rejected the same only on the ground that since the preliminary decree does not provide for any such variance, it would not be permissible for the petitioner to invoke Sections 2 and 3 of the Partition Act, 1893 (Hereinafter referred to as the ‘1893 Act’, for brevity) and to seek any such relief though it was contended that Sections 2 and 3 of the 1893 Act would permit such a step being taken. As pointed out by the court below, the final decree could be in terms of the preliminary decree. Therefore, any variance to be applied can only be in the event that the preliminary decree is accordingly varied. In this regard, in the absence of any such variation, it would be impermissible for the petitioner to invoke Sections 2 and 3 of the 1893 Act as if it is a matter at large before the court to mould the decree to suit the convenience of the parties. Therefore, the petitioner is left to his remedies insofar as the impugned order is concerned and no fault can be found with it.