State Vs Anwar Singh

The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 30.06.2011 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.1, Rohru, District Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181 and 187 of Motor Vehicle Act (MV act). (The parties shall hereinafter be referred

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act. It was asserted that Anisha Devi (PW1), the daughter of the informant Bal Krishan, was studying in the Government Senior Secondary School Dashalini. She was returning to her home on 15.11.2008. A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0556 hit her near Samala Stadium at about 4:30 p.m. She sustained injuries, and the motorcyclist fled from the scene. Rahul Soni (PW4) and Sweety Kula (PW5) brought the injured to the hospital. The accident occurred because of the negligence of the motorcyclist. The matter was reported to the police, and an FIR (Ext.PW12/A) was registered in the Police Station. ASI Mohan Singh (PW13) investigated the matter. He filed an application (Ext.PW13/A) for the examination of the injured Anisha Devi (PW1). Dr Ranveer Vardhan (PW9) examined her and found that she had sustained simple injuries that could have been caused in a motor

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vehicle accident. He issued the MLC (Ext.PW9/A). ASI Mohan Singh (PW13) went to the spot and prepared the site plan (Ext.PW13/B). He seized the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558 along with the documents vide memo (Ext.PW8/C). HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW7) examined the motorcycle and did not find any defect in it that would have led to the accident. The accused was asked to produce a driving licence, but he could not produce any license. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and Sections 181 and 187 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined 13 witnesses to prove its case. Anisha Devi (PW1) is the injured. Rachna Pandey (PW2) and Megha (PW3) are the eyewitnesses. Rahul Soni (PW4) and Sweeety Kula (PW5) carried the injured to the hospital. Ashok Sharma (PW6) was informed about the incident. HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW7)

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conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Chikrant Thakur (PW8) is the owner of the motorcycle. Dr Ranveer Vardhan (PW9) examined the injured. Kewal Ram (PW10) and Pritam Lal (PW11) witnessed the recovery. Inspector Lal Man Sharma (PW12) signed the FIR. Mohan Singh (PW13) investigated the matter.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that the witnesses deposed against him falsely, and he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in his defence.

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The learned Trial Court held that the accused was not properly identified. The victim stated that she had disclosed the name of the accused because he was loitering in the area. The other witnesses also could not identify the motorcyclist, and there was insufficient evidence to show that the accused was driving the motorcycle. The registration number of the motorcycle was mentioned as HP-10A-0556 in the FIR, but the police seized the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558. No explanation was provided for the change in the registration number. The

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prosecution's case was highly suspect due to these infirmities. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. Anisha Devi (PW1) and Rachna Pandey (PW2) had identified the accused present in the Court as the motorcyclist who had caused the accident. Rahul Soni (PW4) and Sweety Kula (PW5) categorically stated that the accident occurred due to the rashness of the motorcyclist and the high speed of the motorcycle. The prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the learned trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. Hence, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/ State and Ms Preetika Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence on record. The informant

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and her friend had duly identified the accused present in the Court as the motorcyclist who had caused the accident. There was a clerical error in the registration number of the motorcycle, and this was blown out of proportion by the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Ms Preetika Thakur, learned vice counsel representing the respondent/accused, submitted that the identification of the accused in the Court was not proper. The witnesses admitted that they did not know the accused before the incident, and the Test Identification Parade was necessary to establish the identity. However, no Test Identification Parade was conducted. The registration number of the motorcycle was also changed by the prosecution, and no explanation was provided for the change. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made to the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2025) 5 SCC 433: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence, omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed at page 438:

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“24. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial Judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.

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This position was reiterated in State of M.P. v. Ramveer

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Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1743 , wherein it was observed:

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We may note that the present appeal is one against acquittal. Law is well-settled by a plethora of judgments of this Court that, in an appeal against acquittal, unless the finding of acquittal is perverse on the face of the record and the only possible view based on the evidence is consistent with the guilt of the accused, only in such an event, should the appellate Court interfere with a judgment of acquittal. Where two views are possible, i.e., one consistent with the

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acquittal and the other holding the accused guilty, the appellate Court should refuse to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgments of this Court in the cases of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka (2024) 8 SCC 149 ; H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 and Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar (2022) 3 SCC 471 .

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A similar view was taken in Tulasareddi v. State of

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Karnataka, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 89, wherein it was observed:

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“29. From the aforesaid decisions rendered by this Court, it can be said that if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the Appellate Court should not disturb the findings of acquittal recorded by the Trial Court. Further, if the view taken is a possible view, the Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible. The following principles have to be kept in mind by the Appellate Court while dealing with the appeals against an order of acquittal:

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(a) whether the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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(b) whether the judgment is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence on record;

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(c) an order of acquittal is to be interfered with only when there are “compelling and substantial reasons” for doing so. If the order is “clearly unreasonable”, it is a compelling reason for interference.’

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(d) the appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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(e) if the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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(f) the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The FIR specifically mentions that a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0556 came at high speed and hit the girl. However, the police seized the motorcycle bearing registration number HP-10A-0558. An explanation was provided in the charge sheet that the registration number was wrongly mentioned as HP10A-0556, whereas the registration number of the motorcycle was HP-10A-0558. The informant was not produced before the Court to explain the discrepancy in the registration certificate. The police did not find out whether the registration number HP-10A-0556 was allotted to a motorcycle or to some other vehicle. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the prosecution's case because of this discrepancy.

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HC Sanjeev Kumar (PW7) did not mention any dent or damage to the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558 in his report. He has mentioned ‘correct’ against the chassis frame. He has left the column of body condition blank. Therefore, the report of the mechanic does not show that the motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558 was involved in the accident.

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Anisha Devi (PW1) stated that a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558, being driven by the accused, hit her. She fell and sustained injuries. She stated in her crossexamination that Rachna Pandey (PW2) and Megha (PW3) had disclosed the name of the accused to her. She admitted that the accused was not a resident of the area. She volunteered to say that she knew the accused before the accident because she had seen him in Rohru Bazaar. She admitted that she fell and did not know who was driving the motorcycle. She volunteered to say that she disclosed the name of the accused because he had moved twice in that area and met her on the way.

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The cross-examination of this witness shows that she had not seen the motorcyclist after the impact because she had fallen. The name of the accused was disclosed to her by her friend,

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and she had named the accused because the accused had moved twice in that area. All these reasons for the identification of the motorcyclist are not proper. Merely because the accused had moved twice around that area cannot lead to an inference that he had caused the accident.

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Rachna Pandey (PW2) stated in her cross-examination that she did not know the accused and had never seen him. Megha (PW3) stated that she could not identify the accused as the person who was driving the motorcycle. She stated in her crossexamination by the learned counsel for the defence that she had not seen the accused at the place of the accident. Thus, these witnesses have not corroborated the victim’s version that they had disclosed the name of the accused to her.

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Rahul Soni (PW4) stated that he and Sweety Kula (PW5) were returning to their home. Motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558 hit Anisha Devi. The accused was driving the motorcycle. The motorcyclist sped away from the spot after the accident. He stated in his cross-examination that he was at a distance of 300-400 meters, and it is difficult to identify a person from such a distance. He volunteered to say that he was at a

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distance of 3-4 feet. It took about 4-5 minutes to reach the place of the accident, and the motorcyclist was not present on the spot. He admitted that he did not know the accused.

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The statement of this witness also does not prove that the accused was driving the motorcycle at the time of the accident. He was at a distance from the place of the accident and reached the spot after 4-5 minutes of the accident. He had not seen the motorcycle on the spot, and his identification was doubtful.

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Sweety Kula (PW5) stated that he and Rahul Soni (PW4) were returning to their homes. A motorcycle bearing registration No. HP-10A-0558, being driven by the accused, hit Anisha Devi (PW1) at high speed. She fell and sustained injuries. The motorcyclist fled away from the spot. He stated in his crossexamination that he came to know about the name of the accused in the Police Station. He admitted that the motorcycle was being driven at a normal speed.

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The statement of this witness shows that he was also moving with Rahul Soni (PW4), and since Rahul Soni had no opportunity to see the motorcyclist, he would also have no opportunity to see the motorcyclist. Hence, his identification of the

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motorcyclist cannot be believed. This is also apparent from the fact that he came to know about the name of the motorcyclist in the Police Station.

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HC Mohan Singh (PW13) investigated the matter. He has not explained how he changed the registration number of the motorcycle and traced the accused as the motorcyclist. It was laid by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Chand v. State of Rajasthan, (2002) 1 SCC 702: 2002 SCC (Cri) 256: 2001 SCC OnLine SC 1243 that when the identity of the accused is not disclosed, the Investigating Officers should explain the steps leading to the detection of the offender to exclude the likelihood of his innocence having been branded as a culprit. It was observed at 713:

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“26. Before parting with the case, we would like to place on record an observation of ours, touching on an aspect of the case. There are clueless crimes committed. The factum of a cognizable crime having been committed is known, but neither the identity of the accused is disclosed nor is there any indication available of the witnesses who would be able to furnish useful and relevant evidence. Such offences put to the test the wits of an investigating officer. A vigilant investigating officer, well-versed with the techniques of the job, is in a position to collect the threads of evidence, finding out the path that leads to the culprit. The ends, which the administration of criminal justice serves, are not achieved merely by catching hold of the culprit. The accusation has to be proved to the hilt in a court of law. The evidence of the investigating officer given in the court should have a rhythm

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explaining step by step how the investigation proceeded, leading to the detection of the offender and the collection of evidence against him. This is necessary to exclude the likelihood of any innocent person having been picked up and branded as a culprit, and then the gravity of the offence arousing human sympathy persuading the mind to be carried away by doubtful or dubious circumstances, treating them as of “beyond doubt” evidentiary value.

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The prosecution relied upon the identification made in

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the Court. However, not much advantage can be derived from the identification made for the first time in the Court. Professor Rupert Cross has stated in his celebrated treatise, Cross on Evidence , Fifth Edition, Butterworths, that identification of the accused for the first time in the dock is highly suspect. He observed:

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"It might be thought that in criminal cases there could not be better identification of an accused than that of a witness who goes into the box and swears that the man in the dock is the one he saw coming out of a house at a particular time, or the man who assaulted him. Nevertheless, such evidence is suspect where there has been no previous identification of the accused by the witness, and this is because its weight is reduced by the reflection that, if there is any degree of resemblance between the man in the dock and the person previously seen by him. The witness may very well think to himself that the police must have got hold of the right person, particularly if he has already described the latter to them, with the result that he will be inclined to swear positively to a fact of which he is by no means certain.

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People have mistakenly identified friends and relations well known to them with sufficient frequency to make them question the propriety of convicting an accused person on nothing more than the visual identification of a single

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witness who may only have had a fleeting glance of him in poor light."

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It has been stated in Halsbury's Laws of England 4^th Edition Volume 2 that the identification of the accused for the first time in the Court is improper and the witness should be asked to identify the accused in a prior test identification parade. It has been observed in para 363:

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“A witness shouldn't be asked to identify the defendant for the first time in the dock at his trial; and as a general practice, it is preferable that he should have been placed previously in a parade with other persons, so that potential witnesses may be asked to pick him up.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.

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Sasikumar v. State of T.N., (2024) 8 SCC 600: (2024) 3 SCC (Cri) 791: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1652 that when the accused were not known to the witnesses on the date of the incident, their identification in the dock is not acceptable. It was observed on page 605:

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“17. The admitted position in this case is that the test identification parade (hereinafter referred to as “TIP”) was not conducted. All the prosecution witnesses who identified the accused in the Court, such as PW 1 and PW 5, were not known to the present appellant, i.e. Accused 2. They had not seen the present appellant before the said incident. He was a stranger to both of them. More importantly, both of them have seen the appellant/Accused 2 on the date of the crime while he was wearing a “green-coloured monkey cap”!

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21. It is well settled that TIP is only a part of the police investigation. The identification in TIP of an accused is not a substantive piece of evidence. The substantive piece of evidence, or what can be called evidence, is only dock identification, that is, identification made by a witness in court during the trial. This identification has been made in court by PW 1 and PW 5. The High Court rightly dismissed the identification made by PW 1 for the reason that the appellant, i.e. Accused 2, was a stranger to PW 1 and PW 1 had seen the appellant for the first time when he was wearing a monkey cap, and in the absence of TIP to admit the identification by PW 1 made for the first time in the court was not proper.

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23. We are afraid the High Court has gone completely wrong in believing the testimony of PW 5 as to the identification of the appellant. In cases where the accused is a stranger to a witness, and there has been no TIP, the trial court should be very cautious while accepting the dock identification by such a witness (see: Kunjumon v . State of Kerala , ( 2012) 13 SCC 750: (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 406] ).

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27. In the facts of the present case, the identification of the accused before the court ought to have been corroborated by the previous TIP, which has not been done. The emphasis of TIP in a given case is of vital importance, as has been shown by this Court in the recent two cases of Jayanv. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 and Amrik Singh v. State of Punjab, (2022) 9 SCC 402: (2023) 2 SCC (Cri) 404 .

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28. In Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 , this Court disbelieved the dock identification of the accused therein by a witness, and while doing so, this Court discussed the aspect of TIP in the following words: ( Jayan v. State of Kerala, (2021) 20 SCC 38 , SCC p. 44, para 18)

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“ 18 . It is well settled that the TI parade is a part of the investigation, and it is not substantive evidence. The question of holding a TI parade arises when the accused is

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not known to the witness beforehand. The identification by a witness of the accused in the Court who has, for the first time, seen the accused in the incident of the offence is a weak piece of evidence, especially when there is a large time gap between the date of the incident and the date of recording of his evidence. In such a case, the TI parade may make the identification of the accused by the witness before the Court trustworthy.”

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Therefore, the identification of the accused by the witnesses for the first time in the Court without any corroboration from previous Test Identification Parade is meaningless, and cannot be relied upon to record the conviction.

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Thus, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the identification of the accused as the motorcyclist who had caused the accident was not established. This was a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible.

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No other point was urged

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent/accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the respondent/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Records be sent back to the learned Trial Court forthwith, along with a copy of the judgment.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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15^th June, 2026 (Nikita)

State v. Anwar Singh

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State v. Anwar Singh

Case brief

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