Akki Lakshmi Reddy Vs State of Karnataka

AKKI LAKSHMI REDDY S/O LATE NARASIMHAREDDY, AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS, R/AT PRESENT PEDDALAPALLI VILLAGE, B KODURU MANDALAM, PEDDLAAPALLI POST, BADVEL TALL KADAPA, ANDRA PRADESH STATE PIN-505 172.

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…PETITIONER

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(BY SRI. HEMANTHA B., ADVOCATE (P/H))

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AND:

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Digitally signed by LAKSHMI T Location: High Court of Karnataka

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY R.T. NAGAR P.S., BENGALURU CITY, REP BY ITS STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT COMPLEX, BENGALURU-560 001.

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ANUSHA H.A. D/O ANJINAPPA, AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS, R/AT BHAGAWAN MAHAVEER JAIN HOSPITAL, MILLERS ROAD, VASANTHNAGAR, BENGALURU CITY, KARNATAKA-560 046.

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…RESPONDENTS

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NC: 2025:KHC:44413 CRL.P No. 15001 of 2025

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HC-KAR

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(BY SRI. RAHUL RAI K., HCGP FOR R1 (P/H); SRI. THEJAS N.S., ADVOCATE FOR SRI. LAKSHMIKANTH K., ADVOCATE FOR R2 (P/H))

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THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S 482 CR.PC (FILED U/S 528 BNSS) PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.191/2025 (ARISING OUT OF CRIME NO.346/2024) OF RESPONDENT NO.1 R.T. NAGAR POLICE, FOR COGNIZANCE TAKEN OF THE ALLEGED OFFENCE PUNISHABLE UNDER SECTIONS 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i)(ii), 3(1)(s) AND 3(2)(v) OF SC/ST (PREVENTION OF ATROCITIES) ACT 1989 AND SECTIONS 351(2), 351(3), 352, 64 OF BNS, AND SAME IS PENDING BEFORE THE C/C LXX ACC AND SJ, BENGALURU.

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THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER:

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MOHAMMAD NAWAZ

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ORAL ORDER

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Petitioner is seeking to quash the proceedings in Spl.C.No.191/2025 pending on the file of the Court of LXX ACC & SJ, Bengaluru.

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Petitioner is the sole accused against whom a complaint was lodged by respondent No.2 herein, based on which a case in Crime No.346/2025 was registered at R.T.Nagar Police Station for the offence punishable under Section 3(1)(r), 3(1)(w)(i)(ii), 3(1)(s) of SC and ST

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(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 and Section 351(2), 351(3), 352, 64, 74 of BNS, 2023.

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The chargesheet is filed for the aforementioned offences except Section 74 of BNS, 2023.

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It is alleged that the petitioner with a false promise of marriage subjected the complainant/victim to sexual intercourse and also threatened and abused her in filthy language referring to her caste and refused to marry her etc.

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As could be seen from the complaint averments and the material collected, the dispute is between the petitioner and respondent No.2/defacto complainant, who are present before the Court. A joint memo is filed signed by them, wherein respondent No.2 has stated that the matter is settled out of Court in the presence of elders and family members of both the families, who have agreed to perform the marriage of respondent No.2 with the

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petitioner and the petitioner has also agreed to marry respondent No.2.

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Para 2 to 4 of the joint memo are extracted

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here under:

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2. It is further submits that, the petitioner and the respondent No.2 love each other since from 5 years and due some mis-understanding and mis-communication the respondent No.2 gave complaint against the petitioner and now matter is settled out of the court in the presence of the elder and both the family members and both the family members are also agreed to perform the marriage between the respondent No.2 and the petitioner and the petitioner also agreed to marry with the respondent No.2.

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3. It is further submitted that, in-spite of that, the respondent No.2 is ready and agreed to withdraw the case filed against the petitioner and further the petitioner and respondent No.2 are admit and agree that, there is no collusion or force, fraud or any undue influence in filling the above joint memo petition and entering into this compromise in the aforesaid manner.

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4. In-spite of that, if the proceedings are conducted against the petitioner it would amount wastage of the precious time of the court and cause irreparable loss and injury to the both the petitioner and the respondent No.2, Hence on the ground itself this Hon'ble court

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pleased to quash the entire proceedings against the petitioner and the respondent No.2 have no objection to quash the entire proceeding against the petitioner.”

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The offences alleged are non-compoundable in

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nature. However, the parties have resolved the dispute among themselves and it is stated that the petitioner has agreed to marry respondent No.2.

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It is relevant to extract Para 9 and 10 of the

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judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ramawatar v.

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State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 13 SCC

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635 .

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“9. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length, we are of the opinion that two questions fall for our consideration in the present appeal. First, whether the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution can be invoked for quashing of criminal proceedings arising out of a "noncompoundable" offence? If yes, then whether the power to quash proceedings can be extended to offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act?

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10. So far as the first question is concerned, it would be ad rem to outrightly refer to the recent

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decision of this Court in Ramgopal v. State of M.P. (2022) 14 SCC 531 : 2021 SCC Online SC 834, wherein, a two-Judge Bench of this Court consisting of two of us (N.V. Ramana, CJI g & Surya Kant, J.) was confronted with an identical question. Answering in the affirmative, it has been clarified that the jurisdiction of a court under Section 320 CrPC cannot be construed as a proscription against the invocation of inherent powers vested in this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution nor on the powers of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC. It was further held that the touchstone for exercising the extraordinary powers under Article 142 or Section 482 CrPC, would be to do complete justice. Therefore, this Court or the High Court, as the case may be, after having given due regard to the nature of the offence and the fact that the victim/complainant has willingly entered into a settlement/compromise, can quash proceedings in exercise of their respective constitutional/inherent powers.”

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9. In Narinder Singh and others v. State of

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Punjab and another reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , the

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Hon’ble Apex Court at para Nos.8 and 24 has held as under:

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"8. We find that there are cases where the power of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code to quash the proceedings in those offences which are uncompoundable has been recognised. The only

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difference is that under Section 320(1) of the Code, no permission is required from the Court in those cases which are compoundable though the Court has discretionary power to refuse to compound the offence. However, compounding under Section 320(1) of the Code is permissible only in minor offences or in nonserious offences. Likewise, when the parties reach settlement in respect of the offences enumerated in Section 320(2) of the Code, compounding is permissible but it requires the approval of the Court. Insofar as serious offences are concerned, quashing of criminal proceedings upon compromise is within the discretionary powers of the High Court. In such cases, the power is exercised under Section 482 of the Code and proceedings are quashed. Contours of these powers were described by this Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana (2003) 4 SCC 675, which has been followed and further explained/elaborated in so many cases thereafter, which are taken note of in the discussion that follows hereinafter."

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"24. The two rival parties have amicably settled the disputes between themselves and buried the hatchet. Not only this, they say that since they are neighbours, they want to live like good neighbours and that was the reason for restoring friendly ties. In such a scenario, should the court give its imprimatur to such a settlement? The answer depends on various incidental aspects which need serious discourse. The legislators have categorically recognized that those offences which are covered by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code

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are concededly those which not only do not fall within the category of heinous crimes but also which are personal between the parties. Therefore, this provision recognizes where there is a compromise between the parties, the court is to act at the said compromise and quash the proceedings. However, even in respect of such offences not covered within the four corners of Section 320 of the Code, the High Court is given power under Section 482 of the Code to accept the compromise between the parties and quash the proceedings. The guiding factor is as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power, both the ultimate consequences may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment. This is so recognized in various judgments taken note of above."

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In view of the joint memo and the settlement

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between the parties, no useful purpose will be served in keeping the criminal proceedings pending against the petitioner. Hence exercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, the proceedings against the petitioner can be quashed, to meet the ends of justice. Accordingly, the following:

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