Renuka and Another Vs State of Hp

This application has been preferred by the applicants/appellants for suspension of the sentence awarded to them vide judgment dated 29.11.2025 passed by Chairman, H.P. State Waqf Tribunal-cum-Sessions Judge, Dharamshala, in Sessions Case (RBT) No.12 of 2023/2017 , titled as State of Himachal Pradesh versus Renuka and others , arising out of FIR No.55 of 2017 dated 24.04.2017, registered at Police Station Jawali,

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1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes

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District Kangra, H.P., for commission of offences punishable under Sections 326-A and 201 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, " IPC "), whereby the applicants/appellants have been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of ₹50,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 326-A IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and to pay a fine of ₹5,000/- each for the offence punishable under Section 201 IPC and, in default of payment of fine, to further undergo imprisonment for one year each.

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Learned counsel for the applicants/appellants has submitted that the incident is alleged to have taken place on 12.09.2016, whereas the FIR came to be registered only on 24.04.2017. According to him, there is an inordinate and unexplained delay in lodging the FIR and no plausible explanation has been furnished by the prosecution for such extraordinary delay.

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It has been further submitted that PW-15 Dr. Avneesh

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Kumar has deposed on oath that when the victim approached him for treatment, she had disclosed that the injuries were result of accidental burn. Further in his cross-examination, PW-15 Dr. Avneesh Kumar stated that the injuries were about six months old

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and were stated to have been sustained in an accident in a laboratory.

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It has also been submitted that the victim had approached the hospital of PW-15 Dr. Avneesh Kumar in April 2017 with an alleged history of a six months' old chemical burn. Six months prior to April 2017 would mean that injuries were suffered in November/December, 2016, whereas prosecution alleged that the incident had taken place on 12.08.2016. Therefore, according to learned counsel, the injuries suffered by the victim cannot be related to the incident alleged in the FIR.

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It has also been submitted by the learned counsel for the applicants/appellants that the exact place of occurrence is also doubtful. In the complaint (Ex. P-1/PW-2), the victim stated that when she was about to enter the room of the Institute and had reached at the door, applicant/appellant-Renuka Kumari poured some liquid from a glass upon her and applicant/appellant-Mohinder Singh was standing there. However, while deposing before the Court, the victim stated that when she entered the laboratory to collect her answer sheet, applicant/appellant-Renuka Kumari, already present there, poured some liquid upon her. According to learned counsel, in one version the alleged occurrence has been stated to have taken place at the door of the laboratory, whereas in the other version, the occurrence has been stated to have taken place inside the

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laboratory. This discrepancy, according to learned counsel, creates doubt regarding the veracity of the victim’s version.

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It has further been submitted that Ex. P-11/PW-10 indicates that the victim remained admitted and received treatment only for ten days.

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Learned counsel has argued that where two views are possible on the evidence available on record, the one favourable to the accused deserves to be adopted.

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It has also been submitted that the applicants/appellants have no criminal antecedents and had never jumped the bail granted to them during the trial. According to learned counsel, the FIR itself is the result of an afterthought.

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On the other hand, learned Deputy Advocate General has submitted that the victim has duly explained the delay in lodging the FIR by stating that she was initially informed that the liquid poured upon her was only a mild chemical and she would be alright after treatment. However, when her wounds failed to heal and she subsequently came to know that the substance poured upon her was not an ordinary chemical but an acid, then she approached the police and lodged the FIR.

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It has further been submitted that the photographs of the victim placed on record as Ex. P-19/PW-15, the treatment chart Ex. P-18/PW-15 and statement of PW-15 clearly establish that the injuries suffered by the victim were result of acid poured upon her.

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It has also been submitted that the use of acid stands corroborated by the report of the State Forensic Science Laboratory (Ex. PX), which confirms presence of sulphuric acid in the burnt clothes of the victim.

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According to learned Deputy Advocate General, there is no contradiction regarding the place of occurrence. In one statement, the victim has stated that she had just entered through the door of the laboratory, whereas in the other statement she stated that she had reached inside the laboratory. Both versions substantially refer to the same place and, therefore, no material contradiction or ambiguity exists with regard to the place of occurrence.

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It has been further submitted that the applicants/ appellants are convicts and, therefore, the consideration for enlarging them on bail by suspending the sentence is different from the consideration of the facts and circumstances governing grant of bail to an undertrial prisoner. The parameters to be considered under Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (now Section

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430 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023), are distinct from those applicable while considering the grant of bail during the pendency of trial.

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It would be relevant to refer following observation of the Apex Court in Shivani Tyagi vs. State of U.P. & Anr. , reported in AIR 2024 SC 4594 : AIROnline 2024 SC 346 :-

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“4. We will briefly refer to some of the relevant decisions dealing with Section 389, Cr. PC. In the case of short-term imprisonment for conviction of an offence, suspension of sentence is the normal rule and its rejection is the exception. [See the decision in Bhagwan Rama Shinde Gosai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 4 SCC 421]. However, we are of the considered view that the position should be vice-versa in the case of conviction for serious offences when invocation of power under Section 389 is invited….”

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15. The Apex Court in Kishori Lal vs. Rupa & Ors. , reported in (2004) 7 SCC 638 , has observed as under:-

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“4. Section 389 of the Code deals with suspension of execution of sentence pending the appeal and release of the appellant on bail. There is a distinction between bail and suspension of sentence. One of the essential ingredients of Section 389 is the requirement for the appellate Court to record reasons in writing for ordering suspension of execution of the sentence or order appealed. If he is in confinement, the said court can direct that he be released on bail or on his own bond. The requirement of recording reasons in writing clearly indicates that there has to be careful consideration of the relevant aspects and the order directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail should not be passed as a matter of routine.

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The appellate Court is duty bound to objectively assess the matter and to record reasons for the conclusion that the case warrants suspension of execution of sentence and grant of bail. In the instant case, the only factor which seems to have weighed with the High Court for directing suspension of sentence and grant of bail is the absence of allegation of misuse of liberty during the earlier period when the accused-respondents were on bail.”

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16. With reference to the offence involved in present case,

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following observation of the Apex Court in above referred Shivani

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Tyagi’s case ( supra ) are also relevant:-

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“11. We have no hesitation to hold that the impugned order is infected with non-application of mind and non- consideration of the relevant factors required for invocation of power under Section 389 in the light of the settled position of law. An acid attack may completely strip off the victim of her basic human right to live a decent human life owing to permanent disfiguration. We have no hesitation to hold that in appeals involving such serious offence(s), serious consideration of all parameters should be made. Even a cursory glance of the impugned order would reveal the consideration thereunder was made ineptly. The serious nature of the offence involved was not taken into account besides the other relevant parameters for the exercise of power under Section 389, Cr. PC.

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In such circumstances, the impugned judgment cannot be sustained. The upshot of the discussion is that the order suspending the sentence of the private respondents and enlarging them on bail, invite interference. Consequently, the impugned order is set aside and consequently the bail granted to the private respondent in all these appeals stands cancelled. Consequently, the appellants shall surrender before the trial Court for the purpose of their committal to judicial custody. This shall be done within a period of four days. In case of their failure to surrender as ordered, the private respondents who are convicts shall be re- arrested and committed to custody.”

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17. It is well settled that after conviction, the presumption of

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innocence no longer survives and the prayer for suspension of sentence is to be considered on parameters different from those applicable to an undertrial prisoner seeking bail. The submissions advanced on behalf of the applicants essentially require reappreciation of evidence at the stage of final hearing of the appeal and do not, at this stage, disclose any exceptional circumstance

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warranting suspension of sentence, particularly when the offence under Section 326-A IPC is one of extreme gravity affecting the bodily integrity and dignity of a woman. Therefore, stricter parameters govern the consideration of suspension of sentence.

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Applicants/appellants have been convicted vide judgment dated 29.11.2025 and applicants have undergone only about 7–8 months of imprisonment against a sentence of ten years.

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Taking into consideration the observations of the Apex Court, period of sentence undergone, nature of the crime involved in present case and the fact that Criminal Appeal is of the year 2026, we are of the considered opinion that at this stage, applicants/appellants are not entitled for suspension of sentence.

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Observations made in the application shall confine to adjudication of this application only and it shall not have any impact on merits of the case in appeal.

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Accordingly, the application is dismissed.

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Judge

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(Ranjan Sharma) Judge

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10^th July, 2026 (Pardeep)

Renuka and Another v. State of Hp

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Renuka and Another v. State of Hp

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