Sri.N Gangadhar Vs Smt. Usha B

2 . M/S. VENKATESHWARA ENGINEERING WORKS, REPRESENTED BY ITS PROPRIETOR SRI C.V. SOMASHEKAR HAVING REGISTRED OFFICE AT NO.162/2, TANK BUND ROAD, BENGALURU - 560 002.

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3 . THE SUB-REGISTRAR, BASAVANAGUDI, GANDHI BAZAAR MAIN ROAD, GANDHI BAZAAR, BASAVANAGUDI BENGALURU - 560 004, KARNATAKA.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI HIRAN KRISHNASWAMY, ADVOCATE FOR C/R1) SRI SESHU V., HCGP FOR R3)

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THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 115 OF CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE 1908, CALL FOR RECORDS IN O.S.NO.6654/2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE 12^TH ADDL. CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE, AT BANGALORE AND SET ASIDE THE

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ORDER DATED 11-02-2025 ON IA NO.4 FILED UNDER ORDER 7 RULE 11 (a) AND (d) OF CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1908 AND ALLOW IA NO.4 BY ALLOWING THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION WITH COSTS.

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THIS CIVIL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 24.09.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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CAV ORDER

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The petitioners/defendants 1 to 3 are at the doors of this Court calling in question rejection of an application, I.A.No.4 filed by them under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC seeking rejection of plaint, on the score that the cause that is sought to be projected before the Court is barred by limitation.

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Heard Sri P. Vinaya Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri Hiran Krishnaswamy, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 and Sri V. Seshu, learned High Court Government Pleader appearing for respondent No.3.

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3. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: -

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3.1. Before embarking upon considering of the issue in the lis , I deem it appropriate to notice the protagonists involved. The 1^st respondent is the plaintiff; petitioners 1, 2 and 3 are defendants 1, 2 and 3 and respondents 2 and 3 are defendants 4 and 5. The schedule property was purchased by the plaintiff’s father-in-law, one Munnoji Rao on 29-12-1949 through a registered sale deed. The said property was then acquired by the husband of 1^st respondent/plaintiff after the death of Munnoji Rao which also becomes the subject matter of partition deed. On 23-01-1995, the husband of the plaintiff is said to have executed a General Power of Attorney in favour of the 1^st defendant. Pursuant to execution of General Power of Attorney, on 27-07-2004, the 1^st defendant is allegedly executed a registered agreement of sale seeking to sell the schedule property in favour of the 3^rd petitioner/defendant No.3’s late husband one A.M.R. Reddy. Pursuant to agreement of sale so registered on 27-07-2004, two sale deeds also come to be executed on 02-04-2005 by the 2^nd petitioner in favour of A.M.R.

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Reddy. The said A.M.R. Reddy then enters into an agreement of sale conveying the schedule property in favour of the 2^nd defendant.

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3.2. After the aforesaid events, the husband of the plaintiff dies. The plaintiff contends that she became aware of the fraud played in the purported execution of agreements of sale and registered sale deeds when she obtained encumbrance certificate in respect of the schedule property. On the aforesaid premise, she institutes the subject suit in O.S.No.6654 of 2024 seeking the relief of declaration and injunction. Notices are served on the defendants. The defendants then file an application under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC seeking rejection of the plaint on the score that the cause of action is barred by limitation. The concerned Court rejects the application filed by the present petitioners holding that projection of limitation is always a mixed question of law and fact and, therefore, it would be a matter of trial. Rejection of the application is what has driven the petitioners to this Court in the subject petition.

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The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners’ Sri P. Vinaya Kumar would vehemently contend that registered Power of Attorney is of the year 1995. Pursuant to execution of General Power of Attorney agreements of sale entered into are of the years 2004 and 2006. In the interregnum registered sale deeds are executed in the year 2005. Therefore, cause of action is of the years 1995, 2004, 2005 and 2006. This is sought to be challenged in the year 2024. The learned counsel would further contend that petitioners are the absolute owners of the subject property. The plaintiff is not the owner of the subject property at all. The 1^st petitioner/defendant No.1 and the 2^nd petitioner/defendant No.2 are the same person who have changed their names in the affidavit. The relationship between the plaintiff and her husband is itself in dispute. Criminal proceedings had been initiated against the petitioners in respect of the schedule property. They have been acquitted of all the blame of forgery or fraud and the acquittal has become final. On all these issues, the learned counsel would submit that the plea of limitation ought to have been accepted and the plaint rejected.

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Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the 1^st respondent would submit that identity of defendants 1 and 2 is itself in dispute. The affidavit so produced before the concerned Court dated 07-07-2021 declaring change of name would itself require a trial. The registered agreement of sale is executed by one Gangadhar and the name is said to have been changed to Surya Prasad. Finger prints of petitioner No.1/defendant No.1 and petitioner No.2/defendant No.2 are identical. There are various agreements and sale deeds executed on the same schedule property fraudulently. Therefore, in the peculiar facts of this case the issue of limitation does become a mixed question of law and fact. He would seek dismissal of the petition.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. In furtherance whereof, the only issue that falls for consideration is:

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“Whether the concerned Court was right in rejecting the application filed by these petitioners under Order VII

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Rule 11(a) and (d) of the CPC, on the score that it is a mixed

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question of law and fact?”

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The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. Certain dates assume significance and would require iteration only from the date on which a General Power of Attorney comes to be executed. In the year 1995 i.e., on 23-01-1995 one M. Bhadrachalapathi Rao, husband of the plaintiff is said to have executed a registered General Power of Attorney in favour of the 1^st defendant. The preamble in the power of attorney is as follows:

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“POWER OF ATTORNEY

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THIS POWER OF ATTORNEY is executed on this, the 23^rd day of January 1995 at Bangalore, BY (Mr.M.B.RAO) M. BHADRACHALAPATHY RAO, s/o. Munoji Rao, aged about 50 years, Residing at No.162/1, Lay & New No.39/2, Mavalli Tank Bund Road, BANGALORE - 560 002, in favour of Mr. N. GANGADHAR, aged about 34 Years, Residing (b) at No.1228, Ist Main, 3^rd Cross, Yeshwanthpur, Bangalore -560 022.

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WHEREAS I the (Mr. M.B.RAO) M. BHADRACHALAPATHY RAO absolute Owner of the Property bearing Bangalore Corporation No.162/1 & New No. 39/2 Mavalli Tank Bund Road, Bangalore – 560 002, WHEREAS We have given our assent and agreed and hereby, by virtue of this document, empower the said Mr. N. GANGADHAR to enter into or execute any document required the purpose to Deposit the Title Deeds for the purpose of obtaining monies and to sign all papers and documents be required for the purpose.

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By this power of attorney I hereby authorise Sri.N.GANGADHAR Residing at No.1228, Ist Main, 3rd Cross, Yashwanthpur, B'lore-22 to do the following acts and deeds.”

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Pursuant to execution of power of attorney, it appears that an agreement of sale is executed by the 1^st petitioner in favour of the 3^rd petitioner’s late husband on 27-07-2004. The preamble of the agreement reads as follows:

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ಸ� ಎರಡು �ಾ�ರದ �ಾಲ��ೇ ಇಸ� ಜು"ೈ$ಾ%ೆ &�ಾಂಕ ಇಪ(ತ � ಾಲ�ರ)* (24.07.2004) +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 022, ಯಶವಂತಪ0ರ, 1�ೇ ಮುಖ3 ರ�ೆ�, 1345�ೇ ನಂಬ5 ಮ�ೆಯ)* 6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8�ೕ.ಮು9�ಾ�: �ೆ;<, �ೆ;<ಯವರ ಮಗ�ಾದ 8�ೕ.ಎ.ಎಂ.ಆ5.�ೆ;< ಆದ 9ಮ>ೆ .

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+ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 002, $ಾವ?@ Aಾ3ಂB ಬಂC ರ�ೆ�, 162/1�ೇ ನಂಬ5 :ಮ�ೆಯ)* 6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8�ೕ.ಮು�ೋE �ಾF ರವರ ಮಗ�ಾದ 8�ೕ.ಎಂ.ಭದ� ಚಲಪ� �ಾF (ಎಂ.I.�ಾF)ರವರ ಜನರJ ಫªÀgï ಆL ಅAಾ9N %ೋಲ<5 ಆದ +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು-560 022, ಯಶವಂತಪ0ರ, 3�ೇ Oಾ�P, 1�ೇ ಮುಖ3 ರ�ೆ�, 1228�ೇ ನಂಬ5 ಮ�ೆಯ)* 6ಾಸ6ಾ7ರುವ 8�ೕ. ನಂಜಪ(ರವರ ಮಗ 8�ೕ.ಎ�. ಗಂ>ಾಧ5 ಆದ �ಾನು ಒS( ಬ�ೆ�OೊಟU ��ರ ಸ��ನ ಶುದ� ಕ�ಯದ ಕ�ಾರು ಪತ�ದ ಕ�ಮ6ೇ�ೆಂದ�ೆ :

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ಆVಾ7 +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು �W, OಾXೕN�ೇಷ� ;�ಜ� ನಂಬ5 27, $ಾವ?@, Aಾ3ಂB ಬಂಡ ರ�ೆ�ಯ)ರುವ 162/1 %ೊಸ ನಂಬ5 39/2 ರ ಸ�ತು� &�ಾಂಕ 12.05.1986 ರಂದು 8�ೕ. ಎಂ. ಭದ�ಚಲಪ� �ಾFರವZ>ೆ ಇವರ ಅಣ\ ತಮ]ಂ&ರುಗ^ಾದ 1�ೇ 8�ೕ. ಎಂ.ಅಶ�ತ � ಾ�ಾಯಣ �ಾF, 2�ೇ ಎಂ. ಭದ�ಚಲಪ� �ಾF, 3�ೇ 8�ೕ. ಎಂ._ಾಂಡುರಂಗ �ಾF, 4�ೇ 8�ೕ.ಎಂ.ಎಕ�ಾಥ �ಾF ರವರುಗಳa $ಾ;Oೊಂಡ �bಾಗ ಪತ�ವ0 +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು, >ಾಂcನಗರ, Oೇಂ&�ಯ ಉಪ�ೋಂದeಾcOಾZಯವರ ಕfೇZಯ), 1�ೇ ಪ0ಸ�ಕ, 3270�ೇ ಸಂಪ0ಟ, 134 Zಂದ 144�ೇ ಪ0ಟಗಳ)* 314�ೇ ನಂಬ�ಾ7 ZEಸU5 ಆ7ರುವ �bಾಗ ಪತ�ದ ಮೂಲಕ I _ೆಡೂ3Jನ)* ನಮೂದು $ಾ;ರುವ ಸ�ತು� 8�ೕ.ಎಂ.ಭದ�ಚಲಪ� �ಾFರವರ g¸Éì>ೆ ಬಂದು, ನಂತರ +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು ಮ%ಾನಗರ _ಾ)Oೆ 6ಾCN ನಂಬ5 42ರ)* hಾiೆಯನುj kಾಮ�ಾಜ_ೇAೆ ವಲಯ, ಸಹ ಕಂVಾಯ ಅcOಾZಯವರ ಕfೇZಯ)* �ೋಂVಾm�Oೊಂಡು &�ಾಂಕ 19.1.1995 ರಂದು ; ಎ� 42/S ಆ5116/94-95 ರಂiೆ hಾiಾ

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ಪ�$ಾಣ ಪತ�ವನುj ಪnೆದುOೊಂಡು ಕಂVಾಯವನುj ಸOಾNರOೆ� _ಾವ� $ಾ;Oೊಂಡು ಅನುಭ��Oೊಂಡು ಬರು��ರುವ0ದು ಸZಯoೆU, ಸದZ ಸ��ನ 9>ಾವeೆ ಮತು� ವ3ವ%ಾರ $ಾಡಲು &�ಾಂಕ 23.01.1995 ರಂದು +ೆಂಗಳ.ರು �W, ಬಸವನಗು; ಉಪ�ೋಂದeಾcOಾZಯವರ ಕfೇZಯ)* 4�ೇ ಪ0ಸ�ಕ, ಎP. ಎL 187�ೇ ಸಂಪ0ಟ, 134 Zಂದ 136�ೇ ಪ0ಟಗಳ), 522�ೇ ZEಸU5 ಜನರJ ಪವ5 ಆL ಅAಾ9N ಪತ�ವನುj 8�ೕ ಎ�.ಗಂ>ಾಧ5 ಆದ ನನ>ೆ 9ೕ;ರುiಾ � ೆ , ಈ Zೕ�qಾ7 ಎಂ.ಭದ�ಚಲಪ� �ಾF ರವZಂದ ಅcOಾರ ಪnೆದುOೊಂಡು oೆಡೂ3Jನ) ನಮೂದು $ಾ;ರುವ ಸ�ತ�ನುj �ಾನು ಅrವೃ&� ಪ;�Oೊಂಡು ಬರು��ರುವ0ದು ಸZಯoೆU.”

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Pursuant to the agreement of sale, two sale deeds are executed on 02-04-2005 in favour of the 3^rd defendant’s late husband one A.M.R. Reddy. On 21-10-2006, A.M.R. Reddy executed a sale deed conveying the property in favour of 2^nd petitioner/defendant No.2. Therefore, there are transactions that have happened in 1995, the GPA; in 2004, registered agreement of sale; in 2005, two registered sale deeds; in 2006, a registered agreement of sale and in 2007 the husband of plaintiff dies.

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The plaintiff, in 2023, is said to have gained knowledge about execution of certain documents concerning the schedule property between the defendants and the husband of the plaintiff. The knowledge is gained when encumbrance certificate is sought in respect of the subject property and the suit comes to be instituted in O.S.No.6654 of 2024. It is trite law that to consider the

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application under Order VII Rule 11 (a) and (d) of the CPC, it is not the defence or it is not the contents in the statement of objections, but the plaint averments that are necessary to be noticed. Accordingly, relevant averments in the plaint are germane and they read as follows:

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Further, Late M Bhadrachalapathi Rao S/o Late Munnoji Rao had acquired the Schedule property vide Partition Deed dated 12.05.1986, registered as Book-I, Volume 3270, Pages 134 to 144, document bearing number 413, at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Gandhinagar, Bangalore. The certified copy of this partition deed dated 12.05.1986 is enclosed herewith as Annexure C.

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Late Sri. M Bhadrachalapathi Rao S/o Late Munnoji Rao expired on 12.08.2007 leaving behind the Plaintiff (Smt. Usha Bhadrachalapathy) as the only surviving legal heir. The copy of the crematorium certificate is enclosed herewith as Annexure D. The original copy of the family tree certificate of Smt. Usha B is enclosed herewith as Annexure E.

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After the death of her husband, the Plaintiff moved in to live with her brother, Sri N.S.Suresh. The Plaintiff was aware of the property situated at Bangalore City, Corpn. Division No.27, Ward No. 42, Mavalli Tank Bund Road, Municipal No. 162/1, new no.39/2 measuring 135 feet by 45 feet, owned by her late husband. However, more recently, her health started deteriorating and she required money to meet her growing medical needs. She desired to sell her late husband's property to cover her medical expenses and other needs to maintain herself. However, it was at this point that she was informed that her husband's Schedule Property had been sold off by one Surya Prasad (Defendant No. 2), claiming to be a GPA holder of her late husband.

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The Plaintiff's younger brother (Sri. N S Suresh) took it upon himself to investigate and extract all the necessary documents to understand how the Schedule Property was sold/ alienated. He found certain incriminating documents when he obtained the encumbrance certificate. With great difficulty and with the help of his well-wishers, the Plaintiff's brother, obtained the certified copies and other copies of the documents fabricated and executed in relation to the Schedule Property.

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The Schedule Property was allegedly sold off on the basis of the power of attorney allegedly executed late Bhadrachalapathy Rao. The said power of attorney was registered before the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, bearing number 522 of 1994-95, stored in Book-IV, volume no. SF187, pages 134 to 136. The certified copy of the power of attorney dated 23.01.1995 on the basis of which the said Surya Prasad has sold the Schedule Property is enclosed herewith as Annexure F.

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It is pertinent to note that this power of attorney does not authorize Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) but N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1). Further, the execution of this power of attorney is itself disputed by the Plaintiff and her family. No such execution has taken place and the said power of attorney is fabricated.

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On the basis of the fabricated power of attorney, the Defendant No.1, (N Gangadhar) executed a registered agreement to sell the Schedule Property in favour of one AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband). The copy of the registered agreement of sale dated 24.07.2004, bearing number BSG-1-02473/2004-05, stored in CD No. BSGD28 is enclosed herewith as Annexure G.

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Subsequently a totally different person viz, Surya Prasad, the Defendant No.2 herein, executed two sale deeds in favour of AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3’s late husband).

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i. Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-100030/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi.

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ii. Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-100031/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi.

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Each of the said sale deeds allegedly conveyed one half of the property situated at Bangalore City, Corpn. Division No.27, Ward No. 42, Mavalli Tank Bund Road, Municipal No. 162/1, new no. 39/2 measuring 135 feet by 45 feet belonging to the Plaintiff, Smt. Usha, w/o Late Bhadrachalapathy Rao. Both the sale deeds convey one half of the Schedule Property. The motive behind this exercise was to ensure that the details of these sale deeds should not be reflected in the encumbrance certificate of the Schedule Property. A cursory glance at the encumbrance certificate enclosed as Annexure K herewith would prove this averment. Both the sale deeds are missing from the encumbrance certificate of the Schedule Property.

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The certified copies of the two sale deeds are enclosed herewith as Annexures H and I respectively.

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It is pertinent to note that the two sale deeds dated 02.04.2005 was executed and registered by Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) on the basis of the fabricated power of attorney granted in favour of N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1). Surya Prasad's name was not even mentioned in this fabricated power of attorney.

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Moreover, the agreement of sale dated 24.07.2004 was purportedly executed by N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1) in favor of late AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband). Even in the said Agreement, nowhere is Surya Prasad's name mentioned.

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Further, it is pertinent to note that the signatures of the executants on the Agreement of Sale dated 24.07.2004 and the two sale deeds dated 02.04.2005, are identical. A bare perusal of these three registered documents would show that Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) and N Gangadhar (Defendant No. 1) were impersonators with different identities.

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Further, a glance at the biometric fingerprints would also show that the fingerprints of Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) and N Gangadhar (Defendant No.1) are identical. Defendant Nos. 1-3 are a part of an organized criminal network which impersonates the identities of different persons for criminal activities.

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To summarize the documents pertaining to the Schedule Property which nave been forged and fabricated are:-

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Sl. No.	Date of Execution	Particulars	Parties having executed the document
1.	23.01.1995	Registered Power of Attorney (Ann. F).	Allegedly by the Plaintiff's late husband and the Defendant No.1.
2.	24.07.2004	Registered Agreement To Sell (Ann. G).	Defendant No.1 in favor of Defendant No.3.
3.	02.04.2005	Sale Deed for half of the Schedule Property (Ann. H).	Defendant No.2 in favor of late AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband).
4.	02.04.2005	Sale Deed for the remaining half of the Schedule Property (Ann.I).	Defendant No.2 in favor of late AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's late husband).
5.	21.10.2006	Registered Agreement of	Late AMR Reddy (Defendant No.3's

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Sale (Ann. J).	husband) in favor
	of Defendant No.2.

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The Schedule Property continues to be an empty piece of land. The photographs of the Schedule Property are enclosed herewith as Annexure O.

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CAUSE OF ACTION : The Plaintiff, Smt. Usha B W/o Late Bhadrachalapathy Rao is the sole and absolute owner of the Schedule Property. When the Plaintiff wished to sell the Schedule Property, she was informed that the said property was already sold to some third-party stranger. Shocked by this information, the Plaintiff's younger brother, N S Suresh, took it upon himself to find out more information about the alleged sale of the Schedule Property. When the Plaintiff obtained the encumbrance certificate on 27.09.2023, she found out that a series of fraudulently fabricated and forged documents have been registered by unknown persons. The Plaintiff with the assistance of her younger brother, applied for obtaining the copies of all other documents and sought the necessary legal opinion. The cause of action arose on 27.09.2023 when the encumbrance certificate was obtained by the Plaintiff.

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PRAYER

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WHEREFORE the Plaintiff most respectfully prays that this Hon'ble Court be pleased:

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i. Declare that the Power of Attorney dated 23.01.1995 registered as document bearing number 522 of 1994-95, stored in Book-IV, volume no. SF187, pages 134 to 136, at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, Bangalore (Annexure F) is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff.

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ii. Declare that the Registered Agreement to Sell Power of Attorney dated 24.07.2004, bearing number BSG-1-

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02473/2004-05, stored in CD No. BSGD28 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, Bangalore (Annexure G) is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff.

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iii. Declare that the Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-1-00030/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi (Annexure H) is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff.

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iv. Declare that the Sale Deed dated 02.04.2005, bearing no. BSG-1-00031/2005-06 stored in CD BSGD48 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi (Annexure I) is null and void and not binding on the plaintiff.

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v. Declare that the Registered Agreement to Sell Power of Attorney dated 21.10.2006, bearing number BSG-103836-2006-07 stored in CD No. BSGD84 at the Office of the Sub-Registrar, Basavanagudi, Bangalore (Annexure J) is null and void and not binding on the Plaintiff…..”

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The averment in the plaint is that sale has taken place between defendants 1, 2 and 3. A suspicion arose when an affidavit is executed in the year 2001 by Gangadhar changing his name to Surya Prasad. In the petition, Gangadhar is different and Surya Prasad is different. The registered agreement of sale is executed by Gangadhar/1^st petitioner in favour of 3^rd petitioner’s husband one AMR Reddy and in turn, the said AMR Reddy has executed the agreement of sale in favour of the 2^nd petitioner/Surya Prasad. The narration is clear and the document produced is that the schedule property even today continues to be a vacant land.

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In the light of the averments in the plaint, which prima facie depict cause of action, plethora of objections are projected before this Court to contend that the suit is barred by limitation. Same contention is projected before the concerned Court. The concerned Court, by the impugned order, rejects the application on the following reasons, inter alia :

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Further, regarding vacant possession of suit schedule property is concerned, the plaintiff in paragraph 25 of the plaint, stated that her husband had leased the schedule property to a business concern defendant No.4 for parking their vehicles and she has produced copy of lease agreement dated 21.06.1997 and produced photographs which show board of parking in the name of defendant No.4. This application is filed before appearance of defendant No.4 and this defendant appeared before court before service of summons submitted that on 1911-2024 there is urgency in the matter and made the court to hear on IA prior to issuance of suit summons to defendant No.4 and filed citation with copy of order in Execution Petition No.25417/2023. The said execution petition is filed to execute decree passed in OS No.25706/2015. In that case, it is stated that the defendant of that case is parking his lorries in the schedule property. Why this court is considering it here is, though it is defence of defendant, because as stated supra, the plaintiff has stated that the suit schedule property is leased by her husband in favour of 4^th defendant and connected document is produced by her. The defendant who is using it as parking area in that case is different from defendant No.4 in this case. In that execution petition, the operative portion runs as under;

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“The petition is allowed.

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The office is hereby directed to issue attachment in respect of the Jabitha mentioned and call for the sale of property and pay to the DHR out of the sale proceeds.

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¶103

Further directed to put the DHR in possession of the suit schedule property with the help of the police and also arrest the JDR and keep him in detention until realization of the entire decretal amount.

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No order as to costs.”

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36. According to plaintiff, the suit schedule property was purchased by her father-in-law vide registered sale deed dated 29-12-1949 and she has produced certified copy of the same. Her husband acquired the suit schedule property vide partition deed dated 12-05-1986 and she has produced certified copy of the same. After his demise on 12-08-2007, this plaintiff inherited the suit schedule property as sole surviving legal heir and document pertaining to his death and family tree are produced by her. Due to health reasons after his death, she has moved to her brother’s house, but recently as she required money for her medical needs, wanted to sell the suit schedule property and at that time, she came to know that the defendant No.2 had sold the suit schedule property claimed to be a GPA Holder of her husband. Then, the period of limitation includes mixed question of facts and law and it needs trial to conclude on it.

¶106

37. Further, it is stated by the plaintiff that, on enquiry through her brother, she came to know that the suit schedule property is sold and the same is reflected in EC, but she is claiming that the said GPA is fabricated one. The plaintiff mainly claiming against the GPA by producing the certified copy of the same that the said GPA does not authorise Surya Prasad (Defendant No.2) but N. Gangadhar (Defendant No 1 ). According to plaintiff, on the basis of alleged GPA, as alleged to be fabricated, the defendant No.1 executed registered agreement to sell suit schedule property in favour of defendant No 3’s husband and said Surya Prasad is totally different person who executed two sale deeds in favour of husband of 3^rd defendant. Through the said two sale deeds, one half of schedule property is conveyed.

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There is dispute about signatures of defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 by way of impersonation and the execution of this GPA is itself disputed as no such execution has ever taken place and as it is fabricated, which shows that there is a matter of trial to be decided.

¶109

38. Further, the averments of the affidavit filed in support of IA No.4 are nothing but the defence of defendant No.1 and hence, without trial, they can’t be decided and further, the defendant No.5 has to file written statement and defendant No.4 is yet to appear, but this defendant requested the Court hear and dispose of this IA by representing himself as authorised person of the defendants, but there is no authority produced by him than the GPA executed by defendant No.3 to prosecute in earlier case. Moreover, there is no ground of res-judicata as plaintiff is not party to that case. The facts and circumstance of the case in the plaint involve mixed question of facts and law which needs trial.

¶110

39. Further in the affidavit to IA, it is sworn as “I Gangadhar @ Surya Prasad, Major, R/at No 1996, 7^th Cross, Judicial Layout, Bangalore, 560064”. But in the plaint, they are treated as different persons as defendant No.1 and defendant No.2 respectively. There is no document produced by this defendant as both the names are belonging to him. Further in the affidavit, only one signature is found and there is no GPA of either defendant No.1 or defendant No.2 or defendant No.3 executed by them on behalf of person who appeared party in person before the court which itself needs trial. This applicant relied upon 2023 SAR (Civ) 740 (Ramisetty Venkatanna and Anr vs Nasyam Jamal Saheb and others) about rejection of plaint on the basis of period of limitation. But as discussed above, here in this case, the period of limitation is matter of trial.

¶111

40. Therefore, as per the facts and circumstances of the case and above discussions, it is the considered opinion of the Court that the applicant of this IA has not made out grounds to reject the plaint and hence this Court answers Point No.1 in the Negative.

¶112

20

¶113

41. Point No.2:- For the foregoing reasons and as per negative answer to Point No.1, this court thinks that IA No.4 filed by the defendant No.1 as applicant is liable to be rejected and accordingly proceed to pass the following;

¶114

ORDER

¶115

IA No.4 filed by defendant No.1 as Gangadhar @ Surya Prasad under Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d) read Section 151of CPC is hereby rejected.”

¶116

(Emphasis added)

¶117

The issue now would be, whether the reasons rendered by the concerned Court to reject the application are in tune with law or otherwise. Referring to several judgments that are cited would only bulk this order. Therefore, I deem it appropriate to notice the law laid down by the Apex Court in the case of

¶118

P. KUMARAKURUBARAN v. P.NARAYANAN¹ . The Apex Court in the said judgment has held as follows:

¶119

“…. …. ….

¶120

11. It is well-settled that Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, governs suits seeking cancellation of an instrument and prescribes a period of limitation of three years from the date when the plaintiff first had knowledge of the facts entitling him to such relief. The emphasis under Article 59 is not on the date of the transaction per se , but on the accrual of the cause of action, which, in cases involving allegations of fraud or

¶121

1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 975

¶122

21

¶123

unauthorized execution of documents, hinges upon the date on which the plaintiff acquired knowledge of such facts.

¶124

12. In the present case, the appellant has specifically averred in the plaint that upon becoming aware of registration of documents allegedly carried out among the defendants in relation to the suit property, he immediately approached the Additional Commissioner of Police, Chennai and lodged a land grabbing complaint on 09.12.2011 against the family of Defendant No. 1. Subsequently, he applied for patta in his favour on 24.02.2012, and raised objections on 05.03.2012 to Defendant No. 4 stating that the suit property belonged to the plaintiff and that no registration concerning the same should be carried out. He has also submitted an objection petition to Defendant No. 5 requesting that no planning permit be granted to anybody except the appellant in respect of the suit property. Thereafter, the appellant instituted the suit on 03.12.2014 seeking a declaration and consequential reliefs. On the other hand, the respondents/defendants stated in their application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC that the appellant had knowledge of the execution of the sale deed by his father in favour of Defendant No. 1 at the earliest point of time and hence, the suit instituted by the appellant was barred by limitation. While the trial Court rejected the said application holding that the issue of limitation involved a mixed question of law and fact, the High Court in revision, took a contrary view and allowed the application filed under Order VII Rule 11 CPC and rejected the plaint solely on the ground that the suit was barred by limitation.

¶125

12.1. However, we are of the considered view that the issue as to whether the appellant had prior notice or reason to be aware of the transaction at an earlier point of time, or whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge is credible, are matters that necessarily require appreciation of evidence. At this preliminary stage, the averments made in the plaint must be taken at their face value and assumed to be true. Once the date of knowledge is specifically pleaded and forms the basis of the cause of action, the issue of limitation cannot be decided summarily. It becomes a mixed question of law and fact, which cannot be adjudicated at the threshold

¶126

22

¶127

stage under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Therefore, rejection of the plaint on the ground of limitation without permitting the parties to lead evidence, is legally unsustainable.

¶128

12.2. In this regard, we may usefully refer to the following decisions of this Court, which have consistently held that when the question of limitation involves disputed facts or hinges on the date of knowledge, such issues cannot be decided at the stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC: (i) DalibenValjibhai v. Prajapati Kodarbhai Kachrabhai⁷

¶129

“10. The First Appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendants made an application for correcting the revenue records only in the year 2017 and on the said application the Deputy Collector issued notice to the plaintiffs in March 2017 and that was the time when the plaintiffs came to know about the execution of the sale deed. It is under these circumstances that the suit was instituted in the year 2017. While the High Court came to the correct conclusion that under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, a suit can be instituted within 3 years of the knowledge, it proceeded to return a finding that in cases where the document is registered, the knowledge must be presumed from the date of registration.

¶130

11….

¶131

12. Further, in Chhotanben v. Kirtibhai Jalkrushnabhai Thakkar where again a suit for cancellation of sale deed was opposed through an application under Order 7 Rule 11, on ground of limitation, this Court specifically held that limitation in all such cases will arise from date of knowledge. The relevant portion is as follows:

¶132

“15. What is relevant for answering the matter in issue in the context of the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC, is to examine the averments in the plaint. The plaint is required to be read as a whole. The defence available to the defendants or the plea taken by them in the written statement or any application filed by them, cannot be the basis to decide the application under Order 7 Rule 11(d). Only the averments in the plaint are germane. It is common ground that the registered sale deed is dated 1810-1996. The limitation to challenge the registered sale deed ordinarily would start running from the date on which

¶133

23

¶134

the sale deed was registered. However, the specific case of the appellant-plaintiffs is that until 2013 they had no knowledge whatsoever regarding execution of such sale deed by their brothers, original Defendants 1 and 2, in favour of JaikrishnabhaiPrabhudas Thakkar or Defendants 3 to 6. They acquired that knowledge on 26-12-2012 and immediately took steps to obtain a certified copy of the registered sale deed and on receipt thereof they realised the fraud played on them by their brothers concerning the ancestral property and two days prior to the filing of the suit, had approached their brothers (original Defendants 1 and 2) calling upon them to stop interfering with their possession and to partition the property and provide exclusive possession of half (½) portion of the land so designated towards their share. However, when they realised that the original Defendants 1 and 2 would not pay any heed to their request, they had no other option but to approach the court of law and filed the subject suit within two days therefrom. According to the appellants, the suit has been filed within time after acquiring the knowledge about the execution of the registered sale deed. In this context, the trial court opined that it was a triable issue and declined to accept the application filed by Respondent 1- Defendant 5 for rejection of the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11(d). That view commends to us.

¶135

19. In the present case, we find that the appellant- plaintiffs have asserted that the suit was filed immediately after getting knowledge about the fraudulent sale deed executed by original Defendants 1 and 2 by keeping them in the dark about such execution and within two days from the refusal by the original Defendants 1 and 2 to refrain from obstructing the peaceful enjoyment of use and possession of the ancestral property of the appellants. We affirm the view taken by the trial court that the issue regarding the suit being barred by limitation in the facts of the present case, is a triable issue and for which reason the plaint cannot be rejected at the threshold in exercise of the power under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC.”

¶136

(emphasis supplied)

¶137

13. In view of the above, there was no justification for the High Court in allowing the application under Order 7 Rule 11, on issues that were not evident from the plaint averments itself. The High Court was also not justified in holding that the limitation period commences from the date

¶138

24

¶139

of registration itself. In this view of the matter the judgment of the High Court is unsustainable.”

¶140

(ii) Salim D. Agboatwala v. ShamaljiOddhavji Thakkar⁸

¶141

“11. As observed by this Court in P.V. Guru Raj Reddy v. P. Neeradha Reddy [(2015) 8 SCC 331 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ) 100], the rejection of plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 is a drastic power conferred on the court to terminate a civil action at the threshold. Therefore, the conditions precedent to the exercise of the power are stringent and it is especially so when rejection of plaint is sought on the ground of limitation. When a plaintiff claims that he gained knowledge of the essential facts giving rise to the cause of action only at a particular point of time, the same has to be accepted at the stage of considering the application under Order 7 Rule 11.

¶142

12. Again as pointed out by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Chhotanben v. KiritbhaiJalkrushnabhai Thakkar [(2018) 6 SCC 422 : (2018) 3 SCC (Civ) 524], the plea regarding the date on which the plaintiffs gained knowledge of the essential facts, is crucial for deciding the question whether the suit is barred by limitation or not. It becomes a triable issue and hence the suit cannot be thrown out at the threshold.

¶143

13 …

¶144

14. But a defendant in a suit cannot pick up a few sentences here and there from the plaint and contend that the plaintiffs had constructive notice of the proceedings and that therefore limitation started running from the date of constructive notice. In fact, the plea of constructive notice is raised by the respondents, after asserting positively that the plaintiffs had real knowledge as well as actual notice of the proceedings. In any case, the plea of constructive notice appears to be a subsequent invention.”

¶145

(iii) Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. v. Central Bank of India

¶146

“6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC?

¶147

7. Indeed, Order 7 Rule 11 CPC gives ample power to the court to reject the plaint, if from the averments in the

¶148

25

¶149

plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by any law including the law of limitation. This position is no more res integra. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in Ram Prakash Gupta v. Rajiv Kumar Gupta [(2007) 10 SCC 59]. In paras 13 to 20, the Court observed as follows : (SCC pp. 65-66)

¶150

“13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to be

¶151

rejected in the following cases:

¶152

‘(a) where it does not disclose a cause of action;

¶153

(b) where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

¶154

(c) where the relief claimed is properly valued but the plaint is written upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the plaintiff, on being required by the court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed by the court, fails to do so;

¶155

(d) where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by any law;

¶156

(e) where it is not filed in duplicate;

¶157

(f) where the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9;’

¶158

14. In Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra, [(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that:

¶159

‘9. … the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power … at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage.…’ (SCC p. 560, para 9).

¶160

26

¶161

15. In ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [ITC Ltd. v. Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal, (1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic question to be decided while dealing with an application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code is whether a real cause of action has been set out in the plaint or something purely illusory has been stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code.

¶162

16. “The trial court must remember that if on a meaningful—not formal—reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC.” (See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], SCC p. 468.)

¶163

17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be read. As was observed by this Court in Roop Lal Sathi v. Nachhattar Singh Gill [(1982) 3 SCC 487], only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole must be rejected.

¶164

18. In Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen to find out whether clause (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 was applicable.

¶165

19. In SopanSukhdeo Sable v. Charity Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus : (SCC pp. 146-47, para 15)

¶166

‘15. There cannot be any compartmentalisation, dissection, segregation and inversions of the language of various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a course is adopted it would run counter to the cardinal canon of interpretation according to which a pleading has to be read as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is not permissible to cull out a sentence or a passage and to read it out of the context in isolation. Although it is the substance and not merely the form that has to be looked into, the pleading has to be construed as it stands without addition or subtraction or

¶167

27

¶168

words or change of its apparent grammatical sense. The intention of the party concerned is to be gathered primarily from the tenor and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole. At the same time it should be borne in mind that no pedantic approach should be adopted to defeat justice on hair-splitting technicalities.’

¶169

20. For our purpose, clause (d) is relevant. It makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain necessary averments relating to limitation, the same is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the duty of the person who files such an application to satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose how the same is in time. In order to answer the said question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record the order to that effect with the reasons for such order.”

¶170

8. On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable Trust & Educational Charitable Society v. Ponniamman Educational Trust [(2012) 8 SCC 706 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 612], observed as follows : (SCC pp. 713-15, paras 10-12)

¶171

“10. … It is clear from the above that where the plaint does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to enclose the required copies and the plaintiff fails to comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no other option except to reject the same. A reading of the above provision also makes it clear that power under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time before the conclusion of the trial.

¶172

11. This position was explained by this Court in Saleem Bhai v. State of Maharashtra [(2003) 1 SCC 557], in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code, it was held as under : (SCC p. 560, para 9)

¶173

‘9. A perusal of Order 7 Rule 11 CPC makes it clear that the relevant facts which need to be looked into for deciding an application thereunder are the averments in the plaint. The trial court can exercise the power under Order 7

¶174

28

¶175

Rule 11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before registering the plaint or after issuing summons to the defendant at any time before the conclusion of the trial. For the purposes of deciding an application under clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 Order 7 CPC, the averments in the plaint are germane; the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement would be wholly irrelevant at that stage, therefore, a direction to file the written statement without deciding the application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC cannot but be procedural irregularity touching the exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.’

¶176

It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the court to scrutinise the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage, the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only on the plaint averments. These principles have been reiterated in Raptakos Brett & Co. Ltd. v. Ganesh Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] and Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. v. Vessel M.V. Fortune Express [(2006) 3 SCC 100].

¶177

12. It is also useful to refer the judgment in T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC 467], wherein while considering the very same provision i.e. Order 7 Rule 11 and the duty of the trial court in considering such application, this Court has reminded the trial Judges with the following observation : (SCC p. 470, para 5)

¶178

‘5. … The learned Munsif must remember that if on a meaningful — not formal — reading of the plaint it is manifestly vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of not disclosing a clear right to sue, he should exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And, if clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the first hearing by examining the party searchingly under Order 10 CPC. An activist Judge is the answer to irresponsible law suits. The trial courts would insist imperatively on examining the party at the first hearing so that bogus litigation can be shot down at the earliest stage.

¶179

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¶180

The Penal Code is also resourceful enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI) and must be triggered against them.’

¶181

It is clear that if the allegations are vexatious and meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer, J. in the abovereferred decision [T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467], it should be nipped in the bud at the first hearing by examining the parties under Order 10 of the Code.”

¶182

14. All these events have been reiterated in Para 28 of the plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit. Indeed, the said para opens with the expression “the cause of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed and letter dated 21-7-2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to how the interest was being calculated”. This averment cannot be read in isolation.

¶183

22. It is well-established position that the cause of action for filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts. Further, the factum of the suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed question of fact and law. Even for that reason, invoking Order 7 Rule 11 CPC is ruled out. In the present case, the assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its claim was being processed by the regional office and the regional office would be taking appropriate decision at the earliest. That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8-5-2002 followed by another letter dated 19-9-2002 to the effect that the action taken by the Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further. This firm response from the respondent Bank could trigger the right of the appellant to sue the respondent Bank. Moreover, the fact that the appellant had eventually sent a legal notice on 28-11-2003 and again on 7-1-2005 and then filed the suit on 23-2-2005, is also invoked as giving rise to cause of action. Whether this plea taken by the appellant is genuine and legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending on the response of the respondents.”

¶184

30

¶185

13. In this backdrop, the approach of the High Court in reversing the well-reasoned order of the trial Court warrants interference. The trial Court had rightly held that the issue of limitation necessitated adjudication upon evidence, particularly in view of the appellant's assertion that the Power of Attorney executed by him did not confer any authority upon his father to alienate the suit property and that the impugned transaction came to his knowledge only at a much later point in time. In such circumstances, the determination of limitation involved disputed questions of fact that could not be summarily decided without the benefit of trial. The High Court, however, proceeded to reject the plaint solely on a prima facie assumption that the suit was barred by limitation, without undertaking any examination as to whether the plea regarding the date of knowledge was demonstrably false or inherently improbable in light of the record. In the opinion of this Court, such an approach amounts to an error of law and constitutes a misapplication of the wellestablished principles governing the exercise of power under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. For the same reasons, the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents are inapplicable, being factually distinguishable.

¶186

14. It is also to be noted that the appellant has categorically averred in the plaint that he executed the registered power of attorney in favour of his father solely for the limited purpose of constructing a house and carrying out related activities. There is no express clause authorizing his father to sell the suit property to any person without the appellant's consent and knowledge. Yet, the appellant's father executed a sale deed in favour of his granddaughter, going beyond the scope of the power of attorney, which raises serious doubt about misuse of authority and potential fraud. Such assertions cannot be rejected in the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC. Accordingly, we are of the view that the plaint discloses a cause of action which cannot be shut out at the threshold. Thus, the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction in refusing to reject the plaint and in holding that the matter ought to proceed to trial. The High Court, while exercising its revisional jurisdiction under Section 115 CPC, ought not to have interfered in the absence of any jurisdictional error or perversity in the

¶187

31

¶188

trial court's order. Rejecting the plaint where substantial factual disputes exist concerning limitation and the scope of authority under the Power of Attorney, is legally unsustainable.”

¶189

(Emphasis supplied)

¶190

The Apex Court holds that in certain cases plea of limitation becomes a mixed question of law and fact which necessitates adjudication upon evidence. When determination of limitation involves a disputed question of fact, the plaint cannot be summarily rejected without a full-fledged trial.

¶191

On the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court if the case at hand is noticed, what would unmistakably emerge is, that the issue revolves around seriously disputed questions of fact and law, which cannot be decided without evidence being let in. Though the power of attorney that is executed in the year 1995 is sought to be challenged in the 2024, for the reasons rendered in the plaint for such challenge and without the reasons being demolished by evidence, the plea of rejection of the plaint cannot be accepted.

¶192

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¶193

For the aforesaid reasons, the petition deserves to be

¶194

dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.

¶195

SD/(M.NAGAPRASANNA)

¶196

JUDGE

¶197

BKP CT:MJ

Sri.N Gangadhar v. Smt. Usha B

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