Sumit Khajuria Vs State of Hp

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2026:HHC:21577

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP(M) No. 739 of 2026 Reserved on: 26.5.2026 Date of Decision: 4.6.2026.

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Sumit Khajuria …. Petitioner Versus State of HP …. Respondent

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Coram

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*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,*Judge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	*No.*
For the Petitioner :	Mr Vijender Katoch, Advocate.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition seeking regular bail in FIR No. 126 of 2023 dated 27.7. 2023, registered at Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, District Kangra, H.P., for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 22 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (NDPS Act).

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police were on patrolling duty on 27.7.2023. They noticed a person sitting in a suspicious condition near Sumehar Bridge at

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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about 1.30 P.M. He ran towards Sunehar Bridge after seeing the police and threw his backpack in the bushes. The police apprehended him, and he revealed his name as Sumit Khajuria (the present petitioner). The police joined Harbans Lal and checked the bag. It was found to contain 1160 capsules of Proxivon Spas. The police arrested the petitioner and seized the capsules. These allegations are false. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No. 375 of 2025 and was dismissed on 5.5.2025. The petitioner preferred SLP (Crl.) No. 9606 of 2025, which was withdrawn on 28.7.2025. The trial has not progressed, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. An FIR No. 33 of 2022 has been registered against the petitioner for the commission of an offence punishable under Sections 8, 22 and 23 of the NDPS Act. The petitioner is ready and willing to furnish the local surety to the satisfaction of the Court and abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on

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27.7.2023. They found one person in a suspicious condition near

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the Sunehar Bridge. He got frightened after seeing the police and started running away. He threw the backpack in the bushes while running. Police apprehended him, and he identified himself as Sumit Khajuria (the present petitioner). The police checked the backpack in the presence of an independent witness and recovered 1160 capsules. The police seized the capsules and arrested the petitioner. Capsules were sent to FSL. The report of analysis shows that the total weight of capsules was 627.560 grams, and the total weight of powder was 438 grams. The capsules of Proxyvon contained Tramadol. FIR No. 33 of 2022 was registered against the petitioner in Police Station Hiranagar, District Kathua, for the commission of offences punishable under sections 21 and 22 of the ND&PS Act. The prosecution has cited 15 witnesses out of whom five witnesses have been examined, and the matter is listed on 21.9.2026, 22.9.2026, 12.10.2026, 20.10.2026 and 14.10.2026. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

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Mr Vijender Katoch, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The petitioner has remained in custody since 27.7.2023 and the prosecution has not completed its evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajadurai Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, SLP (Crl.) No. 4729 of 2026, decided on 5.5.2026 and State of Punjab Vs. Sukhwinder Singh @ Gora 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 421 in support of his submissions.

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of Tramadol. The rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner had earlier filed a bail petition, which was dismissed by the Court. A subsequent bail petition only lies when there is a change in the circumstances, and the petitioner has not shown any change in the circumstances. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It is undisputed that the petitioner had filed a bail petition before this Court, which was registered as Cr.MP(M) No.375 of 2025 and was dismissed on 5.5.2025. The petitioner had filed a Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No. 9606 of 2025, titled Sumit Kajuria Vs. State of H.P. before the Hon’ble Supreme Court, which was withdrawn on 28.7.2025. It was held in the State of Maharashtra. Captain Buddhikota Subha Rao (1989) Suppl. 2 SCC 605, that once a bail application has been dismissed, a subsequent bail application can only be considered if there is a change of circumstances. It was observed:

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“Once that application was rejected, there was no question of granting a similar prayer. That is virtually overruling the earlier decision without there being a change in the fact situation. And when we speak of change, we mean a substantial one, which has a direct impact on the earlier decision and not merely cosmetic changes, which are of little or no consequence. 'Between the two orders, there was a gap of only two days, and it is nobody's case that during these two days, drastic changes had taken place, necessitating the release of the respondent on bail. Judicial discipline, propriety and comity demanded that the impugned order should not have been passed, reversing all earlier orders, including the one rendered by Puranik, J., only a couple of days before, in the absence of any substantial change in the

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fact situation. In such cases, it is necessary to act with restraint and circumspection so that the process of the Court is not abused by a litigant and an impression does not gain ground that the litigant has either successfully avoided one judge or selected another to secure an order which had hitherto eluded him.

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Similarly, it was held in Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan @ Pappu Yadav (2004) 7 SCC 528 that where an earlier bail application has been rejected, the Court has to consider the rejection of the earlier bail application and then consider why the subsequent bail application should be allowed. It was held:

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“11. In regard to cases where earlier bail applications have been rejected, there is a further onus on the court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the grounds on which earlier bail applications have been rejected and after such consideration, if the court is of the opinion that bail has to be granted then the said court will have to give specific reasons why in spite of such earlier rejection the subsequent bail application should be granted.”

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A similar view was taken in State of T.N. v. S.A. Raja,

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(2005) 8 SCC 380 , wherein it was observed:

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When a learned Single Judge of the same court had denied bail to the respondent for certain reasons, and that order was unsuccessfully challenged before the appellate forum, without there being any major change of circumstances, another fresh application should not have been dealt with within a short span of time unless there were valid grounds giving rise to a tenable case for bail. Of

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course, the principles of res judicata are not applicable to bail applications, but the repeated filing of bail applications without there being any change of circumstances would lead to bad precedents.”

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This position was reiterated in Prasad Shrikant Purohit

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v. State of Maharashtra (2018) 11 SCC 458 , wherein it was observed:

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“30. Before concluding, we must note that though an accused has a right to make successive applications for the grant of bail, the court entertaining such subsequent bail applications has a duty to consider the reasons and grounds on which the earlier bail applications were rejected. In such cases, the court also has a duty to record the fresh grounds, which persuade it to take a view different from the one taken in the earlier applications.”

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It was held in Ajay Rajaram Hinge v. State of

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Maharashtra, 2023 SCC OnLine Bom 1551, that a successive bail application can be filed if there is a material change in the circumstances, which means a change in the facts or the law. It was observed:

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“7. It needs to be noted that the right to file successive bail applications accrues to the applicant only on the existence of a material change in circumstances. The sine qua non for filing subsequent bail applications is a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstances settled by law is a change in the fact situation or law that requires the earlier view to be interfered with or where the earlier finding has become obsolete. However, a change in circumstance has no bearing on the salutary principle of judicial propriety that successive bail applications need to

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be decided by the same Judge on the merits, if available at the place of sitting. There needs to be clarity between the power of a judge to consider the application and a person's right based on a material change in circumstances. A material change in circumstance creates in a person accused of an offence the right to file a fresh bail application. But the power to decide such a subsequent application operates in a completely different sphere, unconnected with the facts of a case. Such power is based on the well-settled and judicially recognized principle that if successive bail applications on the same subject are permitted to be disposed of by different Judges, there would be conflicting orders, and the litigant would be pestering every Judge till he gets an order to his liking resulting in the credibility of the Court and the confidence of the other side being put in issue and there would be wastage of Court's time and that judicial discipline requires that such matter must be placed before the same Judge, if he is available, for orders. The satisfaction of material change in circumstances needs to be adjudicated by the same Judge who had earlier decided the application. Therefore, the same Judge needs to adjudicate whether there is a change in circumstance as claimed by the applicant, which entitles him to file a subsequent bail application.”

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This position was reiterated in Mohseen v. State of U.P.,

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2026 SCC OnLine SC 919, wherein it was observed:-

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24. While there is no absolute bar against a High Court granting bail to an accused whose bail was previously cancelled by this Court, the grant of bail must be supported by reasons demonstrating either a change in circumstances or the existence of fresh grounds not considered by this Court at the time of cancellation.

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The Court had earlier held that the petitioner was

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prima facie involved in the commission of an offence involving

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2026:HHC:21577

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the commercial quantity. He had failed to satisfy the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. He had criminal antecedents and was not entitled to bail on this consideration. These considerations have not changed.

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It was submitted that the prosecution has failed to complete the evidence, which violates the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial. Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to bail on this consideration. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner has not filed the copies of the order sheet to demonstrate the delay. The petitioner was prima facie found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, and he is not entitled to bail without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Vijin K. Varghese 2025:INSC:1316 that bail cannot be granted on the ground of prolonged incarceration without satisfying the twin conditions laid down under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It was observed: -

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“17. The High Court then, on the strength of those premises, recorded a finding that there exist reasonable grounds to believe that the applicant is not guilty of the alleged offence, treating prolonged incarceration and likely delay as the justification for bail. Such a finding is not a casual observation. It is the statutory threshold

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under Section 37(1)(b)(ii), which would disentitle the discretionary relief and grant of bail must necessarily rest on careful appraisal of the material available. A conclusion of this nature, if returned without addressing the prosecution’s assertions of operative control and antecedent involvement, risks trenching upon the appreciation of evidence which would be in the domain of the trial court at first instance.

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This Court ordinarily shows deference to the discretion exercised by the High Court while considering the grant of bail. However, offences involving a commercial quantity of narcotic drugs stand on a distinct statutory footing. Section 37 enacts a specific embargo on the grant of bail and obligates the Court to record satisfaction on the twin requirements noticed above, in addition to the ordinary tests under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

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In the present case, the High Court has not undertaken the analysis of those twin requirements with reference to the material placed by the prosecution. The orders dated 22.01.2025 and 12.03.2025 do not advert to the allegation regarding the respondent’s prior involvement in a seizure of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances only days prior to the seizure forming the subject matter of the present complaint, nor do they engage with the prosecution’s assertion as to the respondent’s role in arranging, importing, clearing and supervising the consignments. The omission to consider these factors bears directly upon the statutory satisfaction required by Section 37(1)(b).”

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A similar view was taken in Union of India v Namdeo

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Ashruba Nakade SLP (Crl.) 9792/2025, decided on 07.11.2025, wherein it was observed:

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“11. In the present case, this Court finds that though the Respondent-accused was in custody for one year, four months, and charges have not been framed, yet the

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allegations are serious inasmuch as not only is the recovery much in excess of the commercial quantity, but the Respondent-accused allegedly got the cavities ingeniously fabricated below the trailer to conceal the contraband.

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Prima facie, this Court is of the opinion that the Respondent-accused is involved in drug trafficking in an organised manner. Consequently, no case for dispensing with the mandatory requirement of Section 37 of the NDPS Act is made out in the present matter.”

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A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

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Sukhwinder Singh, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 671 , wherein it was

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observed:-

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9. It is well-settled that in matters involving recovery of contraband in commercial quantity, the twin conditions under Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act are mandatory and entail no relaxation merely on the ground that the accused has undergone prolonged incarceration during the pendency of trial. The provision casts upon the Court a duty to record, before enlarging an accused on bail, its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions, first, that there exist reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged; and second, that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a mandatory precondition, the non-observance of which vitiates the grant of bail. This Court, in Kashif (supra), has held in no uncertain terms that the recording of satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37 is mandatory and not merely directory, and that an order granting bail without such recorded satisfaction stands vitiated and cannot be sustained. The same view stands reiterated in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra).

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10. The impugned order, on its own showing, does not record the satisfaction mandated under Section 37(1)(b)

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(ii) of the NDPS Act. Far from recording such satisfaction, the High Court has gone on to observe that ‘the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial.’ Such an approach is plainly contrary to the settled law laid down by this Court and deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. The right to speedy trial, rooted in Article 21 of the Constitution, is undoubtedly a precious Constitutional right. That said, in matters governed by a special enactment such as the NDPS Act, particularly where the recovery is of a commercial quantity, the said right under Article 21 must be exercised within the framework of Section 37 and cannot be pressed into service solely on the ground of delay to override it. The constitutional right under Article 21 and the special provision of law under Section 37, NDPS Act, are to be read harmoniously and not placed in opposition to each other. The High Court, by failing to record its satisfaction on the twin conditions under Section 37, has, in this Court's view, committed an error.

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9. The position of law on the grant of bail in matters involving the recovery of a commercial quantity of contraband under the NDPS Act is well settled. Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act is cast in mandatory terms. Where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail, the Court can enlarge an accused on bail only upon recording its satisfaction on two cumulative conditions: first, that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence; and second, that the accused is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The recording of such satisfaction is not a mere formality but a jurisdictional requirement. This Court in Kashif (supra) has held, in plain terms, that the nonrecording of the twin satisfaction, being mandatory in nature, renders an order granting bail unsustainable. A similar view has been expressed in Lalrintluanga Sailo (supra) and Ajay Kumar Singh (supra).

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10. When the impugned order is tested against that settled position, it becomes apparent that paragraph 8 of the impugned order, which carries the weight of the reasoning, does not contain a finding on either of the twin conditions prescribed by Section 37(1)(b)(ii) of the NDPS Act. What the High Court has, instead, proceeded on is the proposition that “the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act can be diluted bearing in mind the right to a speedy trial”. The right to speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution is undoubtedly a valuable constitutional guarantee, but in the context of a special statute such as the NDPS Act dealing with commercial quantity, that right has to be read alongside, and not in displacement of, the mandate of Section 37. The omission to record the twin satisfaction prescribed by the statute, it appears, may have escaped the attention of the High Court.

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Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial.

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The status report filed by the State shows that the matter is listed on five dates, which shows the anxiety of the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial at its earliest. Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that his trial is not likely to be completed soon. However, he is at liberty to approach the Court again if there is a delay in the progress of the trial.

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In the Rajadurai (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court had granted bail on the ground that not a single witness had been examined. In the present case, five witnesses have been examined, and the matter is listed for recording the statements

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of the remaining witnesses; therefore, the cited judgment does not apply to the present case.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed. However, the petitioner is at liberty to file a bail petition in case his trial is not concluded expeditiously.

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The observation made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the instant petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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4th June, 2026 (Chander)

Sumit Khajuria v. State of Hp

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Sumit Khajuria v. State of Hp

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