Surendra Kumar Vs the State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Dept. of Food Public Distribution and Consumer Matters

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI L.P.A No.550 of 2024

Surendra Kumar, aged about 64 years, S/o Late Ramcharitra Singh, R/o House No.493C, Suresh Colony, near Double Transformer, P.O+P.SHazaribag, District-Hazaribag, Jharkhand

¶5

…. …. Appellant

¶6

-Versus-

¶7

1 . The State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Department of Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Matters, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S-Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand

¶8

2 . Additional Secretary, Department of Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Matters, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.SJagarnathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand

¶9

3 . Joint Agricultural Director-cum-Controller Weight and Measurement, Department of Food, Public Distribution and Consumer Matters, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. Dhurwa, P.S-Jagarnathpur, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand …. …. Respondents

¶10

¶11

CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR

¶12

¶13

For the Appellant : Mr. Mahesh Tiwari, Advocate : Mr. Abhishek Kumar Dubey, Adv. For the Respondents : Mr. Ravi Prakash Mishra, AC to AAG-II ----

¶14

Order No.05/Dated: 07^th July, 2025

¶15

1. The instant appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent is directed against the order/judgment dated 18.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P(S) No.3333 of 2023, by which, the order of punishment dated 15.12.2017 inflicting punishment of ‘Censure’ and ‘Stoppage of two increments with cumulative effect’ has been refused to be interfered with by dismissing the said writ petition.

¶16

2. The brief facts of the case as per the pleading made in the instant appeal as has been taken note in the impugned order, which reads as under:-

¶17

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶18

The petitioner, who was working as Technical Assistant in the office of Assistant Agricultural Director-cum-Deputy Controller, Weight and Measurement, Hazaribagh, was taken into custody in connection with Vigilance Case No. 15/2016, Hazaribagh on 20.10.2016 and consequent thereto, vide office order No. 23/2016 issued vide Memo No.390 dated 28.10.2016, he was put under suspension. Thereafter, the petitioner was issued charge-sheet vide Memo No.621 dated 07.09.2017, seeking his reply within fifteen days to the same. In response to which, the petitioner submitted his reply to the show cause on 22.09.2017 denying the charges levelled against him. Thereafter, the departmental proceeding was conducted in which the petitioner was held guilty of the charges of taking amount of gratification. Subsequently, vide order dated 15.12.2017, the respondent No.3 issued the order of punishment as aforesaid. The petitioner challenged the said order of punishment in Appeal and the Appellate Authority vide order dated 20.08.2018 dismissed the appeal preferred by the petitioner. 3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the petitioner, who was working as Technical Assistant in the Office of Assistant Agricultural Director-cum-Deputy Controller, Weight and Measurement, Hazaribagh, was taken into custody in connection with Vigilance Case No. 15/2016, Hazaribagh on 20.10.2016 on the accusation of accepting gratification.

¶19

4. The departmental proceeding has been decided to be initiated against the appellant. The memorandum of charge was issued alleging therein for commission of irregularity by accepting the amount of gratification in lieu of

¶20

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.2

¶21

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶22

discharge of public duty. However, the writ petitioner has denied the said allegation. The enquiry proceeding began and the present appellant/writ petitioner had participated before the Enquiry Officer by putting forth his defence. The Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved and forwarded the same to the disciplinary authority. The disciplinary authority has inflicted the punishment of ‘Censure’ and ‘stoppage of two annual increments with cumulative effect’.

¶23

Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant:

¶24

5. The writ-petitioner/appellant has challenged the said order on the following grounds:-

¶25

(i) The principle of natural justice has not been followed, since, no witness has been examined in the course of the enquiry proceeding.

¶26

(ii) The Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved only on the basis of the imputation so made in the First Information Report.

¶27

(iii) The learned Single Judge has not agreed with the said grounds rather on consideration of the ground of fairness as has been followed in the enquiry proceeding and the issuance of 2^nd show-cause notice, since, the charge has found to be proved, hence, he has observed that there is no reason to interfere with the impugned order of punishment under the extra ordinary jurisdiction conferred to the Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which is subject matter of the present appeal.

¶28

(iv) Learned counsel appearing for the appellant/writ-petitioner has submitted that it is a case where the principle of natural justice has been flouted, since, the Enquiry Officer has proceeded by concluding the enquiry only

¶29

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.3

¶30

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶31

on the basis of the accusation made against the present appellant, which cannot be the basis to prove the charge by an Enquiry Officer.

¶32

(v) It has been contended that since the basis of inflicting punishment is only the institution of the FIR and hence, the same since has been considered to be the cogent material available against the appellant, having been accepted by the learned Single Judge, it cannot be said to be just and proper, reason being that the Enquiry Officer himself is saying in the enquiry report that so long as the appellant is not being acquitted from the criminal case and the charge which has been framed on the basis of accusation in the FIR said to be proved, till then the appellant cannot be considered as innocent, meaning thereby, the Enquiry Officer has not come out with his independent mind while acting as quasi-judicial functionary.

¶33

6. The argument, therefore, has been made that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the aforesaid aspect of the matter. Hence, the impugned order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge is fit to be interfered with by quashing and setting-aside the same.

¶34

Submission of the learned counsel for the respondents

¶35

7. Per contra, Mr. Ravi Prakash Mishra, learned A.C to Mr. Sachin Kumar, AAG-II appearing for the State has submitted that there is no error in the impugned order/judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, since, the reason which has been assigned therein is totally under the jurisdiction of the Hon’ble High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the administrative decision taken by the disciplinary authority.

¶36

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.4

¶37

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶38

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order/judgment and has also appreciated the arguments so advanced on behalf of the parties.

¶39

9. The issue which requires consideration in the present case is as under:-

¶40

“ As to whether merely on the basis of accusation made in the FIR, can a punishment be imposed in the departmental proceeding against delinquent employee?”

¶41

10. There is no dispute that the departmental proceeding has to go parallel to that of the criminal case as has also been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony vrs. Bharat Gold Mines Limited and Anr reported in 1999 (3) SCC 376 , wherein, law has been laid down that there is no bar in a simultaneous proceeding upon initiation of the departmental proceeding during pendency of the criminal case. However, guidelines have been formulated wherein, it has been laid down that in a case where complex issue is involved, in such circumstances, the appropriate approach of the disciplinary authority would be to keep the departmental proceeding in abeyance awaiting outcome of the criminal case. The relevant paragraph of the said judgment reads as under:-

¶42

“ 22 . The conclusions which are deducible from various decisions of this Court referred to above are:

¶43

(i) Departmental proceedings and proceedings in a criminal case can proceed simultaneously as there is no bar in their being conducted simultaneously, though separately.

¶44

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.5

¶45

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶46

(ii) If the departmental proceedings and the criminal case are based on identical and similar set of facts and the charge in the criminal case against the delinquent employee is of a grave nature which involves complicated questions of law and fact, it would be desirable to stay the departmental proceedings till the conclusion of the criminal case.

¶47

(iii) Whether the nature of a charge in a criminal case is grave and whether complicated questions of fact and law are involved in that case, will depend upon the nature of offence, the nature of the case launched against the employee on the basis of evidence and material collected against him during investigation or as reflected in the charge-sheet.

¶48

(iv) The factors mentioned at (ii) and (iii) above cannot be considered in isolation to stay the departmental proceedings but due regard has to be given to the fact that the departmental proceedings cannot be unduly delayed.

¶49

(v) If the criminal case does not proceed or its disposal is being unduly delayed, the departmental proceedings, even if they were stayed on account of the pendency of the criminal case, can be resumed and proceeded with so as to conclude them at an early date, so that if the employee is found not guilty his honour may be vindicated and in case he is found guilty, the administration may get rid of him at the earliest.”

¶50

11. Similarly, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Stanzen Toyotetsu

¶51

India (P) Ltd. v. Girish V., (2014) 3 SCC 636 has reiterated the same view

¶52

in the paragraph 8 of the aforesaid judgment which reds as under:

¶53

“8. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at some length. The only question that falls for determination in the above backdrop is whether the courts below were justified in staying the ongoing disciplinary proceedings pending conclusion of the trial in the criminal case registered and filed against the respondents. The answer to that question would primarily depend upon whether there is any legal bar to the continuance of the disciplinary proceedings against the employees based on an incident which is also the subject matter of criminal case against such employees. It would also depend upon the nature of the charges in the criminal case filed against the employees and whether the case involves complicated questions of law and fact. The possibility of

¶54

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.6

¶55

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶56

prejudice to the employees accused in the criminal case on account of the parallel disciplinary enquiry going ahead is another dimension which will have to be addressed while permitting or staying such disciplinary enquiry proceedings. The law on the subject is fairly well settled for similar issues and has often engaged the attention of this Court in varied fact situations. Although the pronouncements of this Court have stopped short of prescribing any straitjacket formula for application to all cases, the decisions of this Court have identified the broad approach to be adopted in such matters leaving it for the courts concerned to take an appropriate view in the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case that comes up before them. Suffice it to say that there is no short-cut solution to the problem. What is, however, fairly well settled and was not disputed even before us is that there is no legal bar to the conduct of the disciplinary proceedings and a criminal trial simultaneously.”

¶57

12. The admitted fact herein is that the appellant/writ-petitioner while working as Technical Assistant in the office of Assistant Agricultural Director-cum-Deputy Controller, Weight and Measurement, Hazaribagh, was implicated in a criminal case in connection with Vigilance Case No.15 of 2016 on the accusation of acceptance of amount of gratification who was taken into custody on conclusion of the trial. The disciplinary authority has initiated the departmental proceeding by framing the following charges:

¶58

“(1 )�ी सुरे� कुमार, तकनीकी सहायक को ए० सी०बी० (��ाचार िनरोधक �ूरो) के �ारा रंगे हाथ घूस लेने के आरोप म� िगर�ार िकया गया (2) �ी सुरे� कुमार का कृ� सरकारी सेवक के िलये शोभनीय नहीं है तथा उ�ोंने पुरी शीलिन�ा एवं कत के �ितिन�ा के अनु�प सरकारी काय� का स�ादन नहीं िकया।“

¶59

13. The Enquiry Officer has found the charge proved.

¶60

14. We have considered the findings so recorded by the Enquiry Officer

¶61

in order to consider the argument advanced on behalf of the parties and found therefrom that the Enquiry Officer admittedly has not applied its

¶62

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.7

¶63

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶64

independent mind rather he was swayed away by the accusation made against the appellant by institution of the FIR against him. The aforesaid fact is apparent from the face of the enquiry report as has been appended to the paper book as Annexure-I to the counter affidavit filed by the State in the writ petition.

¶65

15. For reference the part of the findings of the Enquiry Officer is being recorded hereunder:-

¶66

“संचालन पदािधकारी का िन�ष�

¶67

(1) �ी सुरे� कुमार को ��ाचार िनरोधक �ुरो, हजारीबाग �ारा िदनांक 26.10. 2016 को धुस लेने के आरोप म� िगर�ार िकया गया था । पुिलस अधी�क, ��ाचार िनरोधक �ोरे, हजारीबाग के प�ांक-11565 िदनांक 31.10.2016 के �ारा उनके िव�� लगाये गये आरोप को �थम ��या �मािणत पाये जाने के कारण ही �ी सुरे� कुमार को िहरासत म� िलया गया था, इस िलए जब तक ��ाचार िनरोधक �ूरों के �ायालय �ारा उसे दोष मु� नहीं िकया जाता है, तब तक �ी सुरे� कुमार को िनद�ष मानना उिचत �तीत नहीं होता है ।

¶68

(2) इस �कार यह �� हो जाता है �ी सुरे� कुमार को ��ाचार िनरोधक �ोरो के �ारा घूस लेने के आरोप म� िगर�ार िकया गया है । इस िलए झारख� सरकारी सेवक आचार िनयमावली 2001 के िनयम-3 (i) का उलंधन है ।“

¶69

16. It is settled position of law that the moment the Enquiry Officer is appointed to conduct an enquiry, he has to act as an independent quasijudicial authority and he is to act as an adjudicator. Primarily his duty is to call for the witnesses for their examinations as also to provide opportunity to the delinquent employee to cross-examine such witnesses.

¶70

17. It needs to refer herein that the examination of the complainant is sine qua non for coming to the rightful conclusion and if the complainant has not been examined in the enquiry proceeding, the same will amount to violation of the principle of natural justice.

¶71

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.8

¶72

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶73

18. Since it is an admitted fact that as per the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer, wherein, he himself has referred in the enquiry report that so long as the accusation which has been made against the present appellant is not being disapproved, the allegation made against the appellant will have to be accepted and that is the basis of giving finding for proving the charge against the appellant. Therefore, what the Enquiry Officer has done is that he has simply gone into the accusation made in the FIR by making the same basis to prove the charge. If such findings of the Enquiry Officer will be accepted then how it can be said that he has applied its independent mind by going through the relevant documents and the examination of the witnesses, particularly the complainant. It is not that in a trap case, there cannot be departmental proceeding, but the caution which is to be taken is that even in the trap case the departmental proceeding is being initiated, since, it is a case involving the moral turpitude, then the process of examining the witnesses, particularly the complainant and the other relevant documents which has been seized by the trap team, needs to be brought on record for the purpose of handing it over in favour of the delinquent employee, so as to have the proper enquiry after providing an opportunity of being heard to the delinquent employee. But the said aspect of the matter is lacking, which is particularly evident from the enquiry report itself.

¶74

19. The second show cause notice although has been given, but the question is that when there is no proper finding given by the Enquiry Officer due to non- consideration of all aspect of the matter and by denial of the

¶75

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page No.9

¶76

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶77

principle of natural justice then what would be the meaning of second show cause notice. That is not understandable to this Court.

¶78

20. The second show-cause notice cannot be merely a formality rather the same should be made effective by giving opportunity to the heard delinquent employee. The issuance of second show-cause notice prior to the issuance of the Memorandum of charge is also required, if the Memorandum of charge is based upon the fact findings enquiry.

¶79

21. The second show-cause notice is also required in a case where the disciplinary authority and the Enquiry Officer are two different individuals, reason being that, if the Enquiry Officer has given a finding of proving the charge then the order of punishment is to be passed by the disciplinary authority. Prior to applying the mind by the disciplinary authority, an opportunity is to be given by the disciplinary authority to the delinquent employee, in order to provide an opportunity and proper appreciation of his mind before taking decision on the punishment. However, the said principle of law would not be applicable if the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority are same, since, in such circumstances, both identities will be the same person and there will no occasion to cause prejudice to the delinquent employee.

¶80

22. We are conscious with the law regarding the jurisdiction which has been conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to interfere with the decision of the disciplinary authority as has been laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Cour in Union of India Vs. P. Gunasekaran, AIR

¶81

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page

¶82

No.10

¶83

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶84

2015 SC 545 , in particular to paragraph 13, laying down following guidelines which are self-explanatory:

¶85

“13. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, re-appreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge No. 1 was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether:

¶86

a. the enquiry is held by a competent authority;

¶87

b. the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf;

¶88

c. there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings;

¶89

d. the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case;

¶90

e. the authorities have allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant or extraneous considerations;

¶91

f. the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion;

¶92

g. the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence;

¶93

h. the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding;

¶94

i. the finding of fact is based on no evidence.

¶95

Under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:

¶96

(i) re-appreciate the evidence;

¶97

(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law;

¶98

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page

¶99

No.11

¶100

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶101

(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;

¶102

(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;

¶103

(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based.

¶104

(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;

¶105

(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.”

¶106

23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Railways v. Rajendra Kumar Dubey , (2021) 14 SCC 735 while referring the ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of s tate of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao , AIR 1963 SC 1723 has observed that generally the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is not a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant, however, interference over the decision of the authorities may be made where the departmental authority which has held the proceedings against the delinquent officer are inconsistent with the principles of natural justice, where the findings are based on no evidence, which may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry, or the authorities were actuated by some extraneous considerations and failed to reach a fair decision, or allowed themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations, or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion.

¶107

24. The parameters have been given as in the paragraphs as referred hereinabove to the effect that in which circumstances, the power of judicial

¶108

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page

¶109

No.12

¶110

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶111

review is to be exercised and in which circumstances, it is not to be exercised.

¶112

25. Since, it is case of violation of the principle of natural justice as also the findings so recorded by the Enquiry Officer is without any application of mind, hence, this case is coming under the parameters as mentioned herein above.

¶113

26. This Court, after having discussed the aforesaid factual and legal aspect and after going through the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found that the learned Single Judge while giving the reason not to interfere in the impugned order at paragraph No.6 has not taken into consideration the factual aspect along with the legal issues, as above, rather the learned Single Judge has only gone into the factum of proving the charge by the Enquiry Officer, but the learned Single Judge has not appreciated as to what basis has been made by the Enquiry Officer including the charge.

¶114

27. The copy of the enquiry report has been shown to be served but when the basis of the enquiry report itself is defective then merely by handing the copy of the enquiry report does not cure the defect which is incurable. Similar is the situation of reason taken that the second show cause notice has also been issued, but for what? Then the finding of the Enquiry Officer itself is not based upon the independent application of mind.

¶115

28. The learned Single Judge has also referred the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of ECIL vrs. B. Karunakar etc ., as reported in 1993 (4) SCC 727 , but we are of the view that in the facts of the

¶116

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page

¶117

No.13

¶118

2025:JHHC:18297-DB

¶119

present case, the said judgment is not applicable, reason being that the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the said case is with respect to causing prejudice due to non-supply of the enquiry report. But the question of prejudice is not the subject matter herein, rather, it is a question of propriety of the conduct of the Enquiry Officer and the disciplinary authority, who only on the basis of the accusation made in the FIR has inflicted the punishment.

¶120

29. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge is not sustainable in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the order dated 18.06.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S) No.3333 of 2023 is hereby quashed and set-aside. However, the respondents are at liberty to proceed afresh in accordance with law.

¶121

30. The instant appeal is hereby, allowed and consequently the writ petition also stands allowed.

¶122

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

¶123

(Rajesh Kumar, J.)

¶124

Jharkhand High Court 7^th July 2025 A.Mohanty/Raja/AFR Uploaded

¶125

LPA No.550 of 2024 Page

¶126

No.14

Surendra Kumar v. the State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Dept. of Food Public Distribution and Consumer Matters

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Surendra Kumar v. the State of Jharkhand through Secretary, Dept. of Food Public Distribution and Consumer Matters

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Mansoor Mian Nanhu Mian And Ors. Vs State of Bihar

Saraswati Devi Vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

The Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Shri Girdhari Lal Sharma Prop Ms Pasupati Vyapaar

Susmita Gorai Vs Abhijit Gorai

Santosh Kumar Jha Vs Sarita Jha

Rakesh Rajan Khalkho Vs Rachna Toppo

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Why is it important?

Mansoor Mian  Nanhu Mian And Ors. Vs State of Bihar

Saraswati Devi Vs Bharat Coking Coal Limited through Its Chairman Cum Managing Director

The Commissioner of Income Tax Vs Shri Girdhari Lal Sharma Prop Ms Pasupati Vyapaar

Susmita Gorai Vs Abhijit Gorai

Santosh Kumar Jha Vs Sarita Jha

Rakesh Rajan Khalkho Vs Rachna Toppo

Mansoor Mian Nanhu Mian And Ors. Vs State of Bihar