State Vs Ramesh Chand Anr.

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 12.12.2012, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Rampur Bushahar, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 354 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as

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they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the victim (name withheld to protect her identity) made a statement to the police that she had gone to Sheel Naal for grazing her goats on 06.11.2008. She was sitting on the road at about 3:00 PM when Bunty came to the spot. He tried to tear her clothes. The victim resisted. A vehicle came to the spot, and the accused ran away after seeing the vehicle. Soon thereafter, Ramesh came to the spot and bit her cheeks. She shouted for help. Asha Devi (PW2) heard her cries, and she asked the accused to leave the victim. The victim ran away. The victim suffered injuries on her face, breast and stomach. The matter was reported to the police, and FIR (Ext.PW1/A) was registered in the police station. ASI Jawahar Singh (PW7) investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW7/B). An application (Ext.PW7/A) was filed for medical examination of the victim. Dr D.K. Bhaglani (PW5) examined the victim and found that she had sustained multiple injuries. He referred the victim to the dental surgeon for expert opinion. Dr Kala (PW4) examined the victim and found that she had suffered a bite mark over the right zygomatic area. She issued the report (Ext.PW4/A). Dr D.K. Bhaglani found the nature of injuries to be simple. He issued the report (Ext.PW5/A). The

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victim produced the shirt (Ext.P1), which was worn by her at the time of the incident. It was put in a cloth parcel, and the parcel was sealed with a seal impression ‘H’. The seal impression ‘H’ (Ext. PW7/C) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the parcel was seized vide memo (Ext.PW1/B). The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to them, for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 354, read with Section 34 of the IPC, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined seven witnesses to prove its case. The victim (PW1) narrated the incident. Asha Devi (PW2) heard the cries of the victim. Nirja Devi (PW3) accompanied the victim to the Police Station. Dr Kala (PW4), Dental Surgeon, examined the victim. Dr D.K. Bhaglani (PW5) issued the MLC. Madan Kashyap (PW6) witnessed the recovery. ASI Jawahar Singh (PW7) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. They did not produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the FIR was lodged belatedly. The victim changed her version in the Court, which made her testimony doubtful. Asha Devi (PW2) did not corroborate the victim’s statement. She specifically stated that no vehicle had crossed the road, which falsifies the victim’s version that the accused Bunty had run away after seeing the vehicle. The Medical Officer admitted that the injuries could have been caused by a fall and could also have been self-inflicted. The Dental Surgeon was not sure whether the mark noticed by her was a human bite or something else. These circumstances made the prosecution's case suspect. The prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the accused were entitled to the benefit of doubt, which was extended to them, and they were acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 354, read with Section 34 of the IPC.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material

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on record. The informant specifically stated that both the accused had outraged her modesty and torn her shirt. Her statement was corroborated by Asha Devi (PW2) and her mother (PW3). The medical evidence also proved that the victim had sustained injuries that could have been caused by a bite. The learned Trial Court had taken a view which could not have been taken by any reasonable person. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, and Mr Dinesh Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent/accused.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the victim had specifically named the accused. Her testimony was corroborated by Asha Devi (PW2). Minor contradictions in the statements of the witnesses were insufficient to record an acquittal. The statement of the victim was duly corroborated by the medical evidence and the recovery of the torn shirt. Learned Trial Court ignored the prosecution's evidence and wrongly acquitted the accused.

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Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr Dinesh Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondents/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the prosecution witnesses contradicted each other on material aspects. The Medical Officer could not provide unequivocal corroboration to the statement of the victim, as he was not sure that the injury could have been caused by a human tooth bite. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the

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evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page

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438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743, wherein it was observed:

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“21. We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 , and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The incident had occurred on 06.11.2008 at about 3:00 pm. The matter was reported to the police on 07.11.2008 at about

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9:15 PM. The FIR mentions that the victim’s father was not

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present at home, and the matter could not be reported to the police in his absence. This explanation was abandoned in the Court. Even otherwise, the victim’s mother and not her father had accompanied her to the police station, therefore, the delay was not properly explained.

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The victim stated in her cross-examination that her village had a telephone facility. Many people have mobile phones with them. Her father had called the Police Station during the night, and the police had advised him to visit the Police Station in the morning. No entry in the daily diary was produced to corroborate the victim’s version that her father had called the Police Station during the night.

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It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed:

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"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any,

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used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on, after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

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This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

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Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40 , wherein it was observed: -

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“12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a

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concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].”

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A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. ,

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(2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653, wherein it was observed on page 182:

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“14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution’s version.

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15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution’s case because of the delay in reporting the matter to the police.

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The victim (PW1) stated that she had gone to the Jungle to graze her goats. She was sitting on the roadside when Bunty came and caught her breasts. Her shirt was torn. He tried to open the drawstring of the salwar, and she sustained injuries on her stomach. A vehicle came to the spot, and the accused ran away from the spot.

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Asha Devi (PW2) specifically stated in her crossexamination that no vehicle had crossed the spot in her presence.

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Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the testimonies of these two witnesses did not corroborate each other. The victim stated that the accused Bunty had ran way after seeing the vehicle, whereas Asha Devi (PW2) stated that she had not seen any vehicle.

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Asha Devi (PW2) stated in her cross-examination that she was at a distance of about 1 km from the road. There was a steep gorge between her and the victim. She had not recognised Bunty or Ramesh. She had not seen them going to the spot. Their names were disclosed by the victim.

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Her cross-examination shows that she was at a distance of about 1 km from the spot and could not identify the accused. Considering the distance between the place of the incident and where this witness was present, the learned Trial Court was justified in discarding her statement.

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The victim stated that the accused Ramesh came after some time. He misbehaved with her. He caught hold of her breast and tore her shirt. He bit her cheek and tried to open her drawstring. She shouted for help, and Ramesh ran away from the spot.

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Asha Devi (PW2) stated in her cross-examination that the shirt was torn near the lap. The seizure memo (Ext. PW1/B) mentions that the shirt was torn near the breast. Asha Devi (PW2) had witnessed the recovery of the shirt, and her testimony makes it doubtful that the shirt produced before the Court was the one that was worn by the victim on the spot.

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Dr Kala (PW4) admitted that the injury noticed by her could be self-inflicted. The injury was superficial, and she should not say whether the injury was a human bite or not. This crossexamination makes it suspect that the accused had caused the tooth bite injury on the victim’s cheek.

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Dr D.K. Bhaglani (PW5) found multiple injuries on the victim’s body. He stated in his cross-examination that the injuries noticed by him were superficial in nature and could be selfinflicted or caused by a fall. Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the medical evidence does not provide unequivocal corroboration to the victim’s testimony.

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The victim stated that Bunty came first, and Ramesh Chand came five minutes after the departure of Bunty. It is difficult to believe that both the accused would decide to molest the victim on the same day, independently of each other.

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All these circumstances would make it difficult to rely upon the prosecution's case. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and the same is dismissed, and so are the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondents/accused are directed to furnish

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bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondents/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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A copy of the judgment, along with records of the learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

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( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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16^th March, 2026 (Nikita)

State v. Ramesh Chand Anr.

Case brief

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State v. Ramesh Chand Anr.

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