Allowed

Sri C H Ramesh v. State of Karnataka

Karnataka HC1 Sept 2016CRL.A/165/2013

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

In a criminal appeal challenging a conviction for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC, the High Court of Karnataka acquitted the appellants. The court held that the alleged threats and filing of a false complaint did not directly drive the deceased to suicide, finding a miscarriage of justice in the lower court's decision to convict particularly the second accused.

What did the court decide?

The impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence are set aside; the appellants are acquitted.

Sri C H Ramesh Vs State of Karnataka — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Karnataka HC (2016)

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

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DATED THIS THE 01^ST DAY OF SEPTEMBER 2016

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BEFORE

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THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND BYRAREDDY

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CRIMINAL APPEAL No.165 OF 2013

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BETWEEN:

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Sri. C.H.Ramesh, Son of Late Hucchappa, Aged about 49 years, Lecturer, BES Evening – Pre-University College, Bangalore. Residing at No.1555, 18^th Main, Muneshwara Block, Avalahalli, Bangalore – 560026.

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Sri. Seenappa @ Srinivas, Son of Late Kempalingaiah, Aged about 56 years, Residing at No.215/A, Nanjappa Layout, Magadi Road, Kottige Palya, Bangalore – 560 091.

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…APPELLANTS

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(By Shri B. Anand, Advocate )

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AND:

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State of Karnataka by Amruthur Police Station, Kunigal Taluk, Tumkur District.

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…RESPONDENT

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(By Shri K.R.Keshav Murthy, State Public Prosecutor-II, for Respondent / State )

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This Criminal Appeal filed under Section 374(2) of the code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, by the advocate for the appellants/accused Nos. 1 and 2 praying to set aside the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 1.2.2013 passed by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur in S.C.No.48/2012 – convicting the appellants/accused for the offence punishable under Section 306 read with 34 of IPC and etc;

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This appeal coming on for Hearing this day, the Court delivered the following:

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JUDGMENT

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Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and the

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learned State Public Prosecutor.

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The appellants were the accused before the court below and have been convicted for offences punishable under

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Section 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

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1860 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’, for brevity) and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 5 years and to pay fine of Rs.10,000/- each.

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It was the case of the prosecution that on 5.4.2011 at about 10PM, the complainant Narasamma had lodged a complaint to state that she was a resident of Honnegowdanapalya and that about one and half years prior to the complaint, she had filed a civil case seeking partition of her ancestral property situated at Chottanahalli before the Court of the Civil Judge, Kunigal. The defendants in that suit were her younger brother Ramesha and her elder brothers. Her younger brother Ramesha was frequently calling upon her son Jagadisha, who was at Bangalore and bringing pressure on him to convince the complainant to withdraw the civil suit filed by her for partition. Ramesha had also threatened Jagadisha that if the case was not withdrawn, that Jagadisha would come to harm. Jagadisha had brought this to the attention of the complainant. On 8.3.2011, Ramesha again is said to have sent

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for Jagadisha near the BES College, Jayanagar, Bangalore where he has working and again reminded that he was to convince his mother to withdraw the suit and threatened him of setting rowdies against him if he did not oblige. Jagadisha had brought this again to the knowledge of the complainant. It transpires that one Srinivas, who was again related to the complainant, had met Jagadisha and also threatened him that he would be killed if the civil suit was not withdrawn. On 3.4.2011, there was again a phone call from Ramesh to Jagadisha that he has lodged a complaint against him at the Girinagar Police Station, Bangalore and that he would ensure that he would be arrested. In the said complaint filed by him, it was alleged that Jagadish had molested the wife and daughter of Ramesha and that he was certain to be arrested. This had put the fear of god into Jagadisha, who was shocked and feared that he would be arrested by the Police and immediately rushed to the land of one Raju of Honnegowdanapalya and had consumed pesticide and was found struggling for his life. One K.Murthy

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had informed the complainant about the incident. Jagadisha was given first aid treatment, but he had died. Therefore, a complaint was lodged to take necessary action against Ramesha, who was the sole cause for the commission of suicide by Jagadisha. A case was registered in Crime No.44/2011 and a First Information Report was filed. After further proceedings of collecting the statements of witnesses as well as particulars of the inquests and the post-mortem of the deceased, a charge sheet was filed against accused nos.1 and 2 for the offences as aforesaid.

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The court below having taken cognizance, had committed the matter to the Sessions Court and thereafter charges were framed. The accused having pleaded not guilty and having claimed to be tried, the prosecution had examined six witnesses and marked several exhibits and material objects. The statements of the accused having been recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the court below had framed the following points for consideration:

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“1. Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that on 5.4.2011 at about 12 noon in the land belonging to one Raju, situated near Honnegowdana Palya, within the limits of complainant – Police Station, Jagadisha, son of C.W.1 Narasamma, consumed organo phosphorous insecticide and committed suicide, the accused in furtherance of their common intention had abetted the commission of said suicide and thereby accused have committed an offence punishable under Section 306 read with 34 IPC? ’’

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The court below has held the above point in the affirmative and convicted the accused. It is this which is under

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challenge in the present appeal.

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The learned counsel for the appellants would point out

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that from the material that is available on record, it is evident that there was no evidence to bring home the charge against the appellants for the alleged offence under Section 306 of the IPC.

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Mere fact that there was a suit for partition and accused no.1 was bringing pressure on the deceased to convince his mother, who had filed a civil suit for partition, to withdraw the same and on account of such unrelenting pressure thrown on him by accused no.1, he had been driven to commit suicide is not established. The mere fact that he was on more than one occasion had repeatedly told him that he should speak to his mother and ensure that the civil suit was withdrawn is not of much relevance as would lead to a presumption that Jagadisha would commit suicide on account of the same. The deceased was young enough to commit suicide under any such pressure and he was not a person to take such decision and his mother also knew that it was Ramesha, who was bringing such pressure on Jagadisha. Therefore, the suit was not of such a nature as would have driven him to commit suicide.

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It is pointed out that Jagadisha is allegedly said to have committed suicide at 12.30PM on 5.4.2011, but the death was not reported to the Police till 10PM and the complaint then

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having been brought alleging that the accused had driven Jagadisha to commit suicide is, therefore, a well discussed and a concocted allegation only to frame the accused - appellants. This is further evident from the circumstance that PWs.4 and 5 had come to the village from Bangalore and it is only after their arrival that there were discussions as to the manner in which the complainant could be framed and it is thereafter that a complaint was filed. The theory of the prosecution that it was constant needling and constant demands by Ramesha that the deceased should influence his mother to withdraw the civil suit and his persistent threats of bringing harm to the deceased and setting rowdies on him was certainly a criminal offence and nothing prevented the complainant or Jagadisha to have lodged a criminal case in this regard. In the absence of any such criminal case, the allegation of continuous and constant threats and demands by the accused is not established on the face of it. Further, it is on the other hand, the immediate cause for commission of suicide was that there was a complaint lodged

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by accused no.1 on the ground that the deceased had threatened to molest his wife and daughter if he continued to pester him and on hearing this, the deceased is said to have committed suicide. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was on account of the accused allegedly pestering the deceased that he had committed suicide, but on account of the criminal proceedings being initiated against him for having threatened to molest the wife and daughter of accused no.1.

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The learned Counsel would contend that the court below has mechanically proceeded to accept the allegations and the circumstances as being sufficient to establish a case for abetment of suicide when the settled principles of law would point otherwise. He would contend that in order to bring home a charge against the accused for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC, it must be shown that the accused had by his act even indirectly instigated or prevented the deceased to commit suicide or it should be shown that he had committed an act to have facilitated the commission of suicide by the

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deceased. When the alleged provocation or instigation by accused no.1 was intermittent and placed far in between and there were even alleged threats of bringing harm to the deceased, there was no impediment for him to have lodged a complaint against the accused and even if he was not inclined to do so, since the threats held out pointed both at the deceased and the complainant, nothing prevented the complainant herself from lodging a complaint in this regard and in the absence of any such complaint, there is no direct nexus that can be established between the alleged threats and demands and the commission of suicide. In the absence of this, the court below was not justified in holding that the charge had been proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

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In this regard, reliance is placed on a decision of this court in Umesha vs. State of Karnataka, ILR 2015 Kar.153, wherein there is reference to other judgments of the Supreme Court laying down the principles that require to be established for holding that an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC

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has been committed. In that, attention was drawn to a judgment in Swamy Prahaladdas vs. State of M.P., 1995 Supp.(3) SCC 438, wherein the appellant therein was charged for an offence punishable under Section 306 of the IPC on the ground that the appellant therein was, during a quarrel, said to have remarked to the deceased to “go and die”. She has promptly said to have complied with. The Supreme Court however had held that mere words uttered by the accused to the deceased would not prima facie be sufficient to instigate the deceased to commit suicide.

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Reliance is also placed on a decision in Mahendra Singh and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 1995 Supp (3) SCC 731, wherein the deceased having left behind a dying declaration seeking to implicate the appellant wherein she had stated, “My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law (husband’s elder brother’s wife) harassed me. They beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra wants to marry a second time. He has illicit connections with my sister-in-law.

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Because of these reasons and being harassed I want to die by burning.”

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This again was turned down by the Supreme Court by holding that the charge and conviction of the appellant for an offence under Section 306 IPC was not sustainable, merely on the allegation of harassment to the deceased and it was held that the ingredients of abetment were not attracted on the statement of the deceased.

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In Chitresh Kumar Chopra vs. State Government of NCT of Delhi, 2009(11) SCALE 24, the apex court has held that the sensitivity of each individual differs from another and it was opined that in instigation, there must be an intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing of an act by the latter. Each person’s suicidability pattern (sic) was different from another. That each person had his own idea of self esteem and self respect and that it would be impossible to lay down a strait jacket formula in addressing such cases.

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In Gangula Mohan Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh,

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2010 AIR SCW 337, it was held that the intention of the Legislature and the ratio of the cases decided by the Apex Court clearly indicated that in order to convict a person under Section 306 of the IPC, there has to be a clear mens rea to commit the offence. And it would also require an active act or direct act, which lead the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and that act must have been intended to push the deceased into such a position that he committed suicide.

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Therefore, it is contended that the reasoning of the court below in holding that the acts alleged were sufficient to incite, instigate and provoke the deceased to commit suicide cannot be readily accepted and seeks that the judgment of the trial court be set aside and the accused be acquitted.

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The learned State Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, would vehemently oppose the appeal and would insist that all the ingredients of an offence punishable under Section

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306 IPC were present in the case on hand. In view of the continuous and constant harassment by the appellants, compelling the deceased to convince his mother to withdraw the civil suit and the constant threats of bringing harm to him and finally, when the accused went to the extent of lodging a false complaint and thereby putting more pressure on the deceased, who was a young man of 22 and having brought a complaint, which would have certainly brought humiliation and disrespect to himself and his family of allegedly having threatened to molest the wife and daughter of accused no.1, which was wholly a false and concocted allegation, the deceased having immediately committed suicide on hearing such news, would amount to a direct act of the accused goading him to commit suicide. Even though he may not have said the same in so many words, the desperation was apparent in the response and the reaction by the deceased and therefore, it cannot be said that the present case would not come within the four corners of the principles laid down in the case law,

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which the learned Counsel for the appellants himself has cited. The learned State Public Prosecutor places reliance on a decision of the apex court in Praveen Pradhan vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2012)9 SCC 734, which has again addressed and discussed the case law, which is referred to hereinabove.

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Given the above facts and circumstances and the case law cited, the observation of the Supreme Court in Praveen Pradhan, supra, to the effect that investigation has to be gathered from the circumstances of a particular case and that no straight jacket formula can be laid down to find out as to whether in a particular case, there has been instigation which forced a person to commit suicide and that in particular case, there may not be direct evidence in regard to instigation, which may have direct nexus to suicide. In such a case, inference would have to be drawn from the circumstances and it is to be determined whether circumstances had been such, which in fact had created a situation that a person felt totally frustrated and committed suicide.

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Applying this guideline, if the facts of the present case are addressed closely, insofar as the several instances that are referred to whereby the appellants are said to have threatened or demanded or brought pressure on the deceased to convince the complainant to withdraw the partition suit that she had filed,

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there are only two instances which are referred to by the complainant of the accused having accosted the deceased and demanded that he convince his mother to withdraw the partition suit.

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Further, it is claimed by the complainant that the accused is said to have telephoned the deceased and informed him that he had lodged a complaint of the deceased having threatened to molest his wife and daughter. Whether this telephone call was sufficient to drive the deceased to commit suicide out of fear is a question. The fact that it was claimed to be a false complaint and that the complaint itself indicated that there was only a threat that the deceased would molest his wife and daughter, which was not of such serious nature as would have brought

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humiliation and shame on the deceased or caused such fear that he should immediately commit suicide. If it was a case, where he had, in fact, committed such molestation and that there was a criminal complaint in this regard, he was certain to face humiliation and shame. The deceased was a young man of 22 and was also employed and was worldly wise to know the consequences of a police complaint having been lodged. Therefore, to conclude that this phone call by the appellant was sufficient to drive the deceased to commit suicide cannot be readily accepted. In that view of the matter, the conclusion by the trial court that the instances referred to by the complainant were sufficient to drive the deceased to commit suicide. The contention on behalf of the learned State Public Prosecutor that he was driven to a corner and it is out of sheer desperation, seeing no way out, that he had committed suicide cannot be readily pressed into service. There were enough safeguards available in law to have protected himself and the extreme step

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of committing suicide cannot be attributed to the instances referred to in the complaint.

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Consequently, there is a miscarriage of justice in the court having found the accused guilty of the offences committed, particularly, when the allegations are not made against accused no.2. The court below has referred to only one instance of the accused having met the deceased and also having threatened him. There was no justification in the court having convicted accused no.2 as well. Though the main accusation is against accused no.1 and in the absence of any other nexus between the accused, the court having found that accused no.2 was equally guilty of the offence, is again inexplicable. For this reason also, the judgment of the court below is bad in law.

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Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the court below is set aside. The accused are acquitted. The bail

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bonds, if any, furnished shall stand cancelled and the fine

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amount, if any, paid shall be refunded to the appellant.

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Sd/-

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JUDGE

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