Ms. Ashwini T Vs the Karnataka Lokayukta

2 . MR. MAHESH S., S/O LATE SHETTAPPA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS NO. 189/6, 5^TH CROSS TELEPHONE EXCHANGE OFFICE ROAD M.V.EXTENSION, HOSAKOTE TOWN BENGALURU RURAL DISTRICT.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI B.B.PATIL, ADVOCATE FOR R-1)

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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 528 OF BHARATIYA NAGARIK SURAKSHA SANHITA, 2023, PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR IN CR.NO.8/2024 DATED 03.07.2024 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 7(a) OF THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPTION ACT REGISTERED ON THE FILE OF THE HON’BLE PRINCIPAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, KOLAR AT ANNEXURE A.

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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 07.04.2025, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA

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CAV ORDER

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The petitioner/accused No.1 is before this Court calling in question registration of crime in Crime No.8 of 2024 for offence punishable under Section 7(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’ for short).

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Facts in brief, borne out from the pleadings, are as follows:-

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The petitioner who is a public servant was at the relevant point of time working as Assistant Director of Land Records at Malur, Kolar District. One K.Kamanna said to be the owner of land in Sy.No.201/2 of Doddakdathur village, Kasaba Hobli, Malur Taluk through his GPA holder, the 2^nd respondent, applied for conversion of land from agriculture to non-agricultural purpose or residential purpose to be specific and on 24-04-2024 submits an application for alienation sketch. The concerned Revenue Inspector is said to have directed the 2^nd respondent to produce certain documents for the purpose of conversion. One of the documents sought is said to be the alienation sketch. The 2^nd respondent/complainant after filing the application for alienation sketch approaches the petitioner/Assistant Director of Land Records and enquired about the work. It is alleged that though on several occasions the 2^nd respondent visited, the work had not been completed.

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On 14-06-2024 the complainant is said to have sought the reason for delay in issuance of alienation sketch. The complainant is

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asked by the petitioner to approach the concerned Revenue Inspector and he would inform how much money is to be paid for the purpose of the sketch. The allegation is that the 2^nd respondent/complainant meets accused No.2 one Manjunatha, Revenue Inspector on 24-06-2024 and the complainant was informed that the amount was ₹30,000/- to ₹40,000/- for the purpose of preparation of the sketch. On that demand, it is the allegation, that the complainant paid ₹10,000/- to accused No.2 and informed him that he would pay the balance of ₹30,000/- and leaves the place. The 2^nd respondent then registers a complaint with the 1^st respondent/Karnataka Lokayukta on 03-07-2024. On that day a mahazar is drawn, trap proceedings are initiated and the complainant hands over a CD containing voice recording of the petitioner wherein, it is allegedly said, that the petitioner directs the complainant to meet accused No.2 and he will inform what would be the amount. The trap proceedings were conducted on 06-072024 by the 1^st respondent and an amount of ₹30,000/- was found in the possession of accused No.3 one S.Nagappa, a Group-D employee and the petitioner was taken into custody along with others. Registration of crime in Crime No.8 of 2024 and drawing

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the petitioner as accused No.1 is what has driven the petitioner to this Court in the subject petition.

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Heard Sri Sandesh J. Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri B.B.Patil, learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1.

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The learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner would vehemently contend that there is no proof of demand and acceptance in the case at hand, which is sine qua non for constituting an offence under Section 7 of the Act. Proof of demand should be at the spot/time of the trap, as it is a necessary ingredient to constitute the offence. Work pending, according to the learned senior counsel, is an essential ingredient to constitute an offence. There is need for trap laying officer to ascertain the alleged demand prior to initiating trap proceedings. Above all, the learned senior counsel would contend that the trap was conducted against accused Nos. 2 and 3 and the petitioner was not even present at the time of trap. The amount is recovered from accused No.2. The complaint itself states that the petitioner had asked the

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complainant to contact accused No.2 for getting the work done and there is no allegation in the complaint even that the petitioner made any demand of illegal gratification. On the aforesaid ground, the learned senior counsel submits that the subject case is a classic illustration of a failed trap and the petitioner is being dragged into the web of proceedings without any rhyme or reason.

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Per contra, the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for Lokayukta Sri B.B.Patil would vehemently refute the submissions in contending that the issues projected by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner are all a matter of trial. There is an allegation of demand and acceptance for handing it over to the petitioner. He would accept the fact that the petitioner was not present at the time of trap. No amount was recovered from the petitioner. The only allegation even in the complaint is that the petitioner had asked the complainant to meet accused No.2. He would however, submit that all these would be a matter of investigation in the least. As the matter is still at the stage of investigation, this Court should not interfere at this stage. Both the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the learned Special

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Public Prosecutor Sri B.B. Patil place reliance upon several judgments of the Apex Court and that of this Court, all of them would bear consideration qua their relevance in the course of the order.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record.

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The afore-narrated facts are borne out from the pleadings, the complaint or the trap mahazar. Therefore, they would not be necessary to be reiterated again. Before embarking upon consideration of the case of the petitioner on its merit, I deem it appropriate to notice the elucidation of law by the Apex Court both pre and post amendment to the Act interpreting and necessary ingredients of Section 7(a) of the Act. The provisions of the Act that are alleged are as follows:

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“7. Offence relating to public servant being bribed. —Any public servant who,—

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(a) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain from any person, an undue advantage, with the intention to perform or cause performance of public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or cause

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forbearance to perform such duty either by himself or by another public servant; or

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(b) obtains or accepts or attempts to obtain, an undue advantage from any person as a reward for the improper or dishonest performance of a public duty or for forbearing to perform such duty either by himself or another public servant; or

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(c) performs or induces another public servant to perform improperly or dishonestly a public duty or to forbear performance of such duty in anticipation of or in consequence of accepting an undue advantage from any person,

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shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation 1.—For the purpose of this section, the obtaining, accepting, or the attempting to obtain an undue advantage shall itself constitute an offence even if the performance of a public duty by public servant, is not or has not been improper.

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Illustration.—A public servant, ‘S’ asks a person, ‘P’ to give him an amount of five thousand rupees to process his routine ration card application on time. ‘S’ is guilty of an offence under this section.

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Explanation 2.—For the purpose of this section,—

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(i) the expressions “obtains” or “accepts” or “attempts to obtain” shall cover cases where a person being a public servant, obtains or “accepts” or attempts to obtain, any undue advantage for himself or for another person, by abusing his position as a public servant or by using his personal influence over another public servant; or by any other corrupt or illegal means;

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(ii) it shall be immaterial whether such person being a public servant obtains or accepts, or attempts to obtain the undue advantage directly or through a third party.]

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7-A. Taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence.—Whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person any undue advantage as a motive or reward to induce a public servant, by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of his personal influence to perform or to cause performance of a public duty improperly or dishonestly or to forbear or to cause to forbear such public duty by such public servant or by another public servant, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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12. Punishment for abetment of offences.—Whoever abets any offence punishable under this Act, whether or not that offence is committed in consequence of that abetment, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than three years, but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant .—(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,—

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(a) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or any property under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or

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(b) if he intentionally enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office.

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Explanation 1.—A person shall be presumed to have intentionally enriched himself illicitly if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession of or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account for.

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Explanation 2.—The expression “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful sources.

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(2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than four years but which may extend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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Section 7 directs that any public servant who accepts or attempts to obtain from any person undue advantage with an intention to perform or cause performance of public duty or to forbear such performance either by himself or by another public servant is said

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to have committed the offence of bribe. Therefore the soul of Section 7(a) is demand and acceptance for the performance of public duty or forbearance of such performance. Section 7A deals with taking undue advantage to influence public servant by corrupt or illegal means or by exercise of personal influence. The section mandates that whoever accepts or obtains or attempts to obtain from another person for himself or for any other person undue advantage for performance of a public duty or its forbearance is amenable for punishment. Here again it should be demand and acceptance by himself or through some other person. Section 12 deals with abatement of offence which cannot be applicable to the petitioner. Section 13(2) deals with punishment for criminal

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misconduct. Criminal misconduct is defined in Section 13(1)(a) that whoever dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or enriches himself illicitly during the period of his office. These are the offences alleged against the petitioner. Since the soul is Section 7 either under the un-amended Act or under the amended Act, the interpretation of Section 7(a) or Section 7A by the Apex Court qua un-amended Act or the amended Act is germane to be noticed.

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INTERPRETATION UNDER THE UN-AMENDED ACT:

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The Apex Court in the case of B.JAYARAJ v. STATE OF

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ANDHRA PRADESH¹ interprets Section 7 of the Act and holds as follows:

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“ 7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [(2010) 15 SCC 1 :

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1 (2014) 13 SCC 55

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(2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [(2009) 3 SCC 779: (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1].”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In the case of N.VIJAYAKUMAR v. STATE OF TAMILNADU² the Apex Court holds as follows:

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“26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.

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27. The relevant paras 7, 8 and 9 of the judgment in B. Jayaraj [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] read as under: (SCC pp. 5859)

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“7. Insofar as the offence under Section 7 is concerned, it is a settled position in law that demand of illegal gratification is sine qua non to

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2 (2021) 3 SCC 687

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constitute the said offence and mere recovery of currency notes cannot constitute the offence under Section 7 unless it is proved beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted the money knowing it to be a bribe. The above position has been succinctly laid down in several judgments of this Court. By way of illustration, reference may be made to the decision in C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P. [C.M. Sharma v. State of A.P., (2010) 15 SCC 1 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 89] and C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] .

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8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Ext. P-11) before LW 9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW 1 and the contents of Ext. P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a

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public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established.

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9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”

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The abovesaid view taken by this Court fully supports the case of the appellant. In view of the contradictions noticed by us above in the depositions of key witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, we are of the view that the demand for and acceptance of bribe amount and cellphone by the appellant, is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Having regard to such evidence on record the acquittal recorded by the trial court is a “possible view” as such the judgment [State of T.N. v. N. Vijayakumar, 2020 SCC OnLine Mad 7098] of the High Court is fit to be set aside. Before recording conviction under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, the courts have to take utmost care in scanning the evidence. Once conviction is recorded under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, it casts a social stigma on the person in the society apart from serious consequences on the service rendered. At the same time it is also to be noted that whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view or not, there cannot be any definite proposition and each case has to be judged on its own merits, having regard to evidence on record.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court, later, in the case of K.SHANTHAMMA v. STATE OF TELANGANA³ has held as follows:

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“10. We have given careful consideration to the submissions. We have perused the depositions of the prosecution witnesses. The offence under Section 7 of the PC Act relating to public servants taking bribe requires a demand of illegal gratification and the acceptance thereof. The proof of demand of bribe by a public servant and its acceptance by him is sine qua non for establishing the offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

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11. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P. [P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152 : (2016) 1 SCC (Cri) 11] , this Court has summarised the wellsettled law on the subject in para 23 which reads thus : (SCC p. 159) “23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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12. The prosecution's case is that the appellant had kept pending the return of commercial tax filed by the said Society for the year 1996-97. The appellant had issued a notice dated 14-2-2000 to the said Society calling upon the said Society to produce the record. Accordingly, the necessary books were

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3 (2022) 4 SCC 574

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produced by the said Society. The case made out by PW 1 is that when he repeatedly visited the office of the appellant in February 2020, the demand of Rs 3000 by way of illegal gratification was made by the appellant for passing the assessment order. However, PW 1, in his cross-examination, accepted that the notice dated 26-2-2000 issued by the appellant was received by the said Society on 15-3-2000 in which it was mentioned that after verification of the books of accounts of the said Society, exemption from payment of commercial tax as claimed by the said Society was allowed. PW 1 accepted that it was stated in the said notice that there was no necessity for the said Society to pay any commercial tax for Assessment Year 1996-97.

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13. According to the case of PW 1, on 23-3-2000, he visited the appellant's office to request her to issue final assessment order. According to his case, at that time, initially, the appellant reiterated her demand of Rs 3000. But she scaled it down to Rs 2000. Admittedly, on 15-3-2000, the said Society was served with a notice informing the said Society that an exemption has been granted from payment of commercial tax to the said Society. Therefore, the said Society was not liable to pay any tax for the year 1996-97. The issue of the final assessment order was only a procedural formality. Therefore, the prosecution's case about the demand of bribe made on 233-2000 by the appellant appears to be highly doubtful.

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14. PW 1 described how the trap was laid. In the pre-trap mediator report, it has been recorded that LW 8, Shri R. Hari Kishan, was to accompany PW 1 — complainant at the time of offering the bribe. PW 7 Shri P.V.S.S.P. Raju deposed that PW 8 Shri U.V.S. Raju, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB, had instructed LW 8 to accompany PW 1 — complainant inside the chamber of the appellant. PW 8 has accepted this fact by stating in the examination-in-chief that LW 8 was asked to accompany PW 1 and observe what transpires between the appellant and PW 1. PW 8, in his evidence, accepted that only PW 1 entered the chamber of the appellant and LW 8 waited outside the chamber. Even PW 7 admitted in the cross-examination that when PW 1 entered the appellant's chamber, LW 8 remained outside in the corridor. Thus, LW 8 was supposed to be an independent witness accompanying PW 1. In breach of the directions issued to him by PW 8, he did not accompany PW 1

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inside the chamber of the appellant, and he waited outside the chamber in the corridor. The prosecution offered no explanation why LW 8 did not accompany PW 1 inside the chamber of the appellant at the time of the trap.

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15. Therefore, PW 1 is the only witness to the alleged demand and acceptance. According to PW 1, firstly, the demand was made of Rs 3000 by the appellant on 24-2-2000. Thereafter, continuously for three days, she reiterated the demand when he visited the appellant's office. Lastly, the appellant made the demand on 29-2-2000 and 23-3-2000. On this aspect, he was cross-examined in detail by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. His version about the demand and acceptance is relevant which reads thus:

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“In the vicinity of office of AO the jeep, in which we went there was stopped and I was asked to go into the office of AO and the trap party took vantage positions. Accordingly, I went inside the office of AO. I wished AO. At that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and he was talking to the AO. AO offered me a chair. After discussion with the AO the said other person left the room of AO. I informed AO that I brought the bribe amount as demanded by her and also asked her to issue the final assessment orders. Then I took the said tainted currency notes from my shirt pocket and I was about to give the same to the AO and on which instead of taking the same amount directly by her with her hands she took out a diary from her table drawer, opened the diary and asked me to keep the said amount in the diary. Accordingly, I kept the amount in the said diary. She closed the said diary and again kept the same in her table drawer and locked the drawer and kept the keys in her hand bag which was hanging to her seat. She pressed the calling bell and a lady attender came into the room of AO, then she instructed the lady attender to call ACTO concerned to her along with the society records concerned.

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Accordingly, ACTO came to AO along with record. After going through the ledger and cash book, etc. AO signed on the last page of the said ledger and cash book mentioning 26-2-2000

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below her signature in the said register though she signed on 27-3-2000 in my presence. AO directed her attender to affix official rubber stamp below her signature in the ledger and cash book and accordingly attender affixed the same. AO also signed on the office note of final assessment orders at that time. Thereafter, I collected the general ledger and cash book from the attender after affixing the said rubber stamp thereon and came out of the office of AO and relayed the pre-arranged signal to the trap party.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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16. Thus, PW 1 did not state that the appellant reiterated her demand at the time of trap. His version is that on his own, he told her that he had brought the amount. What is material is the cross-examination on this aspect. In the cross-examination, PW 1 accepted that his version regarding the demand made by the appellant on various dates was an improvement. The relevant part of the cross-examination of the appellant reads thus:

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“I did not state to ACB Inspector in Section 161 CrPC statement that on the evening of 24-2-2000 I met the AO and that she demanded the bribe. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that continuously for 3 days after 24-2-2000 I met the AO and the AO reiterated her demand. I did not mention in Ext. P-3 complaint that on 29-2-2000 I approached the AO and the AO demanded bribe of Rs 3000 and that unless I pay the said bribe amount she will not issue final assessment orders. I did not state in my Section 164 statement before the Magistrate that 13-3-2000 to 16-3-2000 I was on leave and from 1-3-2000 to 12-3-2000, I was engaged in recovering the dues of the society. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO continuously 3 days i.e. on 25-2-2000, 26-2-2000 and 27-2-2000 and that 27-2-2000 is Sunday. It is not true to suggest that I did not meet the AO in the evening of 24-2-2000 and that AO did not demand any money from me. I did not state in my Section 161 CrPC statement to Inspector of ACB that before I left the office of DSP on the date of trap I made a phone call enquiring about the availability of AO and the AO was in the office and informed me that she should be available in the office from 6.00 to 7.00 p.m. on that day

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so also in my Section 164 CrPC. I made such a phone call from the office of the DSP, ACB. I do not remember as to from which phone number I made phone call on that day. I cannot describe office telephone number of the AO. It is not true to suggest that I did not make any such phone call to AO and that she did not give any such reply to me. I did not state to ACB Inspector in my Section 161 CrPC statement or to the Magistrate in my Section 164 CrPC statement that I went inside the office of AO and I wished AO and at that time apart from AO some other person was found in the office room of AO and that he was talking to the AO and that the AO offered me a chair and that after discussion with the AO the said person left the room of AO and then I informed the AO that I brought the bribe amount. I did not state that said aspects to DSP during the post trap proceedings also.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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17. Thus, the version of PW 1 in his examination-in-chief about the demand made by the appellant from time to time is an improvement. As stated earlier, LW 8 did not enter the appellant's chamber at the time of trap. There is no other evidence of the alleged demand. Thus, the evidence of PW 1 about the demand for bribe by the appellant is not at all reliable. Hence, we conclude that the demand made by the appellant has not been conclusively proved.

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18. PW 2, Shri B.D.V. Ramakrishna had no personal knowledge about the demand. However, he accepted that on 15-3-2000, the said Society received a communication informing that the said Society need not pay any tax for the year 1996-97. PW 3 Shri L. Madhusudhan was working as Godown Incharge with the said Society. He stated that on 15-32000, when he visited the appellant's office, ACTO served the original notice dated 26-2-2000 in which it was mentioned that the Society was not liable to pay any tax. It is his version that when he met the appellant on the same day, she enquired whether he had brought the demanded amount of Rs 3000. However, PW 3 did not state that the appellant demanded the said amount for granting any favour to the said society.

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19. PW 4 Ahmed Moinuddin was ACTO at the relevant time. He deposed that on 27-3-2000, the appellant instructed him to prepare the final assessment order, which was kept ready in the morning. He stated that he was called at 6 p.m. to the chamber of the appellant along with books of the said Society. At that time, PW 1 was sitting there. He stated that the appellant subscribed her signature on a Register of the said Society and put the date as 26-2-2000 below it. He was not a witness to the alleged demand. However, in the crossexamination, he admitted that the appellant had served a memo dated 21-3-2000 to him alleging that he was careless in performing his duties.”

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The afore-quoted judgments were rendered interpreting Section 7 as it stood prior to amendment. The Apex Court holds that demand and acceptance are sine qua non for an offence under Section 7 of the Act.

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JUDGMENTS POST AMENDMENT:

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The Apex Court has further interpreted Section 7(a) post

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amendment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA v. STATE (GOVT. OF

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N.C.T. OF DELHI⁴ and holds as follows:

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“ 8. Before we analyze the evidence, we must note that we are dealing with Sections 7 and 13 of the PC Act as they stood prior to the amendment made by the Act 16 of 2018 with effect from 26^th July 2018. We are referring to Sections 7 and 13 as they stood on the date of commission of the offence. Section 7, as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:

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4 2023 SCC OnLine SC 280

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“ 7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—

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Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than three years but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanations.-

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(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”- If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section.

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(b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money.

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(c) “Legal remuneration”The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept.

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(d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression.

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(e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section.”

¶133

9. Section 13(1)(d), as existed at the relevant time, reads thus:

¶134

“ 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.—

¶135

(1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,-

¶136

(a) ………………………………

¶137

(b) ………………………………

¶138

(c) ………………………………

¶139

(d) if he,-

¶140

(i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

¶141

(ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or

¶142

(iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or

¶143

(e) ………………………………….”

¶144

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¶145

10. The demand for gratification and the acceptance thereof are sine qua non for the offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act.

¶146

11. The Constitution Bench⁴ was called upon to decide the question which we have quoted earlier. In paragraph 74, the conclusions of the Constitution have been summarised, which read thus:

¶147

“ 74. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:

¶148

(a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶149

(b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary evidence.

¶150

(c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.

¶151

(d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

¶152

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act.

¶153

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¶154

In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

¶155

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment . In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶156

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Section 13(1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13(1)(d) and (i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶157

(e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a presumption of

¶158

25

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fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence of rebuttal presumption stands.

¶160

(f) In the event the complainant turns ‘hostile’, or has died or is unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused public servant.

¶161

(g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶162

(h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point

¶163

(e) as the former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in nature.”

¶164

(emphasis added)

¶165

12. The referred question was answered in paragraph 76 of the aforesaid judgment, which reads thus: “76. Accordingly, the question referred for consideration of this Constitution Bench is answered as under:

¶166

In the absence of evidence of the complainant (direct/primary, oral/ document-tary

¶167

26

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evidence), it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability/guilt of a public servant under Section 7 and Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the Act based on other evidence adduced by the prosecution .”

¶169

(emphasis added)

¶170

13. Even the issue of presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act has been answered by the Constitution Bench by holding that only on proof of the facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the Court to raise a presumption that illegal gratification was for the purpose of motive or reward as mentioned in Section 7 (as it existed prior to the amendment of 2018). In fact, the Constitution Bench has approved two decisions by the benches of three Hon'ble Judges in the cases of B. Jayara j¹ and P. Satyanarayana Murth y² . There is another decision of a three Judges' bench in the case of N. Vijayakumar v. State of Tamil Nadu⁵ , which follows the view taken in the cases of B. Jayaraj¹ and P. Satyanarayana Murth y² . In paragraph 9 of the decision in the case of B. Jayaraj¹ , this Court has dealt with the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act. In paragraph 9, this Court held thus:

¶171

“9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.”

¶172

(emphasis added)

¶173

14. The presumption under Section 20 can be invoked only when the two basic facts required to be proved under

¶174

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Section 7, are proved. The said two basic facts are ‘demand’ and ‘acceptance’ of gratification. The presumption under Section 20 is that unless the contrary is proved, the acceptance of gratification shall be presumed to be for a motive or reward, as contemplated by Section 7. It means that once the basic facts of the demand of illegal gratification and acceptance thereof are proved, unless the contrary are proved, the Court will have to presume that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated by Section 7. However, this presumption is rebuttable. Even on the basis of the preponderance of probability, the accused can rebut the presumption.

¶176

15. In the case of N. Vijayakuma r⁵ , another bench of three Hon'ble Judges dealt with the issue of presumption under Section 20 and the degree of proof required to establish the offences punishable under Section 7 and clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of PC Act. In paragraph 26, the bench held thus:

¶177

“ 26. It is equally well settled that mere recovery by itself cannot prove the charge of the prosecution against the accused. Reference can be made to the judgments of this Court in C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI [C.M. Girish Babu v. CBI, (2009) 3 SCC 779 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] and in B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P. [B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P., (2014) 13 SCC 55 : (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 543] In the aforesaid judgments of this Court while considering the case under Sections 7, 13(1) (d)(i) and (ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 it is reiterated that to prove the charge, it has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused voluntarily accepted money knowing it to be bribe. Absence of proof of demand for illegal gratification and mere possession or recovery of currency notes is not sufficient to constitute such offence. In the said judgments it is also held that even the presumption under Section 20 of the Act can be drawn only after demand for and acceptance of illegal gratification is proved. It is also fairly well settled that initial

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presumption of innocence in the criminal jurisprudence gets doubled by acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

¶180

(emphasis added)

¶181

16. Thus, the demand for gratification and its acceptance must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶182

17. Section 7, as existed prior to 26^th July 2018, was different from the present Section 7. The unamended Section 7 which is applicable in the present case, specifically refers to “any gratification”. The substituted Section 7 does not use the word “gratification”, but it uses a wider term “undue advantage”. When the allegation is of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof by the accused, it must be as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act. The fact that the demand and acceptance of gratification were for motive or reward as provided in Section 7 can be proved by invoking the presumption under Section 20 provided the basic allegations of the demand and acceptance are proved. In this case, we are also concerned with the offence punishable under clauses (i) and (ii) Section 13(1)(d) which is punishable under Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 13, which existed on the statute book prior to the amendment of 26^th July 2018, has been quoted earlier. On a plain reading of clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d), it is apparent that proof of acceptance of illegal gratification will be necessary to prove the offences under clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d). In view of what is laid down by the Constitution Bench, in a given case, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public servant can be proved by circumstantial evidence in the absence of direct oral or documentary evidence. While answering the referred question, the Constitution Bench has observed that it is permissible to draw an inferential deduction of culpability and/or guilt of the public servant for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The conclusion is that in absence of direct evidence, the demand and/or acceptance can always be proved by other evidence such as circumstantial evidence.

¶183

18. The allegation of demand of gratification and acceptance made by a public servant has to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. The decision of the Constitution

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Bench does not dilute this elementary requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Constitution Bench was dealing with the issue of the modes by which the demand can be proved. The Constitution Bench has laid down that the proof need not be only by direct oral or documentary evidence, but it can be by way of other evidence including circumstantial evidence. When reliance is placed on circumstantial evidence to prove the demand for gratification, the prosecution must establish each and every circumstance from which the prosecution wants the Court to draw a conclusion of guilt. The facts so established must be consistent with only one hypothesis that there was a demand made for gratification by the accused. Therefore, in this case, we will have to examine whether there is any direct evidence of demand. If we come to a conclusion that there is no direct evidence of demand, this Court will have to consider whether there is any circumstantial evidence to prove the demand.”

¶186

Subsequent to NEERAJ DUTTA’S case the Apex Court in the case of SOUNDARAJAN v. STATE⁵ has held as follows:

¶187

“ FINDING ON PROOF OF DEMAND

¶188

9. We have considered the submissions. It is well settled that for establishing the commission of an offence punishable under Section 7 of the PC Act, proof of demand of gratification and acceptance of the gratification is a sine qua non. Moreover, the Constitution Bench in the case of Neeraj Dutt a³ has reiterated that the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act can be invoked only on proof of facts in issue, namely, the demand of gratification by the accused and the acceptance thereof.

¶189

10. As stated earlier, complainant PW-2 has not supported the prosecution. He has not said anything in his examination-in-chief about the demand made by the appellant. The public prosecutor cross-examined PW-2. The witness stated that there was no demand of a bribe made by the appellant.

¶190

5 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 424

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¶192

According to him, he filed a complaint as the return of the sale deed was delayed. Though PW-2 accepted that he had filed the complaint, in the cross-examination, he was not confronted with the material portions of the complaint in which he had narrated how the alleged demand was made. The public prosecutor ought to have confronted the witness with his alleged prior statements in the complaint and proved that part of the complaint through the concerned police officer who had reduced the complaint into writing. However, that was not done.

¶193

11. Now, we turn to the evidence of the shadow witness (PW-3). In the examination-in-chief, he stated that the appellant asked the PW-2 whether he had brought the amount. PW-3 did not say that the appellant made a specific demand of gratification in his presence to PW-2. To attract Section 7 of the PC Act, the demand for gratification has to be proved by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. The word used in Section 7, as it existed before 26^th July 2018, is ‘gratification’. There has to be a demand for gratification. It is not a simple demand for money, but it has to be a demand for gratification. If the factum of demand of gratification and acceptance thereof is proved, then the presumption under Section 20 can be invoked, and the Court can presume that the demand must be as a motive or reward for doing any official act. This presumption can be rebutted by the accused.

¶194

12. There is no circumstantial evidence of demand for gratification in this case. In the circumstances, the offences punishable under Section 7 and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) have not been established. Unless both demand and acceptance are established, offence of obtaining pecuniary advantage by corrupt means covered by clauses (i) and (ii) of Section 13(1)(d) cannot be proved.”

¶195

The Apex Court in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA supra was clarifying and interpreting the judgment in the case of NEERAJ DUTTA which was rendered by a Constitution Bench and further holds that proof of demand and acceptance of gratification is sine qua non for any

¶196

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¶197

allegation under Section 7 of the Act, be it pre-amendment or postamendment. This is reiterated in the case of SOUNDARAJAN supra.

¶198

The Apex Court, in its latest judgment, in the case of AMAN BHATIA v. STATE (GNCT OF DELHI)⁶ , while considering

¶199

the purport of Section 7 of the Act has held as follows:

¶200

“…. …. ….

¶201

51. In C.K. Damodaran Nair v. Govt. of India, (1997) 9 SCC 477, this Court, although interpreting the term “accept” in the context of the 1947 Act, observed that “accept” means to take or receive with a consenting mind. In contrast, “obtain” was understood to imply securing or gaining something as a result of a request or effort. In both instances, a demand or request by the receiver is a prerequisite for establishing an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

¶202

52. It is well-settled that mere recovery of tainted money, by itself, is insufficient to establish the charges against an accused under the PC Act. To sustain a conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act respectively, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the public servant voluntarily accepted the money, knowing it to be a bribe. The courts have consistently reiterated that the demand for a bribe is sine qua non for establishing an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act.

¶203

53. A five-Judge Bench of this Court in Neeraj Dutta v. State (Government of NCT of Delhi), (2023) 4 SCC 731, categorically held that an offer by bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant have to be proved by the

¶204

6 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1013

¶205

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¶206

prosecution as a fact in issue for conviction under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. Mere acceptance of illegal gratification without proof of offer by bribe-giver and demand by the public servant would not make an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the PC Act. The relevant observations are reproduced hereinbelow:

¶207

“ 88.4. (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following aspects have to be borne in mind:

¶208

(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe-giver without there being any demand from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.

¶209

(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe-giver accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the public servant. This is an offence under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.

¶210

(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe-giver and the demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an offence under Section 7 or Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii), respectively of the Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe-giver which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence. Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the bribe-giver and in turn there is a payment made which is received by the public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act.”

¶211

(Emphasis supplied)

¶212

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¶213

54. It was further explained by this Court in P. Satyanarayana Murthy v. State of A.P., (2015) 10 SCC 152, as follows:

¶214

“ 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Section 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder.”

¶215

(Emphasis supplied)

¶216

55. From the above exposition of law, it may be safely concluded that mere possession and recovery of tainted currency notes from a public servant, in the absence of proof of demand, is not sufficient to establish an offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the PC Act respectively. Consequently, without evidence of demand for illegal gratification, it cannot be said that the public servant used corrupt or illegal means, or abused his position, to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage in terms of Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

¶217

56. The present case is not one of an “offer to pay by the bribe-giver” where, in the absence of any demand from the public servant, the mere acceptance of illegal gratification would constitute an offence under Section 7 of the PC Act. The expression “offer” indicates that there is a conveyance of an intention to give, which must be communicated and understood by the recipient, leading to meeting of minds. Consequently, the offer is accepted. For such an acceptance to constitute an offence under Section 7, there must be clear and cogent evidence establishing that the public servant was aware of the offer and accepted it voluntarily, knowing it to be illegal gratification. In other words, even where there is no express demand, the bribe-giver and the bribe-taker must be shown to have been ad idem as regards the factum of offer of bribe.

¶218

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¶219

57. By applying the abovementioned principles to the evidence on record, we are of the considered view that, having regard to material inconsistencies in the testimony of the complainant and the testimony of the panch witness, the allegation of demand by the appellant herein does not emerge clearly, let alone being proved beyond reasonable doubt.

¶220

58. Undoubtedly, when dealing with a wholly reliable witness, the court faces no difficulty in reaching a conclusion, it may convict or acquit solely on the basis of such testimony, provided it is free from any suspicion of interestedness, incompetence, or subordination. Similarly, in the case of a wholly unreliable witness, the court again faces no ambiguity in discarding the testimony. The real challenge arises when the witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In such situations, the court must proceed with caution and seek corroboration in material particulars, whether through direct or circumstantial evidence. The court's duty to act on the testimony of a single witness arises when it is satisfied, upon a careful perusal of the testimony, that it is free from all taints and suspicions. [See: VediveluThevar v. State of Madras, 1957 SCC OnLine SC 13; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 390].”

¶221

The Apex Court also considers the presumption under Section 20 of the Act and holds on examination of evidence, the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Apex Court has held as follows:

¶222

v. Presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act

¶223

64. Insofar as the presumption under Section 20 of the PC Act is concerned, such presumption is drawn only qua the offence under Sections 7 and 11 respectively and not qua the

¶224

35

¶225

offence under Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act. The presumption is contingent upon the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification to the effect that the gratification was demanded and accepted as a motive or reward as contemplated under Section 7 of the PC Act. Such proof of acceptance can follow only when the demand is proved.

¶226

65. In that case, the prosecution evidence alone cannot be considered for the purpose of coming to the conclusion. The evidence led by the prosecution and, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, are also required to be considered. It is then to be seen as to whether the total effect of the entire evidence led before the court is of a nature by which the only conclusion possible was that the public servant accepted the amount. If the answer is in affirmative, then alone it can be held that the prosecution established the case beyond reasonable doubt.

¶227

66. Undoubtedly, the presumption under Section 20 arises once it is established that the public servant accepted the gratification. However, in determining whether such acceptance occurred, the totality of the evidence led at the trial must be appreciated. The evidence led by the prosecution, the suggestions made by the defence witnesses, if any, the entire record is required to be considered. Only if the cumulative effect of all the evidence is such that the sole possible conclusion is that the public servant accepted the gratification can it be said that the prosecution has established its case beyond reasonable doubt.

¶228

67. On examination of the entire evidence, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond all reasonable doubt, the demand of bribe and its acceptance, in a trap laid by the ACB. In such circumstances, there is no question of a presumption under Section 20. Consequently, we find ourselves compelled to conclude that it would be entirely illegal to uphold the conviction of the appellant under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) read with Section 13(2) of the Act.

¶229

G. CONCLUSION

¶230

68. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we have reached the following conclusion:

¶231

36

¶232

68.1 The legislature has used a comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose of punishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption. Keeping this intention of the legislature in mind, we are of the view that the definition of “public servant” as defined under the PC Act should be given a purposive and wide interpretation so as to advance the object underlying the statute.

¶233

68.2 It is the nature of duty being discharged by a person which assumes paramount importance when determining whether such a person falls within the ambit of the definition of public servant as defined under the PC Act.

¶234

68.3 Stamp vendors across the country, by virtue of performing an important public duty and receiving remuneration from the Government for the discharge of such duty, are undoubtedly public servants within the ambit of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.

¶235

68.4 In the case at hand, the appellant was eligible for receiving discount on the purchase of stamp papers owing to the license that he was holding. Further, the discount is traceable to and is governed by the 1934 Rules framed by the State Government. Thus, the appellant, without a doubt, could be said to be “remunerated by the government” for the purposes of Section 2(c)(i) of the PC Act.

¶236

68.5 Further, the prosecution has failed in establishing the allegation of demand for illegal gratification and acceptance thereof beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant for the offences under Section 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act cannot be sustained and is, thus, liable to be set aside.”

¶237

On a coalesce of the judgments rendered by the Apex Court, as quoted supra, the soul of Section 7 is demand and acceptance. The unmistakable inference on the interpretation, in the considered view

¶238

37

¶239

of the Court would be, if there is demand but no acceptance it would not make an offence under Section 7. If there is acceptance but no demand, it would then also make no offence under Section 7. An act alleged under Section 7 should have the ingredients of demand and acceptance and it is for the performance of a public duty or forbearance from performance. Therefore, demand and acceptance should be for the purpose of performance of some duty. For such performance there should be work pending at the hands of the public servant against whom Section 7 is alleged.

¶240

APPLICABILITY OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF THE CASE :

¶241

In the case at hand, the petitioner at the relevant point in time, was working as Assistant Director of Land Records. The issue revolves round furnishing of an alienation sketch for the purpose of conversion of land of CW-5 whose General Power of Attorney was held by CW-1. It appears that CW-1 approaches the petitioner when the petitioner only asks CW-1 to meet accused No.2 one Manjunatha, Revenue Inspector. It is accused No.2 who is said to have demanded ₹30,000/- to ₹40,000/- for the purpose of

¶242

38

¶243

preparation of alienation sketch. ₹10,000/- is said to have been paid to Manjunatha and the balance of ₹30,000/- is promised to be paid to Manjunatha. Therefore, the complaint itself narrates that the amount was demanded by Manjunatha. In the light of the aforesaid facts, it is necessary to notice the complaint. The complaint reads as follows:

¶244

“¢£ÁAPÀ: 03.07.2024

¶245

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¶246

WೕಲSಂಡ "ಷಯ(ೆS ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ , ಮ�ೇ� ಆದ �ಾನು ತಮ)ೆ "ನಂEಸುವX;ೇ�ೆಂದ�ೆ , �ಾನು *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು, ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ:, ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು

¶247

39

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)ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ.201/2 ರ 0-35 ಗುಂ�ೆ)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ @.A.ಕನBಷ0�)ಾC Y�ಾಂಕ 24-04-2024 ರಂದು ಅ50 ಸ�6Aರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ ಮತು� Y�ಾಂಕ: 04-05-2024 ರಂದು ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ)ೆ ಅ50 ಸಂ>ೆ+: 19090524804477 ರಂ8ೆ ಅ50ಯನುZ ಸ�6Aರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . @.A.ಕನBಷ0�)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ ಕಸ9ಾ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರನುZ [ೇT *ಾಡ2ಾC ಕನBಷ0� ಾ@A(ೊಡಲು ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ಮತು� ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆಯನುZ (ೊಡಲು ಸೂ]Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಆಗ �ಾನು ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ)ೆ ಅ50 ಸ�6Aದಂ8ೆ ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ (ೋ� ಎ.@.ಎG.ಆH ಅDBF ರವರನುZ ಸಂಪ_0A ನನZ (ೆಲಸದ ಬ)ೆV "�ಾ�Aರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಹಲಾರು 9ಾ� ಕaೇ�)ೆ [ೇT Fೕ@ದರೂ ಸಹ ಆDBF ರವರು ನನZ (ೆಲಸವನುZ *ಾ@ರುವXYಲ6. Y�ಾಂಕ:14.06.2024 ರಂದು ಮ8ೊ�Wb D=ೕಮE ಅDBF ರವರ ಬ: ನನZ (ೆಲಸ "ಳಂಬಾಗುE�ರುವ ಬ)ೆV (ೇ:;ಾಗ ನನZ ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರ ಬ: �ೋC ಅವರು ಎಷುU ಹಣ (ೊಡ9ೇ(ೆಂದು E:ಸು8ಾ � ೆ . ಅದರಂ8ೆ �ಾನು Y�ಾಂಕ:24.06.2024 ರಂದು �ಾನು ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರನುZ ನನZ (ೆಲಸದ ಬ)ೆV "�ಾ�ಸ2ಾC, ಎರಡು-ಮೂರು Yನ cಟುU ಬರುವಂ8ೆ E:Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . Y�ಾಂಕ:27.06.2024 ರಂದು ಮdಾ+ಹZ ಸುಾರು 3:30 ಗಂ�ೆ)ೆ ಆH.ಐ, ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರನುZ [ೇT *ಾ@ "�ಾರ *ಾಡ2ಾC, ಎ2ಾ6 ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ¥Àj²Ã°¹ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳO ಸ� ಇರುವXYಲ6`ೆಂದು ಅದನುZ ಸ�ಪ@ಸಲು 30-40 �ಾ"ರ ಆಗುತ�;ೆ ಎಂದು ಆH T A ಯ�6 ಕಲಂ ನಂ. 11 ರ�6 15 ವಷ0 ಪರ9ಾ�ೆ *ಾಡ9ಾರ;ೆಂದು ನಮೂ;ಾCರುತ�;ೆ ಎಂದು E:Aದರು. ಆಗ �ಾನು ಇದ(ೆS ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ ಏನು *ಾಡ9ೇಕು ಎಂದು (ೇ:;ಾಗ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರು 30-40 ಆಗುತ�;ೆ ಎಂದು ಮತು� ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳO ಸ�gಲ6. ಇದು C=ೕ� 9ೆ ®Ö)ೆ ಬರುತ�;ೆ ಎಂದು �ೌ� iಾ6Fಂj ರವ�)ೆ ಎರಡುವ�ೆ ಲ- ಖಚು0 ಬರುತ�;ೆ ಎಂದು E:A ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳO iಾ=ಬ6k ಇ;ೆ ಎಂದು �ೆದ�Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಆಗ �ಾನು ಅವರ ಬ: ಮನ" *ಾ@(ೊಂಡು (ೆಲಸ *ಾ@(ೊಡಲು (ೋ�ರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಸBಲl ಸಮಯದ ನಂತರ (ೈಸ�ೆZ ಮು>ಾಂತರ ಹಣವನುZ (ೊಡಲು ಒ8ಾ�gAರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಆಗ �ಾನು ನನZ�6 ಇದo ರೂ.10,000/-ಗಳ ಹಣವನುZ ಇಷU"ಲ6Yದoರೂ ಅವ�)ೆ (ೊTUರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ ಇನೂZ ಉ:(ೆ ರೂ.30,000/-ಗಳ ಹಣ(ೊಡು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ ಎಂದು �ೇ: �ೊರಟು ಬಂYರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಮ8ೆ� Y�ಾಂಕ: 28.06.2024 ರಂದು ನನZ q9ೈG ನಂಬH: 9449877755 q9ೈG �ೕ�Fಂದ ಆH.ಐ, ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ ರವರ q9ೈG ನಂಬH: 9986604604 )ೆ ಕ�ೆ *ಾ@;ಾಗ ಎ2c ಭಟಹ:t ಬ: ಬರುವಂ8ೆ E:Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಅದರಂ8ೆ �ಾನು ಅವರನುZ [ೇT *ಾ@;ಾಗ 9ೇ�ೆ 9ೇ�ೆ "ಷಯಗಳನುZ *ಾತ�ಾ@ �ೌ� iಾ6Fಂjನ�6 �ಾ�ೇ *ಾ@A(ೊಳOt8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ ಎಂದು �ೇ: ಕ@W ಹಣ(ೆS *ಾ@(ೊಡಲು (ೇ:(ೊಂ@ರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಆಗ ಅವರು ನನ)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದ (ೆಲಸ *ಾಡು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಆದ�ೆ �ೌ� iಾ6Fಂjನ�6 �ೆಚುu ಕ@Wvಾದ�ೆ FwbಷUಎಂದು �ೆದ�Aರು8ಾ � ೆ .

¶249

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¶250

ಆದುದ�ಂದ (ೋ2ಾರ 52ೆ6, *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು, ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ:, ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ.201/2 ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ)ಾC ಎ.@.ಎG.ಆH ಅDBF ರವರು ಕಸ9ಾ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರ ಮು>ಾಂತರ ಲಂಚ(ೆS 9ೇ@(ೆ ಇTUರುವXದ�ಂದ ಮತು� @.A.ಕನBಷ0�, ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ �ಾಗೂ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ಸ�ಪ@ಸಲು ಕಸ9ಾ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರು ಲಂಚ(ೆS 9ೇ@(ೆ ಇTUರುವXದ�ಂದ ನನ)ೆ ಲಂಚ (ೊಡಲು ಇಷU"ಲ6ದ (ಾರಣ ಸ(ಾ0� (ೆಲಸ(ಾSC ಲಂಚ(ೆS 9ೇ@(ೆ ಇTUರುವ ಎ.@.ಎG.ಆH ಅDBF �ಾಗೂ ಕಸ9ಾ ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರ "ರುದx (ಾನೂನು ಕ=ಮ ಜರುCಸಲು (ೋರು8ೆ�ೕ�ೆ . ಇದ�ೊಂY)ೆ @.A.ಕನBಷ0�)ಾC ಸ�6Aರುವ ಅ50 ಮತು� ಅ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ)ಾC ಸ�6Aರುವ ಅ50ಯ yೆ�ಾ�� ಪ=E, 5.z.ಎ ಪ=E �ಾಗೂ `ಾ{� �ೆ(ಾ!0 ಇರುವ 2 @.".@ ಗಳನುZ ಈ ಅ50}ಂY)ೆ ಲಗE�A ¸À°è¹PÉÆArgÀÄvÉÛÃ£É.

¶251

The narration in the complaint is what is noticed hereinabove. Based upon the said complaint a crime in Crime No.8 of 2024 for offences under Section 7(a) of the Act is registered. Registration leads to trap proceedings being laid. The trap is laid on 6-07-2024. The trap mahazar does not indicate any amount being recovered from the hands of the accused, much less accused No.1. All that the petitioner has done in the case at hand is referring the complainant to accused No.2, the Revenue Inspector. All other conversations are

¶252

between the Revenue Inspector and the complainant.

¶253

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¶254

From what is aforesaid, it become necessary to notice who is the complainant. The complainant is said to have presented a requisition seeking alienation sketch from the hands of the petitioner contending that he is the GPA holder of the original owner. The original owner is one K.Kamanna. On coming to know the activities of the complainant, the original owner has registered a crime against the complainant in Crime No.187 of 2024 alleging that the GPA holder/complainant has forged the signatures of the original owner and is wanting to present applications for conversion of the land for his own benefit. Forgery is alleged against the complainant and the said crime in Crime No.187 of 2024 is said to be pending investigation at the hands of the jurisdictional Police. The gist of the crime as found in column No.10 against the complainant is as follows:

¶255

“Y�ಾಂಕ 10/07/2024 ರಂದು �ಾE= 7-30 ಗಂ�ೆ)ೆ zvಾ0Y;ಾರರು ƒಾ&ೆ)ೆ �ಾಜ�ಾC Fೕ@ದ ದೂ�ನ �ಾ�ಾಂಶೇ�ೆಂದ�ೆ Y�ಾಂಕ 01/07/2024 ರಂದು ಮdಾ+ಹZ 1-30 ಗಂ�ೆ)ೆ zvಾ0Y;ಾರ�)ೆ �ೇ�ದ;ೊಡ� ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸೆ0 ನಂ 201/2 ರ�6ನ 35 ಗುಂ�ೆ , (5 ಗುಂ�ೆ ಖ�ಾಬು) ಜwೕನನುZ ಭೂ ಪ�ವತ0�ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಎ��ೇಷ� ನ?ೆ ತvಾ�(ೆ)ೆ ಾಲೂರು ಸ`ೇ0 ಇ2ಾ>ೆಯ ರ"ಕುಾH ರವರು ಬಂYದುo, ಇವರ yೊ8ೆ ಮ�ೇ� ಎಂಬುವರು ಸಹ ಬಂYದುo, zvಾ0Y;ಾರ�ಂದ ಮಹಜH )ಾC ಬಂYರುವX;ಾC �ೇ: >ಾ� �ಾ†ೆಗ:)ೆ ಸ‡ಯನುZ *ಾ@A(ೊಂ@ದುo, Y�ಾಂಕ 06/07/2024 ರಂದು (ೆಲವರು zvಾ0Y)ೆ ˆೕ� *ಾ@ FನZ ಜwೕFನ ಸಂಬಂಧ 2ೋ(ಾಯುಕ � )ೆ ದೂರು Fೕ@ ಎ.@.ಎG ಆH ಆDBF, ಆH.ಐ ಮಂಜು�ಾK ರವರನುZ 2ೋ(ಾಯುಕ� ˆ�ೕಸರು ವಶ(ೆS 8ೆ)ೆದು(ೊಂಡು �ೋCರುವX;ಾC

¶256

42

¶257

E:Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಆದ�ೆ ಈ ಸಂಬಂಧ zvಾ0Y;ಾರರು vಾವX;ೇ ದೂರು Fೕಡ;ೆ ಇದುo, ಜwೕFನ ಬ: ಬಂYದo ಮ�ೇ� ಎಂಬುವರು ನ?ೆ ತvಾ�(ೆ)ೆ ಅ,(ಾ�ಗಳO ಹಣ(ೆS ಒ8ಾ�gAರುವX;ಾC ದೂರನುZ Fೕ@ರು8ಾ � ೆ . zvಾ0Y;ಾರರ ಬ: vಾವ ಅ,(ಾ�ಗಳO ಹಣ(ೆS ಒ8ಾ�ಯ *ಾ@ರುವXYಲ6. ಆ�ೋzಗ:ಬ‰ರು ಒಳಸಂಚು ರೂzA qೕಸ *ಾಡುವ ಉ;ೆoೕಶYಂದ zvಾ0Y;ಾರರ ಜwೕFನ �ೆಸ�ನ�6 ಸ‡ಗಳನುZ ನಕ� *ಾ@, ನಕ� 5zಎ ಸೃ‹UA(ೊಂಡು zvಾ0Y;ಾರರ ಜwೕನನುZ ಲಪ�ಾgಸಲು ಪ=ಯEZAದುo, zvಾ0Y;ಾರರ �ೆಸರು ಮತು� ಜwೕನನುZ ಉಪ}ೕCA(ೊಂಡು 2ೋ(ಾಯುಕ� ಇ2ಾ>ೆ)ೆ ಸುಳOt, ದೂರನುZ Fೕ@ದುo, ಇವರುಗಳ "ರುದx (ಾನೂನು ಕ=ಮ (ೈ)ೊಳtಲು (ೋ� ದೂರು.”

¶258

A perusal at the gist of the crime would indicate that the complainant has allegedly forged the signatures on the GPA and taken signatures of CW-5 on blank papers and registered the complaint along with an application for conversion. The investigation in Crime No.187 of 2024 is pending before the jurisdictional Police. Though this would be beside the point, it was necessary to notice in the light of the fact that a crime is registered against the complainant. When information is sought from the hands of the Tahsildar by accused No.2 with regard to the application filed or otherwise by the complainant all the queries are answered by the following communication to the Police Inspector of the Lokayukta:

¶259

“ £ÀA.J.J¯ï.J£ï/ gov2024-25 ¢£ÁAPÀ: 16/07/2024 ರವ�)ೆ : ˆೕ�ೕ� ಇ�� iೆಕUH ರವರು,

¶260

43

¶261

ಕ�ಾ0ಟಕ 2ೋ(ಾಯುಕ�

¶262

(ೋ2ಾರ 52ೆ6, (ೋ2ಾರ.

¶263

*ಾನ+�ೆ .

¶264

"ಷಯ:- zvಾ0Y;ಾರರು ಸ�6Aರುವ ಅ50ಯಂ8ೆ @.A.ಕನBಷ0� )ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ಒದCಸುವ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಆ�ೋz -02 D=ೕ ಎ�.5. ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ, �ಾಜ¸Àé F�ೕ-ಕರು ರವರ ಕತ0ವ+ ಾ+z� ಮತು� ಸದ� ಅ50ಯ�6 ಅವರ iಾತ= ಮತು� ಸದ�ಯವರ ಕತ0ವ+ ಹಂ](ೆ)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ "ವರಾದ *ಾ‡E ಮತು� ದೃŒೕಕೃತ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ಒದCಸುವ ಕು�ತು.

¶265

ಉ2ೆ6ೕಖ: ತಮb (ಾvಾ0ಲಯದ ¥ÀvÀæ ಸಂ>ೆ+:2ೋ�/(ೋ2ಾರ/A.ಆH 08/2024. ¢£ÁAP À : 15/07/2024.

¶266

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¶267

"ಷಯ(ೆS ಸಂಬಂYAದಂ8ೆ , Y�ಾಂಕ:03/07/2024ರಂದು ಮdಾ+ಹZ 3.00 ಗಂ�ೆ)ೆ zvಾ0Y;ಾರ�ಾದ D=ೕ ಮ�ೇ� ಎ�. c� 2ೇ.~ೆಟUಪl, �ೊಸ(ೋ�ೆ �ೌ�, 9ೆಂಗಳ•ರು )ಾ=*ಾಂತರ ರವರು Fೕ@ದ ದೂ�ನ Wೕ�ೆ)ೆ (ೋ2ಾರ 52ೆ6, ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6_ನ ಎ.@.ಎG.ಆH. ಕುಾ�. ಅDBF ಮತು� *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ: ಆH.ಐ. D=ೕ ಎ�.5.ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ ರವರ "ರುದx Fೕ@ದ ದೂ�ನ Wೕ�ೆ)ೆ ಪ=ಕರಣವನುZ ;ಾಖ�A(ೊಂ@ದುo, Y�ಾಂಕ:06/07/2024 ರಂದು ಯಶAB (ಾvಾ0ಚರ&ೆಯ�6 A_S cYದುo, ಸದ�ಯವರ "ರುದx ತF>ೆ ಮುಂದುವ�ೆಯುE�ದುo.

¶268

zvಾ0Y;ಾರ�ಾದ D=ೕ ಎ�. ಮ�ೇ� ರವರ ಆ�2ೈ� ಮೂಲಕ ಸ�6A(ೊಂ@ರುವ ಅ50ಗಳ ಸಂಬಂಧ *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ: ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ 201/2 ರ ಜwೕF)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ @.A ಕನZಷ0� )ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ ಪ=ಕರಣದ ಆ�ೋz-2 ರವರ ಕತ0ವ+ ಾ+z� ಮತು� ಸದ� ಅ50ಯ�6 ಅವರ iಾತ= �ಾಗೂ ಸದ�ಯವರ ಕತ0ವ+ ಹಂ](ೆಯನುZ "ವರಾದ *ಾ‡E ಮತು� ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ದೃ@ೕಕ�A (ೇAನ ತF>ೆ ಸಂಬಂಧ ಅEೕ ಜರೂ�ಾC ಒದCಸಲು (ೋ�ರುE�ೕ�, ಅದರಂ8ೆ ಪ�Dೕ�A ಕaೇ�ಯ�6 ಈ "ಷಯದ ಕು�ತು ಲಭ+"ರುವ *ಾ‡EಯನುZ ಈ (ೆಳಕಂಡಂ8ೆ Fೕಡ2ಾC;ೆ .

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1 zvಾ0Y;ಾರರು Y:24.04.2024 ಮತು� Y:25/06/2024 ರಂದು *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ: ;ೊಡ� ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ201/2 ರ ಜwೕFನ @.A ಕನBಷ0� ಸಂಬಂಧ ಸ�6A(ೊಂ@ರುವ ಅ50ಗಳ�6 ಆ�ೋz-2 D=ೕ ಎ�.5.ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ iಾತ=.

¶274

Y:03/05/2024 ರಂದು ಆ� 2ೈ� ನ�6 (ಾಮಣŽ c� 2ೇ• ~ಾ+ಮಣŽ ಎಂಬುವವರು ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ 201/2 ನ�6 0.35 ಎ/ಗು ವಸE ಉ;ೆoೕಶ(ಾSC ಭೂಪ�ವತ0�ೆ (ೋ� ಅ50 ಸ�6Aರು8ಾ � ೆ . ಅದರಂ8ೆ 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕaೇ�gಂದ Y�ಾಂಕ:04/05/2024 gÀAzÀÄ gÁd¸Àé F�ೕ-ಕರ ಕaೇ�)ೆ ವರY)ಾC ಕಳO‡ಸ2ಾCರುತ�;ೆ . ನಂತರ �ಾಜಸB F�ೕ-ಕ�ಂದ ಸದ� ಅ50)ೆ ಸಂಬಂ,Aದಂ8ೆ ಅಗತ+ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳO ಲಭ+"ರುವXY®è. ಅ50ಯನುZ "2ೇ ಇಡಬಹು;ೆಂದು ¢ ರಂದು ವರY ABೕಕೃತ`ಾCದುo ಈ ಕaೇ�gಂದ ಆ� 2ೈ� ನ�6 ಸದ� ಅ50ಯನುZ ವyಾ *ಾಡ2ಾCರುತ�;ೆ .

¶275

¢ :25-06-2024 g À AzÄ À ಸ"ೕಕೃತಾCರುವ ಅ50ಯು ಆಋ.ಆH. T. ~ಾ>ೆ)ೆ ಅ5ಯನುZ Y: ಸಂಬಂಧಪTUದo ಸದ� 09-07-2024 gÀAzÀÄ "ಷಯ Fವ0ಹಕರು ABೕಕ�Aದುo Y: 15-07-2024 ರಂದು �ಾಜಸB F�ೕ-ಕರು ಕಸ9ಾರವ�)ೆ ªÀgÀ¢UÁV ರಾFಸ2ಾCರುತ�;ೆ .

¶276

ಕಂ@(ೆ (2) ರ�6ನ ಪ‘ರಕ ;ಾಖ2ಾEಗಲನುZ ದೃŒೕಕ�A ಈ ಪತ=;ೊಂY)ೆ ಲಗE�A;ೆ

¶277

2 zvಾ0,;ಾದರು Y:24/04/2024 ಮತು� Y: 25/06/2024 ರಂದು *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ: ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ

¶278

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¶279

ಸ.ನಂ 201/2 ರ ಜwೕFನ @.A ಕನBಷ0� ಸಂಬಂಧ ಸ�6A(ೊಂ@ರುವ ಅ50ಗಳ ಸಂಬಂಧ ತಮb ಕaೇ�ಯ�6 Fವ0ಹ&ೆ *ಾ@ರುವ ಕಡತಗಳನುZ �ಾಗೂ ಇ� ವ!0 �5ಸUH ಅನುZ ದೃ@ೕಕ�A ಒದCಸುವXದು.

¶280

3 zvಾ0Y;ಾರರು Y:24/04/2024 ಮತು� Y:25/06/2024 ರಂದು *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು ಕಸ9ಾ �ೋಬ: ;ೊಡ�ಕಡತೂರು )ಾ=ಮದ ಸ.ನಂ201/2 ರ ಜwೕFನ @.A ಕನZಷ0� ಸಂಬಂಧ ಸ�6A(ೊಂ@ರುವ ಅ50ಗಳ Flow chart ಅನುZ "ವರಗ†ೆ•ಂY)ೆ ದೃŒೕಕ�A ಒದCಸುವXದು.

¶281

ಎ) Y: 24/04/2024 (ೆS ಸಂಬಂ,Aದ *ಾ‡E

¶282

ಅ50;ಾರರು ಅ50 ಸ�6Aದ Y: 03/05/2024.

¶283

2)�ಾಜ¸Àé F�ೕ-ಕ�)ೆ ವರY Fೕಡಲು ಕಳO‡Aದ ¢:04/05/2024. 3)�ಾಜಸB F�ೕ-ಕರ�ಂದ ವರY ABೕಕೃತ`ಾದ ¢:15/06/2024. 4) ª À eÁ ª À iÁrz À ¢ :06/07/2024 ಇದರಂ8ೆ ಕಡತದ ಪ=_=’ ನ$ೆಯ2ಾCರುತ�;ೆ .

¶284

c) Y:25/06/2024 (ೆS ಸಂಬಂ,Aದ *ಾ‡E 1) ಅ50;ಾರರು ಅ50 ಸ�6Aದ Y:25/06/2024. 2) �ಾಜಸB F�ೕ-ಕ�)ೆ ವರY Fೕಡಲು ಕಳO‡Aದ Y:15/07/2024. 3) �ಾF ಕಸ9ಾರವ�ಂದ vಾವX;ೇ ವರY ABೕಕೃತ`ಾCರುವXYಲ6.

¶285

4 ಆ�ೋzತ D=ೕ ಎ�.5.ಮಂಜು�ಾಥ �ಾಜಸ“F�ೕ-ಕರು zvಾ0Y;ಾರ�)ೆ @.A ಕನBಷ0� ಸಂಬಂಧ ;ಾಖ2ೆಗಳನುZ ಒದCಸಲು zvಾ0Y;ಾರರ ಬ: ಲಂಚದ ಹಣ(ೆS 9ೇ@(ೆ ಇಟುU ಲಂಚವನುZ ABೕಕ�A 9ೇ@(ೆಯಂ8ೆ (ಾvಾ0ಚರ&ೆಯ�6 A_ScYದುo, ಇದರ ಬ)ೆV ಆ�ೋzತರ Wೕ2ಾ,(ಾ�ಗ†ಾದ Fಮb

¶286

�ಾಜಸB F�ೕ-ಕರು ಕಸ9ಾ(ಆ�ೋzತ �ೌಕರರು) Y:04/05/2024 ರಂದು ಾಸ�ಾಂಶದ ವರY)ಾC �ಾFರವ�)ೆ ಕಡತ ವ)ಾ0gA;ೆ . Y:15/06/2024 ರಂದು �ಾ||F ರವ�ಂದ ವರY ABೕಕೃತ`ಾCದುo, ಅದರಂ8ೆ "2ೇ ಇ�Aದುo, ಅ50ಯನುZ

¶287

46

¶288

ಅ”iಾ=ಯೇನು? ವyಾ)ೊ:ಸ2ಾC;ೆ . WೕಲSಂಡ ಾಸ�`ಾಂಶವನುZ Fಮb ಅವ)ಾಹ�ೆ)ೆ ಸ�6A;ೆ . ತಮb ನಂಬು)ೆಯ, ¸ À »/- ತಹDೕ2ಾoರರು *ಾಲೂರು 8ಾಲೂ6ಕು.”

¶289

The afore-said would clearly indicate that long before the complainant registers the complaint, the alienation sketch was forwarded to the office of the Tahsildar. With all these facts and the act of the complainant himself, there is neither demand nor acceptance in the case at hand. There is no proof even prima facie of the demand of ₹30,000/- or ₹40,000/- by the petitioner, as the case would be. The allegation is that the demand was made by accused No.2. No amount is recovered in the case at hand. The petitioner is not caught accepting the amount. In such circumstance permitting further investigation into the case at hand would become an abuse of the process of law.

¶290

Though the judgments of the Apex Court in certain cases are only rendered after a full-blown trial, the principles laid down

¶291

47

¶292

therein would be the guiding light to consider the case, even at the stage of investigation, as the Apex Court in the case of MAHMOOD ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH⁷ , has held as follows:

¶293

“…. …. ….

¶294

10. The entire case put up by the first informant on the face of it appears to be concocted and fabricated. At this stage, we may refer to the parameters laid down by this Court for quashing of an FIR in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [ State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] . The parameters are : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

¶295

“ 102 . … (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

¶296

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶297

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶298

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶299

7 2023 SCC OnLine SC 950

¶300

48

¶301

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

¶302

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶303

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

¶304

We are of the view that the case of the present appellants falls within Parameters 1, 5 and 7, respectively, of Bhajan Lal [ State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal , 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : AIR 1992 SC 604] .

¶305

11. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely.

¶306

12. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the

¶307

49

¶308

necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not.

¶309

13. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged.

¶310

14. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy [ State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy , (2004) 6 SCC 522 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , a two-Judge Bench of this Court elaborated on the types of materials the High Court can assess to quash an FIR. The Court drew a fine distinction between consideration of materials that were tendered as evidence and appreciation of such evidence. Only such material that manifestly fails to prove the accusation in the FIR can be considered for quashing a FIR. The Court held: ( Golconda Linga Swamy case [ State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy , (2004) 6 SCC 522: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1805] , SCC p. 527, paras 5-7)

¶311

“ 5 . … Authority of the court exists for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any action which would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedings would

¶312

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¶313

otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto .

¶314

6 . In R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab [ R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab , 1960 SCC OnLine SC 21 : AIR 1960 SC 866] , this Court summarised some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings : (SCC OnLine SC para 6)

¶315

( i ) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance e.g. want of sanction;

¶316

( ii ) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged;

¶317

( iii ) where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge .

¶318

7 . In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear in mind the distinction between a case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made, and a case where there is legal evidence which, on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge . Judicial process, no doubt should not be an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Court should be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should take all relevant facts and circumstances into consideration before issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the hands of a private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the section is not an

¶319

51

¶320

instrument handed over to an accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death.”

¶321

(emphasis supplied)

¶322

15. In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The impugned order [ Mahmood Ali v. State of U.P. , 2022 SCC OnLine All 2568] passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is hereby set aside. The criminal proceedings arising from FIR No. 127 of 2022 dated 4-6-2022 registered at Police Station Mirzapur, Saharanpur, State of U.P. are hereby quashed.”

¶323

The Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgment considering the case of BHAJAN LAL and 7 postulates laid down for entertainment of proceedings at the stage of investigation holds that the High Court should not shut the doors of the petitioner seeking to exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. For the reason that the matter is at the stage of investigation, the complaint and the attendant facts and circumstances should be noticed in the light of vexatious proceedings becoming a norm of the day. I felt appropriate to quote the aforesaid judgment only for the reason that the Apex Court has directed this Court to read between the lines of the complaint and consider entertainment of the petition under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Reading of the complaint, the trap mahazar or otherwise, no where pins at the petitioner, as there is

¶324

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¶325

no demand, there is no acceptance and no recovery from the hands of the petitioner.

¶326

15. For the aforesaid reasons, the following:

¶327

O R D E R

¶328

(i) Criminal Petition is allowed.

¶329

(ii) Proceeding pursuant to Crime No.8 of 2024 pending before the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Kolar stand quashed.

¶330

(iii) It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the order are only for the purpose of consideration of the case of petitioner under Section 528 of BNSS and the same shall not bind or influence the proceedings against any other accused.

¶331

Sd/-

¶332

(M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE

¶333

bkp

¶334

CT:MJ/ss

Ms. Ashwini T v. the Karnataka Lokayukta

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Ms. Ashwini T v. the Karnataka Lokayukta

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