Sri K T Srinivas Vs the Inspector of Police

¶1

1

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 4^TH DAY OF JULY, 2025

¶3

BEFORE

¶4

THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH

¶5

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.414/2013

¶6

BETWEEN:

¶7

SRI. K.T.SRINIVAS, S/O LATE K.J.TIRUMALACHALAR, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, THE AUTHORIZED SIGNATORY, M/S. BUTTER SPONGE BAKERY AND FOOD HOUSE, NO.35, VANIVILAS ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU-560 004. AND ALSO RESIDING AT NO.56, GOVINDAPPA ROAD, BASAVANAGUDI, BENGALURU-560 004. … APPELLANT

¶8

(BY SRI. RAMACHANDRA G. BHAT, ADVOCATE)

¶9

AND:

¶10

THE INSPECTOR OF POLICE FOR C.B.I AND ACB, B.A.I.L. ROAD, GANGANAGARA, BENGALURU-560 032. … RESPONDENT

¶11

(BY SRI. PRASANNA KUMAR P., ADVOCATE)

¶12

THIS CRIMINAL APPEAL IS FILED UNDER SECTION 374(2) OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT AND ORDER DATED 13.02.2013 PASSED BY THE XLVI ADDITIONAL CITY CIVIL AND SESSIONS JUDGE AND SPECIAL JUDGE FOR CBI CASES AT BENGALURU CITY IN SPL.C.C.NO.67/2002 -

¶13

2

¶14

CONVICTING THE APPELLANT/ACCUSED FOR THE OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTION 120B OF IPC.

¶15

THIS APPEAL HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR JUDGMENT ON 27.06.2025, THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

¶16

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P.SANDESH

¶17

CAV JUDGMENT

¶18

This appeal is filed by accused No.3 challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence passed in Special C.C.No.67/2002 dated 13.02.2013 for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC and prayed this Court to acquit him and pass appropriate order.

¶19

The factual matrix of the case of the CBI before the

¶20

Trial Court is that the appellant herein is a general power of attorney holder of accused No.2, who is the proprietrix of M/s. V.B Bakery. The firm had availed the overdraft and term loan facility from State Bank of India Bank, V.V.Puram Branch, Bengaluru. The accused No.1 was the Manager of the Bank when the loan was availed by the firm. The prosecution has filed a complaint making the allegation that accused Nos.1 to 3 have entered into a criminal conspiracy to cheat the bank in the matter of obtaining the overdraft facility in the current account

¶21

3

¶22

of accused No.2. Accused No.1 committed the misconduct being a public servant by corrupt and illegal means and has abused his official position as public servant, has permitted the huge overdraft facility without any adequate security and he did not ensure the end use of the funds. The offences invoked against the accused is Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471, 477A of IPC and Sections 13(1) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (‘PC Act’ for short).

¶23

After the registration of FIR and before filing the charge-sheet, the bank instituted a recovery proceedings before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the same was compromised and accused No.2 discharged the entire liability by disposing off two sites under private negotiations, by the consent of the recovery officer of the DRT. In all 14 charges have been framed and the Trial Court acquitted accused No.2. But without proper application of mind and by not appreciating the evidence, has reached to an incorrect conclusion by convicting accused Nos.1 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC and in respect of accused No.1 also invoked Section 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the PC Act.

¶24

4

¶25

It is contended in the appeal that the Trial Court has

¶26

failed to see that the loan application was properly submitted and account opening form Ex.P.2 clearly indicates that accused No.3 is the authorized signatory of accused No.2 firm and absolutely there is no conspiracy among any of the accused to commit any unlawful act or object and none of the ingredients of Section 120B of IPC would attract. It is contended that the Trial Court has failed to see that loan application Exs.P.3 and 12 was submitted along with all required documents Exs.P.1, 2, 4 to 11, 13, 15 and 16 and sanction was proper and the same was in terms of banking norms and the accused firm has executed all loan documents. Accused No.1 had the power of sanction and while invoking Section 120B of IPC, there must be a meeting of minds and the same is absent in the present case. The Trial Court has failed to see the very fact that the civil liability has been settled voluntarily and while convicting the accused for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC, there must be a material regarding meeting of minds and intention to cheat the bank, transaction was taken place and no fraudulent intention or criminal conspiracy can be attributed to the appellant.

¶27

5

¶28

The learned counsel for the appellant would contend

¶29

that the very approach of the Trial Court is erroneous and only an inference was drawn and presumed the conspiracy and no element of criminal conspiracy was found and none of the witnesses have spoken about the alleged conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3. It is contended that even for operation of the account by accused No.3, Ex.P.2 specify that he is permitted to operate the loan account and no fault can be attributed. It is contended that when the loan was obtained, the accused have created common security of all the four sites belonging to Smt. T.Lakshmi and these accused have volunteered to sign all kinds of acknowledgment of debts, additional documents and they have executed all the documents. From the inception of entering into loan agreement, till the discharge of the liability, the accused have acted and transacted in the usual course and no case is made out to invoke Section 420 of IPC. Admittedly, the accused persons are neither parties nor they have any access to the bank records. Ex.P.3 is the application for loan facility, Ex.P.12 is the copy of the proposal for sanction, Ex.P.4 is copy of the return of turn over, Ex.P.5 is the valuation report and Ex.P.6 is the statement of monthly turn over. The letter of

¶30

6

¶31

confirmation of deposit of title deeds is also produced as Exs.P.15 and 16. None of the witnesses who have been examined before the Trial Court have spoken about the conspiracy of this appellant. However, the Trial Court committed an error in convicting the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC and accused No.1 was acquitted for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 468, 471 and 477A of IPC.

¶32

P.W.12 during the cross-examination admitted that

¶33

there was a circular for transfer of the advance which have got more than Rs.25 lakhs transaction to the commercial network and in this regard, Exs.P.246 and 249 came into existence. There is no any evidence to invoke Section 120B of IPC and the observations made by the Trial Court in the judgment is clear that in respect of accused No.3, no material on record, but presumed the conspiracy. The learned counsel would contend that though accused No.1 was convicted, on account of his death, the case against accused No.1 is abated. The learned counsel contend that accused No.2 is the proprietrix and accused

¶34

No.2 is acquitted, but accused No.3 is convicted. P.W.1 categorically admits in the evidence that the transaction was as

¶35

7

¶36

per the banking norms and when accused No.2 proprietrix was exonerated, there cannot be any conviction against accused No.3, who is an authorized signatory. The reason assigned by the Trial Court is erroneous. The learned counsel contend that P.W.1 categorically admitted that loan is already cleared by selling two sites and there are no material even to frame the charge and presume the offence under Section 120B of IPC. The learned counsel contend that the firm is the beneficiary and not this appellant and this appellant operated the account in view of the authorization.

¶37

The learned counsel for the appellant in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of this Court where, in a similar set of facts, this Court acquitted accused Nos.4 and 5 in Crl.A.No.363/2013 c/w Crl.A.No.416/2016 and similar finding was given by the Trial Court invoking Section 120B of IPC and the learned counsel contend that same benefit has to be given to this appellant. The learned counsel in support of his arguments relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of BABU v. STATE OF KERALA reported in (2010) 9 SCC 189 and relied upon paragraph Nos.22, 23 and 26 to 28. The

¶38

8

¶39

learned counsel relying upon the said judgment would contend that in order to invoke Section 120B of IPC, there must be a circumstantial evidence and in the absence of any circumstantial evidence before the Court to prove the conspiracy, there cannot be any conviction.

¶40

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of K.R. PURUSHOTHAMAN v. STATE OF KERALA reported in 2005 CRI.L.J. 4648 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.14, 15 and 21 and contend that the suspicion cannot take the place of a legal proof and the prosecution would be required to prove each and every circumstance in the chain of circumstances so as to complete the chain. In the absence of any complete chain, there cannot be any conviction and also the Court has to take note of the conduct of the parties must be conscious and clear enough to infer their concurrence as to the common design and its execution.

¶41

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of HARIVADAN BABUBHAI PATEL

¶42

v. STATE OF GUJARAT reported in 2013 AIR SCW 4575 and

¶43

9

¶44

brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.23 of the judgment. The learned counsel referring this judgment would contend that the Apex Court has discussed that accused No.2 stood on the same footing as the appellant and hence, the High Court should have acquitted him. It is also canvassed by him that accused No.2 has been acquitted of the charge of criminal conspiracy and, therefore, the appellant deserves to be acquitted. The High Court has taken note of the fact that accused No.2 was not identified by anyone in the test identification. The learned counsel referring this judgment would contend that when accused No.2 was acquitted, the same benefit should have been given to this appellant also.

¶45

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, ACB, MUMBAI v. NARENDRA LAL JAIN

¶46

AND OTHERS reported in (2014) 5 SCC 364 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.3, 12 and 14, wherein the Apex Court referring the judgment in the case of GIAN SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 comes

¶47

to the conclusion that when there was no any offence against the

¶48

10

¶49

society at large, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. could be invoked for quashing of the proceedings.

¶50

Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent

¶51

CBI would contend that there was no sanction of personal loan and Ex.P.12 is not signed by accused No.1 and when there was no sanction, the question of payment does not arise. The learned counsel contend that P.Ws.1, 4, 11 and 13 have spoken about Ex.P.12 that accused No.1 has not signed the proposal and P.W.2 speaks about over drawing and this itself clearly discloses that it amounts to conspiracy. The learned counsel contend that civil settlement not takes away the criminal liability. It is contended that it is only a proprietorship and there is no

¶52

need to array the company and authorized person handled the account i.e., this appellant. The learned counsel contend that the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that without following the banking guidelines, the amount was drawn and there was no authorization by higher officers for lending money. The learned counsel contend that P.W.2 specifically speaks about the violation of banking norms and so also P.W.11 speaks about accused No.3 was called upon to furnish the security and Ex.P.18

¶53

11

¶54

is the sanction order. Ex.P.20 to 586 are the cheques for a period of two years amounts were drawn and the amount was used for private benefits. On account of conspiracy, loss was caused to the bank. This appellant though was the authorized signatory, made use of the loan amount and hence the Trial Court rightly convicted him.

¶55

The learned counsel for the respondent in support of his arguments, relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MIR NAGVI ASKARI v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2009) 15 SCC 643 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph Nos.59 to 66, wherein discussion was made that moreover, it must be noted in this respect that banking norms and established practices and criminal conspiracy, it must be noted in this regard, is an independent offence. The Courts, however, while drawing an inference from the materials brought on record to arrive at a finding as to whether the charges of the criminal conspiracy have been proved or not, must always bear in mind that a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain direct evidence to establish the same. The manner and

¶56

12

¶57

circumstances in which the offences have been committed and the accused persons took part are relevant.

¶58

The learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of

¶59

the Apex Court in the case of SUDHIR SHANTILAL MEHTA v. CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION reported in (2009) 8 SCC 1 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.58, wherein an observation is made that having regard to the fact that Reserve Bank of India exercises control over the banking companies, we are of the opinion that the said circular letter was binding on the banking companies. The officials of UCO Bank were, therefore, bound by the said circular letter.

¶60

The counsel also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION v. HARI SINGH RANKA AND OTHERS

¶61

reported in (2019) 16 SCC 687 and brought to notice of this Court paragraph No.19, wherein it is observed that civil statement of the controversy would not suffice to wipe off the criminal liability. The case reflects fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the chargesheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or

¶62

13

¶63

personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. This Court has further observed that accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there are manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of this kind of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character. The gravity of the offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The quashing of the case was set aside as social interest would be in peril. The learned counsel referring these judgments would vehemently contend that the Court cannot expect direct evidence and circumstances clearly disclose that accused No.1 at the instance of accused No.3 exceeded the limit in releasing the amount in favour of the firm and though accused No.3 is not the direct beneficiary, the firm is the beneficiary and he was in charge of the firm. The Trial Court has not committed an error in passing such an order and it does not require any interference.

¶64

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent as well as the principles laid down in the judgments referred (supra) by the learned counsel for respective parties, the points that would arise for the consideration of this Court are:

¶65

14

¶66

(i) Whether the Trial Court committed an error in convicting accused No.3 invoking Section 120B IPC and whether it requires exercising of appellate jurisdiction?

¶67

(ii) What order?

¶68

Point No.(i):

¶69

Having heard the learned counsel for the appellant and learned counsel for the respondent, it is not in dispute that the respondent-CBI invoked Section 120B read with Sections 420, 468, 471 and 477A of IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act against accused No.1, who being the public servant, contravened the very scope and ambit of his limit and no doubt, the Trial Court convicted accused Nos.1 and 3. Now accused No.1 is no more and the case against accused No.1 is abated.

¶70

Now the material before this Court is with regard to

¶71

accused No.3 is concerned. It is not in dispute that accused No.3 is the authorized signatory of accused No.2. Accused No.1 is the Bank Manager. It is the main contention of the respondent-CBI that accused No.1 exceeded the limit violating the banking norms and extended the benefit more than what

¶72

15

¶73

was the limit and also indulged in creation of the document. The Trial Court having assessed the material on record, though offences invoked are Sections 420, 468, 477 and 477A of IPC, comes to the conclusion that there is no material to come to the conclusion that at the inception of the transaction, there was any intention to cheat the bank and also with regard to creation of document and utilizing of the created document for advancing the loan and the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that there is no material to invoke such offences. However, the Trial Court while convicting accused Nos.1 and 3 for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC, comes to the conclusion that both of them colluding with each other availed the loan and accused No.1 committed an error in making the favour in favour of accused No.3 and accused No.1 did not adhere to the conditions and also he did not take proper documentation and overdraft facility was extended without securing the loan amount and hence he was convicted for the offence punishable under Section 120B of IPC and also under the PC Act.

¶74

The Trial Court while convicting accused No.1, in paragraph No.105 of its judgment made an observation that

¶75

16

¶76

accused No.1 favoured accused Nos.2 and 3. In paragraph No.106, an observation is made in respect of this appellant and held that what exactly was the agreement between accused No.1 and accused No.3 is difficult to unearth, as such an arrangement is presumably secret. In the absence of any proper explanation either by accused No.1 or accused No.3 as to such an arrangement, the only inference one can draw is that there was an extraneous consideration for accused No.1 to transgress his limit in allowing such a facility to accused No.2 of which accused No.3 is the beneficiary, against all accepted banking norms. It is pertinent to note that the said action of accused No.1 was not at all ratified despite his best efforts.

¶77

Having taken note of the reasonings given by the

¶78

Trial Court in paragraph Nos.105 and 106, the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that accused No.1 favoured accused Nos.2 and 3 and accused No.3 is the beneficiary. The very observation made in paragraph No.106 that it is difficult to unearth the conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3 and the same is presumably secret, is an erroneous observation. While convicting the accused, the Court cannot come to the conclusion that arrangement is presumably secret and the Court cannot

¶79

17

¶80

presume the same and there must be an evidence and no doubt, in a case of criminal conspiracy, the Court also cannot expect direct evidence. But there must be circumstantial evidence to come to the conclusion that there was a criminal conspiracy hatched between accused Nos.1 and 3 and the same has been discussed in the judgments referred supra relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned counsel for the respondent in respect of conspiracy is concerned.

¶81

In the case on hand, no doubt, the amount was released in favour of accused No.2 and accused No.3 operated the account as an authorized agent and relationship between accused Nos.2 and 3 is mother and son and accused No.3 acted upon in terms of GPA executed by accused No.2 on behalf of the firm. It is important to note that accused No.2 is the proprietary concern and the accused No.2 is the proprietrix, but the fact is that the Trial Court acquitted accused No.2, but convicted accused No.3. It is important to note that P.W.1 speaks about Ex.P.1 is the attested copy of the current account opened in the name of V.B. Bakery and wife of accused No.3 has introduced the said account and accused No.1 authorised the opening of

¶82

18

¶83

account and Ex.P.2 is the attested copy of the account opening form and it was operated by accused No.3, who is an authorized person. The learned counsel for the respondent contend that Ex.P.12 is the copy of proposal for sanction of term loan and the same is in the handwriting of accused No.1, but contend that it is not signed by accused No.1 and there is no sanction of term loan in pursuance of Ex.P.12.

¶84

The learned counsel for the appellant brought to the notice of this Court that there is a clear admission on the part of P.W.1 in paragraph No.17 that it is true to suggest that Exs.P.4 to 11 were executed by accused No.3 after sanction of the loan and Ex.P.12 is the proposal of accused No.1. When this admission was given that there was a sanction and those documents are executed in pursuance of Ex.P.12, the very contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that there was no any sanction and the same was not signed by accused No.1, cannot be accepted. In respect of the conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3, P.W.1 has not spoken anything.

¶85

P.W.2 speaks about serious irregularities were committed in the matter of sanctioning loans and advance by

¶86

19

¶87

accused No.1, but he speaks only about the irregularities in sanctioning the loan, but did not dispute the fact of sanction of loan. In the cross-examination, he categorically admits that overdraft facility is sanctioned by the bank, it is a loan and no conditions were imposed regarding appropriation of loan amount. But the witness volunteers that the conditions are stipulated at the time of sanction of loan. He admits that he has not noticed any conditions regarding appropriation of loan by V.B. Bakery and also admits that if there is default by the party to repay the loan, properties furnished by way of security are proceeded against for recovery of the dues. This admission given by P.W.2 also takes away the case of the prosecution and no incriminating evidence is found against accused No.3 and P.W.3 also speaks about the gratification is concerned.

¶88

P.W.7 speaks about he used to pass the cheques of

¶89

authorized loan transactions. In the cross-examination, he admits that accused No.1 has passed all these cheques as per the banking norms and these cheques are passed after sanctioning of loan to the parties. These cheques are passed under the discretionary powers of accused No.1. When such

¶90

20

¶91

admissions are given that cheques are passed as per the banking norms and after sanctioning of loan to the parties, cannot find fault with accused No.3.

¶92

P.W.11 speaks about accused No.1 had not handed over those three files pertaining to the above said three firms and he went and found that the files are carried to Bijapur, but the same is not in respect of accused No.3 and in order to come to the conclusion that this appellant had indulged in conspiracy with accused No.1, nothing is placed on record.

¶93

The Trial Court while passing the order, in paragraph No.106 as against this accused is concerned, stated that it is difficult to unearth the conspiracy and agreement between accused Nos.1 and 3. Paragraph No.106 of the Trial Court judgment reads as under:

¶94

“106. What exactly was the agreement between first accused and accused No.3 is difficult to unearth, as such an arrangement is presumably secret. In the absence of any proper explanation either by first accused or accused No.3 as to such an arrangement, the only inference one can draw is that there was an extraneous consideration for first accused to transgress his limit in allowing such a

¶95

21

¶96

facility to second accused of which third accused is the beneficiary, against all accepted banking norms. It is pertinent to note that the said action of the first accused was not at all ratified despite his best efforts.”

¶97

Having extracted this reasoning, the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that it is difficult to unearth the agreement between accused Nos.1 and 3 and the same is presumably secret. No role is played by accused No.3 except executing the document and when such being the case, the very reasoning given by the Trial Court for convicting the appellant is erroneous and I do not find any incriminating evidence against the appellant even to invoke Section 120B of IPC.

¶98

I have already pointed out that accused No.2 was acquitted and the same is a proprietary concern and accused No.2 is the proprietrix. When accused No.2 is acquitted, accused No.3 who is an authorized signatory, cannot be convicted. The Trial Court even comes to the conclusion that nothing is found with regard to accused No.3 has played the role of conspiracy. When the Trial Court comes to the conclusion that accused No.2 is liable to be exonerated, the same benefit would have been

¶99

22

¶100

extended to accused No.3 also and the material available on record speaks about accused No.1 violated the norms of the bank and the fact that now the case is abated against accused No.1 is not in dispute. No material is placed on record with regard to the conspiracy of accused No.3, except signing of the document. When such being the case, I do not find any force in the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that the Trial Court rightly considered the material on record. No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the judgment in the case of Mir Nagvi Askari (supra) and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.59 to 66 that inference has to be drawn. But while drawing inference, there must be some material to arrive at a finding of proving of charge of conspiracy. No doubt, conspiracy is hatched in secrecy, but circumstances must prove that there was a meeting of minds and no direct evidence could be considered and no such circumstances also found. Hence, the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the case on hand.

¶101

The learned counsel for the respondent also relied

¶102

upon the judgment in the case of Sudhir Shantilal Mehta

¶103

23

¶104

(supra) that there was a circular that RBI exercises control over the banking companies and the officials of the bank are bound by the said circular. The same is not applicable to the present appellant and the same is in respect of accused No.1 is concerned. The learned counsel for the respondent also relied upon the judgment in the case of Hari Singh Ranka (supra), wherein is held that civil settlement of the controversy would not suffice to wipe off the criminal liability. The case reflects fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. In order to come to such a conclusion of financial fraud also, though material is found against accused No.1 and in order to prove the conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3, nothing is placed on record. The evidence given by the prosecution witnesses is very clear that passing of cheques is in normal course. A very clear admission is given that the cheques are passed after sanctioning of the loan. When such evidence was given by the prosecution witnesses, the Court cannot presume that there was a conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3.

¶105

Having considered the material on record, it is settled law in view of the judgment of the Babu (supra) that

¶106

24

¶107

burden of proof in case of circumstantial evidence burden on the prosecution is always greater and there cannot be any presumption of innocence as stipulated under Articles 21 and 14 of the Constitution of India. It is important to note that the learned counsel for the appellant brought to the notice of this Court paragraph No.22, wherein discussion was made in case of circumstantial evidence and in paragraph Nos.23 and 26 discussed about the burden of proof and doctrine of innocence and there must be a material of circumstantial evidence to prove the conspiracy and the same is not found. In the judgment in the case of Purushothaman (supra), the Apex Court observed that no evidence on record to show the agreement between the conspirators to misappropriate gold and held not guilty of conspiracy. In paragraph No.15 it is discussed that each one of the circumstances should be proved beyond reasonable doubt and also detailed discussion was made in paragraph Nos.18, 19 and 20.

¶108

30. Having reanalyzed the material on record, both oral

¶109

and documentary evidence placed on record, none of the witnesses speaks about the very role played by this appellant in

¶110

25

¶111

order to come to the conclusion of conspiracy between accused Nos.1 and 3. The admissions given by P.Ws.1, 2, 4, 7 and 11 not goes against this appellant. Accused No.2 was exonerated and case against accused No.1 was abated on account of his death and in the absence of material against this appellant that he conspired with accused No.1, nothing is placed on record that there was a meeting of minds between accused Nos.1 and 3 to hatch a plan to cause loss to the bank. The main contention of the bank is also that in view of conspiracy between them, loss was caused. It is important to note that the entire amount was cleared by accused No.2 after selling two sites and the fact that four sites were given as security and there is no financial loss on the bank also and the entire amount was cleared when the proceedings was initiated against accused No.2. No doubt, the learned counsel for the respondent contended that civil settlement cannot be a ground to acquit. But in the case on hand, in the absence of incriminating evidence against accused No.3, there cannot be any conviction and the reasons given by the Trial Court is clear that only on presuming the secrecy the accused was convicted and in criminal case, only based on presumption there cannot be any conviction unless a cogent

¶112

26

¶113

evidence is placed on record and there must be a proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict the accused. Hence, I answer the point in the affirmative.

¶114

Point No.(ii):

¶115

In view of the discussions made above, I pass the

¶116

following:

¶117

ORDER

¶118

(i) The appeal is allowed.

¶119

(ii) The impugned judgment of the Trial Court is set aside. Consequently, accused No.3 is acquitted. If any fine amount is deposited by the appellant/accused No.3, the same is ordered to be released in his favour, on proper identification.

¶120

(iii) The bail bond executed by the appellant/accused No.3 hereby stands cancelled.

¶121

Sd/- (H.P. SANDESH) JUDGE

¶122

MD

Sri K T Srinivas v. the Inspector of Police

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Sri K T Srinivas v. the Inspector of Police

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Suneel Sivarama Pillai Vs Smt Sahija J

Sri K Srinivasa Vs the Chief Secretary

Sri Govindappa Vs Narasimhappa

Thimmaiah K Vs Sri. Panchamuki Nutriens Private Ltd.

Sri H S Jayaramaiah Vs Sri H S Basavaraju

Mr. Paul Mahinthan Aruliah Vs Nil