24 . Let us take an illustration. The period of limitation under the Code of Civil Procedure for an appeal to a High Court from any decree is 90 days from the date of the decree. The date of the decree is the date of the judgment under O. 20, R. 7, C.P.C. Ordinarily, therefore, time beings to run subject to Section 12 from the date of the judgment which is, for the particular purpose, the date of the decree, 90 days being the prescribed period of limitation, under Section 12 (1), the day from which such period has to be reckoned shall be excluded. Again under Section 12 (2), the time requisite for obtaining a certified copy of the decree shall be excluded. Under Section 12 (3), even the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the judgment on which the decree is founded shall also be excluded. Having thus in the above three clauses excluded a number of days in computing the prescribed period of 90 days, it was absolutely necessary to make it clear in the Explanation that the time taken by the court to prepare the decree before an application for a copy thereof is made shall not be excluded. If the Explanation were not in these terms the old controversy would have persisted about the time claimed by a person before making an application for a copy, whether it should be excluded or not, in view of the earlier conflict of decisions. It is because of this history of the judicial controversy that the Explanation was phrased in the way it has been done by Parliament, namely, that the time taken by the court to prepare the decree before an application thereof is made shall not be excluded. In other words, that period which may elapse in preparing the copy of the decree, prior to the making of an application for copy, shall not be excluded when excluding the time requisite for obtaining a copy while computing the period of limitation. But for this Explanation it could have been again argued that, that time also should be excluded as the entire period of time requisite for obtaining a copy in view of one line of earlier judicial decisions under the old Act. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that the Law Commission had made a very salutary recommendation in order to make the position absolutely clear and to avoid any further controversy in the matter.
