Dr Suresh Chandra Jain Vs Mecon Limited through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

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2026:JHHC:3779

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(S) No. 343 of 2022

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-----

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Dr. Suresh Chandra Jain son of Late ChhakkiLal Jain, resident of Modi Height,

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Post Office Hehal, Police Station Sukhdeo Nagar, District Ranchi.

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… … Petitioner

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Versus

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MECON Limited, A Government of India Enterprises through its Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Vivekanand Path, Doranda, Post Office Doranda, Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi.

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The Chairman-cum-Managing Director MECON Limited officiating from MECON Office Vivekanand Path, Doranda, Post Office Doranda, Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi;

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The Company Secretary and General Manager in Charge (B & C) Company Secretary Division, MECON Limited officiating from Vivekanand Path, Post Office Doranda, Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi.

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The Chief General Manager (HR) MECON Limited officiating from Vivekanand Path, Post Office Doranda, Police Station Doranda, District Ranchi.

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… … Respondents

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---CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J.

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For the Petitioner : Ms. Ritu Kumar, Advocate Mr. Samvesh Bhanj Deo, Advocate For the Respondents: Mr. Amitabh, Advocate

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Mr. Samvesh Bhanj Deo, Advocate

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19/10.02.2026 By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has sought

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for the following reliefs:-

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a) For quashing of the letter contained in Ref. No.11.73/2021/56267/ 231 dated 5.10.2021 (Annexure-13) by which the petitioner has been informed that the departmental appeal preferred by the petitioner has been rejected and the punishment order of ‘removal from service’ has been upheld.

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b) For quashing the punishment order contained in Memo No.11.73.1/56267/37 dated 3.2.2021 (Annexure 11) with the punishment of ‘removal from service’ with effect from 31.7.2014.

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c) For a direction to the respondents to pay Pension (Contributory), family pension (deducted from provident fund EPS), gratuity, leave encashment, full and final settlement including transportation charges and Medical facilities taking into consideration that if the petitioner had not been imposed with the

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punishment of ‘removal from service’ he would have superannuated with effect from 31.8.2018.

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2. The petitioner was appointed as a Chemist in the respondent company on 21.12.1987. He got promoted nine times during 1987 to 2013 in the following manner: -

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1988	Senior Chemist
1989	Assistant Scientific Officer
1992	Scientific Officer
1996	Senior Scientific Officer
2001	Manager
2005	Senior Manager
2009	Assistant General Manager
2013	Deputy General Manager

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Petitioner was called before the Board of Director of the respondent company and was served a chargesheet vide No.11.73.1.56267 dated 08.02.2014 and was also served suspension letter vide No.11.73.1.56267 dated 08.02.2014. The petitioner had replied to the chargesheet dated 08.02.2014 on 22.02.2014. Vide office Order No.11.73.1.56267 dated 12.05.2014, an enquiry committee was constituted. Vide letter No.11.DP.5627 dated 06.06.2014, petitioner was informed that enquiry is to be held on 07.06.2014 at 11.00 a.m. in the office of General Manager (MS). Petitioner was also informed by subsequent letters about the dates of enquiry proceedings. The enquiry was completed on 27.06.2014 and the petitioner claims that without serving the enquiry report, office order vide Memo No.11.73.1.56267 dated 31.07.2014 was issued whereby petitioner has been removed from service. Challenging the said order, the petitioner had moved before this Court in W.P.(S) No.4791 of 2014. The writ petition was allowed vide judgment dated 10.11.2020, whereby matter was remitted back to the Disciplinary Authority with a direction to continue the departmental proceeding from the stage of supply of second show cause notice. Thereafter vide letter dated 24.12.2020 petitioner was served a second show-cause notice and it was also informed that the decision regarding intervening period shall be taken appropriately at the time of passing of final order. The petitioner had filed a reply to the second show cause notice on 11.01.2021. Thereafter the petitioner was served with order No.11.73.1/56267/37 dated 03.02.2021 whereby punishment of ‘removal from service’ with effect from 03.02.2021 was awarded to the petitioner. Against the said order, the petitioner preferred a departmental appeal on 16.09.2021. The said appeal was rejected by a letter contained in Ref.No.11.73/2021/56267/231 dated 05.10.2021 issued by

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the Chief General Manager (HR). Thus, challenging the punishment order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and the order passed by the Appellate Authority the petitioner has preferred this writ petition.

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3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that principles of natural justice was not adhered to in carrying the departmental proceeding against the petitioner, inasmuch the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, based on whose statement, petitioner has been held guilty of the charges. He further contends that there was no charge or allegation of embezzlement in the chargesheet nor was there any charge of causing any kind of monetary loss to the company. He also submits that the punishment of removal from service is grossly disproportionate to the charges leveled against the petitioner. He submits that after having served the Company for 27 years and having secured about 9 promotions during his service period, due to the punishment awarded, he would not be entitled for any post retiral dues. He thus, submits that the impugned order of punishment and the appellate order are bad and are liable to be set aside.

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4. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the charges against the petitioner are grave and serious in nature resulting “Loss of Confidence”. The petitioner has accepted in clear terms and had admitted the charges leveled against him. He further contends that the enquiry was conducted in a proper manner giving adequate opportunity to the petitioner to defend his case. The enquiry report is well founded and based on oral and documentary evidence. The Disciplinary Authority, after appraising the entire materials available on record including the enquiry report, has rightly passed the order of punishment, awarding punishment of ‘removal from service’ to the petitioner. He submits that the punishment awarded commensurate with the proved charges against the petitioner. Subsequently, the Appellate Authority also did not find any material to entertain the appeal preferred by the petitioner and accordingly, the same was rejected. He, thus, contends that there is no merit in the present writ petition and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from this Court.

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5. After hearing both the parties, I find that the main allegation against the petitioner is of unauthorized communication and leaking official documents. The petitioner has written letters address to M/s Bhushan Power and Steel Limited on subjects which were not in the domain of his area of work. He attended meetings with bankers of M/s Bhushan Power and Steel

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Limited on behalf of MECON without any authorization. He also signed and handed over letters on MECON’s letterhead to M/s. Bhushan Power and Steel Limited. Further, there is also an allegation that there is no covering letter of EIA/EMP report prepared and issued by MECON to M/s Bhushan Power and Steel Limited in 2012 available in the files of the project which was handled by him. Further, there is allegation that he has issued some letters which do not fall under the domain of his work. These acts are prejudicial to the goodwill and interests of the Company for which he was departmentally chargesheeted and proceeded against.

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6. Further, I find that this is a second round of litigation. Earlier writ petition of the petitioner was allowed and matter was remitted back to the authorities to continue the departmental proceeding from the stage of supply of second show cause. Thereafter second show cause was issued to the delinquent to which he had submitted his reply and after considering the reply punishment was imposed.

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7. In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, especially in judicial review, scope of interference by this Court in the departmental proceeding is very limited.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of “Director General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey” reported in 2020 SCC OnLine SC 954 at paragraph 21.1 thereof has held that it is well settled that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer. By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh versus S. Sree Rama Rao [1963 AIR SC 1723], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High Court to review the findings and arrive at a different finding. In a departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is excessive, the Court can also interfere. It has also been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:-

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(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

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(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the

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same has been conducted in accordance with law;

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(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

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(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

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(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based;

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(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.

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8. From the records I find that the enquiry was conducted in a proper manner. From the inquiry report I find that the delinquent has been examined and in reply to the questions asked by the authorities he accepted the charge. He admitted that he has done mistake and requested to give him chance to rectify his mistakes. This admission itself is sufficient to hold him guilty. Further the procedure adopted by the respondent authorities is also free from any procedural lapses inasmuch as once the matter was remanded by this Court, the respondents gave the delinquent proper opportunity of hearing. The inquiry report was supplied to the petitioner by the respondents and reply to the second show cause was also filed by the delinquent. After considering the same, the respondents have passed the order of punishment. The order passed by the respondent is well reasoned. The respondents, after considering the submission of the delinquent on each of the charge and considering the admission of the guilt by the delinquent, have passed the order of punishment. Thus, the procedure adopted by the respondent cannot be faulted.

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9. So far as quantum of punishment is concerned the same is the prerogative of the Disciplinary Authority. There is limited scope of judicial review in this matter. Only in cases where the quantum of punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the Court exercising jurisdiction under article 226 can interfere.

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10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank versus Rajendra Singh reported in (2013) 12 SCC 372 at paragraph 19 has held as follows-

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“19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

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19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in a particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

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19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

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19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

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19.4. Even in such a case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such a case.

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19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the codelinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be a complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of chargesheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”

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11. In the case of Suresh Pathrella versus Oriental Bank of Commerce reported in (2006) 10 SCC 572, the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 22 has held as follows: -

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“22. In the present case the appellant acted beyond his authority in breach of the Bank’s regulation. Regulation 3(1) of the Bank’s Regulations required that every officer of the Bank at all times takes all possible steps to protect the interest of the Bank and discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence and do nothing which will be unbecoming of a bank officer. It is a case of loss of confidence in the officer by the bank. In such a situation, it would be a futile exercise of judicial review to embark upon the decision of the disciplinary authority removing the officer from service, preceded by an enquiry, and to direct the bank to take back the officer in whom the bank has lost confidence, unless the decision to remove the officer is tainted with mala fides, or in violation of principles of natural justice and prejudice to the officer is made out. …”

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12. In the case of Karnataka SRTC versus M.G. Vittal Rao reported in (2012) 1 SCC 442, the Hon’ble Supreme Court while referring to number of earlier decisions at paragraphs 25 to 30 has held as under: -

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25. Once the employer has lost the confidence in the employee and the bona fide loss of confidence is affirmed, the order of punishment must be considered to be immune from challenge, for the reason that discharging the office of trust and confidence requires absolute integrity, and in a case of loss of confidence, reinstatement cannot be directed. [Vide Air India Corpn. V. V.A. Rebellow [(1972) 1 SCC 814 : AIR 1972 SC 1343], Francis Klein & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Workmen [(1972) 4 SCC 569 : AIR 1971 SC 2414] and BHEL v. M. Chandrasekhar

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Reddy [(2005) 2 SCC 481 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 282 : AIR 2005 SC 7769].

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26. In Kanhaiyalal Agrawal v. Gwalior Sugar Co. Ltd. [(2001) 9 SCC 609 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 257 : AIR 2001 SC 3645] this Court laid down the test for loss of confidence to find out as to whether there was bona fide loss of confidence in the employee, observing that, (SCC p. 614, para 9) (i) the workman is holding the position of trust and confidence; (ii) by abusing such position, he commits an act which results in forfeiting the same; and (iii) to continue him in service/establishment would be embarrassing and inconvenient to the employer, or would be detrimental to the discipline or security of the establishment. Loss of confidence cannot be subjective, based upon the mind of the management. Objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the management, regarding trustworthiness or reliability of the employee, must be alleged and proved. (See also Sudhir Vishnu Panvalkar v. Bank of India [(1997) 6 SCC 271 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1662 : AIR 1997 SC 2249].)

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27. In SBI v. Bela Bagchi [(2005) 7 SCC 435 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 940 : AIR 2005 SC 3272] this Court repelled the contention that even if by the misconduct of the employee the employer does not suffer any financial loss, he can be removed from service in a case of loss of confidence. While deciding the said case, reliance has been placed upon its earlier judgment in Disciplinary Authority-cum-Regional Manager v. Nikunja Bihari Patnaik [(1996) 9 SCC 69 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1194]. 28. An employer is not bound to keep an employee in service with whom relations have reached the point of complete loss of confidence/faith between the two. [Vide Binny Ltd. v. Workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 806 : AIR 1972 SC 1975], Binny Ltd. v. Workmen [(1972) 3 SCC 152 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 444 : AIR 1973 SC 1403], Anil Kumar Chakraborty v. Saraswatipur Tea Co. Ltd. [(1982) 2 SCC 328 : 1982 SCC (L&S) 249 : AIR 1982 SC 1062], Chandu Lal v. Pan American World Airways Inc. [(1985) 2 SCC 727 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 535 : AIR 1985 SC 1128], Kamal Kishore Lakshman v. Pan American World Airways Inc. [(1987) 1 SCC 146 : 1987 SCC (L&S) 25 : AIR 1987 SC 229] and Pearlite Liners (P) Ltd. v. Manorama Sirsi [(2004) 3 SCC 172 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 453 : AIR 2004 SC 1373].] 29. In Indian Airlines Ltd. v. Prabha D. Kanan [(2006) 11 SCC 67 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 359 : AIR 2007 SC 548], while dealing with the similar issue this Court held that : (SCC p. 90, para 56)

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“56. …loss of confidence cannot be subjective but there must be objective facts which would lead to a definite inference of apprehension in the mind of the employer regarding trustworthiness of the employee and which must be alleged and proved.”

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30. In case of theft, the quantum of theft is not important and what is important is the loss of confidence of employer in employee. (Vide A.P.SRTC v. Raghuda Siva Sankar Prasad [(2007) 1 SCC 222 : (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 151 : AIR 2007 SC 152].)

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13. In the present case, I find that the charges leveled against the petitioner are grave as he made unauthorized communications, leaked official documents which are not only prejudicial to the interest of the company, but, at the same time, has also caused loss of confidence of the employer

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(company) over the employee (petitioner). By his acts, the petitioner has caused apprehension in the mind of the management regarding trustworthiness or reliability and the nature of acts committed by the petitioner are such that could not have been erased, wiped out or washed away unless he was removed from service. Thus, in my view the punishment imposed upon the delinquent commensurate to the proved charge, especially keeping in view the position and responsibility which the petitioner was occupying in the respondent Company.

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14. Thus, I find no merit in this writ petition, the same is accordingly dismissed. Pending Interlocutory Applications, if any, stand disposed of.

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(Ananda Sen, J.)

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Ranchi Dated 10^th February, 2026 Kumar/Cp-02 AFR

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Uploaded on 19.02.2026

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Dr Suresh Chandra Jain v. Mecon Limited through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

Case brief

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Dr Suresh Chandra Jain v. Mecon Limited through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

Case brief

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