Dismissed¶116

Inderjeet Singh @ Indra v. State of Hp

Criminal miscellaneous petition – regular bail

Himachal Pradesh HC17 Mar 2026CRMPM/2445/2025

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Himachal Pradesh High Court (Rakesh Kainthla, J., 17.03.2026) dismisses regular bail application of Inderjeet Singh @ Indra in Cr. MP (M) No. 2445 of 2025 arising from FIR No. 243 of 2023, P.S. Nalagarh, District Solan (Ss. 302, 382, 120B IPC, double murder near Idgah): eyewitness statements establish prima facie involvement; non-holding of TIP not a ground for bail; disclosure leading to recovery of co-accused and knife admissible (S. 27 Evidence Act); custody over two years and trial delay rejected as grounds in a murder case.

What did the court decide?

The statements of witnesses Gulshan Kumar, Mohamad Nisar and Ankit Kumar prima facie show the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime. ¶86

Inderjeet Singh @ Indra Vs State of Hp — Murder and Culpable Homicide | Himachal Pradesh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

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Issue for consideration

Whether the petitioner Inderjeet Singh @ Indra is entitled to regular bail in FIR No. 243 of 2023 registered under Sections 302, 382 and 120B IPC. +3 more

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Court's answer

The statements of witnesses Gulshan Kumar, Mohamad Nisar and Ankit Kumar prima facie show the petitioner's involvement in the commission of the crime.

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Ratio / Principle

A Test Identification Parade is not a substantive piece of evidence but only a corroborative piece of evidence; the primary evidence is the identification made in Court, which the Court may rely upon even though no previous TIP was conducted.

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Key takeaways

Whether the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to identify the accused at the spot is a question of fact to be adjudicated during the trial, not in the bail proceedings.ratio¶85
The statement made by the petitioner leading to the discovery of the co-accused and the knife/dagger is prima facie admissible (consistent with the Section 27 Evidence Act principle in Mehboob Ali).ratio¶98
The petitioner is prima facie involved in the commission of murder, which is punishable with capital punishment; the severity of punishment is a relevant consideration against grant of bail.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

Criminal miscellaneous petition — regular bail — murder under S. 302 IPC with Ss. 382 and 120B IPC, FIR No. 243 of 2023, P.S. Nalagarh, District Solan — statements of Gulshan Kumar, Mohamad Nisar and Ankit Kumar prima facie showed the petitioner's involvement — absence of Test Identification Parade not fatal at bail stage: TIP is corroborative, not substantive evidence; identification in Court is the primary evidence and adequacy of opportunity to identify is a question of fact for trial — petitioner's disclosure statement leading to discovery of co-accused Gaurav Gill and the knife/dagger prima facie admissible on the Section 27 Evidence Act principle (Mehboob Ali relied on) — murder punishable with capital punishment; severity of punishment weighs against bail (Gudikanti Narasimhulu relied on) — period of incarceration and delay in trial by themselves confer no right to bail in a crime like murder (Anil Kumar Yadav relied on) — parameters laid down in Pinki v. State of U.P. applied; bail-not-jail rule (State of Rajasthan v. Balchand) did not assist the petitioner — petition dismissed; observations confined to disposal of the bail petition.

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2026:HHC:7498

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP (M) No. 2445 of 2025

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Reserved on: 09.03.2026 Date of Decision :17.03.2026

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Inderjeet Singh @ Indra ...Petitioner Versus State of H.P. ...Respondent

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Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,*Jud*	*ge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	*No.*
For the Petitioner :	Mr Advo Advo	N.S. cate cate.	Cha with	ndel Mr	, Senior K.S. Gill,
For the Respondent/State :	Mr Advo	Pras cate	hant Genera	Sen l.	, Deputy

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 243 of 2023, dated 10.08.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 302, 382 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) at Police Station Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P.

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the police received information regarding a fight near Idgah on

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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10.08.2023 at about 6:00 p.m. The police went to the spot and found two people lying on the roadside, soaked in blood. The injured were taken to the hospital. One person was identified as Kunal baba and was declared ‘brought dead’, while the other person, Varun, succumbed to his injuries after receiving first aid. The informant, Lovkesh baba, made a statement to the police that his nephew, Kunal, had received an Instragram call from Gaurav on 10.08.2023 and he (Kunal) disclosed that Gaurav was asking him to visit Banga (Punjab). The informant then talked to Gaurav, who mentioned that Kunal had been posting stories on his Instagram. The informant assured him that Kunal would not do so in the future, after which Gaurav disconnected the call. Kunal called the informant on the same day at about 4:30 p.m. and informed him that Gaurav was coming to Nalagarh. The informant advised Kunal to stay at home. Subsequently, the informant received a call from his niece stating that Kunal and Varun had been stabbed and were lying near Idgah. There was ongoing tension between Gaurav and Kunal. Gaurav and his associate had killed them with a sharpedged weapon. The police investigated the matter and arrested Gaurav and the petitioner. The matter was listed on 17.12.2025

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for prosecution evidence. There has been a delay in the trial, and the petitioner’s right to a speedy trial is being violated. No Test Identification Parade (TIP) was conducted, which renders the prosecution's case suspect. The petitioner belongs to a respectable family and undertakes to abide by all the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it is prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police received an information on 10.08.2023 at about 6:00 p.m. regarding a fight near Idgah on Ramshehar Road. The police reached the spot and found two people lying in an injured condition. They were taken to the hospital. The Medical Officer declared Kunal dead, while Varun succumbed to his injuries during treatment. The informant, Lovkesh, made a statement to the police stating that Varun and Kunal were his nephews. Kunal had received a call from Gaurav. Kunal told the informant that Gaurav was asking him to visit Banga (Punjab). The informant spoke to Gaurav, who stated that Kunal had been uploading stories on his Instagram account. The informant assured Gaurav that Kunal would not upload any story in the

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future. The informant again received a call at about 4:30 p.m. from Kunal, who informed him that Gaurav was visiting Nalagarh. The informant advised Kunal to stay at home. At about 6:00 p.m., the informant received a call stating that Kunal and Varun had been stabbed and were lying near Idgah. The police registered the FIR and started the investigation. The Medical Officer stated that the cause of death of Varun was hemorrhagic shock and liver laceration due to antemortem injuries. The Medical Officer further stated that the cause of death of Kunal was spleen rupture and hemorrhagic shock as a result of antemortem injuries. During the investigation, the police found that Gaurav, Inderjit Singh @ Indra, and one unknown person had used a motorcycle bearing registration number PB-08FB9802 to commit the crime. The police obtained the call detail records and found that Gaurav was in touch with Inderjit Singh @ Indra, son of Surjit Singh. The police arrested Inderjit Singh, who revealed the involvement of Gaurav and Inderjit Singh, son of Bablir Singh (the present petitioner). The police searched for the other accused and seized the motorcycle bearing registration number PB-08FB-9802 at Amritsar. The police later arrested Gaurav Gill and the petitioner, Inderjit Singh. They disclosed the

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involvement of Akashdeep Singh. The motorcycle bearing registration number PB-08FB-9802 was found to be registered in the name of the petitioner. The police also arrested Akashdeep Singh and recovered one iPhone from his possession, which belonged to Varun. Petitioner Inderjit Singh revealed that he had handed over the knife to Gaurav Gill. Gaurav Gill made a disclosure statement and got the knife recovered. Akashdeep produced a T-shirt, which was seized by the police. No case was found against Inderjit Singh, son of Surjit Singh, and he was discharged. The call detail records showed the presence of the petitioner and the other accused at Nalagarh on the date of the incident. The Medical Officer issued the final report stating that the injuries noticed could have been caused by means of a knife. Human blood was found on the knife, and the DNA on the knife completely matched the DNA of Varun. The face of Gaurav Gill in the photograph matched the face seen in the CCTV footage. The clothes also matched the clothes worn by the person seen in the CCTV footage. The CCTV footage was found to be continuous and without any editing. Hence, the status report.

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4. I have heard Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr K.S. Gill, learned counsel for the petitioner and

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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5. Mr N.S. Chandel, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. There is no material to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. The knife/dagger stated to have been recovered by the police was recovered from Gaurav Gill and not the petitioner. No Test Identification Parade was conducted, and the petitioner’s face was not found in the CCTV footage. The police arrested the petitioner based on suspicion. The petitioner has remained in prison for more than two years, and his right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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6. Mr Parshant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioner was identified on the spot by the witnesses. The name of Gaurav Gill was disclosed by the petitioner, and the recovery made from him would be admissible against the petitioner. The knife/dagger

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was used in the commission of the crime, and the DNA on the

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knife matched the DNA of Varun. The petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime is, prima facie, proved on record; hence, he prayed that the petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC

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314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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56. In GudikantiNarasimhuluv.High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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57. In Prahlad Singh Bhativ.State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution

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will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While the placement of the accused in society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkarv.Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkarv.Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under

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with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Deviv. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual

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order ( Pappu Kumarv. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singhv. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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Hon’ble Supreme Court held in State of Rajasthan v.

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Balchand , (1977) 4 SCC 308: 1977 SCC (Cri) 594: 1977 SCC OnLine SC

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261 that the normal rule is bail and not jail, except where the gravity of the crime or the heinousness of the offence suggests otherwise. It was observed at page 308:

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2. The basic rule may perhaps be tersely put as bail, not jail, except where there are circumstances suggestive of fleeing from justice or thwarting the course of justice or creating other troubles in the shape of repeating offences or intimidating witnesses and the like, by the petitioner

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who seeks enlargement on bail from the Court. We do not intend to be exhaustive but only illustrative.

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3. It is true that the gravity of the offence involved is likely to induce the petitioner to avoid the course of justice and must weigh with us when considering the question of jail. So also, the heinousness of the crime….” 10. The present petition has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Witness Mohamad Nisar told the police that he had seen three boys beating two other boys. He tried to rescue them, but the assailants ran away from the spot. Gulshan Kumar stated that Gaurav and two other persons had visited the shop of Prince. Subsequently, Gulshan Kumar and Ankit identified Akashdeep Singh, Gaurav Gill, and the petitioner, Inderjit Singh, in the presence of witnesses.

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It was submitted that the Test Identification Parade was not conducted and that the identification should have been carried out in the presence of learned Magistrate. However, it is not necessary to adjudicate this submission at this stage because a Test Identification Parade is not a substantive piece of evidence but only a corroborative piece of evidence² . The primary evidence is the identification made in Court, and if the

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2 Mukesh Singh v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1061

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Court is impressed by the identification made before it, it can rely upon such identification even though no previous Test Identification Parade was conducted³ . Further, it is a question of fact whether the witnesses had an adequate opportunity to identify the accused at the spot, which can be adjudicated during the trial and not during the present proceedings.

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Suffice it to say that the statements of Gulshan Kumar, Mohamad Nisar and Ankit Kumar, prima facie, show the petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime.

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The petitioner disclosed that Gaurav Gill had used the knife/dagger. The police arrested Gaurav Gill and recovered a knife/dagger at his instance. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mehboob Ali v. State of Rajasthan , (2016) 14 SCC 640: (2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 412: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 1043 , that the information given by the accused, leading to the discovery of another accused from whom forged currency notes were recovered, is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. It was observed at page 646: -

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“15. It is apparent that on the basis of the information furnished by accused Mehboob Ali and Firoz, and other

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3 Jayawant Dattatraya Suryarao v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 10 SCC 109

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accused, Anju Ali was arrested. The fact that Anju Ali was dealing with forged currency notes was not known to the police. The statements of both the accused have led to the discovery of the fact and arrest of the co-accused, not known to the police. They identified him, and ultimately, statements have led to unearthing the racket of the use of fake currency notes. Thus, the information furnished by the aforesaid accused persons vide information memos is clearly admissible, which has led to the identification and arrest of accused Anju Ali, and as already stated, possession of Anju Ali's fake currency notes had been recovered. As per information furnished by the accused Mehboob and Firoz vide memos Exts. P-41 and P-42, the fact has been discovered by the police as to the involvement of the accused Anju Ali, which was not known to the knowledge of the police. The police were not aware of the accused Anju Ali, as well as the fact that he was dealing with fake currency notes, which were recovered from him. Thus, the statement of the aforesaid accused Mehboob and Firoz is clearly saved by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The embargo put by Section 27 of the Evidence Act was clearly lifted in the instant case. The statement of the accused persons has led to the discovery of facts proving complicity of the other accused persons, and the entire chain of circumstances clearly makes out that the accused acted in conspiracy, as found by the trial court as well as the High Court.

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20. Considering the aforesaid dictums, it is apparent that there was a discovery of a fact as per the statement of Mehmood Ali and Mohd. Firoz. The co-accused was nabbed on the basis of an identification made by the accused Mehboob and Firoz. That he was dealing with fake currency notes came to the knowledge of the police through them. Recovery of forged currency notes was also made from Anju Ali. Thus, the aforesaid accused had the knowledge about co-accused Anju Ali, who was nabbed at their instance and based on their identification. These

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facts were not to the knowledge of the police, hence the statements of the accused persons leading to the discovery of the fact are clearly admissible as per the provisions contained in Section 27 of the Evidence Act, which carves out an exception to the general provisions about inadmissibility of confession made under police custody contained in Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act.”

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Therefore, the statement made by the petitioner leading to the discovery of the co-accused and the knife/dagger would be prima facie admissible.

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The petitioner is, prima facie , involved in the commission of murder, which is punishable with capital punishment. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P. , (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115: 1977 SCC OnLine SC 327 that when the punishment is severe, the person is not entitled to bail. It was observed at page 244:

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“6. Let us have a glance at the pros and cons and the true principle around which other relevant factors must revolve. When the case is finally disposed of and a person is sentenced to incarceration, things stand on a different footing. We are concerned with the penultimate stage, and the principal rule to guide release on bail should be to secure the presence of the applicant who seeks to be liberated, to take judgment and serve a sentence in the event of the Court punishing him with imprisonment. In this perspective, the relevance of considerations is regulated by their nexus with the likely absence of the applicant for fear of a severe

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sentence, if such be plausible in the case. As Erle. J. indicated that when the crime charged (of which a conviction has been sustained) is of the highest magnitude and the punishment for it assigned by law is of extreme severity, the Court may reasonably presume, some evidence warranting, that no amount of bail would secure the presence of the convict at the stage of judgment, should he be enlarged. [ Mod. Law Rev. p. 50 ibid., 1852 I E & B 1] Lord Campbell, C.J., concurred in this approach in that case, and Coleridge J. set down the order of priorities as follows: [ Mod. Law Rev. ibid., pp. 50-51 ]

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“I do not think that an accused party is detained in custody because of his guilt, but because there are sufficient probable grounds for the charge against him as to make it proper that he should be tried, and because the detention is necessary to ensure his appearance at trial .... It is a very important element in considering whether the party, if admitted to bail, would appear to take his trial; and I think that in coming to a determination on that point three elements will generally be found the most important: the charge, the nature of the evidence by which it is supported, and the punishment to which the party would be liable if convicted. In the present case, the charge is that of wilful murder; the evidence contains an admission by the prisoners of the truth of the charge, and the punishment of the offence is, by law, death.”

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7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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It was submitted that there is a delay in the progress

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of the trial, and the petitioner is entitled to bail because of the violation of his right to a speedy trial. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil

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Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) , (2018) 12 SCC 129: (2018) 3

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SCC (Cri) 425: 2017 SCC OnLine SC 1363 that the period of incarceration would not by itself entitle a person to bail in a crime like murder. It was observed at page 141:

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“24. As pointed out earlier, one of the grounds for the grant of bail to the appellant Anil Kumar Yadav by the Sessions Court was that he was in custody for more than one year. In crimes like murder, the mere fact that the accused was in custody for more than one year may not be a relevant consideration. In Gobarbhai Naranbhai Singala v. State of Gujarat, (2008) 3 SCC 7775:(2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 743] , it was observed that the period of incarceration by itself would not entitle the accused to be enlarged on bail. The same was reiterated in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 ”

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18. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to

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bail because of the delay in the progress of the trial.

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