Jamyang Tsering and Others Vs State of Hp and Another

For the Petitioners : Mr Nishant K. Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No.1 : Mr Jitender Sharma, Additional Advocate General, assisted by HC Manoj Kumar, No.68, IO, PS, Bhunter, District Kullu, H.P.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing of FIR No. 33 dated 23.02.2026 registered at Police Station, Bhunter, District, Kullu, H.P., for the commission of

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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offences punishable under Sections 20, 25 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act).

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that the police registered an FIR No. 33 of 2026 at Police Station, Bhunter, asserting that the police had set up a naka at Siund on 22.02.2026. A vehicle bearing registration No. HP-88-3888 came from Manikaran at about 06.50 p.m. HC Manoj Kumar signalled the driver to stop it. He demanded the documents for the vehicle. The occupants of the vehicle appeared to be frightened. The police checked the vehicle and found a black substance in a poly zipper. The police stopped 10-15 vehicles and asked the occupants to join as independent witnesses, but nobody agreed. HHC Girdhari Lal was directed to bring an independent person. He brought Vinay Thakur and Sher Singh. The driver revealed his name as Kaiden Regzin. The person occupying the front seat revealed his name as Jamyang Tsering, and the person sitting in the rear seat revealed his name as Tenzin Kyab. The police searched the vehicle and recovered a transparent poly zipper containing 28 grams of charas/cannabis. The police seized the cannabis. The police also found a black suitcase containing ₹4,00,000/- in currency notes of ₹500/-.

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The police seized the currency notes. Jamyang Tsering was hit by a vehicle bearing registration No.CH-02AA-7771. He was shifted to the Regional Hospital, Kullu. The police registered the FIR and investigated the matter.

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Being aggrieved by the registration of the FIR, the petitioners have filed the present petition, asserting that the FIR is a fabricated, malicious and retaliatory prosecution as a consequence of the petitioners' refusal to submit to unlawful and coercive demands made by the police officials. The petitioners were subjected to an unlawful and coercive ordeal by the local police because they were carrying ₹4,00,000/- in cash with them. The criminal law cannot be set in motion for ulterior motives, and investigative powers are to be exercised within the bounds of legality, fairness, and reasonableness. The criminal proceedings are attended with mala fide intent and instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance or causing harm, and are liable to be quashed. The petitioner, Jamyang Tsering, arrived in India from the United States of America on 29.01.2026. He and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 visited Manali and other tourist areas to evaluate a suitable location for their new venture. They proceeded to Kasol on 20.02.2026 and Gurdwara Manikaran

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Sahib. They were returning to McLeodganj on 22.02.2026, when their vehicle was intercepted by the police. One police officer asked the petitioners to provide a lift to the Police Station Bhunter; however, the petitioners declined by saying that they were going to McLeodganj. The police official forcibly boarded the vehicle. The petitioners protested, and the police official asked the petitioners to get out of the vehicle. He searched the vehicle. He demanded the bag containing currency notes worth ₹ 4,00,000/-from petitioner No. 1. He called other police officials, who also demanded the money. The petitioners insisted that a senior police official be summoned and a proper legal procedure be followed, but their demands were not satisfied. Another vehicle bearing registration No. HP-84-8184 also arrived on the spot, which was parked in front of the petitioner's vehicle. The petitioner, no. 1, was directed to get out of the vehicle and enter the vehicle bearing registration No. HP-84-8184. The petitioner No. 1 recorded a video of the incident and transmitted it to his family members and close associates, apprehending a threat to his life. The police officials, the Investigating Officer and other police officials opened the bag belonging to petitioner No.1 and introduced a packet into it. The petitioners protested, and the

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police officials pushed petitioner No.1 towards the road. A mini bus hit him. The petitioners were unlawfully detained from 06.30 p.m. to 01:30 p.m. They were not taken to the police station. They were denied food, water and access to the washroom facility and were continuously intimidated. Petitioner No. 1 was taken to the hospital in a grievously injured condition. FIR No. 32 was registered against the driver of the mini bus regarding the accident. There is an unexplained delay in the registration of the FIR against the petitioner. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR be quashed.

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The petition is opposed by filing a reply, making a preliminary submission regarding the lack of maintainability. The contents of the petition were denied on the merits. It was asserted that the police had effected the recovery of 28 grams of charas and currency notes of ₹4,00,000/- from the car being occupied by the petitioners in the presence of independent witnesses. The petitioners were detained by the police on the spot, and proceedings were being conducted when a tempo traveller bearing registration No. CH-02AA-7771 came from Manikaran at a high speed and hit petitioner No.1. The

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proceedings were stopped, and petitioner No. 1 was carried to Civil Hospital, Degubehar, for immediate medical assistance. He was shifted to the Regional Hospital, Kullu. An FIR was registered against the driver of the Tempo Traveller. The petitioners could not give any satisfactory explanation regarding the currency notes of ₹4,00,000/-. There was a reasonable apprehension that the money was to be used for illegal purposes or was the outcome of any illicit act. Hence, the act of police officials in seizing the currency notes and the charas was legally justified. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr Nishant K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

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Mr Nishant K. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioners, submitted that the petitioners are innocent and they were falsely implicated. The vehicle was intercepted at 06.50 AM, and petitioner No.1 was hit by the Tampo Traveller at about 01.30 AM as per the prosecution. No explanation has been provided for the huge time gap between the interception and the injury of petitioner No. 1, which shows that the petitioners’ version

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regarding the incident is true. The police had surreptitiously introduced the charas into the petitioners’ belongings. The present case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal AIR 1992 SC 604 . Hence, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR and consequential proceedings arising out of it be quashed. He also relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani Vs. State of U.P. & anr. Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025, decided on 02.09.2025 in support of his submissions.

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Mr Jitender Sharma, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the petitioners were found in possession of 28 grams of charas. The police conducted the investigation, which took some time. The petitioners were also found in possession of ₹4,00,000/- in currency notes. It was necessary to carry out the investigation to determine the source of the money, and the police were justified in seizing the currency notes. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The law relating to quashing of criminal cases was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of

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U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

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“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein this Court has summarised some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

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“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

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(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

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(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

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(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

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(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable based on which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

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(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings, and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

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(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

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accused and with a view to spite him due to a private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

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8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

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In clause (1), it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

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As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

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Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceedings can be quashed.”

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This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185, wherein it was observed:

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“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

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9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby preempting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 ).

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A similar view was taken in Rajendra Bihari Lal v. State

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of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2265, wherein it was observed:

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“70. The aforesaid decisions of this Court make it clear that where the High Court is satisfied that the process of any court is being abused or likely to be abused or that the ends of justice would not be secured, it is not only empowered but also obligated under the law to exercise its inherent powers. The provision does not confer any new power on the High Court but rather saves the power which the High Court already possesses, from before the enactment of the legislation, by reason of its very existence. In exercise of its power, it would be legitimate for the High Court to quash any criminal proceedings if the High Court finds that the initiation or continuation of it may lead to abuse of process of court, and quashing of the proceedings would serve the ends of justice.”

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The averments in the FIR show that the police had intercepted a vehicle bearing registration No. HP-88-3888 and found 28 grams of charas and currency notes worth ₹4,00,000/in it. These allegations prima facie show the commission of an offence. All the petitioners were travelling in the vehicle. In Madan Lal versus State of H.P. (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664: 2003 SCC OnLineSC 874 , the contraband was recovered from a vehicle, and it was held that all the occupants of the vehicle would be in conscious possession of the contraband. It was observed:

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“19. Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle, and as noted by the trial court, they were known to each other, and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

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Section 20(b) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be conscious possession.

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It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e., conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

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The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term that assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different

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backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in the Supdt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [(1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038: AIR 1980 SC 52] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniformly applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

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The word “conscious” means awareness of a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

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As noted in Gunwantlal v. State of M.P. [(1972) 2 SCC 194: 1972 SCC (Cri) 678: AIR 1972 SC 1756], possession in a given case need not be physical possession but can be constructive, having power and control over the article in the case in question, while the person to whom physical possession is given holds it subject to that power or control.

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The word “possession” means the legal right to possession (see Heath v. Drown [(1972) 2 All ER 561: 1973 AC 498: (1972) 2 WLR 1306 (HL)] ). In an interesting case, it was observed that where a person keeps his firearm in his mother's flat, which is safer than his own home, he must be considered to be in possession of the same. (See Sullivan v. Earl of Caithness [(1976) 1 All ER 844: 1976 QB 966: (1976) 2 WLR 361 (QBD)] .)

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Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where a presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.

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In the factual scenario of the present case, not only possession but conscious possession has been established. It has not been shown by the accused-appellants that the possession was not conscious in the logical background of Sections 35 and 54 of the Act.”

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Therefore, the petitioners were prima facie in possession

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of 28 grams of charas, which is punishable under Section 20(B)(ii)(b) of the NDPS Act.

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It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false, and the police had surreptitiously introduced Charas into the vehicle. This submission will not help the petitioner. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Punit Beriwala v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2025 SCC OnLine SC 983, that the Court exercising the inherent jurisdiction has to treat the allegations in the FIR as correct. It was observed: -

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“29. It is settled law that the power of quashing a complaint/FIR should be exercised sparingly with circumspection, and while exercising this power, the Court must believe the averments and allegations in the complaint to be true and correct. It has been repeatedly held that, save in exceptional cases where noninterference would result in a miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences. Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court should not be used routinely according to its whims or caprice.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, that the Court cannot conduct a mini-trial to determine the genuineness of the allegations. It was observed: -

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“13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to

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the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at their face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint, even if taken at their face value, do not disclose the commission of an offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra) .

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14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060 :

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“ 14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of the FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding the question of whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed: (SCC p. 63, para 16)

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“ 16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed,

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the learned Single Judge [ Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365 ] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dharambeer Kumar Singh v. State of Jharkhand, (2025) 1 SCC 392: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1894 that the Court cannot conduct a minitrial while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC. It was observed at page 397:

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“17. This Court, in a series of judgments, has held that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, the High Court is not supposed to hold a mini-trial. A profitable reference can be made to the judgment in CBI v. Aryan Singh [CBI v. Aryan Singh, (2023) 18 SCC 399: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 379 ]. The relevant paragraph from the judgment is extracted hereunder: (SCC paras 6-7)

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6 . … As per the cardinal principle of law, at the stage of discharge and/or quashing of the criminal proceedings, while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court is not required to conduct the mini-trial. …

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7 . … At the stage of discharge and/or while exercising the powers under Section 482CrPC, the Court has very limited jurisdiction and is required to consider ‘whether any sufficient material is available to proceed further against the accused for which the accused is required to be tried or not’.”

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Therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed at this stage on

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the ground that the allegations of the FIR are false. This is a matter of

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trial and is to be determined by the learned Trial Court, where the matter is pending.

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It was submitted that there were procedural violations, and the petitioners were kept on the spot for about 7 hours. Petitioner No.1 was injured in the accident caused by a Tempo Traveller. These allegations require proof, but they cannot be used for quashing the FIR. Any procedural illegality committed by the police will not absolve the petitioners of their liability for the possession of the charas.

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A photocopy of the show cause notice issued by the Superintendent of Police, Kullu, was produced to submit that the police are in the habit of preparing false cases. This submission will not help the petitioners. First, issuance of a show-cause notice does not mean that its contents are true. Secondly, even if some irregularities were found in one case does not mean that all the cases are false. Thus, not much advantage can be derived from the showcause notice.

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The case diary maintained by the police does not provide any satisfactory explanation as to why the petitioners were kept on the spot from 6.50 PM till 1.30 AM. The entry in the

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case diary also mentions that the e-sakshya app was not functioning, and recording was not carried out. The circumstances in which petitioner No.1 was injured are also not properly explained. Therefore, it is necessary that an independent investigation be carried out in the circumstances surrounding the injury to petitioner No.1 and the apprehension of the petitioners. Therefore, the CBI is directed to investigate the present matter surrounding the apprehension of the petitioners and injury to petitioner No.1.

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A copy of this order be forwarded to the Director, CBI.

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With these observations, the present proceedings stand disposed of.

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The observations made herein before shall remain confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

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13^th July, 2026 (Chander)

Jamyang Tsering and Others v. State of Hp and Another

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Jamyang Tsering and Others v. State of Hp and Another

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