Ashok Kumar Singh Vs Union of India And Ors.

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2025:JHHC:18015

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI

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Ashok Kumar Singh son of Shri K.D.N. Singh, residing at B-5, N.T.P.C. Coloney, Sipat, District Bilaspur (Chattisgarh), presently posted as Inspector/Exe, CISF Unit NTPC, Sipat, Bilaspur …. Petitioner

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-- Versus --

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1.Union of India

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2.Central Industrial Security Force through the Director General,Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), Block No.13, CGO Comlex, Lodhi Road, New Delhi-3

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3.Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), CISF Eastern Sector Head Quarters, Patna 800 013

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4.Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs) CISF Unit BCCL, PO Koylanagar, Police Station Saraidhela, District Dhanbad

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…. Respondents

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioner :- Mr. Sankalp Goswami, Advocate For the Respondents :- Mr. Ravi Prakash, Advocate

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09/ 04.07.2025 Heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.1 to 4.

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This petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for quashing of the order dated 31.07.2002 passed by the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) Unit, B.C.C.L., whereby a penalty of reduction of pay scale by two stages from 7300-6900 in the time scale of pay of Rs.6500- Rs.10500/- for a period of four years with a further direction that petitioner will not earn increments on pay during the reduction period and on expiry of the period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment of pay has been passed. The prayer is

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-1- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

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further made to quash the order dated 01.08.2003 passed by the Inspector General, Eastern Sector, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) CISF Eastern Sector Head Quarters, Patna, whereby the appeal preferred by the petitioner has been dismissed. The order dated 30.07.2004 passed by the Director General, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), New Delhi is also under challenge who is the reviewing authority whereby he has been pleased to dismiss the review petition of the petitioner.

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Mr. Sankalp Goswami, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the petitioner was an employee of Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) and while he was posted as Inspector at Damodar Valley Corporation (DVC), Maithan he was served with a memorandum of charge dated 29.12.2001 wherein two articles of charges were served upon him by the Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), B.C.C.L., Dhanbad and the petitioner was directed to submit a statement of defence. The charge no.1 was to the effect that while functioning as company commandant in gate no.1 on 8.11.2001 at about 20.00 hours the civilian were allowed to carry coal on their bi-cycles through the barrage gate which was in violation of the instruction of the Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, CISF in D.V.C., Maithan.

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The Charge no.2 was to suppress the fact of the incident which occurred on the intervening night of 8/9.11.2001, when the petitioner was called by the Deputy Commandant, Central Industrial Security Force, CISF in D.V.C., Maithan in his office on 9.11.2001 it was said to be a gross misconduct and indiscipline.

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Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner on receiving of the same charge has filed a detailed reply to the said charge disclosing that he was not Area Commandant at the time and only Mr. T. Mohapatra was the Area Commandant and he was not posted there. He submits that in spite of that, the disciplinary authority has decided to proceed

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-2- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

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against the petitioner and a departmental proceeding was initiated by the order dated 26.2.2002. He submits that the petitioner has attended the disciplinary proceeding. He submits that in the said proceeding, fair opportunity was not provided to the petitioner and the enquiry officer has submitted the report holding both the charges proved. Relying on the said enquiry proceeding, the disciplinary authority has passed the order dated 31.7.2002 to the effect that a penalty of reduction of pay scale by two stages from 7300-6900 in the time scale of pay of Rs.6500- Rs.10500/- for a period of four years with a further direction that petitioner will not earn increments on pay during the reduction period and on expiry of the period, the reduction will have the effect of postponing the future increment of pay. He submits that aggrieved with the said order, the petitioner has preferred the appeal before the appellate authority, however, the appellate authority has also rejected the same and thereafter the revision was preferred before the Director General Central Industrial Security Force, New Delhi and the revision was further dismissed by order dated 30.07.2004.

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The learned counsel, in the above background, submits that there is complete violation of fair play in the departmental proceeding and he was not allowed to put questions to the witnesses. He submits that this is a case of no evidence. He submits that in many questions, the PW-5 and PW-2 have stated that the petitioner herein has not asked to allow the civilians to carry coal and in spite of that, based on which, the impugned orders have been passed by the disciplinary authority, appellate authority and the reviewing authority. He further submits that if the enquiry officer has not acted impartially, that can be a subject matter before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. To buttress his such argument, he relied in the case of Union of India and Others v. Ram Lakhan Sharma, reported in (2018) 7 SCC 670 and

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referred paragraph nos.27 and 33 which are as under:

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“ 27. In State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha [State of U.P. v. Saroj Kumar Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772 : (2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 675] , this Court

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-3- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

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had laid down that Enquiry Officer is a quasi-judicial authority, he has to act as an independent adjudicator and he is not a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. In paras 28 and 30 the following has been held: (SCC p. 782)

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“28. An Enquiry Officer acting in a quasi-judicial authority is in the position of an independent adjudicator. He is not supposed to be a representative of the department/disciplinary authority/Government. His function is to examine the evidence presented by the Department, even in the absence of the delinquent official to see as to whether the unrebutted evidence is sufficient to hold that the charges are proved. In the present case the aforesaid procedure has not been observed. Since no oral evidence has been examined the documents have not been proved, and could not have been taken into consideration to conclude that the charges have been proved against the respondents.

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***

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30. When a departmental enquiry is conducted against the government servant it cannot be treated as a casual exercise. The enquiry proceedings also cannot be conducted with a closed mind. The Enquiry Officer has to be wholly unbiased. The rules of natural justice are required to be observed to ensure not only that justice is done but is manifestly seen to be done. The object of rules of natural justice is to ensure that a government servant is treated fairly in proceedings which may culminate in imposition of punishment including dismissal/removal from service.”

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33. The Division Bench after elaborately considering the issue summarised the principles in para 16 which is to the following effect:

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“16. We may summarise the principles thus:

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(i) The Enquiry Officer, who is in the position of a Judge shall not act as a Presenting Officer, who is in the position of a prosecutor.

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(ii) It is not necessary for the disciplinary authority to appoint a Presenting Officer in each and every inquiry. Non-appointment of a Presenting Officer, by itself will not vitiate the inquiry.

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(iii) The Enquiry Officer, with a view to arrive at the truth or to obtain clarifications, can put questions to the prosecution witnesses as also the defence witnesses. In the absence of a Presenting Officer, if the Enquiry Officer puts any questions to the prosecution witnesses to elicit the facts, he should thereafter permit the delinquent employee to cross-examine such witnesses on those clarifications.

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(iv) If the Enquiry Officer conducts a regular examination-inchief by leading the prosecution witnesses through the prosecution case, or puts leading questions to the departmental witnesses pregnant with answers, or cross-examines the defence witnesses or puts suggestive questions to establish the prosecution case employee, the Enquiry Officer acts as prosecutor thereby vitiating the inquiry.

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(v) As absence of a Presenting Officer by itself will not vitiate the inquiry and it is recognised that the Enquiry Officer can put questions to any or all witnesses to elicit the truth, the question whether an Enquiry Officer acted as a Presenting Officer, will have to be decided with reference to the manner in which the evidence is let in and recorded in the inquiry.

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Whether an Enquiry Officer has merely acted only as an Enquiry Officer or has also acted as a Presenting Officer depends on the facts of each case. To avoid any allegations of bias and running the risk of inquiry being declared as illegal and vitiated, the present trend appears to be to invariably appoint Presenting Officers, except in simple cases. Be that as it may.”

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-4- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

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He submits that in absence of any presenting officer, the enquiry was proceeded and in view of that, further enquiry was vitiated and in view of that the entire proceeding against the petitioner is not in accordance with law. He further relied in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others v. Ajai Kumar Srivastava reported in (2021) 2 SCC 612 and refers to paragraph nos.24 to 31 of the said judgment which are as under:

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“ 24. It is thus settled that the power of judicial review, of the constitutional courts, is an evaluation of the decision-making process and not the merits of the decision itself. It is to ensure fairness in treatment and not to ensure fairness of conclusion. The court/tribunal may interfere in the proceedings held against the delinquent if it is, in any manner, inconsistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the conclusion or finding reached by the disciplinary authority is based on no evidence. If the conclusion or finding be such as no reasonable person would have ever reached or where the conclusions upon consideration of the evidence reached by the disciplinary authority are perverse or suffer from patent error on the face of record or based on no evidence at all, a writ of certiorari could be issued. To sum up, the scope of judicial review cannot be extended to the examination of correctness or reasonableness of a decision of authority as a matter of fact.

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25. When the disciplinary enquiry is conducted for the alleged misconduct against the public servant, the court is to examine and determine:

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(i) whether the enquiry was held by the competent authority;

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(ii) whether rules of natural justice are complied with;

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(iii) whether the findings or conclusions are based on some evidence and authority has power and jurisdiction to reach finding of fact or conclusion.

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26. It is well settled that where the enquiry officer is not the disciplinary authority, on receiving the report of enquiry, the disciplinary authority may or may not agree with the findings recorded by the former, in case of disagreement, the disciplinary authority has to record the reasons for disagreement and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent may record his own findings if the evidence available on record be sufficient for such exercise or else to remit the case to the enquiry officer for further enquiry.

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27. It is true that strict rules of evidence are not applicable to departmental enquiry proceedings. However, the only requirement of law is that the allegation against the delinquent must be established by such evidence acting upon which a reasonable person acting reasonably and with objectivity may arrive at a finding upholding the gravity of the charge against the delinquent employee. It is true that mere conjecture or surmises cannot sustain the finding of guilt even in the departmental enquiry proceedings.

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28. The constitutional court while exercising its jurisdiction of judicial review under Article 226 or Article 136 of the Constitution

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would not interfere with the findings of fact arrived at in the departmental enquiry proceedings except in a case of mala fides or perversity i.e. where there is no evidence to support a finding or where a finding is such that no man acting reasonably and with objectivity could have arrived at those findings and so long as there is some evidence to support the conclusion arrived at by the departmental authority, the same has to be sustained.

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29. In the case on hand, the charge-sheet was served upon the respondent delinquent for misappropriation of public funds by affording fake credits in his various accounts maintained at the branch where he was serving (Mumfordganj Branch) during the relevant period. In all, 7 charges were levelled against him of grave misconduct which he had committed in discharge of his official duty and after affording an opportunity of hearing to the respondent delinquent and due compliance of the principles of natural justice, the enquiry officer in his report while dealing with the preliminary objections raised by the respondent delinquent specifically indicated that the details of enquiry report contained 22 pages along with documents produced by the presenting officer marked as PEX-1 to PEX-28 to establish the allegations/charges levelled against the respondent delinquent who neither produced any document nor witness in his defence. It was further indicated that the respondent stated in the course of enquiry that he neither wants to say anything about the prosecution document nor he wants to ask any question to the presenting officer and never requested to seek permission to defend the representative of his choice.

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30. After affording an opportunity of hearing at the conclusion of the departmental enquiry, along with the written note submitted by the presenting officer and by the respondent delinquent, the enquiry officer marshalled the record of enquiry and based on the documentary evidence produced by the presenting officer in reference to each charge recorded a finding in holding Charge 1 not proved and Charges 2-7 stood proved against the delinquent respondent.

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31. It was later revisited by the disciplinary authority and apart from the note of disagreement in reference to Charge 1, the disciplinary authority accepted the finding of fact recorded by the enquiry officer in his report for Charges 2 to 7 and with its prima facie opinion, called upon the respondent to submit his explanation and after affording an opportunity of hearing and dealing with the objections raised by the respondent in his written reply expressed its brief reasons while upholding the finding recorded by the enquiry officer in his report and confirmed its opinion of inflicting penalty of dismissal from service by order dated 24-7-1999 and the appellate authority also later revisited on the appeal being preferred and after assigning reasons confirmed the finding of fact in upholding the order of penalty inflicted upon the respondent delinquent.”

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Relying on the above judgment, he submits that power of judicial review of the Constitutional Courts is an evaluation of the of decision-making process and in view of that, this Court is having the discretion to pass appropriate order. On this ground, he submits that the impugned orders may kindly be quashed.

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-6- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

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Per contra, Mr. Ravi Prakash, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos.1 to 5, submits that PW-5 was found to be hostile by the appellate authority, however, the appellate authority has considered the statement of PW-2 who has supported the prosecution case in the departmental proceeding. He submits that in clear terms, PW-2, namely, C.S. Pandey has stated, particularly, in answer to the question no.6 that the petitioner along with T. Mohapatra have stated to allow the civilians to take coal. He submits that the charges were grave and the petitioner happened to be a member of disciplined force and due to such act, the entire dam was at the risk and in view of that, the authorities concerned have rightly passed the orders. He submits that the petitioner was provided full opportunity to examine the PWs and the petitioner has asked 53 questions to PW1 and 13 questions to PW2 and after examining by the enquiry officer again asked 39 questions to PW-5 and 3 questions to PW-6. He submits that in view of that there is no violation of any principle of natural justice and the enquiry officer has taken all care of the same and thereafter considering all these aspects, by a reasoned order, the disciplinary authority has passed the order which has been affirmed by the appellate authority and further the reviewing authority has been pleased to dismiss the case of the petitioner and on this ground, he submits that there is no illegality in the impugned orders and the identical penalty has been imposed upon T. Mohapatra and there is parity in the punishment and the punishment is proportionate.

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It is an admitted position that the petitioner was a member of Central Industrial Security Force and said to be posted in D.V.C Maithan as Inspector. The petitioner has been charged with two charges, as disclosed hereinabove in the argument of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner. When the reply to show cause was not found correct, in the mind of the disciplinary authority, the departmental proceeding was initiated against the petitioner in which the petitioner was allowed to participate and the enquiry officer

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appreciating the evidence of the PWs, providing opportunity to the petitioner, has given finding against the petitioner. The appellate authority by the order dated 01.08.2003 has further appreciated the fact and found that although the petitioner was not company commandant, but, he was present on the spot and the PW-2 has disclosed that the petitioner has also instructed the officials to allow the civilians to carry coal on bi-cycle. The appellate authority has further found that no submission of reply to explanation and that was further not explained to senior officer on calling and it was found to be a suppression by the senior officer and in view of that the appellate authority has affirmed the order of the disciplinary authority which was subsequently further confirmed by the review authority by order dated 30.07.2004.

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The evidences have been annexed with the writ petition of PW-5 and PW-2 as well as PW-6, wherefrom it transpires that the petitioner has been allowed to cross examine the witnesses. However, certain questions which are not found to be relevant have been disallowed by the enquiry officer. PW-2 namely C.S. Pandey has stated that both T. Mohapatra and the petitioner has come on the spot in civil dress and both have instructed to allow the civilians to carry coal on bi-cycle and based on that, the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority have passed the orders. Thus, presence along with T. Mohapatra of the petitioner in civil dress and asking the officials to allow the civilians to carry coal is proved and pursuant to that, the enquiry officer has submitted enquiry report and all these aspects have been considered by the appellate authority as well as the reviewing authority and the petitioner was a member of a disciplined force like CISF and the same punishment has been awarded by the disciplinary authority upon T. Mohapatra which was imposed upon the petitioner.

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So far as the judgment relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in the case of Union of India and Others v. Ram Lakhan Sharma and Others (supra) is concerned, in that case, it has been held that

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if the statutory provision is not there of appointing the presenting officer, that cannot be said to be illegal and in that case, the allegation was based against the delinquent of rape which was not proved and in view of that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has passed the said judgment and moreover, the ratio of that case is well settled that the writ Court can entertain the writ petition in a service matter if the procedure is not followed. The fact as discussed hereinabove of the case in hand is otherwise. The facts in the case of Deputy General Manager (Appellate Authority) and Others v. Ajay Kumar Shrivastav(supra) relied by the petitioner is also otherwise. Thus, it is well settled that the Constitutional Court can review the decision only on the certain premises such as, the Courts while exercising the power of judicial review will not sit in appeal over the decisions of the administrative bodies. A petition for judicial review would lie only on certain well-defined grounds. An order passed by an administrative authority exercising discretion vested in it cannot be interfered in judicial review unless it is shown that exercise of discretion itself was perverse or illegal. A mere wrong decision without anything more is not enough to attract the power of judicial review. A supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the court is limited to see that the authorities function within the limits of its jurisdiction and that its decisions do no occasion miscarriage of justice. In light of that it is well settled that while exercising power of judicial review, the Court is more concerned with the decision-making process than the merit of the decision itself. In this background only, a review can be made under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. What has been discussed hereinabove, PW-2 namely C.S. Pandey in clear terms has stated that the petitioner along with T. Mohapatra came to the spot in civil dress and have asked the officials to allow the civilians to carry coal. It is further not a case that the petitioner has not been allowed to participate in the disciplinary proceeding and fair play was not made. The petitioner has been allowed to cross examine all the witnesses in the disciplinary proceeding, however, a few

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of the questions have not been allowed to put by the enquiry officer as it was found not relevant and the petitioner was a member of a disciplined force like Central Industrial Security Force, CISF, having the rank of Inspector and in view of that, employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and the duties to be rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However, same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. For lower post which are not sensitive in nature of duties, the impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by the authority concerned considering the post /nature of the duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects.

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In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, the Court finds that opportunity was provided to the petitioner and the charges against the petitioner has been proved and it has been further proved that on the next date, before the superior authority the same has been tried to be suppressed by the petitioner.

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As a cumulative effect, the Court finds that the petition is fit to be dismissed and accordingly, this petition is, hereby, dismissed.

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Pending petition if any also stands disposed of.

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( Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)

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SI/,

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A.F.R.

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-10- W.P.(S) No.6125 of 2004

Ashok Kumar Singh v. Union of India And Ors.

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Ashok Kumar Singh v. Union of India And Ors.

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