Naveen Bhaluni and Another v. State of Hp and Others

Himachal Pradesh HC3 Jun 2026CRMMO/381/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

HHC Shimla Cr. MMO 381/2026 (dec. 03.06.2026, Justice Rakesh Kainthla): S.482 CrPC petition to quash FIR 94/2020 (IPC ss.341/323/325/506/147/149, PS Rampur Bushehar) DISMISSED; offences prima facie made out (unlawful assembly; CCTV-based charge sheet; informant beaten at police station); no mini-trial or genuineness enquiry permitted at quashing stage; allegations to be treated as correct; charge sheet filed, matter left to Trial Court.

What did the court decide?

None; the petition was dismissed and the F.I.R. and proceedings arising out of it were not quashed. ¶85-86

Naveen Bhaluni and Another Vs State of Hp and Others — Himachal Pradesh HC (2026) — LawSathi Research

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

None; the petition was dismissed and the F.I.R. and proceedings arising out of it were not quashed.

¶85-86

Issue for consideration

Whether the FIR No. 94 of 2020 and the proceedings arising out of it should be quashed as prayed for by the petitioners. +2 more

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Court's answer

When the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate it; the chargesheet having been filed and the learned Trial Court being seized of the matter, the FIR and consequential proceedings are not to be quashed at this stage.

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Ratio / Principle

Prima facie, the offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 325, 506, 147 and 149 of the IPC are made out against the petitioners: the CCTV-verified charge sheet shows the informant was called to the police station where the petitioners with the co-accused were waiting and gave him beatings; nine persons acted with a common objective to cause hurt, forming an unlawful assembly whose members restrained the informant, caused simple and grievous hurt, intimidated him and committed violence.

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Key takeaways

The Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint/FIR as correct; accordingly, the petitioners' submission that the allegations against them are false and were levelled due to enmity will not assist them.ratio¶52
It is impermissible for this Court to conduct a mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not; the Court cannot enquire into the reliability, genuineness or sufficiency of the allegations or evidence at the quashing stage.ratio¶77-78
The present petition fails and is dismissed; the FIR No. 94 of 2020 and the proceedings arising out of it are not quashed.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla (Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla), Cr. MMO No. 381 of 2026, decided 03.06.2026: Petition under Section 482 CrPC by Naveen Bhaluni & another seeking quashing of FIR No. 94 of 2020 (dated 03.07.2020, PS Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla), registered for offences under Sections 341, 323, 325, 506, 147 and 149 IPC, and the proceedings arising therefrom, dismissed. Following B.N. John v. State of U.P. and the Bhajan Lal categories, the Court found from the CCTV-verified charge sheet that the informant was called to the police station where the petitioners, with co-accused, waited and beat him; nine persons shared a common objective, forming an unlawful assembly that restrained the informant, caused simple and grievous hurt, intimidated him and committed violence — hence the offences were prima facie made out. The Court declined to test the petitioners' claim of false implication due to enmity, holding that treating allegations as correct is required (Punit Beriwala) and that a mini-trial or enquiry into genuineness/reliability of allegations is impermissible at the quashing stage (Maneesha Yadav; Dharambeer Kumar Singh; Muskan; C.S. Prasad). With the charge sheet filed, the Trial Court was to be left to appreciate it (Iqbal). Observations confined to disposal of the petition.

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2026:HHC:21283

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 381 of 2026 Reserved on: 27.04.2026 Date of Decision: 03.06.2026

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Naveen Bhaluni & another ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & Anr. ...Respondents

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioner	: Mr Prajwal Sharma, Advocate
For the respondent	: Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
No.1/ State	Advocate General

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 94 of 2020, dated 03.07.2020, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 341, 323, 325, 506, 147 and 149 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Rampur Bushehar, District Shimla, H.P. and the proceedings arising out of the said F.I.R.

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the informant Amitabh Kapur received a call from the mobile No. xxxxxxx425 that his presence was required at the Police Station. He went to the Police Station, where Prem Nath Sharma, Deepak Sharma, son of Prem Nath, Sonu Bhaluni and 7-8 persons attacked him. The police registered the F.I.R and investigated the matter. The police checked the CCTV footage and identified Ankit Sharma, Varinder Bhaluni, Naveen Bhaluni, Kirti Sharma, Poonam Sharma and Meenu Sharma as the assailants. The victim suffered simple and grievous injuries in the incident. The police recorded the statements of the witnesses and filed the charge sheet before the Court.

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Being aggrieved by the registration of the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the police had not found any material against the petitioners. They had not caused any injury to the victim. The petitioners were falsely implicated due to a family dispute. No offences punishable under Sections 147 and 149 of the IPC are made out against the petitioners. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. be quashed.

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I have heard Mr Prajwal Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.

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Mr Prajwal Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. F.I.R contains vague allegations against the petitioners. They had not participated in the commission of a crime. The continuation of the proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the F.I.R. and consequential proceedings be quashed.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1, submitted that the police registered the F.I.R. and checked the CCTV footage. The petitioners were found to be involved in the commission of the crime; therefore, the charge sheet was filed before the Court. This Court should not exercise the inherent jurisdiction when the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code, except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of

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Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The copy of the charge-sheet filed by the police specifically mentions that the CCTV footage was checked, and the petitioners were found to be beating the informant. The fact that the informant was called to the police station, where the petitioner, along with the co-accused, were waiting for him and gave him beatings clearly shows that they shared a common objective to cause hurt to the victim. Police found the involvement of nine persons, who had caused simple and grievous hurt to the victim. Thus, prima facie , the petitioners and the co-accused had formed an unlawful assembly, and the members of the unlawful assembly had restrained the informant from proceeding further, caused simple and grievous hurt to him, intimidated him and committed violence as members of the assembly. Therefore, prima facie , the offences punishable under Section 341, 323, 325, 506, 147, and 149 of the IPC are made out against the accused/petitioners.

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It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false and were levelled because of enmity between the petitioners and the informant. This submission will not assist the

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petitioners. It was held in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC has to treat the allegations in the complaint as correct. It was observed:

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing of a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”

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It was laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction to quash the FIR cannot go into the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations. It was observed : -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the

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categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same is not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed on page 397:

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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

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6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

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7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

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This position was reiterated in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan

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(Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, wherein it was observed: -

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22. On the aspect of the powers of the Courts under Section 4 82 of the Cr. P.C ., it is settled that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not required to conduct a mini-trial. Thus, the jurisdiction under Section 4 82 of the C r. P.C. with respect to quashing is somewhat limited as the Court has to only consider whether any sufficient material is available to proceed against the accused or not. If sufficient material is available, the power under Section 482 should not be exercised.

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Xxxx

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27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons…”

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It was held in C.S. Prasad v. C. Satyakumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 50, that the Court exercising inherent jurisdiction cannot go into the genuineness of the allegations or the reliability, sufficiency or the acceptability of the evidence. It was observed:

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“24. On these lines, it is clear that even though the powers under Section 4 8 2 of the C r.P.C. are very wide, their conferment requires the High Courts to be more cautious and diligent. While examining any FIR, the High Court, exercising its power under this provision, cannot embark upon the genuineness of the allegations made. The High Court must only consider whether there exists any sufficient material to proceed against the accused or not, and must not be concerned with the reliability, sufficiency, or acceptability of the evidence.”

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Therefore, it is impermissible for this Court to conduct a

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mini-trial to determine whether the allegations in the FIR are correct or not.

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The police have filed the chargesheet before the Court, and the learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed, the learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate it. It was observed:

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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, yet we are of the view that the

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appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any case for discharge is made out or not.”

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails and is

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dismissed

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The observations made hereinbefore shall remain

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confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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03^rd June, 2026 (ravinder)

Naveen Bhaluni and Another v. State of Hp and Others

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Naveen Bhaluni and Another v. State of Hp and Others

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