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Smt Hombamma v. Sri Bhyraveshwara Sahakara Bank Niyamitha

Karnataka HC14 Jul 2025WP/1345/2023

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

SARFAESI Act Section 14(1) order by Deputy Commissioner Tumakuru challenged in Article 226 writ; alternative remedy under Section 17 SARFAESI before DRT; relegation following Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon (2010) 8 SCC 110; exhaustion of statutory remedy; Bhyraveshwara Sahakara Bank Niyamitha; four-week restraint on precipitative steps; Covid-19 illness plea; WP 1345/2023 (GM-RES); Karnataka HC, decided 14 July 2025.

What did the court decide?

Petition disposed of relegating petitioners to the substantive remedy (Section 17 SARFAESI Act before the DRT); respondent Bank directed not to take precipitative steps for four weeks; all contentions kept open; time spent before the High Court to be noted for limitation before the DRT. ¶59

Smt Hombamma Vs Sri Bhyraveshwara Sahakara Bank… — Banking and Recovery | Karnataka HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

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Issue for consideration

Whether the High Court should entertain the writ petition under Article 226 challenging the Deputy Commissioner's Section 14(1) SARFAESI Act order when the substantive remedy under Section 17 SARFAESI Act before the Debt Recovery Tribunal is available. +1 more

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Court's answer

Taking note of the Apex Court's observations in Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, the appropriate remedy is to relegate the petitioners to the substantive remedy rather than entertain the Article 226 challenge to the Section 14(1) SARFAESI Act order.

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Ratio / Principle

The several factual contentions raised by the petitioners regarding the validity of the impugned order cannot be adjudicated in the present writ proceedings.

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Key takeaways

The petition is disposed of, relegating the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy as regards the impugned proceedings; all contentions of both sides are kept open.ratio¶50
The respondent Bank is directed not to take any precipitative steps for a period of four weeks from the date of the order.ratio¶51
The interim protection is only to enable the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy and is not an adjudication on merits; upon lapse of the stipulated time the protection ceases and the authorities before whom the petitioners approach are to look at the matter afresh uninfluenced by the observations made herein.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Karnataka High Court (single Judge, S Sunil Dutt Yadav J) — writ petition under Article 226 challenging the District Magistrate/Deputy Commissioner, Tumakuru's order dated 04.01.2022 under Section 14(1) of the SARFAESI Act in Case No. MSC(R7)CR:15/2021-22. Relying on Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon, (2010) 8 SCC 110 (exhaustion of statutory remedies in bank-recovery matters), the Court disposed of the petition relegating the petitioners to the Section 17 SARFAESI Act remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, keeping all contentions open. The respondent Bank was restrained from taking precipitative steps for four weeks; the protection was expressly confined to enabling resort to the statutory remedy, ceases on expiry of that period, and the statutory authorities are to consider the matter afresh uninfluenced by the Court's observations. Time spent before the High Court may be reckoned appropriately for limitation before the DRT.

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NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 14^TH DAY OF JULY, 2025

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV

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WRIT PETITION NO. 1345 OF 2023 (GM-RES)

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BETWEEN:

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SMT HOMBAMMA

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W/O LATE SRI THIMMAIAH AGED ABOUT 75 YEARS,

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SRI.K.T.NAGESH S/O LATE SRI THIMMAIAH AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,

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BOTH ARE RESIDING AT NO.1869, WARD NO.15 KOTE BEEDI, KUNIGAL TOWN TUMAKURU DISTRICT - 572 130.

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… PETITIONERS

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Digitally signed by PRAKASH N Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA

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(BY SRI. SOMASHEKARA K M., ADVOCATE)

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AND:

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SRI BHYRAVESHWARA SAHAKARA BANK NIYAMITHA S.S.PURAM, MAIN ROAD, OPPOSITE TO SHIKSHAKARA BHAVANA TUMAKURU-572 102 REP. BY ITS AUTHORISED OFFICER.

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… RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. B S MAHENDRA., ADVOCATE)

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2 - NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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THIS W.P. IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASHING THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 04/01/2022 PASSED BY THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE, TUMAKURU DISTRICT (DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TUMAKURU DISTRICT) IN CASE NO.MSC(R7)CR:15/2021-22 VIDE ANNEXURE-G AND ETC.

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THIS PETITION COMING ON IN THE FRESH MATTERS LIST THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S SUNIL DUTT YADAV

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ORAL ORDER

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The present petition has been filed calling in question the validity of the impugned order dated 04.01.2022 passed under Section 14(1) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (for short 'SARFAESI Act').

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Petitioners have raised various contentions

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regarding the validity of the impugned order. It is further asserted that due to bonafide reason of illness during Covid-19 pandemic, there was some lapse regarding payment of amounts.

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Learned counsel for the respondent submits that as against the impugned order, which is passed by

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3 - NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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the Deputy Commissioner, the substantive remedy under

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Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act is available and accordingly, it would be appropriate to relegate the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy.

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In light of the contentions raised, it is relevant to take note of the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon and Others - (2010) 8 SCC 110 that the appropriate remedy would be to relegate the petitioners to seek for substantive remedy before the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The relevant observations of the Apex Court are as follows:

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"43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions

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NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasijudicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

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44. While expressing the aforesaid view, we are conscious that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases, any Government, directions, orders or writs including the five prerogative writs for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III or for any other purpose are very wide and there is no express limitation on exercise of that power but, at the same time, we cannot be oblivious of the rules of self-imposed restraint evolved by this Court, which every High Court is bound to keep in view while exercising power under Article 226 of the Constitution.

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HC-KAR

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45. It is true that the rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and not one of compulsion, but it is difficult to fathom any reason why the High Court should entertain a petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution and pass interim order ignoring the fact that the petitioner can avail effective alternative remedy by filing application, appeal, revision, etc. and the particular legislation contains a detailed mechanism for redressal of his grievance.

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55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and the Sarfaesi Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection."

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In light of the observations made by the Apex Court, it can be noticed that several factual contentions

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NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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raised by the petitioners are the matters that cannot be adjudicated in the present proceedings.

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Accordingly, the petition is disposed off relegating the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy as regards the impugned proceedings. All contentions of both the sides are kept open.

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In light of disposal of writ petition, it would meet the ends of justice by directing the respondent - Bank not to take any precipitative steps for a period of four weeks from today.

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The interim protection granted under this order

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is only to enable the petitioners to avail of the substantive remedy and must not be considered to be an order passed on the basis of adjudication on merits. Upon the lapse of the time stipulated, the protection granted would cease to operate and the authorities before whom petitioners may approach are to look at the matter afresh uninfluenced by the observations made herein.

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NC: 2025:KHC:25829 WP No. 1345 of 2023

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HC-KAR

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