Dismissed¶79

Kalpana and Another v. State of Hp and Others

Himachal Pradesh HC16 Jun 2026CRMMO/427/2026

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Quashing petition; inherent jurisdiction; Section 482 CrPC; DV Act 2005 Section 12(1); Protection Officer; Domestic Incident Report; emotional abuse; taunting over insufficient dowry; sisters-in-law; shared household; mini-trial prohibited; improvements in statements; civil nature of DV proceedings; Order VI CPC pleading of facts; matter left to trial court; Jaisinghpur Kangra; Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal; Punit Beriwala; Maneesha Yadav; Dharambeer Kumar Singh; Muskan v. Ishaan Khan; Iqbal v. State of U.P.; petition dismissed.

What did the court decide?

A court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not examine the validity or otherwise of the allegations and must treat them as correct; hence the submission that the allegations are false does not help the petitioners. ¶35

Kalpana and Another Vs State of Hp and Others — Domestic Violence | Himachal Pradesh HC (2026)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶79

Issue for consideration

Whether the criminal proceedings (DV Act application) pending against the petitioners before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jaisinghpur should be quashed in exercise of the Court's inherent jurisdiction. +1 more

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Court's answer

As the matter is undisputedly pending before the learned Trial Court, it should be left to the trial court to appreciate it.

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Ratio / Principle

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Key takeaways

The Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of the allegations while deciding a petition for quashing.ratio¶40
The allegations recorded by the Protection Officer in the informant's statement are specific — taunting over insufficient dowry, calling her a servant, and threatening to throw her out of the matrimonial home — and show that the petitioners committed emotional abuse by taunting the aggrieved person.ratio¶56
That the allegations are improvements over the initial complaint made to the police is no ground for quashing; the High Court cannot quash proceedings based on improvements made in subsequent statements.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Himachal Pradesh (Rakesh Kainthla, J.), Cr. MMO No. 427 of 2026, decided 16.06.2026: petition seeking quashing of DV Act proceedings pending before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jaisinghpur (Kangra) against the aggrieved person's sisters-in-law is dismissed. Held: a court exercising inherent jurisdiction must treat the allegations as correct and cannot conduct a mini-trial on their genuineness; the statement recorded by the Protection Officer contained specific allegations that the petitioners taunted the aggrieved person over insufficient dowry and threatened to expel her, amounting to emotional abuse; improvements in later statements and vagueness of the domestic incident report furnish no ground for quashing, DV Act proceedings being predominantly civil in nature and Order VI CPC requiring only facts to be pleaded; the matter being pending before the trial court, it was left to that court. Relied on Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi, Punit Beriwala, Maneesha Yadav, Dharambeer Kumar Singh, Muskan and Iqbal.

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2026:HHC:22397

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MMO No. 427 of 2026

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Reserved on: 06.05.2026 Date of Decision: 16.06.2026

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Kalpana & another ...Petitioners Versus State of H.P. & others ...Respondents _____________________________________

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioners : Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, Advocate. For the respondents : Mr Jitender K. Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioners have filed the present petition for quashing the criminal proceedings pending against them before the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Jaisinghpur, District Kangra, H.P.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the aggrieved person filed a complaint to the SHO

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Police Station, Lamba Gaon asserting that she was married to Ajay Kumar on 24.09.2022 as per Hindu Rites and Customs. Her husband, mother-in-law, father-in-law, sister-in-law and brother-in-law started taunting her after one month of her marriage. Her husband is posted in the Indian Army, and he used to beat her whenever he came on leave. The parents-in-law used to beat her in the absence of her husband. They used to abuse and threaten to kill her. Vijay Kumar (brother-in-law) was serving at Chandigarh, and he also used to misbehave with her. She reported the matter to the police. The police recorded an entry in the daily diary and referred the matter to the Protection Officer for necessary action. The Protection officer recorded the informant’s statement and filed a Domestic Incident Report and an application under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence (DV) Act.

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Being aggrieved by the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court, the petitioners have filed the present petition asserting that the aggrieved person materially improved upon her version, which makes her testimony suspect. The petitioners are the sisters-in-law of the aggrieved person; they are residing separately in their respective matrimonial homes, and they never resided in the shared household with the aggrieved person. The

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aggrieved person has made false allegations against the petitioners, and the allegations, even if accepted as true, do not constitute any domestic violence. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned trial Court be quashed.

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I have heard Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Jitender K. Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.1/State.

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Mr Ritesh Bhardwaj, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners never shared any household with the aggrieved person. The allegations made by the aggrieved person are false, vague and do not show that any domestic violence was committed by the petitioners upon her. The continuation of the proceedings against the petitioners amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the proceedings pending before the learned Trial Court be quashed. He relied upon the following judgments in support of his submissions: -

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Ganga Bhavani @ Gundabattina Ganga Bhavani vs. The State of Telangana & another in Criminal Petition No. 11818 of 2023, dated 02.07.2025; and

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2026:HHC:22397

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Mrs Kinjal Jayesh Mehta vs. Mrs Disha Jimit Sanghiv 2024:BHC=AS: 7359

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate

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General for respondent No.1/State submitted that the

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informant/aggrieved person had filed a complaint before the police, which was forwarded to the Protection Officer. The Protection Officer made enquiries into the matter and filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court. The learned Trial Court is seized of the matter, and this Court should not exercise its inherent jurisdiction in the present case. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi v. Vidhi Rawal, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1158, that the High Court should have a hands-off approach under the DV Act and should interfere only when there is gross illegality or abuse of the process of the Court. It was observed:

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“35. When it comes to the exercise of power under Section 482 of the CrPC in relation to an application under Section 12(1), the High Court has to keep in mind the fact that the DV Act, 2005, is a welfare legislation specially enacted to give justice to those women who suffer from domestic violence

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and to prevent acts of domestic violence. Therefore, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 4 82 of the CrP C for quashing proceedings under Section 12(1), the High Court should be very slow and circumspect. Interference can be made only when the case is clearly of gross illegality or gross abuse of the process of law. Generally, the High Court must adopt a hands-off approach while dealing with proceedings under Section 482 for quashing an application under Section 12(1). Unless the High Courts show restraint in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 4 82 of the CrP C while dealing with a prayer for quashing the proceedings under the DV Act, 2005, the very object of enacting the DV Act, 2005, will be defeated.”

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It was submitted that the allegations against the petitioners are false. This submission will not help the respondents. The Court exercising inherent jurisdiction does not go into the validity or otherwise of the allegations and has to treat them as correct. This position was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court

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in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, wherein it was observed: -

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where non-interference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”

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2026:HHC:22397

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of the allegations. It was observed: -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police

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2026:HHC:22397

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during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial while exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397:

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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

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6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

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7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited

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2026:HHC:22397

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jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

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The Protection Officer recorded the informant’s statement in which she had specifically mentioned that her sistersin-law, Kalpu and Kalpana, used to taunt her for bringing insufficient dowry whenever they would visit their parental home. They used to say that she was a servant in the house and dutybound to serve their parents. They threatened to punish her and throw her out of her matrimonial home if the aggrieved person said anything to their parents. They also used to say that her parents had not provided anything to her in the marriage, so she had to take care of herself.

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These allegations are quite specific and show that the petitioners had committed emotional abuse by taunting the aggrieved person.

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It was submitted that these allegations are improvements and were not made in the initial complaint made to the police. This submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Muskan v. Ishaan Khan (Sataniya), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2355, that the High Court cannot

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2026:HHC:22397

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quash the F.I.R. based on the improvements made in the statements. It was observed: -

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“17. The main issue that arises for our analysis is whether the High Court was right in quashing the criminal proceedings against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier complaints did not mention the two specific incidents dated 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later on added in the FIR and whether the same would not amount to conducting a ‘ mini trial ’ which is clearly prohibited under the scheme of Section 4 8 2 of the Cr. P.C.

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xxxx

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19. From a bare perusal of the above-mentioned paragraphs, it can be seen that one of the important factors that weighed in while allowing the quashing application of the private respondents was that in the earlier complaints filed by the appellant, there was no mention of the events of harassment that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022, which were later added in the FIR dated 28.01.2024.

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Xxxx

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27. We are of the view that the High Court has erred in law by embarking upon an enquiry with regard to the credibility or otherwise of the allegations in the complaints and the FIR. Normally, for quashing an FIR, it must be shown that there exists no prima facie case against the accused persons. In the present case, from the conjoint reading of the complaints and the FIR, it can be seen that prime facie allegations of harassment and demand of dowry are made out, despite that the High Court quashed the FIR against the private respondents primarily on the ground that the earlier two complaints that were filed by the appellant did not mention the specific instances that happened on 22.07.2021 and 27.11.2022 and the same were later on mentioned in the FIR only as an afterthought and was a counterblast to the legal notice sent by respondent no. 1/husband to the appellant, as she was not coming back to her matrimonial home. This

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approach adopted by the High Court, in our considered opinion, amounts to conducting a mini-trial .

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It was submitted that the allegations are vague. This

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submission will not help the petitioners. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shaurabh Kumar Tripathi (supra) that the proceedings under the DV Act are civil in nature. It was observed:

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“28. 1 Thus, there is no doubt that, notwithstanding the penal provisions in the form of Sections 31 and 33 of Chapter V, the proceedings before the Magistrate under the DV Act, 2005, are predominantly of a civil nature.”

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Order VI of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) requires

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that only facts are required to be pleaded. In the present case, the aggrieved person has pleaded the facts regarding the harassment and the demand of dowry. The evidence by means of which the facts are to be proved is not required to be pleaded. Therefore, the domestic incident report cannot be said to be bad simply because the details of the incident with supporting evidence have not been given.

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It is undisputed that the matter is pending before the Learned Trial Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P. , (2023) 8 SCC 734: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the matter is pending before the learned Trial Court, it should be left to appreciate it. It was observed:

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“At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the investigation has been completed and the charge sheet is ready to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not inspire any confidence, particularly in the absence of any specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the view that the appellants should prefer a discharge application before the trial court under Section 227 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even according to the State, the investigation is over and the charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court. In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to look into the materials which the investigating officer might have collected, forming part of the charge sheet. If any such discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is made out or not.”

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18. No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present petition fails, and it is dismissed.

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20. The observation made herein before shall remain

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confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the main case.

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( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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16^th June, 2026 (ravinder)

Kalpana and Another v. State of Hp and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

Kalpana and Another v. State of Hp and Others

Case brief

What is this about?

What did the court decide?

What the court decided

Issues for consideration

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