M/S. Samriddhi Agro Foods Private Limited, Thr. Its Director, Mr. Rishu Chirania Vs M/S. Samriddhi Rice Mill Private Limited, Thr Its Director, Namely, Anand Sekhsaria

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI A.C. (DB) No. 01 of 2025

M/S. SAMRIDDHI AGRO FOODS PRIVATE LIMITED, A Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 2013, having its registered office at Unit no. 302, 3rd Floor, Jokhiram, Chmabers, Jokhiram Lane, Main Road, P.O. G.P.O., P.S. Malar, District-Ranchi through its Director, Mr. Rishu Chirania, Rishu Chirania, Son of Shri Laxmi Narayan Agarwal, aged about 46 years, resident of Flat No. 4B, Suryamani Complex, Shradha Nand Road, Upper Bazar, Ranchi G.P.O., P.O.- G.P.O, P.S.- Kotwali, Ranchi, Jharkhand.

¶4

... Appellant/Respondent

¶5

Versus

¶6

M/S. SAMRIDDHI RICE MILL PRIVATE LIMITED, a Company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 2013, having its registered office at Unit No. 302, 3rd Floor, JokhiramChambers, Jokhiram Lane, Main Road, P.O. G.P.O., P.S.-Kotwali, District- Ranchi through its Director, namely, Anand Sekhsaria, aged about 42 years, son of Late Binod Kumar Sekhsaria, resident of Main Road, Purana Bazar, Chakulia, P.O. & P.S.- Chakulia, District- East Singhbhum, Jharkhand.

¶7

... Respondent/Appellant/Objector

¶8

The Controller General of Patents, Designs and Trade Marks, having office at Boudhik Sampada Bhawan, S.M. Road, Antop Hill, P.O. & P.S.Antop Hill, District- Mumbai.

¶9

The Registrar of Copyrights, Copyright Office, Boudhik Sampada

¶10

1

¶11

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶12

Bhawan, Plot No. 32, Sector-14, Dwarka, P.O. & P.S.- Dwarka, DistrictNew Delhi.

¶13

The Deputy Registrar of Copyrights, Copyright Office, Boudhik Sampada Bhawan, Plot No. 32, Sector-14, Dwarka, P.O. & P.S.-Dwarka, DistrictNew Delhi.

¶14

Senior Examiner of Trade Marks, Trade Marks Registry, having his office at Intellectual Property Bhavan Beside Antop Hill Post Office, P.O. & P.S.Antop Hill, District-Mumbai, Maharashtra.

¶15

Dinman Polypacks Private Limited, a company within the meaning of the Companies Act, 2013, through its Director, having its registered office at Suite No. 406, Vardan, 25A, CamacStreet, P.O. & P.S.- Camac Street, District, Kolkata, West Bengal.

¶16

... Proforma Respondents/Respondents

¶17

CORAM : HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI

¶18

------

¶19

For the Appellant : Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, Advocate For the Resp. 1 : Mr. Rajeev Kumar Jain, Advocate : Mr. Vipul Poddar, Advocate : Ms. Yamini Mahawar, Advocate : Mrs. Sugandha Jaiswal, Advocate ------ 08/Dated: 16^th December, 2025

¶20

Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.:

¶21

Prayer:

¶22

The instant appeal has been filed under the provision of Section 72(3) of the Copyrights Act, 1957 (hereinafter referred as Act, 1957) challenging the order passed by learned Single Judge dated

¶23

2

¶24

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶25

30.04.2025 whereby and whereunder the learned Single Judge has held that appeal arising out of the Copy Rights Act, 1957 under section 72 thereof, is maintainable before this Court and further order dated 25.06.2025 has also been challenged by which the delay of 506 days in filing the appeal has been condoned by the learned single Judge.

¶26

At the outset, it needs to refer herein that it is evident from the order dated 15.10.2025 passed by this Court that the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that he is not questioning the jurisdiction, which has been exercised by this Court holding the appeal [M.A. No. 316 of 2024] to be maintainable vide order dated 30.04.2025.

¶27

Factual Matrix:

¶28

The appeal, although is against the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, condoning the delay of 506 days, but even then, this Court is of the view that the facts, in brief, on merit needs to be referred herein, which reads as under:

¶29

It is a case where the Respondent no.1 herein (Appellant) had preferred the Miscellaneous Appeal as against the order dated 03.01.2023, passed by Ld. Deputy Registrar of Copyrights, in Diary no.3188/2022-C.O./A., which came to be filed after the delay of 506 days and was registered as M.A. No. 316 of 2024.

¶30

After the Stamp Reporting was carried out by the Registry of this Hon'ble Court, a defect was pointed out that the appeal is barred by 506 days and for which, the respondent no.1/appellant, preferred

¶31

3

¶32

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶33

an interlocutory application in miscellaneous appeal, seeking condonation of delay elaborating therein that the delay was not occasioned and there was sufficiency of grounds for condonation of delay. The appeal was heard on 30.04.2025, on two grounds: Firstly, on maintainability of appeal at Ranchi with regard to jurisdictional issue and secondly, the appeal to be heard by Division Bench, in view of the powers vested under the Jharkhand High Court Rules, more specifically, Rule 384, which was so framed in exercise of powers conferred vide section 73 of the Copyrights Act, 1957.

¶34

The objections raised by the present appellant was dismissed vide order and judgment dated 30.04.2025 inter-alia holding that the appeal is maintainable at Ranchi and the Ld. Single Judge can always hear the appeal. The appeal was yet again heard on the I.A. petition seeking condonation of delay and vide order dated 25.06.2025, the Hon'ble Single Judge condoned the delay on the ground of there being no lapses on the part of the appellant in filing belated Miscellaneous Appeal, as also, there being sufficiency of grounds and the appeal was directed to be fixed for hearing on merits. Since, there was a defect in the order dated 25.06.2025, the Advocate on Record mentioned the matter before this Hon'ble Court for rectification, which was so allowed vide order 11.07.2025.

¶35

Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the Order dated 30.04.2025 and 25.06.2025 in M.A. No. 316 of 2025 passed by Learned Single Judge, the appellant has preferred this present memo

4

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

of appeal.

It is evident from the aforesaid facts that the litigant has travelled to the adjudicatory authority invoking the jurisdiction as per the power conferred under the Copyrights Act, 1957. The said proceeding was closed by Ld. Deputy Registrar of Copyrights vide order dated 03.01.2023 in Diary No. 3183/2022-C.O./A.

¶40

Aggrieved by the same, the respondent No. 1 herein approached this Court by filing miscellaneous appeal being M.A. No. 316 of 2024 as provided under Section 72(1) of the Act, 1957 along with the delay condonation application, since by the time the appeal was filed, the delay of 506 days has crept out.

¶41

The issue of limitation has seriously been contested on behalf of the appellant by taking the ground that whatever ground has been taken in the delay condonation application may not be said to be the sufficient ground for condoning the delay.

¶42

The ground has also been taken that the order was communicated through e-mail on 05.01.2023, but even after getting the information that the order was passed on 03.01.2023, the requisition made to get the certified copy was on 03.07.2023 and received on 24.05.2024.

¶43

It has been contended that the period from 03.07.2023 to 24.05.2024 is fit to be excluded in view of the provision of Section 72(4) of the Act, 1957, but even after exclusion of the aforesaid period, the ground which has been shown, cannot be said to be sufficient cause to condone the delay reason being that if the order so

¶44

5

¶45

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶46

passed on 03.01.2023 was already been communicated through e- mail, then why the efforts were not taken for getting the certified copy immediately after 05.01.2023 and why after the lapse of 6 months, i.e., on 03.07.2023, the requisition for the same was made.

¶47

The learned Single Judge, on appreciation of the rival submission advanced on behalf of the parties, placing the reliance upon the statutory provision as provided under Section 72 in entirety and relying upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of State of Manipur and Others V. All Manipur Regular Post Vacancies S.T.A. and Others reported in (1997) 10 SCC 385 has come to the conclusive finding that sufficient cause has been made out to condone the delay of 506 days in filing the appeal and accordingly the same has been condoned and the matter has been listed for further hearing under “For Admission” along with the stay petition.

¶48

It needs to refer herein that the order dated 25.06.2025 passed in M.A. No. 316 of 2024 was subsequently been modified vide order dated 11.07.2025 since the name of Respondent No. 6 has inadvertently been not referred in order dated 25.06.2025 and as such by way of clarificatory order, the appellant herein has been referred said to be the respondent No. 6 in the order dated 25.06.2025.

¶49

The order dated 25.06.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge is the subject-matter of the instant appeal by invoking the jurisdiction

¶50

6

¶51

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶52

conferred under Section 72(3) of the Act, 1957.

¶53

Submissions of the Ld. Counsel for the appellant:

¶54

Representing the appellant, Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, learned counsel has taken the grounds in assailing the impugned order that the learned Single Judge has not appreciated the argument which has been advanced on behalf of the appellant herein to the effect that even though the respondent No. 1 herein came to know about the order dated 03.01.2023 which was communicated through e-mail on 05.01.2023.

¶55

Further submission has been made that the endeavour ought to have been taken on behalf of the respondent concerned for getting the certified copy by filing the requisition, but instead of taking any endeavour, the aid is being tried to be taken of the provision of Section 72(4) of the Act, 1957 wherein it has been stipulated that in calculating the period of three months provided for an appeal under this section, the time taken in granting a certified copy of the order or record of the decision appealed against shall be excluded.

¶56

However, Mr. Nitin Kr. Pasari, learned counsel, while arguing the matter before the single judge has sticked to the argument that even excluding the period from 03.07.2023 to 24.05.2024, the cause which has been shown said to be sufficient for the purpose of condoning the delay of 506 days cannot be said to be sufficient cause if the pleading to that effect will be taken into consideration as referred in the delay condonation application.

¶57

7

¶58

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶59

Further submission has been made that even though the statutory mandate is to supply the certified copy but it does not mean that litigant concerned is to take lethargic approach even for getting the certified copy of the order which is being sought to be challenged and is now seeking entire accountability upon the officials concerned when the issue of delay of 506 days is sought to be condoned.

¶60

On the aforesaid premise the learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the order dated 25.06.2025 by which delay of 506 days has been condoned, may be interfered with and set-aside.

¶61

Submissions of the Ld. Counsel for Respondent no.1:

¶62

Per contra, Mr. Rajeev Kumar Jain, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, has submitted by emphatically relying upon the provision of Section 72 in entirety in order to show the statutory mandate with its object and intend as incorporated therein.

¶63

It has been contended that all efforts have been taken by the respondent no.1 for filing of the appeal within three months, however, belatedly the certified copy of the impugned order has been supplied and the delay has occurred. He further elaborates his argument by way of submitting that in light of these communications and supply of the C.C on 24.05.2024, 388 days can be safely minused out of 506 days.

¶64

Mr. Jain, learned counsel has further submitted that since the argument pertains to the communication of the order dated 03.01.2023 through email dated 05.01.2023 has been given and as

¶65

8

¶66

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶67

such he is advancing the argument on that point.

¶68

However, he has further argued in response to the argument advanced by the appellant by taking the ground of lethargic approach having been taken by the respondent No. 1, the same is absolutely incorrect since the Registrar Copyrights has to supply the certified copy, but it has not been supplied for which the litigant concerned, the respondent No. 1 had to approach the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi, as per the pleading made in Para 36 of the miscellaneous appeal and since, the certified copy was supplied, making the said writ petition infructuous.

¶69

It has been contended that if what has been argued regarding the approach said to be lethargic, so far as respondent No. 1 is concerned, the same cannot be said to be correct in view of the conduct of the litigant concerned, as the respondent No. 1 even had to rushed to Hon’ble High Court of Delhi to show the sincerity and endeavour which has been taken for the purpose of getting the certified copy of the said order.

¶70

Learned counsel has further submitted that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the entire aspect of the matter including the mandate as provided under Section 72(4) of the act, 1957 and if the delay of 506 days have been condoned considering the cause as has been shown in the delay condonation application to be sufficient cause to condone the delay, the same cannot be said to suffer from an error, particularly for the reason that if the lis is there, the same is to

¶71

9

¶72

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶73

be adjudicated on merit and instead of showing out the lis for not getting adjudication on merit.

¶74

Learned counsel, in view of the aforesaid pretext, has submitted that therefore the order passed by the learned Single Judge may not be interfered with.

¶75

Analysis:

¶76

We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the content as has been referred in the delay condonation application which has been taken into consideration by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order.

¶77

At the outset, it needs to refer herein that in order to consider the rival submissions, this Court vide order dated 10.11.2025, has called for the original record from the Office of the respondent No. 3. However, the original record has not been sent, only the scanned copy thereof has been sent and the same has already been taken on record. For ready reference, the order dated 10.11.2025 is quoted herein under:

¶78

“We have heard Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Rajeev Kumar Jain, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent no.1.

¶79

2. This Court after having heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties is of the view that whatever point has been raised on behalf of the respective parties that can only properly be appreciated if the original record will be perused.

¶80

3. Let the original record being Diary No.3188/2022-CO-A be called for from the authority concerned so that the same be reached on or before the next date of hearing.

¶81

4. List this matter on 05.12.2025.

¶82

10

¶83

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶84

5. Let this order be communicated forthwith to the respondent nos.2 and 3 forthwith.”

¶85

This Court, before appreciating the argument needs to refer herein that it is evident from the order dated 15.10.2025 passed this Court that after taking into consideration the provision of Section 72 of the Act, 1957 as also the High Court Rules as contained under Rule 383, 384 & 385, has ignored the defect on the issue of counting the period of limitation from 25.06.2025 and not from 30.04.2025.

¶86

The order dated 15.10.2025 was passed in the pretext that the learned counsel for the appellant has intended to not challenge the order dated 30.04.2025 and as such the Office was directed to come out with fresh note pertaining to the period of limitation. For ready reference, the order dated 15.10.2025 is being referred herein, which

¶87

reads as under:

¶88

“1. Mr. Vipul Poddar, learned counsel appeared on behalf of Caveator/respondent no. 1 has pressed the Caveat No. 177 of 2025.

¶89

2. It has been submitted that the instant caveat has been filed against A.C. (D.B) which has been preferred by the appellant under Section 72(3) of the Copyrights Act, 1957, challenging order dated 25.06.2025 passed in M.A. No. 316 of 2024 by learned Single Judge whereby the limitation petition for condonation of delay of 506 days, preferred in the said M.A. No. 316 of 2024, has been allowed.

¶90

3. Learned counsel for the caveator/respondent no. 1 has submitted that before hearing the matter on merit, the instant caveator may be heard.

¶91

4. We have heard learned counsel for the caveator and perused the caveat petition filed by respondent no. 1 herein. In view of pleadings made in the caveat, the prayer made by the caveator is allowed.

¶92

Filing No. A.C.(D.B.) 8350 of 2025

¶93

5. Learned counsel for the parties has argued the matter, by

¶94

11

¶95

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶96

referring the provisions of Rule 383, 384 and 385 of High Court of Jharkhand Rules.

¶97

6. It has been submitted that High Court of Jharkhand Rules has been notified on 6th June, 2001 vide High Court Notification dated 10th May, 2001.

¶98

7. It has further been submitted that the day when the High Court of Jharkhand Rules was notified the un-amended provision as available under Section 72 of the Copyrights Act 1957 (herein referred as Act 1957), was invoked and the necessary insertion of the provision as under Rule 383, 384 and 385 of High Court of Jharkhand Rules has been made keeping into consideration the said un-amended provision of Act 1957 i.e., the provision pertaining to filing of an appeal to be heard by the High Court, has been inserted but the said Section 72 of the Act 1957 as was invoked on that date i.e., the day when the High Court of Jharkhand Rules has been notified, has been superseded by insertion of Section 72 substituted by Act 33 of 2001 implemented w.e.f. 04.04.2021 wherein the following provisions have been made. For ready reference, the Section 72 of the Act is quoted as under:

¶99

“72. Appeals against orders of Registrar of Copyrights- (1) Any person aggrieved by any final decision or order of the Registrar of Copyrights may, within three months from the date of the order or decision, appeal to the High Court. (2) Every such appeal shall be heard by a single Judge of the High Court: Provided that any such Judge may, if he so thinks fit, refer the appeal at any stage of the proceeding to a Bench of the High Court. (3) Where an appeal is heard by a single Judge, a further appeal shall lie to a Bench of the High Court within three months from the date of decision or order of the single Judge. (4) In calculating the period of three months provided for an appeal under this section, the time taken in granting a certified copy of the order or record of the decision appealed against shall be excluded.”

¶100

8. It has been submitted by referring to Section 72 (1) of the Copyrights Act that any person aggrieved by any final decision or order of the Registrar of Copyrights may, within three months from the date of the order or decision, appeal to the High court. Sub-section (2) thereof provides that every such appeal shall be heard by the Single Judge of the High Court, which contains a provision that any such judge may if he so thinks fit, refer the appeal at any stage of the proceeding to the Bench of the High Court. Sub-section (3) thereof, provides that where an appeal is heard by Single Bench, further appeal shall lie to the Bench of the High Court within three months from the date of decision or order of the single Judge.

¶101

9. It has been contended that in the High Court Rules there is no reference of Section 72(3) thereof i.e., the forum made

¶102

12

¶103

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶104

available by virtue of substituted Act, by an order passed by the learned Single Judge under appellate jurisdiction to be heard by a Bench of the High Court within three months.

¶105

10. It has been submitted that therefore necessary insertion is required to be there in the High Court of Jharkhand Rules.

¶106

11. This Court has considered the provisions as made available under Rules 383, 384 and 385 of the High Court of Jharkhand Rules wherefrom it is evident that there is no reference of subsection 72(3) by which the Coram has been created for hearing of the further appeal by a Bench.

¶107

12. This Court, therefore, is of the view that the necessary insertion of the said provision is required to be made in the High Court of Jharkhand Rules.

¶108

13. In view thereof, the learned Registrar General of this Court is directed to look into the matter and take due endeavor in this regard so that necessary insertion be made expeditiously in the High Court of Jharkhand Rules.

¶109

14. Herein, the appeal since has been preferred under section 72(3) of the Copyrights Act, 1957 by which the power has been conferred for hearing of the further appeal against the order passed by the learned Single Judge, this Court is of the view that since the Act of 1957 confers power upon this Court, therefore, this Court is exercising the said jurisdiction and proceeding to hear the matter.

¶110

15. Accordingly, the matter has been heard on merit.

¶111

16. The present appeal has been preferred under Section 72 (3) of the Copyrights Act, 1957, in which two orders of the learned Single Judge passed in M.A. No. 316 of 2024 have been challenged.

¶112

17. The first one is the order dated 30.04.2025 whereby the appeal has been held maintainable on the point of jurisdiction to be heard by the learned Single Judge of this Court whereas the second order under challenge is order dated 25.06.2025 by which the application filed by the respondent no. 1, seeking condonation of delay of 506 days in preferring the appeal has been allowed.

¶113

18. Mr. Nitin Kumar Pasari, learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that he is not questioning the jurisdiction, which has been exercised by this Court holding the appeal [M.A. No. 316 of 2024] to be maintainable vide order dated 30.04.2025.

¶114

19. It has further been submitted in view of fact that he is not challenging the order dated 30.04.2025, the only order under challenge is order dated 25.06.2025, therefore, the limitation is now to be counted from 25.06.2025 and not from 30.04.2025.

¶115

13

¶116

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶117

20. Learned counsel appearing for respondent no. 1 is present and submitted that since the appellant is not challenging the order dated 30.04.2025, as such fresh office note is required for ascertaining the period of limitation.

¶118

21. In view of submissions advanced by learned counsel for the parties, office is directed to compute the period of limitation, if any, by computing it from 25.06.2025.

¶119

22. Let the matter be placed before this Court with fresh office note.

¶120

23. List this case on 10.11.2025.”

¶121

Now coming to the impropriety of the order dated 25.06.2025 which has been assailed herein.

¶122

The law is well-settled on the issue of condonation of delay that sufficient cause is required to be shown by the litigant concerned who is seeking to condone the delay and the sufficient cause is the paramount consideration to be taken into consideration by the Court of Law irrespective of the period of delay.

¶123

The word ‘sufficient cause’ has been explained by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of “Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer”, [(2013) 14 SCC 81] , wherein, it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-

¶124

“9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, theword “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case

¶125

14

¶126

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶127

must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .)

¶128

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of “sufficient cause”.

¶129

11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula ispossible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .)

¶130

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. 13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

¶131

“605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.—The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the

¶132

15

¶133

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶134

existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence.” An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448]

¶135

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 ] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul 17 Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225].

¶136

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.”

¶137

The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior

¶138

purpose as has been held in “Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhutnath Banerjee & Ors.”, AIR 1964 SC

¶139

16

¶140

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶141

1336; “Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan”, (1969) 2 SCC 770; “Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti”, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and “Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai”, (2012) 5 SCC 157 .

¶142

It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ram

¶143

Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,

¶144

(2002) 3 SCC 195 , wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as

¶145

hereunder:-

¶146

“12. Thus, it becomes plain that the expression “sufficient cause” within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision shouldreceive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute “sufficient cause” or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and

¶147

17

¶148

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶149

hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way.”

¶150

It is thus evident from the aforesaid judgment that while condoning the delay, a pedantic approach is not to be taken depending upon the cause, if the Court comes out to the conclusion that the cause which has been shown to be sufficient, to condone the delay.

¶151

This Court is now proceeding to examine the legality and propriety of the impugned judgment passed by the learned Single Judge in the pretext of two facts:

¶152

(i) The issue of sufficient cause.

¶153

(ii) The duty which has been casted upon the Registrar, Copyrights, if not followed, then whether the litigant concerned can be made to suffer due to the laches committed on the part of the officer concerned?

¶154

So far as the first issue regarding the sufficient cause, in the peculiar circumstances of the present case, both are to be taken into consideration in view of the fact that if the Registrar Copyrights would have supplied the certified copy, as mandated under Section 72(4), then the issue of sufficient cause also ought to be taken into consideration for the purpose of consideration of condonation of delay on the principle that it is now party to establish the sufficient

¶155

18

¶156

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶157

cause due to which such party could not be able to come to the Court of Law for filing the litigation.

¶158

The provision of Section 72 is the provision upon which healthy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No. 1, since the learned Single Judge has placed reliance upon the said judgment. Therefore, Section 72 of Act, 1957 is required to refer herein, which reads as under:

¶159

72. Appeals against orders of Registrar of Copyrights .—(1) Any person aggrieved by any final decision or order of the Registrar of Copyrights may, within three months from the date of the order or decision, appeal to the High Court.

¶160

(2) Every such appeal shall be heard by a Single Judge of the High Court:

¶161

Provided that any such Judge may, if he so thinks fit, refer the appeal at any stage of the proceeding to a Bench of the High Court.

¶162

(3) Where an appeal is heard by a Single Judge, a further appeal shall lie to a Bench of the High Court within three months from the date of decision or order of the Single Judge.

¶163

(4) In calculating the period of three months provided for an appeal under this section, the time taken in granting a certified copy of the order or record of the decision appealed against shall be excluded.]

¶164

It is evident that the provision of Section 72(1) pertains to the stage

¶165

of first appeal to be filed before this Court to be heard under the nomenclature Appeal Case (A.C.) Single Bench (S.B.) and Section 72(3) confers power to the Division Bench of this Court to entertain an appeal against the order/judgment passed under Section 72(1) of the Act, 1957 and for filing the same, the requirement as mandated, has been made under the statutory provision, as under Section 72(4),

¶166

19

¶167

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶168

that in calculating the period of three months provided for an appeal under this section, the time taken in granting a certified copy of the order or record of the decision appealed against shall be excluded.

¶169

Here, it is the admitted case that the certified copy, as was required to be supplied by the Registrar Copyrights was not supplied within reasonable time.

¶170

This Court is coming to the aforesaid conclusion, in view of the specific stand taken on behalf of the respondent No. 1 as under Para 36 as available in Page 52 of the paper book that for obtaining the certified copy, the litigant concerned, respondent No. 1 had to approach to the Hon’ble Delhi High Court for issuance of Writ of Mandamus to command upon the Registrar Copyrights to supply the certified copy of the order dated 03.01.2023.

¶171

Thereafter The Registrar Copyrights, had supplied the certified copy of the order dated 03.01.2023 on 24.05.2024 .

¶172

This Court, therefore, is having with the opinion in the backdrop of the fact that as per the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant that the respondent No. 1 has shown lackadaisical approach in preferring the first appellate forum i.e. High Court, is not fit to be accepted, for the reason, that if the respondent No. 1 was having the lethargic/ lackadaisical approach, he would not have approached the High Court of Delhi for the purpose of getting the certified copy of the impugned order dated 03.01.2023.

¶173

It cannot be disputed that once the litigation is being preferred even

¶174

20

¶175

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶176

before the quasi-judicial functionary, then it is the bounden duty of such quasi-judicial functionary to supply the certified copy in favour of the party and in a situation where there is no provision to supply the same by the functionary of the said quasi-judicial forum and if the requisition is being made, the certified copy is to be supplied without any delay.

¶177

Here, under the Act of 1957, it has been mandated to file the appeal within the period of 90 days and therefore it is the duty being casted upon the concerned authority to supply the certified copy within reasonable time and once the duty has been casted upon the bearer of the quasi-judicial functionary, and if such duty has not been discharged, then the litigant concerned, is having all right to approach the forum carved out under Article 226 of the constitution of India for issuance of Writ of Mandamus, and here, exactly the same thing has been done by the respondent No. 1 by approaching the High Court of Delhi for the purpose of issuing direction upon Registrar Copyrights to supply the certified copy of the order dated 03.01.2023.

¶178

Although, we have referred the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court showing the interpretation of the word “sufficient cause”, but as per the admitted fact, as referred in the preceding paragraphs, of the said judgment is not applicable in the facts of the instant case, since the appeal has been filed within the period of 90 days counting it from the date when the order impugned dated 03.01.2023 was

¶179

21

¶180

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

¶181

received, i.e., on 24.05.2024 and the appeal was filed on 20.08.2025 which is within the period of 90 days as mandated under Section 72(4) of the Act, 1957.

¶182

This Court, after having gone through the order passed by the learned Single Judge, has found that the consideration has been made that the appeal has been filed after delay of 506 days.

¶183

The learned Single Judge, based upon the ground referred in the delay condonation application although has condoned the delay, but, as per the discussion made in the preceding paragraphs, this Court has arrived at conclusion that the appeal has been filed after the period of 90 days, after excluding the period consumed in obtaining the certified copy.

¶184

As such, it is a case where the appeal since has been filed within the period of 90 days as per the explanation furnished in the delay condonation application and as such, there is no need to condone the delay, being filed within time.

¶185

The aforesaid aspect of the matter since has not been considered by the learned Single Judge and as such, the part of the finding as recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order is being replaced to the effect that there is no requirement to show the sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay of 506 days.

¶186

Accordingly, the instant appeal stands disposed of with the modification of the finding part, as contained in the order passed by the learned Single Judge holding that the appeal has been filed within

22

2025:JHHC:38425-DB

time.