Dismissed

Sri H R Shivakumar v. the State of Government

Karnataka HC11 Feb 2021WP/49213/2019

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

A public interest petition sought forfeiture of exempted urban land and challenged its exclusion from acquisition and proposed development. The court held that the exemption-withdrawal power was not saved after repeal. It dismissed the petition as meritless and privately motivated, imposed costs, and barred further public interest petitions by the petitioner.

What the court decided

AI extract

Sri H R Shivakumar Vs the State of Government — Land Acquisition | Karnataka HC (2021)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 11^TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2021

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PRESENT

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THE HON’BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

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AND

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THE HON’BLE MRS.JUSTICE M.G.UMA

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WRIT PETITION NO.49213 OF 2019(LA-BDA/PIL)

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BETWEEN:

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SRI.H.R.SHIVAKUMAR SON OF G.RAJASHEKARAIAH AGED ABOUT 55 YEARS RESIDING AT NO.726 RAJASHEKARA NILAYA I CROSS, VINAYAKA NAGAR HEBBAL, BELLARY ROAD BENGALURU-560 024.

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... PETITIONER

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(BY SRI:HAREESH BHANDARY T., ADVOCATE (PH))

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AND:

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THE STATE OF GOVERNMENT REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY REVENUE DEPARTMENT VIDHANA SOUDHA

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BENGALURU-01.

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THE COMMISSIONER BENGALURU DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY KUMARA KRUPA EAST BENGALURU-01.

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SMT.PARIMALA DESAI WIFE OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 83 YEARS

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DR.ARAVIND DESAI SON OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 68 YEARS

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SMT.MOHINI N.PRASAD DAUGHTER OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 67 YEARS

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SMT.KAMINI A.RAO DAUGHTER OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 66 YEARS

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SMT.NALINI KRISHNAN WIFE OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 64 YEARS

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SRI.ANIL DESAI SON OF P.R.DESAI AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS ALL ARE RESDING AT NO.6 KUMARA KRUPA ROAD KUMARCOT LAYOUT MADHAVANAGARA BENGALURU-560 001.

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M/S ADARSH DEVELOPERS A REGISTERED PARTNERSHIP FIRM NO.10, VITTAL MALYA ROAD BENGALURU-560 001. REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGING PARTNER SRI.B.M.JAYESHANKAR. ... RESPONDENTS

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(BY SRI: R SUBRAMANYA, ADDL., ADVOCATE GENERAL FOR SRI: C.N.MAHADESHWARAN, AGA FOR R1 (PH) SRI: B.S.SACHIN, ADVOCATE FOR R2; SRI: ARUN KUMAR K, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR SRI: M.V.SUNDARARAMAN, ADV FOR R3 TO R9 (PH))

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THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO:

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QUASH THE NOTIFICATION ANNEXURE ‘G’ DATED 18/06/2014 PASSED BY RESPONDENT NO.1 DENOTIFYING THE LAND BEARING SY.NO.25/1 MEASURING 3 ACRES 29 GUNTAS OF KEMPAPURA VILLAGE FROM THE ACQUISITION PROCEEDINGS FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING ARKAVATHI LAYOUT WHILE APPROVING RE.MODIFIED SCHEME FOR FORMATION OF ARKAVATHI LAYOUT;

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DIRECT RESPONDENT NO.1 AND ITS AUTHORITIES TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION FOR FORFEITURE OF THE LAND BEARING SY NO.25/1 MEASURING 3 ACRES 29 GUNTAS OF KEMPAPURA VILLAGE FOR VIOLATING THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS IMPOSED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT VIDE ITS ORDER DATED 30/05/1992 WHILE GRANTING EXEMPTION IN RESPECT OF THE SAID LAND FROM THE PROVISIONS OF KARNATAKA URBAN LAND (CEILING AND CONTROL) ACT, 1976 ANNEXURE-B;

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DECLARE THAT THE JOINT DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT DATED 04/12/2017 ENTERED INTO BETWEEN RESPONDENT NOS.3 TO 8 AND RESPONDENT NO.9 IS NULL AND VOID AS THE SAME IS IN VIOLATION OF THE CONDITION NO.1 IMPOSED BY THE STATE GOVERNMENT WHILE GRANTING EXEMPTION IN RESPECT OF THE LAND IN QUESTION FROM THE PROVISIONS OF THE KARNATAKA URBAN LAND (CEILING AND CONTROL) ACT, 1976 ANNEXURE-H AND ETC.

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THIS WRIT PETITION COMING ON FOR ORDERS THIS DAY, NAGARATHNA, J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

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J U D G M E N T

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This writ petition is stated to be filed in public interest. The petitioner - Sri.H.R.Shivakumar, son of Sri.G.Rajashekaraiah, is stated to be a social worker

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working for the cause of poor and down-trodden in the society.

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It is the case of the petitioner that land bearing Sy.No.25/1 situated at Kempapura Village, Bengaluru North Taluk, measuing 3 acres 35 guntas was owned by one Patel Sonnappa. Respondent No.3 and her husband Dr.P.R.Desai purchased 3 acres 29 guntas in the said land from the said Patel Sonnappa. 2 acres of land in Sy.No.25/1 was purchased by the husband of respondent No.3, while remaining 1 acre 29 guntas in the said survey number was purchased by his wife/respondent No.3.

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In the year 1992, an application was made before respondent No.1 seeking exemption under the provisions of Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to “the Act of 1976” for the sake of brevity). The purpose for seeking such an exemption was to construct a hospital on the land in question for the cause of poor and down-trodden. An order was passed on 30/05/1992, a copy of which is

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produced at Annexure-B, granting exemption under Subsection (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 subject to certain terms and conditions. Respondent No.3 and her husband made an application in the year 1997 before respondent No.1 for change of use of the land in question measuring 3 acres 29 guntas. They stated therein that they intended to construct a hospital on the said land and hence, respondent No.1 accorded permission for conversion of the land from agricultural to non agricultural purpose by order dated 03/07/1997.

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When the matter stood thus, Bengaluru Development Authority (for short ‘BDA’) initiated acquisition for the purpose of formation of Arkavathi Layout. The Final Notification was questioned before this Court in Writ Petition No.21067 of 2004, which was disposed by directing BDA to consider the objections raised by the owners of the land. Thereafter, representation was made on 13/10/2006 and subsequently, the land in question did not find place in the subsequent Final

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Notification. As per order dated 28/05/2010, the Land Acquisition Officer passed an order recommending for denotifying the land in question and in the Notification was issued on 18/06/2014 the land in question does not find a place. According to the petitioner, respondent Nos.3 to 8 have entered into a Joint Development Agreement (for short ‘JDA’) on 04/12/2017 with respondent No.9, who is stated to be a builder, a copy of which is produced as Annexure-H to the writ petition. It is contended that respondent Nos.3 to 8 have violated the order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 and particularly, the conditions incorporated therein.

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The petitioner has sought for following reliefs and interim relief in the writ petition, which are extracted as under:

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“WHEREFORE, it is prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to:

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a) issue writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ quashing the Notification Annexure G dated 18/06/2014 passed by the 1^st

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respondent bearing No.UDD 426 MNJ 2011 denotifying the land bearing Sy.No.25/1 measuring 3 acres 29 guntas of Kempapura village from the acquisition proceedings for the purpose of forming Arkavathi Layout while approving re-modified scheme for formation of Arkavathi Layout.

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b) issue writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ directing the first respondent and its authorities to take necessary action for forfeiture of the land bearing Sy.No.25/1 measuring 3 acres 29 guntas of Kempapura village for violating the terms and conditions imposed by the State Government vide its order dated 30/05/1992 bearing No.HUD 15 ULC 90 while granting exemption in respect of the said land from the provisions of Karnataka Urban Land (Ceiling and Control) Act 1976, Annexure B;

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c) declare that the Joint Development Agreement dated 04/12/2017 entered into between the respondent Nos.3 to 8 and respondent No.9 is null and void as the same is in violation of the condition No.1 imposed by the State Government while granting exemption in

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respect of the land in question from the provisions of the Karnataka Urban Land (Ceiling and Control) Act 1976 Annexure H.

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d) such other relief/s as it deems fit to grant in favour of the petitioner by this Hon’ble Court in view of the facts and circumstances of the cases, in the interest of justice.

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INTERIM PRAYER

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Pending disposal of the above Writ Petition, this Hon’ble court may be pleased to restrain the respondent No.9 or anybody claiming under or through it from developing the land bearing Sy.No.25/1 of Kempapura Village pursuant to the joint development agreement dated 04/12/2017 as per Annexure ‘H’ in the interest of justice.”

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At this stage itself, we may observe that initially submissions were made by Sri.K.Arun Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 9 on the very maintainability of the writ petition by way of a public interest litigation.

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In that regard, our attention was drawn to the statement of objections filed by respondent Nos.3 to 9, in which, specific contention has been raised to the effect that this writ petition filed as public interest litigation is not a bonafide one and that the petitioner has no locus standi to seek the reliefs that he has sought in respect of the private land. It was contended that on the behest of petitioner and his sister, one Smt.H.R.Umadevi, a civil suit bearing O.S.No.2215 of 2017 was instituted by one Sri.V.Govindappa and others against respondent Nos.3 to 8, in which, an order of permanent injunction was issued. But the said suit was withdrawn on 11/04/2019 before the XXXIII Additional City Civil and Sessions Judge, on account of an out of Court settlement arrived at between the plaintiffs and defendants therein. Not being satisfied with the out of Court settlement arrived at in the said suit, the petitioner and his sister, Smt.H.R.Umadevi being strangers have continued to make an attempt to interfere with the possession of respondent Nos.3 to 8 in respect of the land in question and in order to obstruct development activities.

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In that regard, a complaint had been made by respondent No.9 before the Inspector of Police, Amruthahalli Police Station, Bengaluru.

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Learned senior counsel appearing for

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respondent Nos.3 to 9 further drew our attention to the fact that Smt.H.R.Umadevi, sister of the petitioner acting as President of an entity called ‘Shivashakthi Mahila Sangha (R)’, on 14/04/2019, had filed police complaint before the Inspector of Police Amruthahalli Police Station, Bengaluru, falsely alleging kidnap of family members of Sri.V.Govindappa, who had settled claims between respondent Nos.3 to 9 herein and withdrew O.S.No.2215 of 2017. Therefore, it was contended that this petition styled as public interest litigation is filed with an oblique motive for private gain and the petitioner herein has no locus standi to file such a public interest litigation seeking the aforesaid prayers.

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Be that as it may. We have heard Sri.T.Hareesh Bhandary, learned counsel for the petitioner,

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Sri.K.Arun Kumar, learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 9 and Sri.R.Subramanya, learned Additional Advocate General for respondent No.1.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that, all that the petitioner seeking is for initiation of action against respondent Nos.3 to 9 for violating the conditions in Government order which is at Annexure-B dated 30/05/1992. He submitted that the said order was made under the provisions of Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976, exempting the land in question under certain terms and conditions. The most important consideration for granting exemption was, for the purpose

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of utilizing the land to build a hospital, but instead, respondent Nos.3 to 9 intend to put up an apartment complex and JDA dated 04/12/2017 has been entered into by respondent Nos.3 to 8 with respondent No.9, which is in total violation of condition No.1 imposed by State Government while granting exemption in respect of the land in question under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the

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Act of 1976. Therefore, prayer has been sought as against respondent Nos.3 to 9 herein so that the subject land shall be forfeited to the State Government and action must be initiated under the provisions of the Act of 1976.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner also contended that the land in question was the subject matter of acquisition and the same was to be acquired for the purpose of forming Arkavathi Layout, but respondent Nos.3 to 8, the owners of the land categorically stated that the land was required for the purpose of rendering medical service and there was already a clinic and residential quarters for the staff of the clinic and medical facilities in

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the form of a hospital has to be put up on the said land. Therefore, on that basis the land was excluded by way of modified scheme and respondent Nos.3 to 8 got the benefit of the said exclusion, but instead utilizing the land as per the conditions imposed in order dated 30/05/1992, respondent Nos.3 to 9 are seeking to put up the apartment complex. Therefore, this writ petition is filed in public

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interest seeking a direction to the State to initiate action under the provisions of the Act of 1976.

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Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 9, as has been already noted, at the outset, vehemently contended that this public interest litigation ought to be dismissed in limine, as the same is filed with an oblique motive and it is not the public interest at all. This case has been filed only for the private gain. That the petitioner is none other than the brother of Smt.H.R.Umadevi who had earlier made an attempt to interfere with the possession of the land in question as being the President of Shivashakthi Mahila Sangha (R). That the whole object of filing this petition is to ventilate vengeance and this writ petition is a private motivated litigation and hence, the same may be dismissed on that score alone.

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That apart, learned senior counsel Sri.Arun kumar, appearing for respondent Nos.3 to 9 submitted, the prayers sought by the petitioner cannot be granted in

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the writ petition, even if locus standi of the petitioner who filed the writ petition is kept aside for a moment. In this regard, he drew our attention to the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as “the Repealing Act of 1999” for the sake of brevity), to contend that the Repealing Act of 1999 has repealed the provisions of the Act of 1976, except to the extent of actions and orders passed under the Act of 1976 being saved as stated under Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Repealing Act of 1999. He submitted that on a reading of Sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act of 1999, it is clear that what has been saved despite the repeal of Act of 1976 is only orders of exemption passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 and the payments made pursuant to the said orders being passed under the said provisions. He submitted that Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 under which the petitioner is seeking action to be initiated against respondent Nos.3 to 9 is not saved and the said provision stands repealed. Therefore, under the repealed enactment, no direction could be

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sought against the State to initiate action against respondent Nos.3 to 9.

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In support of the aforesaid submission, learned senior counsel relied upon a judgment of the High Court of Judicature, Andhra Pradesh reported in Surendra Raj Jaiswal and another Vs Government of Andhra Pradesh and another [2011 SCC Online AP 462] and particularly paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment . He also relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kirloskar Electric Company Limited Vs The State of Karnataka and Others [Writ Petition No.106705 of 2019] particularly paragraph 46 of the said judgment.

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He, therefore, submitted that when Subsection (2) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 has not been saved, the power to take action under that provision for the alleged violation of the condition imposed by an order passed under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 does not arise. Hence, in the instant case, the State

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Government is not empowered to initiate legal action as against respondent Nos.3 to 8 herein.

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Learned senior counsel further submitted that BDA sought to acquire the land in question for the purpose of Arkavathi Layout and if the said land was acquired, then the same would not have been available for respondent Nos.3 to 9 and possibly it would have been converted into house, sites and the object and purpose of condition imposed in the order dated 30/05/1992 would also not have been achieved in that event. Learned senior counsel contended that the writ petition has no merit and the same could be dismissed with exemplary costs.

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Learned Additional Advocate General appearing for respondent No.1 also submitted that having regard to the material on record, it is evident and apparent that the petitioner has a private vengeance against the respondents. That precious time of the Court is being spent to consider the writ petition and the prayers sought by the petitioner which cannot be granted at all. He

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further contended that, of late, there has been a trend of persons who have absolutely no public interest in mind filing petitions in the name and style of public interest litigation whereas, in substance, it is for ventilating private vengeance or to gain publicity or simply harass persons and thereby, unnecessary precious time of the Court is wasted, which would also result is considerable time and energy being spent by the State, its officers as well as legal Department in resisting such kind of litigation. He contended that this writ petition is one such and therefore, appropriate orders may be made by imposing cost.

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We have considered the rival contentions and perused the pleadings and the material on record. It is not in dispute that the order dated 30/05/1992 was passed under the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 20 of Act of 1976 exempting the land in question from the provisions of the Act of 1976. The object of the Act of 1976, was to provide an imposition of a ceiling on vacant land in urban agglomerations, for the acquisition of such

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land in excess of the ceiling limit, to regulate the construction of buildings on such land and for matters connected therewith, with a view to preventing the concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and speculation and profiteering therein and with a view to bringing about an equitable distribution of land in urban agglomerations to subserve the common good.

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Despite such being the object and purpose of the Act of 1976, Section 20 of the said Act provided for exemption of the vacant land from the provisions of the Act, subject to certain terms and conditions to be imposed by the State. Section 20 of the Act of 1976 reads as under:

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“20. Power to exempt:- (1)

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Notwithstanding anything contained in any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter:

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a) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government is satisfied, either on its own motion or otherwise, that, having regard to the

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location of such land, the purpose for which such land is being or is proposed to be used and such other relevant factors as the circumstances of the case may require, it is necessary or expedient in the public interest so to do, that Government may, by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter;

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b) where any person holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit and the State Government, either on its own motion or otherwise, is satisfied that the application of the provisions of this Chapter would cause undue hardship to such person, that Government may by order, exempt, subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in the order, such vacant land from the provisions of this Chapter.”

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However, on 18/03/1999, the Repealing Act of 1999 was enforced which was an Act to repeal the Act of 1976. Sections 3 and 4 of the Repealing Act of 1999, reads as under:

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“Section-3:- Saving:- 1) The repeal of the principal Act shall not affect-

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a) the vesting of any vacant land under sub-section (3) of Section 10, possession of which has been taken over the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority;

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b) the validity of any order granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, notwithstanding any judgment of any court to the contrary;

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c) any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20.

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(2) Where-

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a) any land is deemed to have vested in the State Government under sub-section (3) of Section 10 of the principal Act but possession of which has not been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority; and

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b) any amount has been paid by the State Government with respect to such land

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then, such land shall not be restored unless the amount paid, if any, has been refunded to the State Government.

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4. Abatement of legal proceedings:- All proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending immediately before the commencement of this Act, before any court, tribunal or other authority shall abate:

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Provided that this section shall not apply to the proceedings relating to sections 11, 12, 13 and 14 of the principal Act in so far as such proceedings are relatable to the land, possession of which has been taken over by the State Government or any person duly authorised by the State Government in this behalf or by the competent authority.

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As a result of Repealing Act of 1999, the Act of

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1976 has been repealed saving only certain provisions of

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the said Act as enunciated under Section 3 of the Repealing Act of 1999 as well as orders made and actions taken thereunder. Section 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c) are those provisions which have been saved, namely, the validity of any order granting exemption under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 or any action taken thereunder, and any payment made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption are saved. This would clearly indicate that Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 is not saved.

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Interpreting the aforesaid provision, the High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in Surendra Raj Jaiswal (supra) has observed at paragraphs 10 and 11 as under:

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“10. From a perusal of the aforesaid provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, it is clear that the orders granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act are saved. It is also clear from a perusal of the provision under Section

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3(1)(c) of the Repealing Act that repeal of the Principal Act shall not affect any payments made to the State Government as a condition for granting exemption under sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Principal Act. But, at the same time, the provision under sub-section (2) of Section 20 is not saved. Section 20(1) of the Principal Act empowers the Government to exempt any land subject to certain conditions, but under sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, the Government was empowered to withdraw such exemption in cases where conditions are violated. A harmonious reading of the provisions under Sections 20(1) and 20(2) of the Principal Act, coupled with Section 3 of the Repealing Act, makes it clear that the order granting exemption is saved only with a view to avoid repayment of any amounts collected by the State Government, while granting exemptions. When the principal Act itself is repealed on the ground that it has failed to achieve the objective expected of it, it is not open for the 1^st respondent-Government to refuse permission in the instant case, only on the ground that the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption shall continue to

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operate. In the absence of any saving clause, saving sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Principal Act, even in cases where conditions are violated, Government is not empowered to withdraw the exemptions granted under.

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Section 20(1) of the Principal Act, after coming into force of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. In the absence of such power, and further, in view of the Repealing Act itself, the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption, have become unenforceable and are non-est. In the absence of initiation of proceedings or withdrawal of exemption granted under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act before the enforcement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, the land, which is exempted, will become a freehold land, and hence, the stand of the respondents that even after coming into force of the Repealing Act, 1999, the conditions imposed in the order granting exemption under Section 20(1) of the Principal Act shall continue to operate, cannot be accepted. The said interpretation will run contra to the very objective of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999. Said view also

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gains support from the other provisions of the Repealing Act, particularly Section 4, which states that all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the Principal Act, pending immediately before the commencement of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act of 1999, shall stand abate, except in cases where possession is taken by the State Government or any person duly authorized by the State Government on behalf of the Competent Authority.

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11. Having regard to the provisions under Section 20(1) and (2) of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 and the provisions under Sections 3 and 4 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 1999, it is to be held that in cases where the vacant land is exempted under Section 20 of the Principal Act and where exemption is not withdrawn before the enforcement of the repealing Act, 1999, such land will become the free-hold land irrespective of any conditions with regard to usage of the exempted land. As held above, as the land in question has become the freehold land in view of the Repealing Act, 1999,

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there appears no reason or justification for not granting permission to use the land covered by exemption proceedings, for the purpose of multiplex theatre-cum-shopping complex. In a strict sense, no such permission is necessary, but, when the Competent Authority under the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act has not received the application, petitioner had to approach the Government, and as permission is denied by misconstruing the various provision of the Repealing Act, 1999, the impugned order is liable to be set aside.”

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In fact, even the learned Single Judge of this Court in Kirloskar Electric Company Limited (supra) has observed at paragraphs 46 and 47 as under:

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“46. Respondent No.2 in the show cause notice at Annexure-L has alleged the violation of order dated 09/12/1983 and 02/03/1988. Surprisingly, the respondent No.2 has alleged violation of the order dated 09/12/1983 and 02/03/1988 passed under Section 20 of the Urban Land Ceiling Act, 1976. The Urban Land Ceiling Act was repealed on 22/03/1999 by the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act,

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1999. Section 4 of the repealing Act provides that all proceedings relating to any order made or purported to be made under the principal Act pending before any court, tribunal or other authority shall abate. In the instant case the proceeding is sought to be initiated after lapse of 30 years from the date of the order. Further on the repeal of the Act the order passed under the said Act cannot be enforced. Even otherwise, there is inordinate delay in initiation of proceedings.

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47. Without prejudice to the aforesaid contentions, as per Section 20(2) of the ULC Act the State Government can withdraw the exemption granted after giving an opportunity of hearing to the person concerned. In the instant case, impugned notice is issued by 2^nd respondent and not by the State Government. Further Section 20(2) of the ULC Act is not in existence by virtue of the Repealing Act. Hence, Section 20(2) cannot be invoked. A reading of the Repealing Act leaves no room for doubt that the order under the ULC Act would cease to operate on passing of the Repealing Act.”

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On a reading of aforesaid dicta, it becomes clear that pursuant to Repealing Act of 1999, there is no provision under the said Repealing Act, which enables any action to be taken for violation any condition of an order of exemption granted under Sub-section (1) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976. In other words, Sub-section (2) of Section 20 of the Act of 1976 which empowered the State Government to withdraw the order of exemption after giving a reasonable opportunity is no longer in the statute book. But the petitioner has not referred to the Repealing Act of 1999 in his writ petition. The petitioner has filed this writ petition seeking action to be initiated against respondent Nos.3 to 9 under the repealed enactment and that too under the provision which has not been saved under the Repealing Act. In other words, this petition filed by the petitioner herein seeking a direction against the State to take action against respondent Nos.3 to 9 herein under the repealed statute, is impermissible in law.

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In the circumstances, the prayers sought by

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the petitioner cannot be granted in this writ petition. Hence, the writ petition being devoid of any merit is liable to be dismissed.

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But the matter does not end. The question is as to why this petitioner filed the writ petition in “public interest” is a significant aspect which has to be considered in the instant case. Detailed submissions have been made by the learned senior counsel for respondent Nos.3 to 9 and learned Additional Advocate General in that regard. We have also perused the statement of objections and the documents appended to the statement of objections by respondent Nos.3 to 9. There is no counter to the same except contending that the petitioner is a “social worker” and therefore, on the strength of his avocation, he has filed this writ petition.

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Learned Counsel for the petitioner emphasized

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that the petitioner is a State President of the Organization called ‘Mannina Maga, Badavaru, Shramikaru, Yuvakara

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Brigade, No.4, P.S.R Marvelous Building, Vinayaka Nagar, Ballari Road, Hebbal, Bengaluru – 560 024. There is no reference to this organization in the memorandum of writ petition. More significantly, the petitioner has sought relief in the nature of public interest litigation seeking action to be initiated by the State Government under the repealed enactment. Further, the said action is sought to be initiated in relation to private land. This writ petition is wholly misconceived apart from being one for oblique private interest and motivated for personal gain. We do not find any public interest being subserved in filing this writ petition. Hence, this writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

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In the circumstances, we dismiss the writ

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petition.

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We also have no hesitation in imposing cost by placing reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Uttaranchal Vs Balwant Singh

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Chaufal and Others [AIR 2010 Supreme Court 2550],

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the relevant paragraph of which are extracted as under:

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“198. In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the PIL, it has become imperative to issue the following directions:

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1) The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL filed for extraneous considerations.

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2) Instead of every individual Judge devising his own procedure for dealing with the public interest litigation, it would be appropriate for each High Court to properly formulate rules for encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the PIL filed with oblique motives. Consequently, we request that the High Courts who have not yet framed the rules, should frame the rules within three months. The Registrar General of each High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of the Rules prepared by the High Court is sent to the Secretary General of this court immediately thereafter.

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3. The courts should prima facie verify the credentials of the petitioner before entertaining a P.I.L.

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4) The court should be prima facie satisfied regarding the correctness of the contents of the petition before entertaining a PIL.

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5) The court should be fully satisfied that substantial public interest is involved before entertaining the petition.

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6) The court should ensure that the petition which involves larger public interest, gravity and urgency must be given priority over other petitions.

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7) The courts before entertaining the PIL should ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of genuine public harm or public injury. The court should also ensure that there is no personal gain, private motive or oblique motive behind filing the public interest litigation.

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8) The court should also ensure that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by

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imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.”

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On a reading of the above, we place reliance on the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the petitions filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior motives must be discouraged by imposing exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel methods to curb frivolous petitions and the petitions filed for extraneous considerations.

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It is also apposite to rely on the observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Tehseen Poonawalla Vs Union of India and another [(2018) 6 Supreme Court Cases 72], which are extracted for immediate reference, at paragraph Nos.96, 97 and 98 as under:

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“96. Public Interest Litigation has developed as a powerful tool to espouse the cause of the marginalised and oppressed. Indeed, that was the foundation on which public

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interest jurisdiction was judicially recognised in situations such as those in Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India. Persons who were unable to seek access to the judicial process by reason of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy are faced with a deprivation of fundamental human rights. Bonded labour and under trials (among others) belong to that category. The hallmark of a public interest petition is that a citizen may approach the court to ventilate the grievance of a person or class of persons who are unable to pursue their rights. Public interest litigation has been entertained by relaxing the rules of standing. The essential aspect of the procedure is that the person who moves the court has no personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings apart from a general standing as a citizen before the court. This ensures the objectivity of those who pursue the grievance before the court. Environmental jurisprudence has developed around the rubric of public interest petitions. Environmental concerns affect the present generation and the future. Principles such as the polluter pays and the public trust doctrine have evolved during the adjudication of public interest petitions. Over time, public

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interest litigation has become a powerful instrument to preserve the rule of law and to ensure the accountability of and transparency within structures of governance. Public interest litigation is in that sense a valuable instrument and jurisdictional tool to promote structural due process.

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97. Yet over time, it has been realised that this jurisdiction is capable of being and has been brazenly mis-utilised by persons with a personal agenda. At one end of that spectrum are those cases where public interest petitions are motivated by a desire to seek publicity. At the other end of the spectrum are petitions which have been instituted at the behest of business or political rivals to settle scores behind the facade of a public interest litigation. The true face of the litigant behind the façade is seldom unravelled. These concerns are indeed reflected in the judgment of this court in State of Uttaranchal v Balwant Singh Chaufal. Underlining these concerns, this court held thus:

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“143. Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out,

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created and nurtured with great care and caution by the courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions with oblique motives. We think time has come when genuine and bona fide public interest litigation must be encouraged whereas frivolous public interest litigation should be discouraged. In our considered opinion, we have to protect and preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of the people of this country but we must take effective steps to prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and nonmonetary directions by the courts.”

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98. The misuse of public interest litigation is a serious matter of concern for the judicial process. Both this court and the High Courts are flooded with litigation and are burdened by arrears. Frivolous or motivated petitions, ostensibly invoking the public interest detract from the time and attention which courts must devote to genuine causes. This court has a long list of pending cases where the personal liberty of citizens is involved. Those who await trial or the resolution of appeals against orders of

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conviction have a legitimate expectation of early justice. It is a travesty of justice for the resources of the legal system to be consumed by an avalanche of misdirected petitions purportedly filed in the public interest which, upon due scrutiny, are found to promote a personal, business or political agenda. This has spawned an industry of vested interests in litigation. There is a grave danger that if this state of affairs is allowed to continue, it would seriously denude the efficacy of the judicial system by detracting from the ability of the court to devote its time and resources to cases which legitimately require attention. Worse still, such petitions pose a grave danger to the credibility of the judicial process. This has the propensity of endangering the credibility of other institutions and undermining public faith in democracy and the rule of law. This will happen when the agency of the court is utilised to settle extra-judicial scores. Business rivalries have to be resolved in a competitive market for goods and services. Political rivalries have to be resolved in the great hall of democracy when the electorate votes its representatives in and out of office. Courts resolve disputes about legal rights

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and entitlements. Courts protect the rule of law. There is a danger that the judicial process will be reduced to a charade, if disputes beyond the ken of legal parameters occupy the judicial space.”

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Hence, we impose the cost of Rs.3,00,000/- to be payable by the petitioner within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of copy of this order to the High Court Legal Services Committee.

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We also direct the Registry to henceforth not entertain any public interest litigation to be filed by this petitioner, namely, Sri.H.R.Shivakumar, son of Sri.G.Rajashekaraiah, aged about 55 years, said to be residing at No.726, Rajashekara Nilaya, I Cross, Vinayaka Nagar, Hebbal, Bellary Road, Bengaluru- 560 024, either in-person or as President of ‘Mannina Maga, Badavaru, Shramikaru, Yuvakara Brigade’.

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In view of the dismissal of the writ petition, IA.1 of 2020 filed for grant of interim prayer and IA.1 of 2021 filed for filing of additional facts stand disposed.

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Sd/JUDGE

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Sd/JUDGE

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*bgn/-

Sri H R Shivakumar v. the State of Government

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Sri H R Shivakumar v. the State of Government

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