Landowners sought condonation of a delay of about seven years in appealing against an enhancement award in a land acquisition reference, citing poverty and later awards to neighbouring lands. The High Court found the explanation vague and unconvincing, refused condonation, and dismissed the appeal.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
NC: 2024:KHC:20633-DB MFA No.8540/2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 12TH DAY OF JUNE, 2024 PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.8540/2015 (LAC)
BETWEEN:
Digitally signed by RUPA V Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA
ALL ARE R/O BASAVANAGANGURU VILLAGE HOLALLUR HOBLI
SHIMOGA TALUK & DISTRICT-577201.
…APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. RAJU BHAT, ADV.,)
AND:
…RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. BASAVARAJ GODACHI, AGA FOR R1 SRI. PRASHANTH B.R. ADV., FOR R2)
THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED:20.10.2008 PASSED IN LAC NO.58/2001 ON THE FILE OF THE 1ST ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN) & CJM, SHIMOGA, ALLOWING THE REFERENCE PETITION FOR ENHANCED COMPENSATION SEEKING FOR FURTHER COMPENSATION.
THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, VIJAYKUMAR A PATIL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT & ORDER ON I.A.No.1/2015
Heard Sri.Raju Bhat, learned counsel for the appellants, Sri.Prashant B.R., learned counsel for respondent No.2 and Sri.Basavaraj Godachi, learned AGA for respondent No.1.
land of the appellants was acquired on 11.09.1997 and the
Land Acquisition Officer passed the award on 23.07.2001. It is submitted that after acquisition, small extent of land is left out for the appellants which is not suitable for agriculture and they
are unable to gain their livelihood in the said small extent of land. It is further submitted that due to the acquisition of their land, the appellants are doing coolie work and they have been forced to borrow money from the lender at a higher rate of interest. They have received compensation of Rs.1,99,940/each in the year 2011 as per the judgment of the reference Court and they had the liability to clear the loan and their family consists of more than 12 members, hence, they could not save the money to file the appeal. It is also submitted that in the year 2012-2013 the reference Court enhanced the compensation to Rs.105/- per square feet, for the land situated at Sominakoppa Village, since the land in question is situated in the same village and its value is more than Rs.105/per square feet, it is contended that soon after receipt of compensation amount, the appellants have enquired about filing of the appeal before the High Court and they came to know that they are required to pay Court fees of Rs.4,00,000/but due to poverty, they could not file the appeal earlier. It is
further contended that the appellants requested their relatives and friends to lend the money to pay the Court fees and in the last week of October 2015, one of their friend and well-wisher assured them to lend money as a hand loan for the purpose of paying the Court fees. Believing the assurance of the relative, they approached the advocate, enquired about the procedure of filing the appeal, enquired about the Court fees and thereafter they filed appeal. It is also contended that apart from financial restraint, the appellants are not well versed with the legal proceedings/procedure and also about the time period for filing of the appeal. Hence, sought for condonation of delay. In support of his contentions, he has placed reliance on the following judgments:
1 (1987) 2 SCC 107
2 LAWS (SC) 2014-7-107
evidence available on record, has allowed the reference in-part vide common judgment and award dated 20.10.2008, by determining the market value of the acquired land i.e., tank fed land at Rs.2,00,000/- per acre as against Rs.1,00,000/- fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer, Rs.1,20,000/- to rain fed land as against Rs.60,000/- fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer and Rs.70,000/- per acre for dry land as against Rs.47,000/- fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer with all statutory benefits and interest.
material. It is contended that the appellants borrowed money from well-wisher in the year 2015, however no details of borrowing were placed along with the affidavit and not even the name of the lender is stated. The impugned judgment and award of the reference Court is dated 20.10.2008 and no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming from the affidavit for the delay from the period of passing of the impugned judgment till 2015. Hence, the explanations offered by the appellants are not genuine explanations and they are only excuses. The appellants are required to show the sufficient cause for the delay in preferring the appeal. In the instant case, the appellants have not shown any satisfactory cause for condoning the enormous delay of 2537 days which comes to nearly seven (07) years.
on the judgment in the case of Katiji referred to supra, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down the broader principles to be followed while considering the application for condonation of delay. Similarly, in the case of Dhiraj Singh referred to supra, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that though the application contains vague averments, and did not
provide a satisfactory explanation, the delay was condoned on the ground that the identical land owners received the enhanced compensation. He has also placed reliance on the order dated 19.01.2016 passed in MFA No.5782/2015 and seeks to condone the delay.
Nos.11 to 15 held as under:
" 11. The expression “ sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned , whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it
3 (2013) 14 SCC 81
considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.”
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “ sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay . No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
(emphasis supplied)
11. In the case of Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India
and others4 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph
Nos.30 to 36 as under;
"30. Considering the aforementioned decisions, there cannot be any quarrel that this Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of private parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. However, these decisions notwithstanding, we reiterate that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial.
4 (2023) 10 SCC 531
31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse”. Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.
32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication.
33. Be that as it may, it is important to bear in mind that we are not hearing an application for condonation of delay but sitting in appeal over a discretionary order of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay. In the case of the former, whether to condone or not would be the only question whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in favour of grant of the prayer for condonation would be the question. Law is fairly well-settled that “a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the discretion exercised by the courts below”. If any authority is required, we can profitably refer to the decision in Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa [Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa,
(2003) 10 SCC 390] , which in turn relied on the decision in Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha [Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha, (1980) 2 SCC 593 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197] where it has been held that:
“an appellate power interferes not when the order appealed is not right but only when it is clearly wrong”.
34. The order under challenge in this appeal is dated 2112-2011 [Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511] . It was rendered at a point of time when the decisions in Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107] , Ramegowda [G. Ramegowda v. LAO, (1988) 2 SCC 142] , Chandra Mani [State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, (1996) 3 SCC 132] , K.V. Ayisumma [Tehsildar (LA) v. K.V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634] and Lipok AO [State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao, (2005) 3 SCC 752 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 906] were holding the field. It is not that the said decisions do not hold the field now, having been overruled by any subsequent decision. Although there have been some decisions in the recent past [State of M.P. v. Bherulal [State of M.P. v. Bherulal, (2020) 10 SCC 654 : (2021) 1 SCC (Civ) 101 : (2021) 1 SCC (Cri) 117 : (2021) 1 SCC (L&S) 84] is one such decision apart from University of Delhi [University of Delhi v. Union of India, (2020) 13 SCC 745] ] which have not accepted governmental lethargy, tardiness and indolence in presenting appeals within time as sufficient cause for condonation of delay, yet, the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice oriented approach expounded in the aforesaid decisions which have been referred to above.
35. We find that the High Court in the present case assigned the following reasons in support of its order:
35.1. The law of limitation was founded on public policy, and that some lapse on the part of a litigant, by itself, would not be sufficient to deny condonation of delay as the same could cause miscarriage of justice.
35.2. The expression “sufficient cause” is elastic enough for courts to do substantial justice. Further, when substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against one another, the former would prevail.
35.3. It is upon the courts to consider the sufficiency of cause shown for the delay, and the length of delay is not always decisive while exercising discretion in such matters if the delay is properly explained. Further, the merits of a claim were also to be considered when deciding such applications for condonation of delay.
35.4. Further, a distinction should be drawn between inordinate unexplained delay and explained delay, where in the present case, the first respondent had sufficiently explained the delay on account of negligence on part of the government functionaries and the government counsel on record before the Reference Court.
35.5. The officer responsible for the negligence would be liable to suffer and not public interest through the State. The High Court felt inclined to take a pragmatic view since the negligence therein did not border on callousness.
36. Given these reasons, we do not consider discretion to have been exercised by the High Court in an arbitrary manner. The order under challenge had to be a clearly wrong order so as to be liable for interference, which it is not."
(emphasis supplied)
judgments has taken note of its earlier Judgment in the case of
Katiji referred to supra and held that the approach of the Courts in condoning the delay should be pragmatic when sufficient cause is shown. In the instant case, the cause shown by the appellants is not sufficient to condone the enormous delay of nearly seven years.
"15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Katiji2 , this Court in advocating the liberal approach in condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary to explain every day's delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of
5 2024 SCCOnline SC 513
limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’ in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption creating new rights.
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justiceoriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act ;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient
cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
Katiji and Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer referred to supra and held that the phrases 'liberal approach', 'justice oriented approach' and 'cause for advancement of substantial justice' cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow the stale matter to be revived and reopened by taking shelter under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Further, it has been held that
no Courts would be justified in condoning such inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever.
after a period of nearly 7 years. Allowing the application would run contrary to the public policy and cause great injustice to the respondents and it also creates an avenue for similarly placed persons to approach the Court as per their whims and fancies. The Court is also required to keep in mind the finality of the lis between the parties while condoning the delay. If Courts start interpreting the word 'sufficient cause' in an unduly liberal way even without there being any acceptable explanation for condoning enormous delay, it would lead to unsettling the rights of the parties which were settled by the reference Court long ago. This Court would have definitely sympathized with the appellants - land losers in considering their appeal on merits, if they had filed the appeal within the period of limitation or sufficient cause was shown for the delay. In the instant case, the appellants have failed to show sufficient cause to condone the delay.
ORDER
I.A.No.1/2015 is dismissed.
Consequently, the appeal and other pending
applications are dismissed.
Sd/JUDGE
Sd/JUDGE
BSR List No.: 1 Sl No.: 10
1 issue framed by the court
Whether the delay of 2537 days in filing the appeal seeking enhanced compensation should be condoned on grounds of financial constraint and parity with other landowners.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another vs. Mst. Katiji and othersExplained¶9
(1987) 2 SCC 107 · Who else cites this
Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through legal representatives and others vs. State of Haryana and othersDistinguished¶9
LAWS (SC) 2014-7-107
Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition OfficerApplied¶10
(2013) 14 SCC 81 · Who else cites this
Sheo Raj Singh vs. Union of India and othersApplied¶11
(2023) 10 SCC 531 · Who else cites this
Pathapati Subba Reddy vs. Special Deputy Collector (LA)Applied¶13
2024 SCCOnline SC 513
2 provisions across 2 enactments
Prakash S/o Byroji Rao dead by his LR's (P. Manjula, Abhilash, Ashisha, Anushri)
Mahendra S/o Byroji Rao
Nagaraja S/o Byroji Rao represented by GPA holder Mahendra S/o Byroji Rao
Subasha S/o Byroji Rao
Dasarath S/o Byroji Rao dead by his LR's (Smt. Anithabai W/o Late Dasarath)
Raju S/o Byroji Rao
K.S. Mudagal
Vijaykumar A. Patil
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
