Rohit Raj Kumar Singh Alias Sanjay Singh Vs Dipty Singh

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

F.A.(D.B.)No.14 of 2025

Rohit Raj Kumar Singh @ Sanjay Singh, aged about 41 years, son of late Raj Nandan Singh @ Rajnarayan Singh, resident of House No. 40, Bansidih, Taranagar, PO and PS: Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand,827013 .… … Respondent/Appellant

¶5

Versus

¶6

Dipty Singh, wife of Sh. Rohit Raj Kumar Singh, present resident of Plot No. 781, Chira Chas, Basant Vihar, B.S. City, PO: Chira Chas SO, PS: Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand 827013, permanent resident of village Chhinegaon, PO Sinha SO, PS Sinha (OP), District Bhojpur, Bihar, 802316. … … Petitioner/Respondent

¶7

¶8

CORAM: HON’BLEMR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

¶9

------For the Appellant :Mr. Subhneet Jha, Advocate For the Respondent : Ms. Aprajita Mishra, Advocate --------

¶10

Order No. 03/Dated: 8^th September, 2025

¶11

The instant appeal has been filed on behalf of the respondent/appellant under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 against the order/judgment dated 12.12.2024 [decree signed on 17.12.2024] passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro in Original Suit No. 512 of 2021, whereby and whereunder, the said Suit filed by the respondent-wife under sections 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 for dissolution of her marriage has been allowed.

¶12

The brief facts of the case are referred herein as under:

¶13

The marriage between the parties was solemnized on 01.03.2012 as per Hindu rites and rituals. Following the marriage, the parties established their matrimonial residence in Bokaro where the marriage was duly consummated resulting in the birth of their son, namely, Aditya Singh on 27.4.2013. By the time the respondent-wife found that the appellant-husband is extremely rude, abusive,

¶14

1 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶15

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶16

unpredictable, ill-mannered and alcoholic and he had also illicit relationship with some other girls. He has no regard for family values and was engaged in illegal activities having nexus with local criminals. The appellant-husband used filthy languages against her and her family members and also used to assault her for more dowry. He forced her to take loan and borrow huge sums of money from her father and when she expressed inability of her father, the appellant along with his family members ousted her from the house on 12.12.2018 along with their four years old son and since then the respondent-wife is living in her father’s house along with her four years son. It is further alleged that the appellanthusband and his brother had taken loan of Rs. 1 crore 10 lakhs from Bank of India, Chas Branch, Bokaro in which the respondent-wife forced to sign as a guarantor. She being an uneducated lady, being hardly 10^th pass in Hindi Medium and not conversant with English language or documents did not understand the contents and signed on the same. The said loan account was declared as NPA on 31.5.2018 leading to filing of a first information report against all parties being Chas PS Case No. 131 of 2018. As being a guarantor in the said loan account, she was arrested and spent more than ten months in custody whereas the appellant was absconding and lastly, he was arrested on 8.2.2021 and, therefore, Original Suit No. 512 of 2021 has been filed by the respondent-wife for decree of divorce.

¶17

Notice was issued to the appellant who appeared and filed his written statement. Thereafter, altogether five issues have been framed by the learned Family Judge which are as follows:

¶18

2 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶19

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶20

(i) Is this suit maintainable in its present form?

¶21

(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the suit?

¶22

(iii) Whether the respondent (husband) has subjected the petitioner (wife to cruelty after marriage?

¶23

(iv) Whether the respondent (husband) deserted his wife (petitioner) since last two years prior to filing of the suit and is entitled to get a Decree of dissolution of marriage on the basis of Sections 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955?

¶24

(v) Whether the petitioner is entitled to get the relief as prayed for?

¶25

The evidences have been made on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter, the judgment dated 12.12.2024 has been passed by the learned Principal Judge, Family Court, Bokaro allowing the Suit by holding that the marriage solemnized on 01.03.2012 between the petitioner, namely, Dipty Singh (respondent herein) and the respondent, namely, Rohit Raj Kumar Singh @ Sanjay Singh (appellant herein) stands dissolved from the date of the decree under the provisions of section 13(1) (ia) and (ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and, thereafter, there shall be no relationship of husband and wife in between the parties and the decree was signed on 17.12.2024.

¶26

The appellant husband being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment dated 12.12.2024 [decree signed on 17.12.2024] passed in Original Suit No. 512 of 2021 has filed present First Appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984.

¶27

3 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶28

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶29

Arguments advanced on behalf of the respondent/appellant:

¶30

It has been contended on behalf of the respondent/appellant (husband) that the impugned judgment and order passed by the learned Principal Judge is highly illegal, improper and unjustified and it has been passed without application of judicial mind and, as such, it is liable to be set-aside.

¶31

It has been submitted that the learned Principal Judge failed to consider that the respondent has not substantiated her allegations of cruelty by producing any independent evidence while on the other hand the appellant produced eight witnesses including neighbours and friends.

¶32

It is further stated that the learned Principal Judge erred in law and facts in overlooking the fact that the alleged criminal case arose from a business matter where both parties were implicated. The learned Principal Judge has also not given weight to the appellant’s evidence showing substantial financial support to the respondent’s family, including Rs. 10 lakhs given to her brother for land purchase.

¶33

The learned Principal Judge has also not considered the fact that the respondent had left the matrimonial home of her own accord, taking all jewellery and household items.

¶34

The learned counsel for the respondent/appellant, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

¶35

4 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶36

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶37

Arguments advanced on behalf of the petitioner/ respondent:

¶38

Per contra , Ms. Aprajita Mishra, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-wife, while defending the impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned judgment.

¶39

The learned Family Judge has considered the issue of cruelty and desertion and having come to the conclusion that the petitioner wife (respondent herein) has succeeded to make out a case for decree of divorce against the respondent/husband (appellant herein) on the ground of cruelty and desertion, has allowed the petition.

¶40

It has been submitted that the appellant-husband is extremely rude, abusive, unpredictable, ill-mannered and alcoholic and he had also illicit relationship with some other girls. The appellant used to torture her and her family members for less dowry. He forced her to borrow huge sums of money from her father and when she expressed inability of her father, the appellant along with his family members ousted her from the house on 12.12.2018 along with their four years old son and since then the respondent-wife is living in her father’s house along with her four years son. The learned Family Court has taken cognizance of the aforesaid fact and hence passed the order of dissolution of marriage which cannot be said to be suffer from an error.

¶41

Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that since the factum of cruelty and desertion has been sufficiently established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been granted as such no interference is required in the order impugned.

¶42

5 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶43

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶44

Analysis:

¶45

This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the findings recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned judgment.

¶46

The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e., by filing an application under Sections 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and, accordingly, issues have been framed by the learned Family Court wherein primarily issue nos.III and IV pertains to cruelty and desertion.

¶47

The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties. For ready reference, the evidences led on behalf of the parties are being referred as under:

¶48

(i) PW-1 Dipty Singh is the petitioner (respondent herein) herself has stated that the appellant-husband is extremely rude, abusive, unpredictable, ill-mannered and alcoholic and he had also illicit relationship with some other girls. The appellant used to torture her and her family members for less dowry. He forced her to borrow huge sums of money from her father and when she expressed inability of her father, the appellant along with his family members ousted her from the house on 12.12.2018 along with their four years old son. The appellant-husband and his brother had taken loan of Rs. 1 crore 10 lakhs from Bank of India, Chas Branch, Bokaro in which she was forced to sign as a guarantor and due to non-

¶49

6 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶50

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶51

payment of the said loan she had to remain behind the bar for about ten months.

¶52

(ii) PW-2 Prakash Kumar Singh is the brother of the petitioner who also corroborated the evidence led by the PW-1 and stated about torture by the respondent upon the petitioner. He also corroborated the factum of taking signature of the petitioner-wife on the documents of the Bank by the respondent-husband. He has also supported the fact that since 12.12.2018 the petitioner-wife is residing in her parent’s home along with her son.

¶53

(iii) PW-3 Shyam Dev Singh is the father of the petitioner-wife.He has also supported the evidence led by PW-1 and PW-2 and deposed on the same line.

¶54

The respondent-husband (appellant herein) has also been examined as R.W.-8. For ready reference, his evidence is being referred as under:

¶55

(i) RW-8 has stated in his examination-in-chief filed on affidavit that he has admitted his marriage with the petitioner on 01.03.2012 at Ara, Bihar and also birth of a male child from their wedlock. He has further stated that after few days of marriage, the petitioner wife insisted him to stay separate from his parents and he started living separately in a rented house at Bansidih, Chas. He got his son admitted in Delhi Public School. After sometime the Petitioner wife started pressurizing him to live at Patna and following her they both started residing at Danapur, Patna.

¶56

7 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶57

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶58

In the year 2019 the petitioner went to her parents’ home taking away her all belongings. He has further stated that in course of business, he had taken loan from Bank of India in which the petitioner was guarantor but due to failure of Om Sai Sales, he could not pay the loan in time and as he was proprietor of Om Sai Sales, the Bank filed a case against him, the petitioner and others in which the petitioner was sent to jail and in the year 2021 she came out from jail. In that case he was also sent to jail but due to lack of evidence he was acquitted.

¶59

He has further stated that due to obduracy of the petitioner he had to leave his business at Bokaro and as such he suffered loss in his business and could not repay the loan to the Bank. He has further stated that he kept the petitioner with him with full honour and dignity and also purchased 33 decimals of land in the name of the petitioner at Narayanpur Mouza, having Khata No. 16, Plot No. 5272 vide Sale Deed No. 8703 (Mark-Y/3).

¶60

He has further stated that after coming out from the jail, the petitioner/wife without informing him sold that land for Rs.36,00,000/- and grabbed that amount. He has further stated that the petitioner/wife was persuaded a lot by respectable persons and their relatives but due to arrogance of the petitioner/wife no settlement could take place. She without any reason has refused to live with him, while he is desirous to keep her with him with full honour and dignity. He has further stated that divorce case filed by her is groundless, manufactured and concocted.

¶61

8 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶62

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶63

(ii) The Examination- in- chief of other witnesses i.e. RW.3 to R.W.7 who are the friend of the appellant husband have been filed wherein similar statement has been given.

¶64

The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and “desertion” and assessing the same from the evidences led on behalf of the parties as also the submissions made in the pleadings, i.e., plaint and written statement, has found that the element of cruelty and desertion have been fully established and accordingly the suit filed by the wife (respondent herein) under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Act 1955 has been allowed and decree of dissolution of marriage has been signed.

¶65

Now coming to the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioner wherein it has been argued that the evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.

¶66

While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the petitioner/respondent that the impugned judgment is well considered and the learned Family Court has rightly appreciated the evidence available on record and come to its conclusion and accordingly granted the decree of dissolution of marriage between the parties.

¶67

This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the parties on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of the word “perverse” as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State

¶68

9 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶69

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶70

[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206

¶71

while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the said judgment reads as under:

¶72

“24. The expression “perverse” has been dealt with in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that the expression “perverse” means that the findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.

¶73

25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that “perverse finding” means a finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber & Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those findings.

¶74

26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the Court observed that a “perverse verdict” may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined “perverse” as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct, etc.

¶75

27. The expression “perverse” has been defined by various dictionaries in the following manner:

¶76

10 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶77

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶78

1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th Edn.

¶79

“Perverse.—Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable.”

¶80

2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International Edn.

¶81

Perverse.—Deliberately departing from what is normal and reasonable.

¶82

3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.

¶83

Perverse.—Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of law.

¶84

4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)

¶85

Perverse.—Purposely deviating from accepted or expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.

¶86

5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.

¶87

“Perverse.—A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the evidence.”

¶88

The ground for divorce has been taken of cruelty and desertion. The “cruelty” has been interpreted by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastane, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the respondent, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious for her to live with the appellant.

¶89

This Court deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning of ‘cruelty’ as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized that “cruelty” can have no fixed definition.

¶90

According to the Hon’ble Apex Court, “cruelty” is the “conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial obligations”. It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such

¶91

11 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶92

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶93

cruelty can be either “mental” or “physical”, intentional or unintentional. For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more “a question of fact and degree.”

¶94

The Hon’ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties are used to, “their economic and social conditions”, and the “culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

¶95

The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to constitute cruelty.

¶96

Further in the case of Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as follows:—

¶97

“22. The expression “cruelty” has an inseparable nexus with human conduct or human behaviour. It is always dependent upon the social strata or the milieu to which the parties belong, their ways of life, relationship, temperaments and emotions that have been conditioned by their social status.

¶98

25. After so stating, this Court observed in Shobha Rani case about the marked change in life in modern times and the sea change in matrimonial duties and responsibilities. It has been observed that : (SCC p. 108, para 5 )

¶99

12 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶100

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶101

“5. … when a spouse makes a complaint about the treatment of cruelty by the partner in life or relations, the court should not search for standard in life. A set of facts stigmatised as cruelty in one case may not be so in another case. The cruelty alleged may largely depend upon the type of life the parties are accustomed to or their economic and social conditions. It may also depend upon their culture and human values to which they attach importance.”

¶102

26. Their Lordships in Shobha Rani case referred to the observations made in Sheldon v. Sheldon wherein Lord Denning stated, “the categories of cruelty are not closed”.Thereafter, the Bench proceeded to state thus: (Shobha Rani case, SCC p. 109, paras 5-6)

¶103

“5. … Each case may be different. We deal with the conduct of human beings who are not generally similar. Among thehuman beings there is no limit to the kind of conduct which may constitute cruelty. New type of cruelty may crop up in any case depending upon the human behaviour, capacity or incapability to tolerate the conduct complained of. Such is the wonderful (sic) realm of cruelty.

¶104

6. These preliminary observations are intended to emphasise that the court in matrimonial cases is not concerned with ideals in family life. The court has only to understand the spouses concerned as nature made them, and consider their particular grievance. As Lord Reid observed in Gollins v. Gollins : (All ER p. 972 G-H)

¶105

‘… In matrimonial affairs we are not dealing with objective standards, it is not a matrimonial offence to fall below the standard of the reasonable man (or the reasonable woman).We are dealing with this man or this woman.’

¶106

In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6

¶107

SCC 334 the Hon’ble Apex Court has observed by taking into consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written statement that his wife was “unchaste” and had indecent familiarity with a person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital

¶108

13 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶109

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶110

affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman, were held to constitute “cruelty” itself.

¶111

The Hon’ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742 , has been pleased to observe that while judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The conduct complained of must be “grave” and “weighty” and trivial irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.

¶112

Since the desertion has also been taken as ground for the decree of divorce therefore the definition of “desertion” is required to be referred herein as defined under explanation part of Section 13 which means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage.

¶113

Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:

¶114

“Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that spouse the deserting party.”

¶115

14 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶116

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶117

The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453 and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol. 12, in the following words:

¶118

“In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent, and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there being no general principle applicable to all cases.

¶119

Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may usually be termed, for short, ‘the home’. There can be desertion without previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of desertion.

¶120

The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or, where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a continuing offence.

¶121

15 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶122

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶123

It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and ( 2 ) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end.

¶124

Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned: ( 1 ) the absence of consent, and ( 2 ) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.

¶125

Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs. Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of ‘desertion’ on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40 which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court. The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting

¶126

16 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶127

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶128

spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home. The view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The said Explanation reads thus:

¶129

“ 13. Divorce .—(1) …

¶130

Explanation.—In this sub-section, the expression “desertion” means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate expressions shall be construed accordingly.”

¶131

This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word “cruelty” and “desertion” has considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been incorporated by the learned Court in the impugned judgment.

¶132

It is evident therefrom that the grounds were taken before the learned Family Judge by the wife (respondent herein) that the appellant is extremely rude, abusive, ill-mannered and alcoholic and has also illicit relationship with some other girls. He always used to torture her for more dowry and when she had shown her inability, she was ousted from her matrimonial home with her four years son. He also cheated the respondent by taking her signature on the documents related to taking of loan and made her guarantor and non-payment of said loan she was arrested and spent ten months in custody.

¶133

The suit has been filed in the year 2021. The grounds taken by the wife are sufficient to prove the issue of cruelty and desertion and, as such, the learned Family Judge has passed the impugned judgment believingthe said

¶134

17 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶135

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶136

grounds to be true. The learned Family Judge, on consideration of both the issues, has found the ground for dissolution of marriage and therefore, allowed the suit. The relevant paragraph of the impugned judgement is being quoted herein:

¶137

“12. In the light of above decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as the explanation, when I examine the evidence and material available on the record then I find that as per para-6 examination-inchief of PW1 (Petitioner), para-7 of examination-in-chief of PW2, para-7 of examination-in-chief of PW3, para-7 and 8 of examinationin-chief of RW1, para-6 of examination-in-chief of RW2, para-7 of examination-in-chief of RW3, para-7 of examination-in-chief of RW4, para-7 of examination-in-chief of RW5, para-7 of examination-inchief of RW6, para-6 of examination-in-chief of RW7 and para-9 of examination-in-chief of RW8 (Respondent) it appears to be admitted fact that in connection with his business the Respondent had taken loan from a bank in which the Petitioner was guarantor and the Respondent made default in payment of loan and the bank had filed a case against the Petitioner and others in which the Petitioner as well the Respondent both were sent behind the bar. The PW1(Petitioner) in para-6 and 7 has stated that her husband taking her in his confidence to file some document in the bank got her signature on some paper and defraud the bank causing outstanding amount of bank to rupees one crore and he and his brothers absconded and as she was guarantor she was apprehended on the FIR of the bank and remained behind the bar for 10 months. As per her evidence she had no prior knowledge about FIR filed by the bank. In para-36 and 37 of the cross-examination she has corroborated her such evidence. The Respondent has not been able to extract from her in the crossexamination that she had knowledge that her husband had made default and the bank had filed case against her also. In her examination-in-chief she has stated that now her husband has been arrested and she is bail out. The PW2 has also corroborated such evidence of the PW1 in his examination-in-chief as well as in para-36 and 37 of the cross-examination. The PW3 has also corroborated the evidence of PW1 and PW2 in his examination-in-chief and para-23 of the cross-examination. So, manifestly for the act of the Respondent in making default in payment of loan of the bank the Petitioner had to

¶138

18 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶139

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶140

remain behind the bar for a very long period of 10 months and it is quite understandable as to from what mental agony she would have gone during those period. It is also clear that parties have lost mutual trust with each other and they have also lost love with each other while mutual trust and love are basic foundation of happy conjugal life. I have no doubt to hold that the Respondent by his act has subjected the Petitioner to grave mental cruelty. She has also stated that from 12.12.2018 she is residing in her parental house at Ara along with her son. She has further stated that she filed a case against cruelty of her husband before Mahila Police Station, Ara vide FIRNo.68/2021 (Mark-X/2). In para-19 of the cross-examination she has deposed that she did not report the matter to the police at Bokaro regarding assault on her at Bokaro. It does not appear to be convincing that the Respondent subjected her to cruelty for demand of additional dowry as she was residing at her parental house since 2018 and she filed case against the Respondent before the police at Ara in the year 2021. The PW3, who is father of the Petitioner, has deposed in para-18 of the cross-examination that the said case filed by the Petitioner against the Respondent at Ara ended without any legal action against the Respondent. The Petitioner (PW1) herself has admitted in para-39 of the cross-examination that no action was taken upon her case filed before Mahila Police Station, Ara. Such evidence indicates that the allegation of the Petitioner regarding demand of dowry and torture was not found to be true by the police. The Petitioner is found to have failed to prove cruelty and torture by the Respondent for demand of additional dowry.

¶141

13. The Petitioner (PW1) has further stated in her examination-inchief that she is residing in her parental house since 12.12.2018 along with her son and any how they are being maintained by her father and the Respondent has neither paying any maintenance to them nor he has come to meet with them. Her such evidence has been well corroborated by the PW2 and PW3. The PW1 has not been specifically cross examined on her such evidence and as such her such evidence remaineduncontroverted. The Respondent in para-31, 32 and 33 of the cross-examination has said that he is residing separately from his wife from three years and during such period he has been sending money for maintenance of his wife and child in bank account and he can file proof of the same in the court but he has not filed any such proof. Therefore, the evidence of the Petitioner is to be relied

¶142

19 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

¶143

2 025:JHHC:27158-DB

¶144

upon that the Respondent is not maintaining her and her child. Not providing financial support to wife and minor child is also a cruelty against them.

¶145

From the relevant paragraphs of the order impugned which have been quoted and referred hereinabove, it is evident that the learned Family Court after taking into consideration the evidences led by both the parties and further has also taken into consideration the settled position of law which has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, has allowed the suit filed by the respondent wife under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Act 1955.

¶146

This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussion, is of the view that the appellant/husband has failed to establish the element of perversity in the impugned judgment as per the discussions made hereinabove, as such, the instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.

¶147

Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.

¶148

Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.

¶149

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

¶150

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

¶151

KNR /A.F.R.

¶152

20 F.A. No. 14 of 2025

Rohit Raj Kumar Singh Alias Sanjay Singh v. Dipty Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Rohit Raj Kumar Singh Alias Sanjay Singh v. Dipty Singh

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

Cases cited

Statutes considered

Procedural history

Parties & counsel

Coram

Case details

Similar cases

Trustline Mining and Minerala Represented through Its Partner Namely, Rashid Ahmed Vs the State of Jharkhand

Kishun Shood And Ors. Vs State of Bihar

Aditya Kumar Vs Union of India Thro the Secretary Ministry of Finance Department of Revenue

Prakash @ Prakash Nonia Vs Lalita Devi

Ms Bharat Coking Coal Limited Through Sri Prakash Chandra Vs Forest

M/S Hindalco Industries Limited, through Its Authorized Representative Samta Sinha, Vs State of Jharkhand, through Its Chief Secretary, Dept. of Industries, Mines and Geology