in the discretion of the court, also be liable to fine.

¶86

(3) For the purposes of this section, a wilful attempt to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act or the payment thereof shall include a case where any person—

¶87

(i) has in his possession or control any books of account or other documents (being books of account or other documents relevant to any proceeding under this Act) containing a false entry or statement; or

¶88

(ii) makes or causes to be made any false entry or statement in such books of account or other documents; or

¶89

(iii) wilfully omits or causes to be omitted any relevant entry or statement in such books of account or other documents; or

¶90

11 -

¶91

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶92

(iv) causes any other circumstance to exist which will have the effect of enabling such person to evade any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under this Act or the payment thereof.’

¶93

Section 50 provides that if any person, being a resident other than not ordinarily resident in India, who has furnished the return of income for any previous year under sub-section (1) or sub-section (4) or sub-section (5) of section 139 of the Income-tax Act, wilfully fails to furnish in such return any information relating to an asset (including financial interest in any entity) located outside India, held by a beneficial owner or otherwise or in which he was a beneficiary, at any time during such previous year, or disclose any income from a source outside India, he shall be punishable with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months but which may extend to seven years and with fine.

¶94

The penalty of the offences under section 51 is for wilful attempt in any manner whatsoever to evade the payment of any tax, penalty or interest chargeable or imposable under the Income-tax Act. The punishment provided under sub-section (1) is for rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to ten years and with fine. In respect to any other person not covered by subsection (1) of section 51, the punishment provided is rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three months but which may extend to three years and shall, in the discretion of the court, also be liable to fine.

¶95

It could therefore be seen, that the scheme of the Black Money Act is to provide stringent measures for curbing the menace of black money. Various offences have been defined and stringent punishments have also been provided. However, the scheme of the Black Money Act also provided one-time opportunity to make a declaration in respect of any undisclosed asset located outside India and acquired from income chargeable to tax under the Income-tax Act. Section 59 of the Black Money Act provided that such a declaration was to be made on or after the date of commencement of the Black Money Act, but on or before a date notified by the Central Government in the Official Gazette. The date so notified for making a declaration is September 30, 2015 whereas, the date for payment of tax and penalty was notified to be December 31, 2015. As such, an anomalous situation was arising if the date under sub-

¶96

12 -

¶97

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶98

section (3) of section 1 of the Black Money Act was to be retained as April 1, 2016, then the period for making a declaration would have been lapsed by September 30, 2015 and the date for payment of tax and penalty would have also been lapsed by December 31, 2015. However, in view of the date originally prescribed by sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Black Money Act, such a declaration could have been made only after April 1, 2016. Therefore, in order to give the benefit to the assessee(s) and to remove the anomalies the date July 1, 2015 has been substituted in sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Black Money Act, in place of April 1, 2016. This is done, so as to enable the assessee desiring to take benefit of section 59 of the Black Money Act. By doing so, the assessees, who desired to take the benefit of one-time opportunity, could have made declaration prior to September 30, 2015 and paid the tax and penalty prior to December 31, 2015.

¶99

It would further be relevant to note that subsection (3) of section 1 of the Black Money Act, itself provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act, it shall come into force on the 1st day of July, 2015. A conjoint reading of the various provisions would reveal that the Assessing Officer can charge the taxes only from the assessment year commencing on or after April 1, 2016. However, the value of the said asset has to be as per its valuation in the previous year. As such, even if there was no change of date in sub-section (3) of section 1 of the Black Money Act, the value of the asset was to be determined as per its valuation in the previous year. The date has been changed only for the purpose of enabling the assessee(s) to take benefit of section 59 of the Black Money Act. The power has been exercised only in order to remove difficulties. The penal provisions under sections 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act would come into play only when an assessee has failed to take benefit of section 59 and neither disclosed assets covered by the Black Money Act nor paid the tax and penalty thereon. As such, we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable.”

¶100

14.1. The crux of the case before the apex court

¶101

or the finding as could be gathered from paragraph 20 supra is that an assessee if he fails to take benefit of section 59 and it remains a fact that the assets are not disclosed, penal provisions under sections 50 and 51 of the Act would kick in. A reading of the afore-quoted judgment of the apex court would make it clear that the

¶102

13 -

¶103

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶104

question of retrospective applicability of sections 50 and 51 qua article 20 of the Constitution of India was not even an issue in the case before the apex court, though the apex court interprets all the sections that are quoted hereinabove including section 72(c). Therefore, the said judgment would not become completely applicable to the issue brought up before the court in the subject lis .

¶105

15. In the considered view of the court, the prosecution so initiated against these petitioners did not and cannot pass constitutional muster under article 20 of the Constitution of India. Non-disclosure of an assessment of the tax return for the year 2007-2008 or 2009-2010 cannot be used to criminally prosecute these petitioners, for an act that has come into force in the year 2015. The law, as on the date alleged, was not the law of such disclosure of assessment. Therefore, the criminal law cannot be set into motion against the petitioners in the aforesaid facts of the case, as it cannot pass muster of article 20 of the Constitution of India. A caveat, this court is considering the criminal liability fastened upon the petitioners by the prosecution including under section 72(c) of the Act and the consideration has led to an unmistakable conclusion that it falls foul of article 20 of the Constitution of India. The Special enactment is a statute. Article 20 comes under Chapter III of the Constitution of India, a fundamental right. Constitution of India is not a statute. It is the fountain head of all statutes including the special statute. Therefore, the rigour of any provision of the Act should pass muster of article 20 of the Constitution of India and it fails to pass such muster in the case at hand and the failure leads to obliteration of the crime against the petitioners.”

¶106

In the light of the admitted facts as quoted hereinabove and the settled principle of law as considered by this Court supra, the unmistakable inference would be quashment of proceedings under the Act in the impugned Special C.C.No.711 of 2023.

¶107

13. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

¶108

O R D E R

¶109

(i) Writ Petitions are allowed.

¶110

14 -

¶111

NC: 2025:KHC:11309 WP No. 6783 of 2025

¶112

(ii) Impugned proceedings in Special C.C.No.711 of 2023 pending before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge and Special Judge for Prevention of Money Laundering Act, Bangalore stand quashed qua the petitioners.

¶113

(iii) It is made clear that this quashment will not come or aid the petitioners to claim quashment of proceedings in the predicate offence where trial is said to be in progress."

¶114

In the light of the quashment of the subject proceedings qua the other accused in the aforesaid writ petitions, the petitioners also become entitled for the same relief.

¶115

For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

¶116

ORDER

¶117

(i) Writ petition is allowed.

¶118

(ii) Impugned proceedings in Special C.C.No.711/2023 pending before the Principal City Civil and Sessions Judge, Bengaluru, stands quashed qua the petitioners.

¶119

Sd/(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

¶120

SJK

¶121

List No.: 1 Sl No.: 23/CT: BHK

Mr a Shafiulla v. Directorate of Enforcement

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Mr a Shafiulla v. Directorate of Enforcement

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

M D Raghu Vs Adithya @ M Ani

Mr. K.T. Venkatesh, Vs M/S Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Ltd.

Mr Krishnamurthy O Vs Karnataka Bank

Shri. Prashanth H H Vs the State of Karnataka

Farohar Global Foundation Vs State of Karnataka

Yashas v Vs Jana Small Finance Bank