Allowed

Mr. Mohammed Shameer v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC10 May 2022CRL.P/521/2022

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

High Court quashed criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC against husband and family members in matrimonial dispute, finding allegations of cruelty and attempt to murder were vague, lacking material evidence, and dragged innocent relatives making it an abuse of process.

What did the court decide?

Criminal proceedings in C.C.No.3121 of 2021 were quashed. Criminal petition allowed.

Mr. Mohammed Shameer Vs State of Karnataka — Matrimonial and Divorce | Karnataka HC (2022)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 10^TH DAY OF MAY, 2022

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BEFORE

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THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA

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CRIMINAL PETITION No.521 OF 2022

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BETWEEN:

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MR.MOHAMMED SHAMEER S/O MOHAMMED MUNEER AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS R/A RAMDAS COMPOUND KOTWAL NAGAR 4^TH CROSS CHITRADURGA DISTRICT KARNATAKA.

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MR. MOHAMMED MUNNEER S/O LATE MAHAMMED AMEER, AGED ABOUT 54 YEARS, R/A RAMDAS COMPOUND, KOTWAL NAGAR, 4^TH CROSS, CHITRADURGA KARNATAKA.

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MRS.KHAMAR TAJ W/O MOHAMMED MUNEER AGED ABOUT 53 YEARS R/A RAMDAS COMPOUND KOTWAL NAGAR, 4^TH CROSS CHITRADURGA KARNATAKA.

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MRS.MUSHTARI BEGUM W/O MOHAMAD AMEER, AGED ABOUT 80 YEARS, R/A RAMDAS COMPOUND,

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KOTWAL NAGAR, 4^TH CROSS, CHITRADURGA KARNATAKA.

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MR. MUHAMAD SABEER S/O MAHAMMED MUNEER AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS R/A RAMDAS COMPOUND KOTWAL NAGAR, 4^TH CROSS CHITRADURGA KARNATAKA.

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MRS. AYISHA SIDDIKKA W/O MAHAMMED HARUN AGED ABOUT 26 YEARS R/A KALIDASA NAGAR 1^ST MAIN, 3^RD CROSS HARIHARA, DAVANAGERE KARNATAKA.

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MR.MAHAMMED HAROON S/O MAHAMMED HANIF AGED ABOUT 27 YEARS R/A KALIDASA NAGAR, 1^ST MAIN, 3^RD CROSS, HARIHARA, DAVANAGERE, KARNATAKA.

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MR.AFROZ KHAN S/O LATE NASEER KHAN AGED ABOUT 29 YEARS R/AT 2^ND MAIN, 2^ND CROSS, B BLOCK, HARIHARA, DAVANAGERE, KARNATAKA.

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... PETITIONERS

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(BY SRI HASHMATH PASHA, SR.ADVOCATE FOR SRI NASIR ALI, ADVOCATE))

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AND:

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STATE OF KARNATAKA BY WOMEN POLICE STATION, DAVANAGERE, (REPRESENTED BY LEARNED STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU).

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SMT. JASMINE D.N., W/O MOHAMAD SHAMEER, AGED ABOUT 25 YEARS, R/A 3^RD CROSS, SS LAYOUT A BLOCK, NEAR SHAMANARU ROAD, DAVANAGERE, KARNATAKA.

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... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI B.J.ROHITH, HCGP FOR R1; R2 SERVED AND UNREPRESENTED))

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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE PROCEEDINGS PENDING IN C.C.NO.3121/2021 ON THE FILE OF II ADDITIONAL SENIOR CIVIL JUDGE AND J.M.F.C., DAVANAGERE FOR THE OFFENCE P/U/S 498-A, 323, 504, 506, 307, 313, 354, 114 R/W 34 OF IPC AND SECTION 3 AND 4 OF DOWRY PROHIBITION ACT WHICH IS ARISING OUT OF CR.NO.112/2021 OF WOMEN POLICE STATION OF DAVANAGERE AS AN ABUSE OF PROCESS OF LAW.

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THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 16.03.2022, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:-

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ORDER

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The petitioners in the subject petition call in question proceedings in C.C.No.3121 of 2021 pending on the file of the II

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Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Davangere arising out of Crime No.112 of 2021 registered for offences punishable under Sections 506, 498A, 504, 307, 313, 323, 354, 114 and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

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Brief facts as projected by the prosecution are as follows:-

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Before embarking upon consideration of the facts in the case it is appropriate to notice the relationship between the protagonists in the alleged episode of crime. 2^nd respondent is the complainant and 1^st petitioner/accused No.1 is her husband; 2^nd petitioner/accused No.2 is her father-in-law; 3^rd petitioner/accused No.3 is her mother-in-law; 4^th

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petitioner/accused No.4 is the grand-mother of the 1^st petitioner/husband; 5^th petitioner/ accused No.5 is the brother of the 1^st petitioner; 6^th petitioner/ accused No.6 is the sister-inlaw; 7^th petitioner/accused No.7 is sister-in-law’s husband and

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8^th petitioner/accused No.8 is a distant relative of petitioner No.1.

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The 1^st petitioner and the complainant got married on 24-10-2020. The relationship of the complainant and the 1^st petitioner gets irrevocably strained. A complaint was lodged by the 2^nd petitioner herein against alleging harassment being caused by the complainant while residing in the house of in-laws before the Vidyanagar Police, Davangere. This was treated as a non-cognizable case and thereto NCR No.137 of 2020 was registered on 12-12-2020, after which, it appears that the complainant moves away from the matrimonial house and began to reside in her parents’ house. On 08-03-2021 the complainant causes a legal notice against the petitioners alleging several instances of harassment meted out to her by the petitioners. This is replied to by the petitioners on 15.03.2021.

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Things standing thus, apprehending threat from the hands of the complainant, the 1^st petitioner/husband files O.S. No.125 of 2021 seeking restraint against the 2^nd respondent/

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complainant in interfering with the affairs in the house of the petitioners. The trial Court grants an ad-interim injunction in the said civil suit by its order dated 20-03-2021. After which, the 1^st petitioner files another suit for divorce in O.S.No.223 of 2021 before the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC at Chitradurga. The said suit is filed on 18-06-2021.

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After the aforesaid proceedings, the complainant/2^nd respondent registers the impugned complaint, pursuant to which, a FIR is registered in Crime No.112 of 2021 for offences punishable under Sections 506, 498A, 504, 307, 313, 323, 354, 114 and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The Police after investigation filed a charge sheet on 10-12-2021 for the offences punishable under Sections 506, 498A, 504,307, 313, 323, 354, 114 and 34 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The learned Magistrate takes cognizance of the aforesaid offences on 23-12-2021. It is at that juncture the petitioners

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have knocked the doors of this Court in the subject criminal petition.

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Heard the learned senior counsel Mr. Hashmath Pasha appearing for the petitioners and Sri B.J.Rohith, learned High

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Court Government representing the 1^st respondent/State. The 2^nd respondent/complainant is served and unrepresented.

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The learned senior counsel would contend that the relationship between the husband and the wife turned sore within few weeks after marriage. Incompatibility between the two became irrevocable and in that light several proceedings are instituted by the husband against the wife and the wife causing notices against the husband and his family members. After the husband initiating proceedings - one suit seeking restraint of entry of the complainant into the house of the petitioners and the other suit for divorce are filed and as a counter-blast, the wife registers a complaint against all the members of the family who are not even connected. Even the grandmother of the accused No.1who is 80 years old is also dragged into these

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proceedings. It is his submission that there cannot be a better case of an abuse of the process of the law, than this.

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On the other hand, the learned High Court Government Pleader would seek to refute the submissions of the learned senior counsel and contends that the complaint and the result of investigation as found in the summary of the charge sheet clearly narrate the circumstances and acts of the petitioners which would point at offences punishable as afore-quoted. He would submit that the charge sheet is filed in the case at hand and this Court should not interfere with the proceedings at this stage and allow the trial to proceed further. If the petitioners are ignorant, they would be acquitted and if guilty, the law would take its course. He seeks dismissal of the petition.

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The 2^nd respondent though served with a notice from the hands of this Court remains unrepresented.

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I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the learned senior counsel and the

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learned High Court Government Pleader and perused the material on record.

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In furtherance of the facts obtaining in the case at hand and the submissions made by the respective learned counsel, the issue that falls for my consideration is:

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“ Whether the proceedings instituted by the 2^nd respondent/wife should be permitted to be continued against the petitioners?

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The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. The 1^st petitioner and the 2^nd respondent/complainant got married on 24-10-2020 and resided at Davangere. The relationship between the 1^st petitioner and the 2^nd respondent appears to have turned irretrievably sore not far off of the marriage. Incompatibility drives the 1^st petitioner and the 2^nd respondent/complainant to live separately. The petitioners though contend certain instances for the complainant to move away from the house, the fact remains that the complainant did move away from the matrimonial house and began to reside at her parents’ house.

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On 04-03-2021 the facts transpire that the complainant has

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moved out of the house and on 08-03-2021 causes a legal notice upon the petitioners. It is in this legal notice the complainant narrates that during the first week of February 2021 she has left the matrimonial house and is residing in her parents’ house. Several other allegations are also made in the said legal notice. The petitioners replied to the said legal notice on 15.03.2021. The next day, the 1^st petitioner – husband files a suit before the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Chitradurga seeking permanent injunction against the complainant/2^nd respondent and her family members from interfering with the peaceful possession of the petitioners. Filing of such suit is itself a rarity. This would demonstrate peculiarity in the facts of the case.

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The Civil Court hearing the plaintiffs’ counsel grants an ad-interim injunction against the 2^nd

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respondent/complainant and her family members in interfering or causing obstruction to the peaceful possession of the

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property. The order of the trial Court dated 18.03.2021 reads as follows:

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“Heard Counsel for the Plaintiff.

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Perused the Plaint and documents available on record.

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In support of I.A.No.1, the Plaintiff has produced notarized copy of registered sale deed dtd:10-5-2010, certified copy Khata extract, Kandayam paid receipt (3), Copy of Form No.2, medical reports of Plaintiff.

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In the Affidavit, the Plaintiff contends that, be is absolute owner of in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Suit Schedule Property as per registered sale deed dtd:10-5-2010 and the Defendant No.4 is his son, Defendant No.1 is his daughter-in-law and Defendants Nos.2 and 3 are the parents of Defendant No.1. On 10-2-2020 without any alternative, effected partition before the elderly persons of locality and Defendant No.4 has received Rs.20-lakhs towards his share and other children have got his family properties and the Defendant No.1 and 4 have left from his house and began to reside independently since 10-12-2020. the Defendants by colluding with each other and with other persons, without having any right, title, interest or possession over the Suit Schedule Property, are making hectic efforts to interfere by causing obstruction in his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same and he requested the Defendants not to make illegal act, but his efforts went in vain. Hence, the present Application. The said apprehension of the Plaintiff is pleaded in the Affidavit and at this stage, if emergent Order is not passed, it would lead to multiplicity of proceedings and would create unnecessary hassle and interference to the Plaintiffs’ possession and enjoyment of the Suit Schedule Property. Hence, it is necessary to pass

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emergent Order pending notice to the Defendant. The Plaintiff has made our prima – facie case. Accordingly, this Court passes the following:

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ORDER

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Issue ad-interim Temporary Injunction against the Defendant.

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The Descendants, their agents, men, servants, supporters and followers etc., are hereby restrained from interfering by causing obstruction in the Plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment of the Suit Schedule Property, till the next date of hearing.

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The Plaintiff’s shall comply with Order 39 Rule 3(a) of CPC, forthwith. Issue T.I. Order, notice of I.A.No.1 and Suit notice to the Defendants, returnable by 16/04/2021.”

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Thereafter, the 1^st petitioner/husband registers another suit in O.S.No.223 of 2021 seeking annulment of marriage with the 2^nd respondent/complainant. The said suit is filed on 18-06-2021. Notice being issued in the said suit seeking annulment of marriage triggers the complainant to register the subject complaint against the petitioners who are husband and other members of the family, notwithstanding whether they did reside with the couple or not. The link in the chain of dates and events clearly make the complaint to be a counter-blast.

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The complaint narrates several allegations against the 1^st petitioner/husband and vague and bald statements against all other members of the family. Since the entire issue initially sprang from the complaint, it is necessary to quote the complaint for the purpose of ready reference:

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¸À»/zÀÆgÀÄzÁgÀ¼ÀÄ.”

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Based upon the said complaint, a FIR is registered in Crime No.112 of 2021 for the afore-quoted offences. A perusal at the complaint (supra) would indicate several instances of arguments taking place between the husband and the wife and absolutely nothing against any other members of the family who are dragged into these proceedings. Several instances of incompatible circumstances between the husband and the complainant are narrated in the complaint.

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The legal notice that is caused by the complainant indicates that the complainant leaves the matrimonial house

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and begins to stay with her parents’ house from the 1^st week of February 2021. The complaint narrates that on 22-08-2021 the

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husband/1^st petitioner goes to the house of the

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wife/complainant and beats her and attempts to kill her. It is the husband himself who had filed a suit seeking restraint of entry of the complainant and her family members entering into the house of the petitioners. Therefore, visualizing a circumstance that the 1^st petitioner would go to the house of the complainant and beat the wife and attempt to kill her cannot but

¶94

be construed to be suffering from want of bona fides . The wound certificate that is appended to the charge sheet reads as follows:

¶95

“(1) Pain with tenderness in lt-shoulder.

¶96

(2) Pain with tenderness in middle 1/3 of front of lt.thigh.

¶97

I am of the opinion that the above wounds (1) & (2) are simple in nature.”

¶98

The wound certificate (supra) indicates what has happened on 04.03.2021 but the complaint is registered on 22-08-2021. The instances narrated in the complaint are of 22-08-2021. There is no evidence produced or gathered from the investigation about

¶99

¶100

any injuries sustained by the complainant on 22-08-2021. Therefore, an inference is to be drawn that the entire complaint suffers from want of bona fides . The Police after investigation have filed a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet reads as follows:

¶101

“17. PÉÃ¹£À ¸ÀAQë¥ÀÛ ¸ÁgÁA±À

¶102

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¶103

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¶105

¶106

In the summary of the charge sheet repetition of words found in

¶107

the complaint is found except quoting certain instances of torture by the husband. Both in the complaint and in the summary of the charge sheet there is nothing that can be found against other members of the family/petitioners 2 to 8. With regard to the husband, there are instances, but whether they would suffice for permitting further proceedings to be continued against the husband is what is to be answered.

¶108

As observed hereinabove, the incident happened on 22-08-2021. In the teeth of proceedings initiated by the husband – one seeking restraint of entry of the wife into the house of the husband or his family and the other for divorce, the allegation that he had been to the house of the wife on 22.08.2021 and attempted to kill her, cannot be on the face of it, believed. Therefore, even against the husband further proceedings if permitted to continue would become an abuse of the process of law.

¶109

¶110

It is germane to notice judgments of the Apex Court which have delineated the power of interference under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. from time to time. The Apex Court in the case

¶111

of MADHAVRAO JIWAJIRAO SCINDIA V. SAMBHAJIRAO

¶112

CHANDROJIRAO ANGRE¹ has held as follows:

¶113

“7. The legal position is well settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the court chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of a case also quash the proceeding even though it may be at a preliminary stage.”

¶114

Later, the Apex Court in the case of STATE OF HARYANA v.

¶115

BHAJANLAL² has held as follows:

¶116

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the

¶117

1 (1988) 1 SCC 692

¶118

2 1992 Supp. (1) SCC 335

¶119

¶120

Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

¶121

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

¶122

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶123

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶124

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶125

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just

¶126

¶127

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

¶128

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶129

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

¶130

(Emphasis supplied)

¶131

The Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments has clearly

¶132

delineated the power of the Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to thwart injustice. The aforesaid judgments have been followed by the Apex Court in plethora of cases in the aftermath of the judgment in the case BHAJANLAL (supra) . That being the powers of this Court, it is now germane to notice the judgments of the Apex Court which have considered the fact of complainants dragging all the members of family into the web of criminal proceedings despite there being no allegations against them qua the facts obtaining in the case at hand.

¶133

¶134

The relationship, in the case at hand, is as noticed hereinabove. Accused No.4 is also drawn into the proceedings. Accused No.4 is the grandmother of the 1^st petitioner who is 80 years old and it is submitted that she is bedridden. The sister of the 1^st petitioner, the 6^th petitioner and her husband 7^th petitioner are living separately for the last 7 years and are in no way concerned with the family of the 1^st petitioner or the squabble between the husband and the wife. They are simply dragged into these proceedings. The 8^th petitioner who is a resident of Harihar had never interfered with the life of the complainant is also dragged into these proceedings. The fatherin-law and mother-in-law/petitioners 2 and 3 herein who, though reside with the husband, no foundation is laid of any harassment meted out against the complainant/2^nd respondent to allege offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323, 307, 313 or 354 of the IPC against them.

¶135

It is the 1^st petitioner/husband who remains. The FIR registered was for offences punishable as afore-quoted. The

¶136

¶137

charge sheet reiterates it. Gravest of the offence that is indicated is Section 307 of the IPC. Section 307 deals with attempt to murder. Offence under Section 307 is punishable with imprisonment upto 10 years and is considered to be grave offence. No foundation is laid in the complaint or in the summary of the charge sheet to bring home the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. Even according to the complainant, she and her husband were living separately from the 1^st week of February 2021. The attempt is alleged to have happened on 22-08-2021 that too in the house of the parents of the complainant. Therefore, the very fact that the husband did enter the house of the complainant despite the aforesaid civil proceedings instituted by him, that too for torture of the complainant would definitely suffer from the vice of improbability. Attempt to murder cannot be imaginary. There is no material placed to demonstrate any attempt to murder. Such allegation is made in thin air and cannot be sustained in thinner air.

¶138

¶139

The other allegation is for offence punishable under

¶140

Section 498A of the IPC. Even to this offence, there is no foundation laid. Bald and vague allegations galore in the case at hand. Section 313 of the IPC is also alleged, which depicts causing miscarriage without one’s consent. There is only a sentence in the complaint alleging that the complainant became pregnant which the parents of the husband did not welcome. There is no material produced to drive home miscarriage without the complainant’s consent. There is not even a miscarriage in the case at hand.

¶141

Section 354 of the IPC again would not be tenable for the reason rendered while considering the offence under Section 307 of the IPC. Section 114 of the IPC that is alleged deals with presence of abettor when the offence is committed. The alleged offence is committed allegedly in the house of the parents of the complainant. Who could abet the offence? None of the petitioners; as the incident happened in the house of the parents of the complainant. Therefore, all the offences alleged lack any

¶142

¶143

foundation in the complaint or in the summary of the charge

¶144

sheet. The Apex Court in the case of PREETI GUPTA v. STATE

¶145

OF JHARKHAND³ has held as follows:

¶146

“28. We have very carefully considered the averments of the complaint and the statements of all the witnesses recorded at the time of the filing of the complaint. There are no specific allegations against the appellants in the complaint and none of the witnesses have alleged any role of both the appellants.

¶147

29. Admittedly, Appellant 1 is a permanent resident of Navasari, Surat, Gujarat and has been living with her husband for more than seven years. Similarly, Appellant 2 is a permanent resident of Goregaon, Maharashtra. They have never visited the place where the alleged incident had taken place. They had never lived with Respondent 2 and her husband. Their implication in the complaint is meant to harass and humiliate the husband's relatives. This seems to be the only basis to file this complaint against the appellants. Permitting the complainant to pursue this complaint would be an abuse of the process of law.

¶148

30. It is a matter of common knowledge that unfortunately matrimonial litigation is rapidly increasing in our country. All the courts in our country including this Court are flooded with matrimonial cases. This clearly demonstrates discontent and unrest in the family life of a large number of people of the society.

¶149

31. The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from Section 498-A of the Penal Code which reads as under:

¶150

3 (2010) 7 SCC 667

¶151

¶152

“498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

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Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, ‘cruelty’ means—

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(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

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(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

¶156

32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under Section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment is also a matter of serious concern.

¶157

33. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fibre of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their

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¶159

concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under Section 498-A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fibre, peace and tranquillity of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.

¶160

36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of an amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.”

¶161

(Emphasis supplied)

¶162

In the case of GEETA MEHROTRA v. STATE OF U.P.⁴ the Apex

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Court holds as follows:-

¶164

“25. However, we deem it appropriate to add by way of caution that we may not be misunderstood so as to infer that even if there are allegations of overt act indicating the complicity of the members of the family named in the FIR in a given case, cognizance would be unjustified but what we wish to emphasise by highlighting is that, if the FIR as it stands does not disclose specific allegation against the accused more so against the co-accused specially in a matter arising out of matrimonial bickering, it would be clear abuse of the legal and judicial process to mechanically send the named accused in the FIR to undergo the trial unless of course the FIR discloses specific

¶165

4 (2012) 10 SCC 741

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¶167

allegations which would persuade the court to take cognizance of the offence alleged against the relatives of the main accused who are prima facie not found to have indulged in physical and mental torture of the complainant wife. It is the well-settled principle laid down in cases too numerous to mention, that if the FIR did not disclose the commission of an offence, the court would be justified in quashing the proceedings preventing the abuse of process of law. Simultaneously, the courts are expected to adopt a cautious approach in matters of quashing, especially in cases of matrimonial disputes whether the FIR in fact discloses commission of an offence by the relatives of the principal accused or the FIR prima facie discloses a case of over implication by involving the entire family of the accused at the instance of the complainant, who is out to settle her scores arising out of the teething problem or skirmish of domestic bickering while settling down in her new matrimonial surrounding.

¶168

26. In the case at hand, when the brother and unmarried sister of the principal accused Shyamji Mehrotra approached the High Court for quashing the proceedings against them, inter alia, on the ground of lack of territorial jurisdiction as also on the ground that no case was made out against them under Sections 498-A/323/504/506 IPC including Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, it was the legal duty of the High Court to examine whether there were prima facie material against the appellants so that they could be directed to undergo the trial, besides the question of territorial jurisdiction. The High Court seems to have overlooked all the pleas that were raised and rejected the petition on the solitary ground of territorial jurisdiction giving liberty to the appellants to approach the trial court.

¶169

27. The High Court in our considered opinion appears to have missed that assuming the trial court had territorial jurisdiction, it was still left to be decided whether it was a fit case to send the appellants for trial when the FIR failed to make out a prima facie case against them regarding the

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allegation of inflicting physical and mental torture to the complainant demanding dowry from the complainant. Since the High Court has failed to consider all these aspects, this Court as already stated hereinbefore, could have remitted the matter to the High Court to consider whether a case was made out against the appellants to proceed against them. But as the contents of the FIR do not disclose specific allegation against the brother and sister of the complainant's husband except casual reference of their names, it would not be just to direct them to go through protracted procedure by remanding for consideration of the matter all over again by the High Court and make the unmarried sister of the main accused and his elder brother to suffer the ordeal of a criminal case pending against them specially when the FIR does not disclose ingredients of offence under Sections 498-A/323/504/506 IPC and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

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28. We, therefore, deem it just and legally appropriate to quash the proceedings initiated against the appellants Geeta Mehrotra and Ramji Mehrotra as the FIR does not disclose any material which could be held to be constituting any offence against these two appellants. Merely by making a general allegation that they were also involved in physical and mental torture of Respondent 2 complainant without mentioning even a single incident against them as also the fact as to how they could be motivated to demand dowry when they are only related as brother and sister of the complainant's husband, we are pleased to quash and set aside the criminal proceedings insofar as these appellants are concerned and consequently the order passed by the High Court shall stand overruled. The appeal is accordingly allowed.”

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(Emphasis supplied)

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The Apex Court in the case of RASHMI CHOPRA v. STATE OF

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U.P.⁵ holds as follows:-

¶177

“18. The learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on various judgments of this Court in support of his submissions. In K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana [K. Subba Rao v. State of Telangana, (2018) 14 SCC 452 : (2019) 1 SCC (Cri) 605] , this Court laid down the following in paras 5 and 6 : (SCC p. 454)

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“5. A perusal of the charge-sheet and the supplementary charge-sheet discloses the fact that the appellants are not the immediate family members of the third respondent/husband. They are the maternal uncles of the third respondent. Except the bald statement that they supported the third respondent who was harassing the second respondent for dowry and that they conspired with the third respondent for taking away his child to USA, nothing else indicating their involvement in the crime was mentioned. The appellants approached the High Court when the investigation was pending. The charge-sheet and the supplementary chargesheet were filed after disposal [T.S.K. Ashwin Kumar v. State of Telangana, 2016 SCC OnLine Hyd 432] of the case by the High Court.

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6. Criminal proceedings are not normally interdicted by us at the interlocutory stage unless there is an abuse of the process of a court. This Court, at the same time, does not hesitate to interfere to secure the ends of justice. See State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] . The courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The

¶180

5 (2019) 15 SCC 357

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relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out. (See Kans Raj v. State of Punjab [Kans Raj v. State of Punjab, (2000) 5 SCC 207 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 935] and Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P. [Kailash Chandra Agrawal v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 551 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 536] )”

¶183

24. Coming back to the allegations in the complaint pertaining to Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. A perusal of the complaint indicates that the allegations against the appellants for the offences under Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are general and sweeping. No specific incident dates or details of any incident have been mentioned in the complaint. The complaint having been filed after the proceeding for divorce was initiated by Nayan Chopra in the State of Michigan, where Vanshika participated and divorce was ultimately granted. A few months after filing of the divorce petition, the complaint has been filed in the Court of CJM, Gautam Budh Nagar with the allegations as noticed above. The sequence of the events and facts and circumstances of the case leads us to conclude that the complaint under Section 498-A and Sections 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act have been filed as counter-blast to divorce petition proceeding in the State of Michigan by Nayan Chopra.

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25. There being no specific allegation regarding any one of the applicants except common general allegation against everyone i.e. “they started harassing the daughter of the applicant demanding additional dowry of rupees one crore” and the fact that all relatives of the husband, namely, father, mother, brother, mother's sister and husband of mother's sister have been roped in clearly indicates that the application under Section 156(3) CrPC was filed with a view to harass the applicants. Further, prior to filing of the application under Section 156(3) CrPC

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there was no complaint at any point of time by the girl or her father making allegation of demand of any dowry by any one of the applicants. When both Nayan Chopra and Vanshika started living separately since November 2013, had there been any dowry demand or harassment the girl would have given complaint to police or any other authority. Further, in the divorce proceedings at Michigan, USA, parties have agreed for dividing their properties including gifts given at marriage but no complaint was made in those proceedings regarding harassment by her husband or his family members. …”

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Further, in the case of KAHKASHAN KAUSAR v. STATE OF

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BIHAR⁶ the Apex Court holds as follows:

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“ Issue Involved

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“11. Having perused the relevant facts and contentions made by the Appellants and Respondents, in our considered opinion, the foremost issue which requires determination in the instant case is whether allegations made against the in-laws Appellants are in the nature of general omnibus allegations and therefore liable to be quashed?

¶191

12. Before we delve into greater detail on the nature and content of allegations made, it becomes pertinent to mention that incorporation of section 498A of IPC was aimed at preventing cruelty committed upon a woman by her husband and her in-laws, by facilitating rapid state intervention. However, it is equally true, that in recent times, matrimonial litigation in the country has also increased significantly and there is a greater disaffection and friction surrounding the institution of marriage, now, more than ever. This has resulted in an increased tendency to employ provisions such as 498A IPC as instruments to

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6 2022 SCC Online SC 162

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settle personal scores against the husband and his relatives.

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13. This Court in its judgment in Rajesh Sharma v. State of U.P .⁴ , has observed:—

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“14. Section 498-A was inserted in the statute with the laudable object of punishing cruelty at the hands of husband or his relatives against a wife particularly when such cruelty had potential to result in suicide or murder of a woman as mentioned in the statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act 46 of 1983. The expression ‘cruelty’ in Section 498A covers conduct which may drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave injury (mental or physical) or danger to life or harassment with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand. It is a matter of serious concern that large number of cases continue to be filed under already referred to some of the statistics from the Crime Records Bureau. This Court had earlier noticed the fact that most of such complaints are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues. Many of such complaints are not bona fide. At the time of filing of the complaint, implications and consequences are not visualized. At times such complaints lead to uncalled for harassment not only to the accused but also to the complainant. Uncalled for arrest may ruin the chances of settlement.”

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14. Previously, in the landmark judgment of this court in Arnesh Kumar v. State of Biha r⁵ , it was also observed:—

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“4. There is a phenomenal increase in matrimonial disputes in recent years. The institution of marriage is greatly revered in this country. Section 498-A IPC was introduced with avowed object to combat the menace of harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband and his relatives. The fact that Section 498-A IPC is a cognizable and nonbailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride

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amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision. In a quite number of cases, bed-ridden grandfathers and grand-mothers of the husbands, their sisters living abroad for decades are arrested.”

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15. Further in Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhan d⁶ , it has also been observed:—

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“32. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section 498A IPC are filed in the heat of the moment over trivial issues without proper deliberations. We come across a large number of such complaints which are not even bona fide and are filed with oblique motive. At the same time, rapid increase in the number of genuine cases of dowry harassment are also a matter of serious concern.

¶203

33. The learned members of the Bar have enormous social responsibility and obligation to ensure that the social fiber of family life is not ruined or demolished. They must ensure that exaggerated versions of small incidents should not be reflected in the criminal complaints. Majority of the complaints are filed either on their advice or with their concurrence. The learned members of the Bar who belong to a noble profession must maintain its noble traditions and should treat every complaint under section 498A as a basic human problem and must make serious endeavour to help the parties in arriving at an amicable resolution of that human problem. They must discharge their duties to the best of their abilities to ensure that social fiber, peace and tranquillity of the society remains intact. The members of the Bar should also ensure that one complaint should not lead to multiple cases.

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34. Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not

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properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.

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35. The ultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. To find out the truth is a herculean task in majority of these complaints. The tendency of implicating husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. The courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realities into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment of husband's close relations who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complaint are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.

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36. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. It is also a matter of common knowledge that in cases filed by the complainant if the husband or the husband's relations had to remain in jail even for a few days, it would ruin the chances of amicable settlement altogether. The process of suffering is extremely long and painful.”

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16. In Geeta Mehrotra v. State of U P⁷ , it was observed:—

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“21. It would be relevant at this stage to take note of an apt observation of this Court recorded in the matter of G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad reported in (2000) 3 SCC 693 wherein also in a matrimonial dispute, this Court had held that the High Court

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should have quashed the complaint arising out of a matrimonial dispute wherein all family members had been roped into the matrimonial litigation which was quashed and set aside. Their Lordships observed therein with which we entirely agree that:

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“there has been an outburst of matrimonial dispute in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate the disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their cases in different courts.” The view taken by the judges in this matter was that the courts would not encourage such disputes.”

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17. Recently, in K. Subba Rao v. The State of Telangan a⁸ , it was also observed that:—

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“6. The Courts should be careful in proceeding against the distant relatives in crimes pertaining to matrimonial disputes and dowry deaths. The relatives of the husband should not be roped in on the basis of omnibus allegations unless specific instances of their involvement in the crime are made out.”

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18. The above-mentioned decisions clearly demonstrate that this court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of section 498A IPC and

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the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the accused. It is further manifest from the said judgments that false implication by way of general omnibus allegations made in the course of matrimonial dispute, if left unchecked would result in misuse of the process of law. Therefore, this court by way of its judgments has warned the courts from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

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19. Coming to the facts of this case, upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR dated 01.04.19, it is revealed that general allegations are levelled against the Appellants. The complainant alleged that ‘all accused harassed her mentally and threatened her of terminating her pregnancy’. Furthermore, no specific and distinct allegations have been made against either of the Appellants herein, i.e., none of the Appellants have been attributed any specific role in furtherance of the general allegations made against them. This simply leads to a situation wherein one fails to ascertain the role played by each accused in furtherance of the offence. The allegations are therefore general and omnibus and can at best be said to have been made out on account of small skirmishes. Insofar as husband is concerned, since he has not appealed against the order of the High court, we have not examined the veracity of allegations made against him. However, as far as the Appellants are concerned, the allegations made against them being general and omnibus, do not warrant prosecution.

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20. Furthermore, regarding similar allegations of harassment and demand for car as dowry made in a previous FIR. Respondent No. 1 i.e., the State of Bihar, contends that the present FIR pertained to offences committed in the year 2019, after assurance was given by the husband Md. Ikram before the Ld. Principal Judge

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Purnea, to not harass the Respondent wife herein for dowry, and treat her properly. However, despite the assurances, all accused continued their demands and harassment. It is thereby contended that the acts constitute a fresh cause of action and therefore the FIR in question herein dated 01.04.19, is distinct and independent, and cannot be termed as a repetition of an earlier FIR dated 11.12.17.

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21. Here it must be borne in mind that although the two FIRs may constitute two independent instances, based on separate transactions, the present complaint fails to establish specific allegations against the in-laws of the Respondent wife. Allowing prosecution in the absence of clear allegations against the in-laws Appellants would simply result in an abuse of the process of law.

¶224

22. Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the accused appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant's husband are forced to undergo trial. It has been highlighted by this court in varied instances, that a criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.”

¶225

(Emphasis supplied)

¶226

The aforesaid judgments were the cases where the Apex Court

¶227

was considering the acts of the complainants in drawing every member of the family into the web of criminal proceedings despite there being no allegation against them.

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The afore-quoted judgments would apply on all fours to the facts obtaining in the case at hand, as every other member of the family is dragged into these proceedings without there being any allegation. Even a 80 year old bedridden lady is also made an accused on bald and vague statements in the complaint or in the summary of the charge sheet. Insofar as the husband is concerned, for the allegations made against him, it is germane to notice the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MIRZA IQBAL @ GOLU AND ANOTHER v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER - 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1251 wherein the Apex Court considers the plea of assault and holds that there should be material produced and when there are no external injuries noticed, it cannot be said that allegations made for offences punishable under Section 323 of the IPC would become tenable. Even in the case at hand there are no materials produced to demonstrate that attempt to kill the complainant was made by the husband. Barring this allegation, every other allegation against the husband and all other members of the family are in common. Therefore, permitting any further

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¶231

proceedings to continue against the petitioners would become an abuse of the process of law and degenerate into harassment

¶232

against them.

¶233

Noticing certain observations of the Apex Court in the

¶234

case of PREETI GUPTA (supra), in the circumstances, would be

¶235

apposite and they read –

¶236

34. Unfortunately, at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and consequences are not properly visualized by the complainant that such complaint can lead to insurmountable harassment, agony and pain to the complainant, accused and his close relations.

¶237

¶238

¶239

The Apex Court holds that unfortunately at the time of filing of the complaint the implications and complications are not visualized by the complainant and the agony and pain that is caused to the accused or his close relations. The Apex Court further holds to find out the truth in the complaint is a herculean task. Therefore, if the complaint and the averments in the complaint or the summary of the charge sheet do not make out any offence, it would become a duty of this Court to interfere and obliterate such proceedings, which would become an abuse of the process of the law. Reference being made to the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of MANOJ MAHAVIR PRASAD KHAITAN v. RAM GOPAL PODDAR⁷ , in the

¶240

circumstances, is apposite. In the said judgment the Apex Court holds as follows:

¶241

“12. We reiterate that when the criminal court looks into the complaint, it has to do so with an open mind. True it is that that is not the stage for finding out the truth or otherwise in the allegations; but where the allegations themselves are so absurd that no reasonable man would accept the same, the High Court could not have thrown its

¶242

7 (2010) 10 SCC 673

¶243

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arms in the air and expressed its inability to do anything in the matter. Section 482 CrPC is a guarantee against injustice. The High Court is invested with the tremendous powers thereunder to pass any order in the interests of justice. Therefore, this would have been a proper case for the High Court to look into the allegations with the openness and then to decide whether to pass any order in the interests of justice. In our opinion, this was a case where the High Court ought to have used its powers under Section 482 CrPC.”

¶245

With regard to the offence alleged under Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, some bald allegations are found in the FIR, as also in the charge sheet, but no proof thereof is produced to sustain the charge. The allegations under these sections are made to somehow bring the petitioners to book. Such an approach cannot be countenanced in law.

¶246

In the light of the preceding analysis of the facts, the judgments of the Apex Court on the subject and the powers of this Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. I deem it appropriate to obliterate the proceedings against the petitioners.

¶247

¶248

26. For the aforesaid reasons, I pass the following:

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O R D E R

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