Dismissed

Thammanna v. the Special Land Acquisition Officer

Karnataka HC12 Jun 2024MFA/5978/2018

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court of Karnataka dismissed appeals filed over three years after the original award in land acquisition proceedings. The court held that knowing about the award and merely waiting for other claimants to get enhanced compensation did not constitute sufficient cause to condone the delay.

What did the court decide?

Applications for condonation of delay dismissed; consequently, appeals dismissed with costs.

Thammanna Vs the Special Land Acquisition Officer — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2024)

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NC: 2024:KHC:20634-DB MFA No.5978/2018 C/W MFA No. 6108/2018 MFA No.6109/2018

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 12^TH DAY OF JUNE, 2024

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PRESENT

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THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL

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AND

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VIJAYKUMAR A. PATIL MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.5978/2018 (LAC)

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C/W

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MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.6108/2018 (LAC) MISCELLANEOUS FIRST APPEAL NO.6109/2018 (LAC)

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IN M.F.A. NO.5978/2018

BETWEEN:

THAMMANNA

SINCE DEAD BY LR'S.

SMT. MAHADEVAMMA AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS W/O LATE THAMMANNA.

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Digitally signed by K S RENUKAMBA Location: High Court of Karnataka

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RAMANNA

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S/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS.

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LAKSHMANA S/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 48 YEARS.

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SMT. THAYAMMA D/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS.

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SHIVANANJAPPA S/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS.

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MARAPPA S/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS.

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SMT. PARVATHI D/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 34 YEARS.

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SMT. MEENAKSHI D/O LATE THAMMANNA AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS.

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APPELLANTS NO.1 TO 9 ARE R/AT LALITHADRIPURAM VILLAGE MYSURU TALUK AND DISTRICT-570 028. …APPELLANTS

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(BY SRI. P. NATARAJU, ADV.,)

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AND:

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THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY MYSURU-570 001. …RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. T.P. VIVEKANANDA, ADV.,)

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THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 54(1) OF LAC ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 04.01.2010 PASSED IN LAC.NO.196/2005, ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE, MYSURU , PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.

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IN M.F.A. NO.6108/2018

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. MALA W/O DEVANNA AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS DOOR NO.723, LALITHADRIPURA VILLAGE VARUNA HOBLI, MYSORE TALUK MYSORE – 570 028 … APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. S. RUPESH KUMAR, ADV.,)

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NC: 2024:KHC:20634-DB MFA No.5978/2018 C/W MFA No. 6108/2018 MFA No.6109/2018

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AND:

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THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY MYSURU – 570 001 … RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. T.P. VIVEKANANDA, ADV.,)

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THIS MFA IS FILED U/S 54(1) OF LAND ACQUISITION ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND DECREE DATED 04/01/2010, PASSED IN LAC. NO.197/2005, ON THE FILE OF THE III ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE (SR.DN.), MYSURU, PARTLY ALLOWING THE REFERENCE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.

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IN M.F.A. NO.6109/2018

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BETWEEN:

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SMT. CHINNAMMA W/O LATE CHIKKANNA AGED ABOUT 70 YEARS RAMAMANDIRA ROAD LALITHADRIPURA VILLAGE VARUNA HOBLI, MYSURU TALUK MYSORE-570 028. … APPELLANT

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(BY SRI. S. RUPESH KUMAR, ADV.,)

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AND: THE SPECIAL LAND ACQUISITION OFFICER MYSURU URBAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY MYSURU - 570 001. … RESPONDENT

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(BY SRI. T.P. VEVEKANANDA, ADV.,)

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THIS MFA IS FILED U/S.54(1) OF THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT, AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DT.04.01.2010 PASSED ON LAC NO.200/2005 ON THE FILE OF THE 3RD ADDITIONAL CIVIL JUDGE, (SR.DN.), MYSORE, PARTLY ALLOWING THE REFERENCE APPLICATION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION.

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THESE APPEALS COMING ON FOR ORDERS, THIS DAY, K.S.MUDAGAL J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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JUDGMENT & ORDER ON IA.No.1/2018.

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All these appeals arise out of the common judgment and award in LAC.Nos.196/2005, 197/2005 and 200/2005. By the impugned award, other claim petitions namely LAC.Nos.212/2005, 149/2006, 150/2006 were also disposed of.

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The appellants in MFA.No.5978/2018 are the LRs of Thammanna who was the claimant in LAC.No.196/2005. There is a delay of 3028 days in filing MFA.No.5978/2018 and 3032 days in filing the other two appeals.

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The above applications are filed seeking condonation of aforesaid delay in filing the appeals. In the affidavits filed in support of all these applications, it is stated that in May 2018, they came to know that for the lands acquired by the same notification, some other land owners were awarded higher compensation. Soon thereafter, they contacted their advocate and they were advised that they too

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have to file the appeals. They claim that after making financial arrangements, they have filed these appeals. Therefore, there was delay and the reason for the delay is bonafide.

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Reiterating the contents of the affidavit,

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Sri.P.Nataraju, learned counsel and Sri.S.Rupesh Kumar, learned counsel submit that the term sufficient cause needs to be liberally construed and all the land owners have to be treated alike. In support of their submissions, they rely on following judgments:

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i. Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana¹

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ii. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority v. Rameshwar @ Ramesh Chandra Sharma²

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The applications were seriously opposed by the respondent claiming that the appeals and applications are filed to make wrongful gain based on the awards in favour of other claimants who had approached this Court and the Hon'ble Supreme Court and there are no bonafides in the applications. It is further submitted that despite having the knowledge, the appellants or their predecessor did not prefer the appeal and to make wrongful gain, the present appeals are filed. It is submitted that the claimant Thammanna in LAC.No.196/2005 had even preferred Execution No.272/2010 and recovered the compensation award and other claimants also have recovered

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1 (2014) 14 SCC 127

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2 (2022) 8 SCC 639

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the award amount. He submits that, if these applications are

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allowed and appeals are entertained, there are several similar land owners who are sitting on the fence and that opens the Pandora box for them to prefer similar appeals. In support of his submission, he relies on the following judgments:

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i. Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer³ ii. Sheo Raj Singh v. Union of India⁴

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iii. Pathapati Subba Reddy v. Special Deputy Collector⁵

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On considering the submissions of both side and on examining the materials on record, the point that arises for consideration is:

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"Whether the appellants had sufficient cause for filing these appeals belatedly?"

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ANALYSIS

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Undisputedly, there is delay of 3028 and 3032 days

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in filing these appeals. It is not the case of the appellants that they were not aware of the impugned award. Admittedly, the claimant Thammanna filed Execution No.272/2010 for recovery of the decreetal amount as long back in the year 2010 itself.

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3 (2013) 14 SCC 81

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4 (2023) 10 SCC 531

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5 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513

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That goes to show that they had knowledge of passing of the award. The claimant in LAC No.196/2005 died on 18.10.2016. He did not prefer any appeal during his lifetime. These appeals were filed almost after eight years, even though they had knowledge of the award.

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It is no doubt true that the term sufficient cause has to be liberally construed. However, there should be an acceptable explanation for the same. The term sufficient cause has to be interpreted keeping in mind the policy and spirit of the law. How sufficient cause has to be interpreted was explained by Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 31 of the judgment in Sheo Raj Singh's case referred to supra , wherein distinguishing between explanation and excuse Court observed as follows:

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"31. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an “explanation” and an “excuse”. An “explanation” is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular

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event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must, however, be taken to distinguish an “explanation” from an “excuse” . Although people tend to see “explanation” and “excuse” as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real.

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32. An “excuse” is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an “excuse” would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. At this stage, we cannot but lament that it is only excuses, and not explanations, that are more often accepted for condonation of long delays to safeguard public interest from those hidden forces whose sole agenda is to ensure that a meritorious claim does not reach the higher courts for adjudication."

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In the present case, in the context of the other judgments, this Court has to examine whether the reasons given by the appellants are explanation or excuse and if explanation, whether that is sufficient or not. As already stated,

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award was well within the knowledge of the claimants. They claim that they came to know about enhancement of compensation in case of other land owners through their counsel, then they made arrangements of the funds and preferred the appeals.

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The claimants in those cases received enhanced compensation as they took the pain of preferring the appeals before the Appellate Court. The claimants herein cannot equate themselves to those claimants and justify it to be a sufficient cause of delay because, the claimants of these cases were complacent with the awards in their favour. If they really felt that the compensation awarded is unjust, they should have filed the appeals promptly. Further, the particulars of the advocate who informed them, when informed them, whom they approached for the funds, when and how they collected the funds are as bald as possible. The claimants in all these cases are represented by their counsel. If there was any difficulty in arranging the funds they could have preferred the appeals as indigent person under Order XLIV of CPC or they could have resorted to free-legal aid under the Legal Services Authority Act.

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The Hon'ble Supreme Court in New Okhla

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Industrial Development Authority's case referred to supra held that the beneficiary had not challenged the order of condonation of delay of 22 years, but only after the compensation was enhanced by the Appellate Court that was challenged. There an observation was made that the claimants therein were entitled to compensation at par with the other land owners whose base compensation was enhanced by the Appellate Court. But the judgments in Sheo Raj Singh's and Pathapati Subba Reddy's cases referred to supra were rendered subsequently. In Sheo Raj Singh's judgment referred to supra , it was held that each case has to be decided based on facts of the case.

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Further in paras 24 and 25 of the judgment in Pathapati Subba Reddy's case referred to supra , the Hon'ble Supreme Court relying on its earlier judgment in Basawaraj's

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case referred to supra held as follows:

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"24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:

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“ 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.”

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25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:

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“ 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate

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delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the

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delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature. ”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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In the above two judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court discouraged the practice of condonation of inordinate delay in preferring the appeals in Land Acquisition cases, imposing condition of waiving interest and statutory benefits. It was held that sufficient cause means an adequate and enough reason, which prevented the appellants from approaching the Court within limitation. Such grounds are not made out in these cases.

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Ultimately in para 26 of the said judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the following guidelines in consideration of the condonation of delay.

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"26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:

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(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself;

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(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time;

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(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;

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(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;

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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;

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(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal;

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(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and

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(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The reading of the above judgment goes to show

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that merely because the other land owners in the similar matters have obtained higher compensation, it does not entitle the appellants to seek the same benefit, if sufficient cause for delay is not shown.

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In light of the above judgments in Pathapati Subba Reddy's and Sheo Raj Singh's cases referred to supra the judgments relied on by learned counsel for the appellants cannot be justifiably applied to the facts of these cases.

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The material on record clearly shows that the appellants were fence sitters, they watched the proceedings filed by the other people and only after those claimants succeeded, to take a chance they have come before this Court. They have tried to play game of lottery by filing these appeals

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and applications. If such applications are allowed, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the respondent, that opens the pandora box for the claimants in the other cases to rush to this Court seeking the same relief. Absolutely, explanation furnished by the appellants cannot be termed as sufficient cause to condone the delay. The explanation as furnished is only an excuse and that cannot be condoned. Hence, the following:

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ORDER

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The applications are dismissed.

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Consequently, the appeals are dismissed with costs.

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Sd/JUDGE

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Sd/JUDGE

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ABK