Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Pvt. Limited Thro Its Managing Direcrtor Shivdutta Sharma Vs the Authorized Officer, Indian Bank (Allahabad) Sam Branch, Ranchi

2026:JHHC:3300

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

(Civil Writ Jurisdiction) W.P. (C) No.6720 of 2025

1. Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Private Limited situated at Bawan Bigha, Deoghar, through its Managing Director Shivdutta Sharma, aged about 56 years, son of Sri Jwala Prasad Singh, resident of Amardham Lane, Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, P.O., P.S. and DistrictDeoghar, Jharkhand PIN-834112.

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2. Smt. Sabina Kumari, aged about 54 Years, wife of Sri Shivdutta Sharma, resident of Amardham Lane, Castair Town, Bawan Bigha, P.O., P.S. and District-Deoghar, Jharkhand PIN-834112 …. …. Petitioner(s)

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Versus

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The Authorized Officer, Indian Bank (Allahabad) SAM Branch, Ranchi, having its office at Paras Complex, Third Floor, Lalpur Chowk, Circular Road, P.O and P.S.-Lalpur, Town and District- Ranchi.

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…. …. Respondent(s)

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

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---For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Sr. Adv. : Mr. Ashok Kr. Yadav, Adv. For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajendra Krishna, Adv. : Ms. Amrita Sinha, Adv. : Ms. Pragunee Kashyap, Adv. : Mrs. Shweta Suman, Adv. ----

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07/Dated: 05^th February, 2026

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1. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.

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2. The present writ petition has been filed for following reliefs:-

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“(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, for quashing of the impugned notice dated 10.07.2025 (Annexure-5) issued under section 13 (2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 (hereinafter referred to as SARFAESI Act) by the respondent bank inasmuch as the same is without jurisdiction as the notice for enforcement of security under the provisions of section 13 of the Act of 2002 is barred by law of limitation.

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(ii) For issuance of appropriate writ/writs, order/orders, direction/directions upon the respondents to stay the operation and the effect of the said notice dated 10.07.2025 issued under section 13 (2) of the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Act, 2002 during pendency of this writ petition. ”

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2026:JHHC:3300

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3. From the argument and pleading of the parties, it appears that a term loan has been sanctioned to the petitioners on 23.06.2004 for the amount of Rupees Two Crores which has been subsequently enhanced to Rupees Nine Crores on 11.11.2005.

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4. It appears that further agreement has been entered into between the parties and additional Rupees Ten Crore term loan has been sanctioned on 20.10.2006 against the same and some additional assets have been added, which means that, in substance, the entire loan transaction constitutes a single event.

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5. It further appears that the petitioners have defaulted and accordingly the account, in question, has been declared Non Performing Asset (NPA) on 31.12.2009. It further appears that on 20.10.2010 the respondent-Bank has issued notice to the petitioners under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act. In the meantime, the Bank has filed Original Application being O.A. No.125 of 2013 under Section 19 of the Recovery of Debt and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 for recovery of the due amount before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Ranchi in the year 2013. It further appears that on 05.06.2014 a final order under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act has been passed and the possession has been taken in the year 2014 itself. Thereafter on compromise, the possession of the impugned property has been reconvened to the petitioners on 14.02.2015.

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6. It further appears that on 18.11.2014, one time settlement offer has been made by the petitioners but it was rejected by the respondent-Bank. Thereafter the petitioners have approached to “Lok Adalat” and in the Lok Adalat a compromise between the parties has taken place on 12.01.2015 wherein it has been agreed by the petitioners that they will repay the loan on further rescheduling of the mode of payments. It further appears that the said compromise has been brought on record in the pending Original Application (O.A.) also and the order has been passed. The relevant portion of the same is quoted hereinbelow:-

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“It is categorically mentioned that in the event of failure to comply the terms and conditions of compromise dated W.P. (C) No.6720 of 2025

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22.01.2015, the Applicant Bank will be at liberty to proceed against the Defendants to recover the entire amount of O.A. No.125 of 2013 but subject to the adjustment of the amount already paid by the Defendants to the Applicant Bank.”

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7. The petitioners have paid the front amount of Rupees Ten Lac for rescheduling of the mode of payment. It appears that thereafter no payment has been made and the petitioners have again defaulted. Accordingly a fresh notice dated 10.07.2005 under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act has been issued. Mainly three objections have been raised by the petitioners:

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(i) It is barred by law of limitation as the NPA has been declared in the year 2009 and the present notice has been issued in the year 2025 that is beyond the period of 12 years.

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(ii) The Bank has taken the plea for the delay that there is an order of the Deputy Commissioner, Deoghar and further a suit is also pending and at present there is First Appeal also. Thus, the said condition still exists and as such the Bank was not right in initiating the proceeding during the pendency of the First Appeal with regard to the property in question.

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(iii) The mandate of law is that they have to decide the objection under Section 13(3-A) of the SARFAESI Act with a reasoned order which has not been done and as such the subsequent action by the Bank is bad in law.

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8. Learned counsel for the Bank has opposed the prayer and it has been submitted by referring to the prayer potion that:

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(i) the only issue raised is regarding the limitation and other two issues have not been pleaded in the present writ petition and as such that is not being replied as it is beyond the prayers and pleading.

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9. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Calcutta in the case of Dr. Dipankar Chakraborty Vrs. Allahabad Bank & Ors. passed in W.P. No.16511 (W) of 2016 and it has been submitted that the period of limitation never stops, it keeps on running. In the present case, the NPA is of the year 2009 and the

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period of limitation has expired after lapse of 12 years. Referring to the above judgments, it has been submitted by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners that the respondent-Bank is at liberty to proceed further after final order to be passed in pending O.A. No.125 of 2013 which has got revived as per the order dated 06.02.2015.

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10. In fact, the real issue involved in the present writ petition is “whether the limitation will starts running from the date of NPA i.e. 31.12.2009 or from the date of compromise i.e. 22.01.2015”.

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11. It is settled principle of law that once limitation starts it only expires never stops. The only question is starting point of limitation, if there is a fresh compromise between the parties. In the case of commercial transaction, acceptance of the liability is the fresh point of limitation.

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12. Learned counsel for the respondents has relied upon paragraph-7 of the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in the case of Ivee Injectaa Ltd. & Anr. Vrs. Junagadh Vibhagiya Nagrik Sahakari Bank Ltd. passed in L.P.A. No.02 of 2005 with analogous cases which is as follow:-

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“7. The submission overlooks the fact that the suits in which consent decrees were passed by the trial Court were filed in the year 1992, i.e. well within the period of 12 years from the date on which the appellants' liability to pay the mortgaged money arose. Once suits were filed within the period of limitation and once the Board of Nominees passed decrees on 26.11.1992, there was no question of the respondentbank's claim becoming time-barred on the basis that the due date for payment was 5/9.6.1990. Admittedly, the impugned notices under Section 13 (2) of the Securitisation Act were issued on 10.3.2003, i.e. well within the period of 12 years from the date of passing of the consent decrees on 26.11.1992, even assuming that under the consent decrees, the moneys became due on the same date. The bank was, therefore, entitled to of execute the decrees within the period of limitation prescribed for execution of the decrees, which is 12 years from the date of the default in payment the amounts under the decrees (Art.136 of the Limitation Act, 1963).”

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13. Otherwise, law is also settled that once there is acceptance or there is fresh compromise between the parties then the cause of action will arise only after arisen of the dispute. In the present case, fresh contract between the

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parties has arrived in the year 2015. Thus, the period of limitation will start from the date of default of the agreement between the parties.

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14. In that view of the matter, this Court finds that the notice issued under Section 13(2) of the SARFAESI Act is within the period of limitation. 15. It is hereby clarified that the present writ petition has been maintained only for the reason that the Debt Recovery Tribunal, Jharkhand, Ranchi (D.R.T.) is not functional. The writ petitions are being maintained only on the point of the interim order, so the litigants should not suffer.

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16. In the present case, the interim prayer has been made on the ground that it is barred by the law of limitation.

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17. In view of above discussion, this Court finds that since it is within the period of limitation and as such this Court does not found any ground to grant interim protection. Accordingly, the prayer for interim protection is, hereby, rejected.

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18. However, it is clarified that any observation made herein will not affect the party in the pending proceeding either before the D.R.T. or before any other authority under the law.

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19. With above observation and direction, the present writ petition stands disposed.

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20. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.

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(Rajesh Kumar, J.)

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Dated: 05^th February, 2026 Shahid/Amar Uploaded on 10.02.2026

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W.P. (C) No.6720 of 2025

Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Pvt. Limited Thro Its Managing Direcrtor Shivdutta Sharma v. the Authorized Officer, Indian Bank (Allahabad) Sam Branch, Ranchi

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Maa Lalita Hospital and Research Centre Pvt. Limited Thro Its Managing Direcrtor Shivdutta Sharma v. the Authorized Officer, Indian Bank (Allahabad) Sam Branch, Ranchi

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