Manoj Kumar Sahu Vs State of Jharkhand AndORS

Laxmi Devi, W/o late Nirmal Baiga Resident of D.S.P. Road, Baraik Muhalla, P.O. and P.S. Gumla, District Gumla (Substituted v.o.d 14.07.2025) Bhim Baiga under the care and guardianship of Nirmal Baiga residing at village Baraik Mohalla, Police Station and district Gumla

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… … Respondents

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CORAM :HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE ANUBHA RAWAT CHOUDHARY

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--For the Petitioners : Mr. Sumit Kumar, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. P.P.N. Roy, Sr. Advocate

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21 /09.02.2026 Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties.

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2. This writ petition has been filed for the following reliefs:

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“That this is a writ application for quashing the order dated 10.4.2000 passed by the Land Reforms Deputy Collector, Gumla, the Respondent no.4, in S.A.R. Case No.249 of 1980-81 contained in Annexure – 9 to the writ application by which order has been passed for restoration of 0.06 ¼ decimals of land out of R.S Plot No.1524 of Khata No.33 situated in village Gumla, Police Station Gumla, District Gumla, in favour of Respondent No.6 under the provisions of Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, and for quashing the order dated 14.2.2001 passed by the Additional Collector, Gumla, the respondent no.3 in SAR Appeal No.6 of 2000-2001 dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioner contained in Annexure – 10 to the writ application and for quashing the order dated 05.03.2001 passed by the Commissioner, South Chotanagpur Division, Ranchi, Respondent no.2 dismissing Gumla SAR Revision No.18 of 2001 filed by the petitioner contained in

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Annexure – 11 to the writ application and for such other relief or reliefs to which the petitioner is legally entitled to.”

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3. The learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the matter relates to khata no.33, including Plot Nos.1524 and 1018 situated in Village Gumla, which were recorded in the revisional survey record of rights in the name of Thupa Baiga, son of Risa Baiga (Kharia), Rati Baiga (Kharia) and Pujar Baiga (Kharia), son of Mahli Baiga.

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4. The recorded raiyats surrendered the lands of Plot No.1524, measuring 0.76 acres, and Plot No.1018, measuring 0.99 acres, total 1.75 acres under Khata No.33, Khewat No.3, to the then landlord, Baraik Devendra Singh, through a registered deed of surrender dated 10.06.1946. The landlord was put in possession from the date of surrender, and accordingly, the surrendered land became the bakast land of the then landlord.

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5. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submitted that the then landlord orally settled an area of 0.12 ½ decimals of land out of RS Plot No.1524, Khata No.33 of said village, in favour of Mritunjay Nand, son of Loknath Nand. The settlement was accompanied by the grant of chaparbandi rent receipts and delivery of possession, followed by customary hukumnama dated 08.01.1947. The settlee was put in possession of the land from the date of settlement, and prior to such settlement, the settlee had executed a kabuliyat in favour of the landlord.

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6. It was further submitted that there was a family partition, and by a registered deed dated 21.02.1950, the property involved in the present case fell in the share of Madhusudhan Nand. Thereafter, Madhusudhan Nand on account of legal necessity, sold 12 ½ decimals of his chaparbandi land in favour of Ramdeo Sahu by virtue of a registered deed dated 18.05.1966 and put him in possession. Ramdeo Sahu subsequently got his name mutated in the circle office and, on account of legal necessity, sold 6 ¼ decimals of land to the petitioners by a registered sale deed dated 21.04.1980 for valuable consideration and put the petitioner in possession.

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7. The learned counsel submits that the property involved in this case is 6 ¼ decimals of land covered by a registered sale deed dated 21.04.1980. He further submits that after purchase, the land was mutated, chaparbandi rent was fixed and ultimately a house was constructed over the property. The petitioner has also got her name mutated in the records of Gumla Municipality and is paying taxes.

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8. The learned counsel has submitted that the recorded tenant had surrendered the land by way of registered deed way back in the year 1946 which passed several hands. After expiry of more than 54 years from the date of surrender, an application seeking restoration of 10 decimals of land against Gaya Prasad Sao and others was filed, which was registered as SAR Case No.354 of 1980-81. He submits that the said property in connection with Gaya Prasad Sao was arising out of the same khata and same plot number and the same applicant as is involved in the present case. He submits that so far as the present case is concerned, the private respondents filed a petition under Section 71A for restoration of land, which was numbered as SAR Case No.249 of 1980-81, and another case was filed by the private respondents with respect to 5 ¾ decimals of land out of the same plot against one Ramdeo Sahu, which was registered as SAR Case No.262 of 1982-83. 9. The learned counsel submits that the present case is arising out of SAR Case No.249 of 1980-81 with respect to the property which was purchased by the petitioner.

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10. The learned counsel submits that initially the SAR case was dismissed and before the court of Additional Collector, Gumla, the matter was remanded. Thereafter, the SAR case was again taken up and the prayer for restoration was allowed. Against the same, the appellate court dismissed the appeal and the learned revision court by the impugned order passed in Gumla SAR Case No.18 of 2001 dismissed the revision.

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11. The learned counsel has submitted that the learned authorities have not taken into consideration the fact that the recorded tenant was dispossessed by virtue of the registered document as back as in the year 1946. He submits that since there was amount of consideration

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involved in the deed of surrender, the authorities have taken it as a sale deed, but the same makes no difference, what is important is that the recorded tenant was dispossessed in the year 1946.

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12. The learned counsel has submitted that in view of the fact that the recorded tenant was dispossessed way back in 1946, the petition for restoration filed in the year 1982-83 being SAR Case No.249 of 1980-81 was itself suffering from unexplained delay and laches on the part of the recorded tenant and this aspect of the matter has not been properly considered by the authorities.

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13. The learned counsel has relied upon the judgement passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court reported in the case of Situ Sahu and Ors. Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors. reported in 2004 (4) JLJR 109 , Jai Mangal Oraon VS. Smt. Mira Nayak & Others reported in 2001 (1) Jhr CR 471 (SC) and Fulchand Munda Vs. State of Bihar and Ors. Reported in 2008 (2) JCR 1 (SC). 14. The learned counsel has submitted that in the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the order for restoration of land is in the teeth of the settled position of law by none less than the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the application for restoration having been filed after 35 years from the date of dispossession, was itself not maintainable.

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15. The learned counsel for the private respondents, on the other hand, has opposed the prayer and submitted that since the petitioner purchased the property by virtue of registered deed of the year 1980, and the application was filed immediately thereafter, and in such circumstances, the judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner, is not applicable.

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16. The learned counsel for the private respondents has tried to distinguish all the three judgements and submitted that in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon (supra) , the period of dispossession was 40 years. In the case of Situ Sahu (supra) , the period of dispossession was 40 years and in the case of Fulchand Munda (supra) , the period of dispossession was 50 years and in the present case, the period of dispossession is about 35 years from the date of surrender. The learned counsel has submitted that the recorded tenant was

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dispossessed in the year 1980, and therefore, the petition was filed within 30 years.

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17. After hearing the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court finds from the records of this case that it is not in dispute that a registered deed of surrender was executed by the recorded tenant on 10.06.1946 in favour of the zamindar which was followed by further transfers said to have been done by the then landlord which included registered sale deeds as mentioned by the learned counsel for the petitioners.

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18. It is further apparent that the learned appellate court questioned the deed of surrender by observing that it contained consideration amount of Rs.6,700/-, and therefore, the deed of surrender was a sale deed. The learned Commissioner, while passing the impugned order, also referred to the deed of surrender and recorded that the tenant was dispossessed by virtue of the surrender deed, which mentioned a consideration amount of Rs.6,700/- and has recorded that such a deed was in violation of Section 46 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act.

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19. In the judgement passed in the case of Jai Mangal Oraon v. Mira Nayak, 2001 (1) JCR 471 (SC): (2000) 5 SCC 141: 2000 SCC OnLine SC 910 it has been held that the use of words “at any time” as used in section 71 A of Chotanagpur tenancy Act, 1908 cannot be taken to mean that those powers could be exercised without any point of time-limit, as in this case after nearly about forty years unmindful of the rights of the parties acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law and the law of limitation. Relevant paragraph of paragraph 16 of the said judgement is quoted as under:-

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“ 16. ………………………………. Merely because Section

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71-A commences with the words “If at any time…” it cannot be taken to mean that those powers could be exercised without any point of time-limit, as in this case after nearly about forty years unmindful of the rights of the parties acquired in the meantime under the ordinary law and the law of limitation. We consider it, therefore, inappropriate to countenance any such contentions in these proceedings.”

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20. Similar view has been taken in the case of Situ Sahu v. State of Jharkhand , 2004 (4) JLJR 109 (SC): (2004) 8 SCC 340 wherein it has been held as under: -

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11. We are, therefore, of the view that the use of the words “at any time” in Section 71-A is evidence of the legislative intent to give sufficient flexibility to the Deputy Commissioner to implement the socio-economic policy of the Act viz. to prevent inroads upon the rights of the ignorant, illiterate and backward citizens. Thus, where the Deputy Commissioner chooses to exercise his power under Section 71-A it would be futile to contend that the period of limitation under the Limitation Act has expired. The period of limitation under the Limitation Act is intended to bar suits brought in civil courts where the party himself chooses to exercise his right of seeking restoration of immovable property. But, where, for socio-economic reasons, the party may not even be aware of his own rights, the legislature has stepped in by making an officer of the State responsible for doing social justice by clothing him with sufficient power. However, even such power cannot be exercised after an unreasonably long time during which third-party interests might have come into effect. Thus, the test is not whether the period of limitation prescribed in the Act of 1963 had expired, but whether the power under Section 71-A was sought to be exercised after unreasonable delay.

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14. We shall now examine the last argument of Shri Narasimha that the transfer was fraudulent. Even on this, we are afraid that the appellants are entitled to succeed. We need not go into the details of the transaction for we may even assume that the transfer was fraudulent. Even then, as held in Ibrahimpatnam (2003) 7 SCC 667, the power under Section 71-A could have been exercised only within a reasonable time. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal, we are not satisfied that the Special Officer exercised his powers under Section 71-A within a reasonable period of time. The lapse of 40 years is certainly not a reasonable time for exercise of power, even if it is not hedged in by a period of limitation. We derive support to our view from the observations made by this Court in Jai Mangal Oraon case (2000) 5 SCC 141 which was also a case which arose under the very same provision of law. There this Court took the view that Section 46(4)( a ), which envisaged a prior sanction of the Deputy Commissioner before effecting the transfer in any of the modes stated therein, was introduced only in the year 1947 (with effect from 5-1-1948) and no such provision existed during the relevant point of time when the surrender was made in that case (15-1-1942). Obviously,

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therefore, no such provision existed in 1938, and the same reasoning applies.”

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21. The findings of fact recorded by the learned Commissioner that the recorded raiyat was dispossessed by virtue of the surrender deed, of the year 1946, the date of dispossession being 1946, cannot be disputed. The recorded tenant filed the application seeking restoration of land under Section 71A of Chotanagpur Tenancy Act only in the year 1981-82. There is no whisper of any claim raised by the recorded tenant during the period from 1946 to 1980-81 and there is no explanation as to why no such steps were taken for a period of more than 34 years from the date of dispossession.

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22. In view of the aforesaid judgements relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, this Court is of the view that although no period of limitation as such has been prescribed for seeking restoration of land under Section 71A of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, but there has been inordinate and unexplained delay of 34 years in filing the application under Section 71A. This Court is of the considered view that this aspect of the matter has not been taken into consideration by the authorities passing the impugned order and the impugned order of restoration of land is contrary to the aforesaid judgements passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and hence calls for interference under Article 226 of the constitution of India. Accordingly, the impugned order of restoration of land in favour of private respondents cannot be sustained in the eyes of law and consequently, the same are hereby set aside.

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23. This writ petition is accordingly allowed.

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24. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed.

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(Anubha Rawat Choudhary, J.)

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Dated: 09.02.2026 Saurav/

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Uploaded on: 21.05.2026

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Manoj Kumar Sahu v. State of Jharkhand AndORS

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Manoj Kumar Sahu v. State of Jharkhand AndORS

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