Satendra Sao Alias Satendra Saw Vs the State of Jharkhand

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2025:JHHC:38040

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI Cr. Revision No.311 of 2021

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1.Satendra Sao @ Satendra Saw, aged about 33 years, son of Chhatradhari Sao

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Chhatradhari Sao @ Chhatardhari Saw, aged about 79 years, son of Late Tejan Sao

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Both are residents of Village Tilokary, P.O. Sarmatand, P.S. Jai Nagar Dist. - Koderma … Petitioners

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Versus

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The State of Jharkhand

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Sunaina Devi, wife of Satendra Sao, resident of Shastri Nagar, P.O. Jarangdih, P.S. Bokaro thermal, Dist. Bokaro, presently resided at Village Tilokary, P.O. Sarmatand, P.S. Jai Nagar, Dist. Koderma … Opp. Parties

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CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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For the Petitioners	------ :	Mr. Rajesh Kumar, Advocate.
For the State	:	Mr. Vineet Kumar Vashistha, APP
For the O.P. No.2	: ------	Mr. Vikash Kumar, Advocate

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9/17.12.2025 Heard the parties.

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This criminal revision has been preferred against the judgment dated 15.02.2021, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II special F.T.C. (C.A.W.), Bermo at Tenughat in criminal appeal No. 131 of 2019, whereby the said appeal has been dismissed by the learned Court and confirmed the judgment dated 28.6.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1 Class, Bermo at Tenughat in G.R. Case No. 893 of 2012, corresponding to T.R. No. 750 of 2019, arising out of Bokaro Thermal P.S. case No.85 of 2012, whereby the petitioners have been convicted under section 498A/34 and sentenced to undergo R.I. for 03 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 10,000/- each for the offence under section 498A IPC and in case of default of payment of fine, to undergo S.I. for 06 months and the period already undergone during pendency of trial shall be set off.

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the matter is arising out of 498A of IPC and good sense has been prevailed between the parties and the compromise has reached. Pursuant to that, both the parties are residing together. As such IA No. 8360 of 2022 has been filed as a joint compromise and in view of that, this matter may kindly be disposed of.

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Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State submits that the matter is arising out of 498A of IPC and in light of IA, it transpires that the compromise is there.

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Learned counsel appearing for the opposite party No. 2 accepts the submission made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and submits that the opposite party No.2 is residing along with the petitioner and in view of that, the compromise petition may kindly be allowed. He further submits that the O.P. No. 2 does not want to proceed further in the matter and she is residing along with the petitioner.

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In view of the above and considering that the matter is arising out of section 498A of IPC and both the petitioner and O.P. No.2 are residing together and in view of that joint compromise petition filed in form of IA No. 8360 of 2022 is allowed.

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Taking note of the object of Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the expected approach of the High Court in the event of bona fide settlement of disputes had been duly exposited by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana , reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 , wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has

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underscored the duty of the Court to encourage the genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes and said as under in paragraphs 12 to 16 of the said judgment:

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“12. The special features in such matrimonial matters are evident. It becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlements of matrimonial disputes.

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The observations made by this Court, though in a slightly different context, in G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 733] are very apt for determining the approach required to be kept in view in a matrimonial dispute by the courts. It was said that there has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.

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There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498-A in the Penal Code, 1860 was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would

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prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Penal Code, 1860.

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In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of its inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and Section 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code.

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For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment and allow the appeal and quash the FIR abovementioned.”

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The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bitan Sengupta v. State of W.B. , reported in (2018) 18 SCC 366.

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In view of the aforesaid judgments and taking note of the terms of settlement as stated in the said I.A. and further considering the judgments passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the cases of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab and another , reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 and Narinder Singh and others v. State of Punjab and another , reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466 , the said settlement is, hereby, accepted. 10. In view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering that the matter is arising out of section 498A of IPC and the petitioner and opposite party No.2 have compromised the matter and they are residing together, the prayer made in the IA No. 8360 of 2022 for compromise is allowed and disposed of.

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Consequently, the judgment dated 15.02.2021, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II special F.T.C. (C.A.W.), Bermo at Tenughat in criminal appeal No. 131 of 2019 and the judgment dated 28.6.2019 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bermo at Tenughat in G.R. Case No. 893 of 2012, corresponding to

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