Rajandeep @ Raja Vs State of Hp

The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in F.I.R. No. 103 of 2025, dated 17.04.2025, registered at Police Station, Baddi, District Solan, H.P., for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 137(2), 105 and 238 of Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023.

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution's case, the informant made a missing person complaint about his

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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brother Gurvinder Singh on 16.04.2025. Gurvinder Singh was accompanying Rajandeep @ Raja (petitioner) on 15.04.2025 at about 5:00 PM. The petitioner had also sent a WhatsApp voice recording admitting that he had thrown the deceased in a canal after a drug overdose. The police registered the FIR and arrested the petitioner on 17.04.2025. The matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 04.02.2026. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions that the Court may impose. Hence, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the informant Abhishek Saini made a missing report to the police on 16.04.2025, stating that Gurvinder Singh was missing since the previous night. He was last seen with his friend Rajandeep @ Raja (petitioner) at about 5:00 PM. Raja sent a WhatsApp voice recording that he had thrown Gurvinder into a canal after Gurvinder had taken an overdose of the drugs. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter. Subsequently, the dead body of Gurvinder was found at Saleempur, Bhakra main line canal. The police seized the dead body, and as per the report of postmortem examination, the

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deceased died due to asphyxia secondary to ante mortem wet drowning, in a case where methamphetamine, morphine, oxycodone, amphetamine and pregabalin were detected in the blood of the deceased. The police arrested the petitioner, who revealed during the interrogation that Gurvinder Singh had injected Heroin after which he became unconscious. His pulse was not palpable, and the petitioner believed him to be dead. He threw him into the canal in a state of fear. The police filed the charge sheet after the completion of the investigation. The statements of three witnesses have been recorded, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 03.06.2026. The result from SFSL is awaited regarding the mobile phone of the petitioner and witness Balvinder Singh @ Bunty. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel, for the petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

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Mr Anirudh Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and that he was falsely implicated. The allegations made in the status report do not disclose the commission of murder. The police have filed

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the charge sheet, and no fruitful purpose would be served by detaining the petitioner in custody. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail.

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Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner was last seen with the deceased, and he has to explain the circumstances leading to the death. The plea taken by him that he had thrown Gurvinder Singh into the canal, believing him to be dead, is yet to be proved. The allegations against the petitioner are heinous, and the offence committed by him is punishable with death. The offence is grave and punishable with severe punishment. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pinki v. State of U.P., (2025) 7 SCC 314: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 781, wherein it was observed at page 380: -

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( i ) Broad principles for the grant of bail

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56. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. High Court of A.P., (1978) 1 SCC 240: 1978 SCC (Cri) 115 , Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: (SCC p. 244, paras 7-9)

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“ 7 . It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor, and the nature of the evidence is also pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or a conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue.

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8 . Another relevant factor is whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being . [ Patrick Devlin, “The Criminal Prosecution in England” (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.]

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9 . Thus, the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record, particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance .” (emphasis supplied)

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57. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 4 SCC 280: 2001 SCC (Cri) 674 , this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: (SCC pp. 284-85, para 8)

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“ 8 . The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles, having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge .” (emphasis supplied)

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58. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598: 2002 SCC (Cri) 688 , speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: (SCC p. 602, para 3)

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“ 3 . Grant of bail, though being a discretionary order, but, however, calls for the exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. An order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though it may be considered by itself, cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail, and the same should always be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is

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one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — the more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter .” (emphasis supplied)

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59. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977 , this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

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60. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765 , this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: (SCC p. 499, para 9)

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“ 9 . … It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are :

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( i ) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence ;

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( ii ) nature and gravity of the accusation ;

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( iii ) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction ;

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( iv ) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail ;

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( v ) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused ;

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( vi ) likelihood of the offence being repeated ;

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( vii ) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and

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( viii ) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail .” (emphasis supplied)

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62. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170 , wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order ( Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, 2021 SCC OnLine Pat 2857 ) of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: ( Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 170] ), SCC p. 511, para 35)

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“ 35 . While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for the grant of bail, a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused .” (emphasis supplied)

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The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The status report specifically mentions that the petitioner had sent a voice note to deceased Gurvinder Singh’s driver in which he admitted to throwing the dead body into the canal because Gurvinder Singh had taken an overdose of the drugs. The status report also mentions that the petitioner disclosed during the interrogation that the pulse of the deceased was not palpable, and the petitioner threw the deceased into the canal, believing him to be dead, after getting frightened. This is the only version propounded by the State about the death of Gurvinder Singh.

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In Palani Goundan v. Emperor , 1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67: ILR (1919) 42 Mad 547: (1919) 10 LW 45: AIR 1920 Mad 862: 1919 Cri LJ 404: (1919) 37 Mad LJ 17 , the accused struck a blow on his wife’s head with a ploughshare, which made her senseless. The accused, believing her to be dead, hanged her on a beam by a rope to create a false defence of suicide by hanging. She died due to asphyxiation by hanging and not by the blow. The Full Bench of Madras High Court held that the accused was not guilty of

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committing culpable homicide because his action was directed towards the lifeless body, and he could not be convicted of murder or culpable homicide but could be convicted of the original assault. It was observed:

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“WALLIS, C.J. : — The accused was convicted of murder by the Sessions Judge of Coimbatore. He appealed to this Court, which took a different view of the facts from that taken by the learned Sessions Judge and has referred to us the question whether, on the facts as found by the learned Judges who composed it, the accused has in law committed the offence of murder. Napier, J., inclined to the view that he had; SadasivaAyyar, J., thought he had not. The facts as found are these: the accused struck his wife a blow on the head with a ploughshare, which knocked her senseless. He believed her to be dead and to lay the foundation for a false defence of suicide by hanging, which he afterwards set up, and proceeded to hang her on a beam by a rope. In fact, the first blow was not a fatal one, and the cause of death was asphyxiation by hanging, which was the act of the accused.

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When the case came before us, Mr Osborne, the Public Prosecutor, at once intimated that he did not propose to contend that the facts as found by the learned referring Judges constituted the crime of murder or even culpable homicide. We think that he was right in doing so, but as doubts have been entertained on the subject, we think it proper to state shortly the grounds for our opinion. By English Law, this would clearly not be murder but manslaughter on the general principles of the Common Law. In India, every offence is defined both as to what must be done and with what intention it must be done by the section of the Penal Code which makes it a crime. There are certain general exceptions laid down in Chapter

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IV, but none of them fit the present case. We must therefore turn to the defining section 299. Section 299 defines culpable homicide as the act of causing death with one of three intentions:

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( a ) of causing death,

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(b) of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,

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(c) of doing something which the accused knows to be likely to cause death.

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It is not necessary that any intention should exist with regard to the particular person whose death is caused, as in the familiar example of a shot aimed at one person killing another, or poison intended for one being taken by another. “Causing death” may be paraphrased as putting an end to human life; and thus all three intentions must be directed either deliberately to putting an end to a human life or to some act which, to the knowledge of the accused, is likely to eventuate in the putting an end to human life. The knowledge must have reference to the particular circumstances in which the accused is placed. No doubt, if a man cuts the head off from a human body, he does an act which he knows will put an end to life, if it exists. But we think that the intention demanded by the section must stand in some relation to a person who either is alive or who is believed by the accused to be alive. If a man kills another by shooting at what he believes to be a third person whom he intends to kill, but which is in fact the stump of a tree, it is clear that he would be guilty of culpable homicide. This is because, though he had no criminal intention towards any human being actually in existence, he had such an intention towards what he believed to be a living human being. The conclusion is irresistible that the intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of the actual circumstances, but in the light of what he supposed to be the circumstances. It follows that a man is not guilty of culpable homicide if his intention was directed only to what is believed to be a

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lifeless body. Complications may arise when it arguable that the two acts of the accused should be treated as being really one transaction as in QueenEmpress v. Khandu [(1891) I.L.R., 15 Bom., 194 .] or when the facts suggest a doubt whether there may not be imputed to the accused a reckless indifference and ignorance as to whether the body he bandied was alive or dead, as in Gour Gobindo's Case [(1866) 6 W.R. (Cr. R.), 55.] . The facts as found here eliminate both these possibilities and are practically the same as those found in Emperor v. Dalu Sardar [(1914) 18 C.W.N. 1279.] . We agree with the decision of the learned Judges in that case and with a clear intimation of opinion by Sergeant, C.J., in QueenEmpress v. Khandu [(1891) I.L.R., 15 Bom., 194.] Though in our opinion, on the facts as found, the accused cannot be convicted either of murder or culpable homicide, he can, of course, be punished both for his original assault on his wife and for his attempt to create false evidence by banging her. These, however, are matters for the consideration and determination of the referring Bench. 12. In Govindan Kutty v. State , 1950 SCC OnLine Ker 13:

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1951 Cri LJ 871 , the accused caused injury to his wife by means of a pointed stick. She collapsed and, believing her to be dead, hanged her on a branch of a tree, so that the people might think that it was a case of suicide. Subsequently, she died due to hanging and not due to the original injuries. The Kerala High Court held that the accused would be liable for the commission of offences punishable under Section 326 and not 302 of the IPC. It was observed:

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The problem that has arisen in this Criminal Appeal is not entirely new. In the case reported in Queen Empress v. Khandu, 15 Bom. 194 , there was a somewhat similar legal position. There, the accused had struck the deceased three blows on the head with the intention of killing him. In the present case, as we have already stated, there is no evidence to show that there was any intention to kill the woman. The intention was only to hurt. In that respect, the present case differs from the case in QueenEmpress v. Khandu, 15 Bom. 194 . In that case, after the accused had dealt three blows to the head of the victim, the latter fell senseless on the ground. The accused believed that he was dead, and with a view to removing all evidence of the crime committed by him, he set fire to the hut in which the victim was lying. The medical evidence disclosed that the blows struck by the accused were not likely to cause death and did not, in fact, cause death, but that death was really caused by the injuries from burning when the accused had set fire to the hut. It was held by a majority of the Judges of the Bombay High Court that the accused was guilty of an attempt to murder under S. 307, Penal Code, 1860. A different view was expressed by Parsons J., which was followed in somewhat similar cases by certain other High Courts. The learned Chief Justice of Bombay, whose opinion finally prevailed, has stated in his judgment that the accused undoubtedly believed that he had killed his victim and that since “there would be difÏculty in regarding what occurred from first to last as one continuous act done with the intention of killing the deceased,” the offence committed by the accused must be held to be the only attempt to murder.

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Another case, which is more to the point, is the Full Bench decision of the Madras High Court reported in Palani Gounden v. Emperor, 42 Mad. 547 : (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Mad. 862 : 20 Cr. LJ 404 F.B.). There the accused struck his wife a blow on her head with a ploughshare which, though not shown to be a blow likely to cause death, did

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in fact render her unconscious and, believing her to be dead, in order to lay the foundation of a false defence of suicide by hanging, the accused hanged her on a beam by a rope and thereby caused her death by strangulation. It was held by the Full Bench that the accused was not guilty of either murder or culpable homicide not amounting to murder. That was the opinion expressed by the Full Bench on a reference made to it, and the learned Judges agreed with the decision of Sergeant, C.J. in the case reported in Queen-Empress v. Khandu, 15 Bom. 194 . When the matter went back again to the Division Bench, the Judges, who originally heard the case, convicted the accused of grievous hurt under S. 326, Penal Code, 1860. In another case, that came up before the Madras High Court, reported in In re KaliappaGoundan, 57 Mad. 158 : (A.I.R. (20) 1933 Mad. 798: 34 Cr. L.J. 1109) , the Court took the view that since the intention of the accused throughout was to kill the woman, who was the victim, they were clearly liable for murder. The headnote, which describes the facts of the case fairly and accurately, is as follows: “The accused, who had formed a deliberate plan to kill a woman and who had intended to kill her, decoyed her under the pretence of taking her to a sick relation. On the way, he had a struggle with the woman during which her thali fell off or was removed. An attempt might have been made to strangle her. She was immediately dragged either in an unconscious or semi-conscious condition onto the railway line, her body was put across the railway track in such a way that her neck lay across the rails, and she was killed by a passing train. The accused did not put forward the case that they believed the woman to be dead when they put her body across the railway line.

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Held: That the accused were guilty of the offence of murder and that the Sessions Judge erred in holding that they were guilty only of the offence of an attempt at murder under S. 307, Penal Code, 1860.”

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It will be seen that the facts, in that case, differ from the facts of the present case because the accused never put forward the defence that they believed the woman to be dead when they put her body across the railway line. The intention was clearly to murder, and the manner in which they put the neck of the victim on the railway line in order that the wheels of the train might pass over it and kill her, clearly indicated what the object was in resorting to this gruesome method of killing the woman. In our view, the present case is very much like the case reported in Palani Goundan v. Emperor, 42 Mad. 547: (A.I.R. (7) 1920 Mad. 862: 20 Cr. L.J. 404 F.B.) . Here, as in that case, the evidence does not disclose that there was any intention to kill the woman, and in the circumstances, we have, as already stated, taken the view that the offence committed by the first accused-appellant is not murder, but only of causing grievous hurt under S. 325, Travancore Penal Code. The decision of the trial Court should accordingly be altered. The conviction for murder cannot stand. The conviction can be only under S. 325, Travancore Penal Code. The sentence also must be set aside.

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In Rajan v. State, 2016 SCC OnLine Mad 16892 , the

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accused closed the mouth and nose of the deceased . She fainted. Believing that the deceased was no more, he laid her on the mat, poured kerosene on her and set her on fire. The deceased died due to burn injuries. The Madras High Court held that the act of the accused does not amount to murder but culpable homicide not amounting to murder. It was observed:

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In the instant case, as we have already pointed out, when the accused committed the first act of slapping the deceased, he had no intention at all, either to cause the

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death or to cause such bodily injury which is likely to cause death. Similarly, when he committed the second act of pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased also, he had no intention to cause the death of the deceased or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. As we have already concluded, these two acts constitute one single act. Had it been the case that the first act was done with the intention to cause death and believing that out of the first act, the deceased died, the second act is done, though factually, the death was caused only by the second act since both the acts constitute one single act and since there was initial intention for the accused to cause the death of the deceased, the act of the accused would fall within the first limb of section 299 of IPC and section 300 of IPC and, therefore, he would be liable for punishment under Section 302 of IPC. But, obviously, the accused never had such an intention to cause the death of the deceased, nor did he have the intention to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. But, at the same time, as we have already concluded, since the accused had committed, the said second act of pouring kerosene and setting fire without taking adequate care and attention, in a reckless manner, and without making due verification as to whether the deceased was dead or not, he had in haste poured kerosene and set fire and killed the deceased. Therefore, the belief, as claimed by the accused, that the deceased was dead is not out of good faith. So, he can be imputed with knowledge as required under the third limb of Section 299 of IPC when he did the second act of pouring kerosene and setting fire to the deceased. At this juncture, it needs to be mentioned that clause (iv) of Section 300 of IPC and the third limb of Section 299 of IPC have presented considerable difÏculty to courts in their practical application to concrete cases. The range of probability in the two clauses relates to causing death, but in one, it is comparatively not so strong as in the other. Although one may know that the act or illegal

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omission is so dangerous that it is likely to cause death, still, it is not murder, even if death was caused thereby, if the doer had no knowledge that, in all probabilities, it would cause death [vide State of Kerala v. Mani @ Chandran, 1992 Crl. L.J. 1682 ]. In the instant case, we are of the view that so much knowledge as is required under the fourth limb of Section 300 of IPC cannot be imputed to the accused and, therefore, he cannot be punished for an offence under Section 302 of IPC, and thus, he is liable to be punished only under Section 304(ii) of IPC.

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In Prathibha v. State of Kerala, 2023 SCC OnLine Ker

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10136 , the accused caused an injury on the part of the head of the deceased by hitting it against the edge of the cot. He threw the body into the Arabian Sea to destroy the evidence. It was held that the accused would be liable for the original injury and not for the murder. It was observed:

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In the light of the evidence tendered by PW27 that the cause of death of the infant was the combined effect of drowning and head injury, it has to be held that the child was disposed of alive by accused 1 and 2 in the sea, even though they believed that the child was lifeless. This takes us to the legal issue of whether an act performed by a person, as in the case at hand, by disposing of the body of the infant in the sea, which he/she believed to be lifeless, would attract the offence punishable under Section 299 IPC. Section 299 is brought under Chapter XVI of IPC titled ‘OF OFFENCES AFFECTING THE HUMAN BODY’ and under the sub-title ‘OF OFFENCES AFFECTING LIFE’. The offence of culpable homicide is defined under Section 299 of the IPC under the said sub-title, which reads thus:

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“299. Culpable homicide.

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Whoever causes death by doing an act with the intention of causing death, or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death, commits the offence of culpable homicide.

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Illustrations

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(a) A lays sticks and turf over a pit, with the intention of thereby causing death, or with the knowledge that death is likely to be thereby caused. Z, believing the ground to be firm, treads on it, falls in and is killed. A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

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(b) A knows Z to be behind a bush. B does not know it. A intending to cause, or knowing it to be likely to cause Z's death, induces B to fire at the bush. B fires and kills Z. Here, B may be guilty of no offence, but A has committed the offence of culpable homicide.

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(c) A, by shooting at a fowl with intent to kill and steal it, kills B, who is behind a bush; A does not know that he was there. Here, although A was doing an unlawful act, he was not guilty of culpable homicide, as he did not intend to kill B or to cause death by doing an act that he knew was likely to cause death.

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Explanation 1: A person who causes bodily injury to another who is labouring under a disorder, disease or bodily infirmity, and thereby accelerates the death of that other, shall be deemed to have caused his death.

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Explanation 2: Where death is caused by bodily injury, the person who causes such bodily injury shall be deemed to have caused the death, although by resorting to proper remedies and skilful treatment, the death might have been prevented. Explanation 3: The causing of the death of a child in the mother's womb is not homicide. But it may

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amount to culpable homicide to cause the death of a living child if any part of that child has been brought forth, though the child may not have breathed or been completely born”.

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As evident from the extracted definition itself, the provision is attracted only when a person does an act which causes the death of another, either with the intention of causing death or with the intention of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death or with the knowledge that he is likely by such act to cause death. These three are the species of mens rea contemplated in the provision, and unless it is established that the act of the accused would fall under any of these, it would not amount to an offence of culpable homicide. Therefore, in order to attract the Section, the act must be one performed with the intention of putting an end to a human life or with the knowledge that the same may put an end to a human life. Needless to say, if the act is performed on a body which the person concerned believed to be lifeless, the offence is not attracted, for when the act was performed, the person concerned could have neither had the intention of putting an end to the human life nor had the knowledge that the act performed by him may or is likely put an end to human life. An identical view is seen taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Palani Goundan v. Emperor, 1919 SCC OnLine Mad 67 . It is also seen that the said case was considered by a Full Bench on a reference by a Division Bench dealing with a case where the accused hanged the body of a person under the belief that the body is lifeless. The relevant portion of the judgment reads thus:

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“When the case came before us, Mr Osborne, the Public Prosecutor, at once intimated that he did not propose to contend that the facts as found by the learned referring Judges constituted the crime of murder or even culpable homicide. We think that he was right in doing so, but as doubts have been entertained on the subject, we think it proper to

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state shortly the grounds for our opinion. By English Law, this would clearly not be murder but manslaughter on the general principles of the Common Law. In India, every offence is defined both as to what must be done and with what intention it must be done by the section of the Penal Code which makes it a crime. There are certain general exceptions laid down in Chapter IV, but none of them fit the present case. We must therefore turn to the defining section 299. Section 299 defines culpable homicide as the act of causing death with one of three intentions:

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(a) of causing death,

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(b) of causing such bodily injury as is likely to cause death,

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(c) of doing something which the accused knows to be likely to cause death.

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It is not necessary that any intention should exist with regard to the particular person whose death is caused, as in the familiar example of a shot aimed at one person killing another, or poison intended for one being taken by another. “Causing death” may be paraphrased as putting an end to human life; and thus all three intentions must be directed either deliberately to putting an end to a human life or to some act which, to the knowledge of the accused, is likely to eventuate in the putting an end to human life. The knowledge must have reference to the particular circumstances in which the accused is placed. No doubt, if a man cuts the head off from a human body, he does an act which he knows will put an end to life, if it exists. But we think that the intention demanded by the section must stand in some relation to a person who either is alive or who is believed by the accused to be alive. If a man kills another by shooting at what he believes to be a third person whom he intends to

¶126

21

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kill, but which is in fact the stump of a tree, it is clear that he would be guilty of culpable homicide. This is because, though he had no criminal intention towards any human being actually in existence, he had such an intention towards what he believed to be a living human being. The conclusion is irresistible that the intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of the actual circumstances, but in the light of what he supposed to be the circumstances. It follows that a man is not guilty of culpable homicide if his intention was directed only to what he believed to be a lifeless body. Complications may arise when it is arguable that the two acts of the accused should be treated as being really one transaction as in QueenEmpress v. Khandu [ILR (1891) 15 Bom 194. ] or when the facts suggest a doubt whether there may not be imputed to the accused a reckless indifference and ignorance as to whether the body he bandied was alive or dead, as in Gour Gobindo's Case [(1866) 6 W.R. (Cr. R.) 55] . The facts as found here eliminate both these possibilities and are practically the same as those found in The Emperor v. DaluSardar [(191314) 18 CWN 1279] . We agree with the decision of the learned Judges in that case and with clear intimation of opinion by Sergeant, C.J., in QueenEmpress v. Khandu .

¶129

Though in our opinion, on the facts as found, the accused cannot be convicted either of murder or culpable homicide, he can, of course, be punished both for his original assault on his wife and for his attempt to create false evidence by banging her. These, however, are matters for the consideration and determination of the referring Bench.”

¶130

As evident from the extracted passage in the judgment, the view taken is that the intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of the actual

¶131

22

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circumstances, but in the light of what he supposed to be the circumstances and that therefore, he/she is not guilty of culpable homicide if his intention was directed only to what he believed to be a lifeless body. We are in respectful agreement with the said view. Needless to say, the conviction of accused 1 and 2 under Section 302 read with Section 34 is liable to be interfered with.

¶134

As clarified by the Madras High Court in Palani Goundan , in a case of this nature, the accused can certainly be convicted for the original act which rendered the child unconscious and also for their attempt to cause the disappearance of the evidence. But, in the case at hand, as noted, there is no charge in respect of the same. In other words, the accused cannot be convicted for any offence. If the accused cannot be convicted for any offence, the question of convicting them for causing disappearance of the evidence does not arise [See Duvvur Dasratharammareddy v. State of A.P., (1971) 3 SCC 247].” 15. In the present case, also assuming the whole of the

¶135

prosecution case to be true, the petitioner cannot be prima facie held liable for the commission of the murder; at best, he can be held liable for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under Section 304A of BNS or at worst, nothing, because deceased Gurvinder had overdosed himself.

¶136

Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioner has to be accepted as correct that the allegations in the FIR, assuming them to be true, do not constitute the commission of an offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.

¶137

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¶139

The petitioner was arrested on 17.04.2025. The charge sheet has been filed, and the matter is listed for recording the statements of witnesses on 03.06.2026. The status report also does not mention any reason justifying the pre-trial detention of the petitioner.

¶140

The petitioner claims that he is a permanent resident of District Roopnagar, Punjab. This was not stated to be incorrect. It means that the petitioner has roots in society, and he is not likely to abscond. Therefore, the further detention of the petitioner is not justified.

¶141

19 In view of the above, the present petition is allowed, and the petitioner is ordered to be released on bail in the sum of ₹1,00,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court. While on bail, the petitioner will abide by the following terms and conditions: -

¶142

(I) The petitioner will not intimidate the witnesses, nor will he influence any evidence in any manner whatsoever;

¶143

(II) The petitioner shall attend the trial on each and every hearing and will not seek unnecessary adjournments;

¶144

(III) The petitioner will not leave the present address for a continuous period of seven days without furnishing the address of the intended visit to the

¶145

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SHO concerned, the Police Station concerned and the Trial Court;

¶148

(IV) The petitioner will surrender his passport, if any, to the Court; and

¶149

(V) The petitioner will furnish his mobile number and social media contact to the Police and the Court and will abide by the summons/notices received from the Police/Court through SMS/WhatsApp/Social Media Account. In case of any change in the mobile number or social media accounts, the same will be intimated to the Police/Court within five days from the date of the change.

¶150

It is expressly made clear that in case of violation of

¶151

any of these conditions, the prosecution will have the right to file a petition for cancellation of the bail.

¶152

The petition stands accordingly disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to the Jail Superintendent of Sub Jail Nalagarh, District Solan, H.P. and the learned Trial Court by FASTER.

¶153

The observations made hereinabove are regarding the disposal of this petition and will have no bearing, whatsoever, on the case's merits.

¶154

(Rakesh Kainthla)

¶155

Judge 11^th March, 2026 Digitally signed by (Nikita) CHANDER CHANDERSHEKHAR SHEKHAR Date: 2026.03.11 12:00:35 +0530

Rajandeep @ Raja v. State of Hp

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Rajandeep @ Raja v. State of Hp

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