Kiran Vs Rajesh Kumar @ Manga and Others

For the respondents : Mr. R.L.Chaudhary, Advocate, for respondents No. 1 to 4. Mr. Diwakar Dev Sharma, Additional Advocate General, for respondent No.5.

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__________________________________________________ Romesh Verma, Judge (oral)

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The present petition arises out of the order dated 17.03.2026, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P., whereby an application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff seeking police assistance for implementation of the ad-interim injunction order dated 26.12.2025 has been dismissed.

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The brief facts of the case are that the

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petitioner/plaintiff filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?

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restraining the defendants through their agents, servants, family members and assignees from causing interference in the peaceful possession, enjoyment, development and construction work over the suit land comprised in Khata No. 10 min, Khatauni No.18 min, Khasra Nos. 728/274, 730/275, 276 and 277, kitas 04, land measuring 00-04-59 hectares, situated at Village Morsu Datyalan, Tappa Pahloo, Tehsil Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P.

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It has been averred in the plaint that the plaintiff is the exclusive and absolute owner in peaceful possession of the suit land. She purchased the suit land in the year 2023 from one Sh. Nikka, S/O Sihnu for valuable sale consideration and since then the plaintiff has been in exclusive ownership and possession of the suit land. It has been averred that the defendants are the stranger to the suit land and they have got no right, title and interest over the same in any manner. After purchasing the suit land, the plaintiff applied for the demarcation and accordingly on 17.11.2023, the revenue authorities conducted the demarcation of the spot and fixed and defined the boundaries of the suit land in presence of the adjoining land owners. Thereafter, plaintiff obtained permission from the department of Town and Country Planning, Government of H.P. vide permission dated 14.08.2025

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for the construction over the suit land. Pursuant to the permission granted by the authorities the plaintiff started leveling the suit land by deploying the JCB machine. Then the defendants appeared on the spot and illegally and forcibly obstructed the development work, created hindrance, and did not allow the plaintiff to carry out the development/ construction on her own land without any lawful justification. That on 15.12.2025 the police visited the spot alongwith Halqua Patwari, who in the presence of the defendants verified the spot and found the construction work which was carried out by the plaintiff over the suit land. That the defendants have continued their unauthorized and unlawful interference despite making requests to them several times.

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Therefore, the suit was filed for permanent prohibitory injunction restraining the defendants from causing any interference in the peaceful possession, enjoyment, development and construction work over the suit land. Further it has been prayed that in case the defendants succeed to cause any obstruction or damage to the development work, then decree for damages be passed in favour of the plaintiff.

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Alongwith the suit an application under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2 CPC read with Section 151 CPC has been filed for the grant of

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ad interim injunction was filed before the learned trial Court. The copy of the permission for the development of the plot/suit land has been placed on record Annexure P-2 in the present proceedings. The learned Civil Judge Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P. vide its order dated 26.12.2025 passed the ex-parte ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner and respondents were restrained from digging, raising construction, changing nature or interfering over the suit land till further orders.

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After the passing of the ad-interim injunction by the learned trial Court, the present petitioner filed an application under Section 151 of CPC for providing police assistance to enforce the order dated 26.12.2025. It was averred in the application that after the passing of the ad interim injunction, the same was duly served upon defendants No. 1 to 4 and they had full knowledge and constructive as well as actual notice of the subsisting of the injunction order. In utter disregard and deliberate violation to the injunction order, the respondents/ defendants No. 1 to 4 acting jointly and with common intention came on spot on 17.02.2026 at about 1:30 p.m. and started creating unlawful and unwarranted interference in the peaceful possession and lawful development activity of the plaintiff over the suit land.

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It has been stated in the application that the defendants are complete stranger to the suit land and are not even adjoining land owners of the suit land. The respondents/ defendants are being instigated by the political persons in order to prejudice the rights of the plaintiff. On 17.02.2026 the husband of

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the plaintiff had deployed the JCB machine for carrying out development and construction activities within the demarcated boundaries of the suit land. The respondents/ defendants No. 1 to 4 forcibly came on the spot and illegally stop the work of the plaintiff without having any right, title or interest over the suit land. Though the construction work was being carried out within the boundary marks fixed by the competent revenue authorities yet the defendants out of ill will and political rivalry, created unlawful interference without any legal justification. The respondents have no regard for law, therefore, in order to uphold the majesty of the law and to ensure the effective and meaningful enforcement of the judicial order dated 26.12.2025, it was prayed that after invoking the provisions of Section 151 CPC the police authorities be directed to render necessary assistance for the implementation of the injunction order.

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The application under Section 151 of CPC was duly contested by the defendants/ respondents. All the averments as made in the application were refuted and it has been stated that the applicant wants to encroach over the government land, i.e. Khasra No. 376, which is adjoining to the suit land and is described as Gair Mumkin Rasta in the revenue record. It has been stated that the plaintiff and her husband after demarcation have uprooted and extended the boundary marks with an intention to encroach upon the government land which is Gair Mumkin Rasta. The said path was made Pacca partly by the Gram Panchayat, Morsu Sultani, by spending Rs.3,00,000/- under MNREGA scheme, and for that purpose, all the adjoining owners have given their NOC for the construction of the said path. The respondents/defendants prayed for the dismissal of the application as filed by the plaintiff/ petitioner.

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The learned trial Court vide its impugned order dated 17.03.2026 dismissed the application filed by the present petitioner.

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Feeling dissatisfied, present petitioner/plaintiff has filed the present petition challenging the order dated 17.03.2026 passed by learned Civil Judge, Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P.

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I have heard learned counsel for the parties and gone through the record carefully.

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It is contended by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Rajiv Jiwan assisted by Mr. Yug Singhal, Advocate that the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court is erroneous and liable to be quashed and set-aside. He submits that in order to uphold the majesty of the order of ad-interim injunction, the learned trial Court should not have dismissed the application for the enforcement of the said order through police. He further submits that on the one hand, the learned trial court had passed the ad interim injunction order after finding prima facie case in favour of the applicant/plaintiff, on the other hand, the act of interference, which is required to be curtailed, by means of the enforcement of the injunction order has been declined, which has caused prejudice to the rights of the petitioner.

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On the other hand, Mr. R.L.Chaduahry, learned counsel for the private respondents has defended the impugned order and he submits that in the garb of the ad interim injunction, the petitioner/plaintiff intends to encroach upon the government land which is not permissible. He further submits that while raising

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the construction, the petitioner/plaintiff is encroaching over the

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government land and trying to uproot the passage being used by the general public.

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The petitioner/plaintiff had filed a suit for permanent prohibitory injunction and damages before the learned trial Court. In the application which was filed by the plaintiff, under Order 39 Rule 1 & 2, the learned trial Court has passed an order whereby the present respondents were restrained from digging, raising construction, changing nature or interfering over the suit land till further orders.

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It is the case of the petitioner that in defiance and non compliance to the said order the present respondents are interfering over the suit land. The respondents/ defendants have set-up the plea that the petitioner is trying to encroach the government land and in the garb of the construction, the plaintiff is encroaching over the government land bearing khasra No. 376.

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The learned trial Court after hearing the respective parties came to the conclusion that the excavation work was carried out near the public pathway and that a dispute has arisen regarding the boundary and alleged encroachment. Learned Civil Judge has further observed that complaints have been made by the Gram Panchayat and villagers regarding alleged damage to

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the public path. Therefore, the application filed by the plaintiff/petitioner under Section 151 CPC for enforcement of the order has been dismissed.

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The plaintiff after satisfying the learned trial Court made out a prima facie case in his favour and consequently adinterim injunction order was passed in favour of the plaintiff. The stand which is being adopted by the defendants that the plaintiff is trying to encroach upon the government land cannot be sustained at this stage in order to override the ad interim injunction order passed in favour of the plaintiff. There is no material on record to substantiate that any construction being raised by the plaintiff is to encroach upon the government land/path. In case the defendants were of the opinion that the plaintiff is trying to encroach upon the government land bearing khasra No. 376, which is adjoining to the suit land and is described as Gair Mumkin Rasta, in that event, the best possible way to resolve the issue was to obtain the demarcation from the revenue authority. In the absence of any concrete material on record, the right of plaintiff cannot be permitted to be jeopardized that too in the light of the ad interim injunction order, whereby the defendants have been restrained from interfering over the suit land. By passing the impugned order

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by the trial Court a premium has been given to the defendants to

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interfere over the suit land and on this account the order as passed by the learned trial Court on 26.12.2025 has virtually lost its efficacy.

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In the garb of the impugned order, the defendants in defiance to the order of injunction order will not allow the plaintiff to carry out the development activities over the suit land which admittedly is owned and possessed by him. In case, it is the stand of the defendants that the plaintiff is trying to encroach upon the government then the best method which is available to the defendants is to obtain the demarcation and to place it on record. The memo of parties reveals that individual persons has been arrayed as party defendants and injunction was sought to restrain them from interfering over the suit land. Neither the Gram Panchayat nor the State is a party defendant. The allegations have been leveled by the private defendants. Merely, on the bald assertion of the defendants, the learned trial Court ought not to have rejected the plea as raised by the plaintiff. The plaintiff has purchased the suit land in the year 2023 from one Nikka, S/O Sihanu. She has placed on record the copy of permission as granted by the department of Town and Planning dated

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14.08.2025. It is the plaintiff who has got prima facie case in her favour and based upon that prima facie case, balance of convenience and irreparable loss, the learned trial Court had passed an ad interim injunction in favour of the plaintiff. In case the said order is not implemented in its letter and spirit, then the very purpose of the passing of such order shall be defeated.

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The Hon’ble Apex Court as well as this Court has repeatedly held that an interim protection order passed by the Competent Court has to be implemented in its letter and spirit and no one can be permitted to violate the same. The majesty of the Court orders has to be upheld. On account of the defiance as made by the present defendants/respondents, the petitioner/ plaintiff were compelled to approach the Court for the grant of interim protection and for the grant of police assistance. Once the interim protection has been granted to the petitioner/plaintiff, then the same cannot be permitted to be violated to the detriment to the rights of the plaintiff.

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A Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CMPMO No. 166 of 2021 , titled Sanjay Kumar vs. Vijay Kumar & others, decided on 13.07.2023 , has held as under :-

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“7. This Court in Jaishi Ram and others Vs. Salig Ram, 1981 Sim. L.C. 156 has held that if the

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circumstances of a case are such that assistance of police for the enforcement of an order is necessary, an order to this effect can be passed. The learned Single Judge has held as under:

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“3. I have perused the order passed by the Sub-Judge. He has based his judgment on a decision in Ravapati Audemma V. Pothineni Narasimham, AIR 1971 A.P. 53. This is a Division Bench judgment of that High Court. In the said judgment the point involved was the same as in the presence case. The learned Judges have discussed the case-law on the point. They have not agreed with certain prior decisions. The relevant observations may be reproduced:

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“The observations in the aforesaid decision no doubt support the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner. The learned Judge Bhima Sankaram, J., referred to Section 151, C.P.C. but took the view that because an order of injunction is capable of enforcement by punishing its disobedience in the manner provided by Order 39 Rule 2(3), C.P.C., it is not open to the Civil Courts to enforce the same with the aid of the police. With great respect we are unable to agree with this reasoning. It has to be noticed that Order 30, Rule 2(3), CPC., provides only for punishment by attachment of the property or by detention in civil prison of the person who committed breach. But it does not further provide for implementation of the order of injunction itself. Order 39, Rule 2(3) cannot be said to be an express provision with respect to implementation of the order of injunction, but is only a provision which provides penalty for disobedience of the order. In such a case there being no other express provisions in the Code for enforcement

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of the order, it is not only proper but also necessary that the courts should render all aid to the aggrieved party to derive full benefits of the order. Though the order of injunction under Order 39, C.P.C. is only interim in nature, still it clothes the person who obtained the order with certain rights and he is entitled to enforce the aforesaid right against the party who is bound by the order. No doubt in such a case, the aggrieved party himself could approach the police authorities to prevent obstruction to the enforcement of the order or to the exercise of the right which he derives under the order or to the exercise of such right which he derives under the order of Court. But we do not see why when the same person brings to the notice of the Court that enforcement of the order is sought to be prevented or obstructed, the Court should not exercise its inherent power under Section 151, C.P.C. and direct the police authorities to render all aid to the aggrieved party in the implementation of the Court’s order. In our opinion the exercise of such power is necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process and the civil court has ample jurisdiction to pass such order under Section 151, C.P.C. The learned Judge’s observation “that the police are not bound to obey and directions of the court in the absence of any statutory obligation to do so and a civil court would be stultifying itself by giving directions which may not be complied with”, with great respect, cannot be said to be correct. Inasmuch as we are of the opinion that such a direction to be police authorities could be given under the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C. the police are bound to obey such directions.”

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The learned Judges have also referred to some decisions on the point, including the observations in Padam Sen Vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1961 SC 218). It is desirable to reproduce the same:

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“The following observations in AIR 1961 e also apposite in this context: “

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The inherent powers of the Court are in addition to the powers specifically conferred on the Court by the Code. They are complementary to those powers and therefore it must be held that the Court is free to exercise them for the purpose mentioned in Sec. 151 of the Code when the exercise of those powers is not in any way in conflict with what has been expressly provided in the Code or against the intentions of the Legislature.’ In view of these clear observations of their Lordships with regard to the scope and ambit of the inherent powers of the Court under Section 151, C.P.C., we are clearly of the opinion that in order to do justice between the parties or to prevent the abuse of process of the Court, the Civil courts have ample jurisdiction to give directions to the police authorities to render aid to the aggrieved parties with regard to the implementation of the orders of Court or the exercise of the rights created under orders of Court. That the police authorities owe a legal duty to the public to enforce the law is clear from a decision of the Court of Appeal, reported in R.V. Metropolitan Police Commr., (1968) 1 All DR 763, where Lord Denning, M.R. observed at page 769 as follows: “I hold it to be the duty of the Commissioner of Police, as it is of every chief constable to enforce the law of the land…..but in all these things he is not the servant of anyone, save of the law itself. The responsibility for law enforcement lies on

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him. He is answerable to the law and to the law alone.”

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The same view was expressed by the other learned Judges. We may also refer to the judgment of the Madras High Court, in Varadachariar V. Commr. Of Police (1969) 2 Mad. LJ 1, where the learned Judge, Kailasam, J., after referring to the English case cited above held that the Commissioner of Police should proceed and act in accordance with the directions indicated in the aforesaid judgment.”

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8. In P. Shanker Rao v. Smt. B. Susheela, AIR 2000 Andhra Pradesh 214, learned Single Judge of Andhra Pradesh has held that the court in its inherent powers under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure can grant police aid to ensure effective implementation of temporary injunction pending suit for perpetual injunction and procedure under order 39 rule 2-A of the Code of Civil Procedure need not be followed. Learned Single Judge has held as under:

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“[3] The observations, in my considered view should be confined to the facts of that particular case. In that case, the defendant sought police protection on the ground that the plaintiff was interfering with his possession despite the fact that the temporary injunction granted earlier in favour of the plaintiff was vacated. Thus, it is not a case where the order to extend police aid was granted in order to ensure compliance with an order of injunction in force pending the suit. The mere fact that the action could be taken against either party for flouting the injunction under Order XXXIX Rule 2-A or under the Contempt of Courts Act does not come in the way of the Court taking all necessary steps for ensuring obedience of the injunction order. The Court need not wait till the injunction is breached. In a fit case, the Court can undoubtedly direct police aid as a

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preventive measure. This power though not expressly conferred, is a power incidental or ancillary to the exercise of the power to grant injunction pending the suit. With great respect, I am not in a position to record my concurrence with the broad observations made by the learned Judge that the civil Court cannot direct police aid for execution of its order - interlocutory or final and that the party should only have recourse to the procedure laid down under Order XXI, Rule 32 or the Contempt of Courts Act. The observations are in the nature of obiter and therefore not binding on me. It is therefore unnecessary to refer the matter to the Division Bench, more so in view of the decision of this Court relied upon by the trial Court. I would however like to point out that the police aid should not be granted for mere asking. The Court has to be satisfied, prima facie, that there is an imminent threat of violation of interim order, if police does not intervene and that there is no other way of ensuring effective compliance. If however an alternative could be found such as, deploying an Officer of the Court to oversee the implementation of the order, the Court can avoid granting order for police aid.”

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The totality of the facts and circumstances in the present case indicates that this is a fit case for interfering in the impugned order as passed by the learned trial Court. In case, the interim protection granted by the learned trial Court is not implemented, in that event, the very purpose of filing of the application under Order 39 Rule 1 and 2 CPC and the order passed by the learned trial Court dated 26.12.2025 shall be

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defeated. The respondents cannot be permitted to rake up the issue of encroachment over the government land in the absence of placing on record any substantive material. As rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel, the respondents/defendants have failed to file any written statement and reply to the interim application. In the application filed under Section 151 of CPC, the defence has been taken that the plaintiff has been encroaching over the government land. Such approach being adopted by the defendants/respondents is not legally sustainable.

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In order to uphold the majesty of law and to implement the ad interim injunction, this court is of the opinion that the present application filed by the petitioner/plaintiff under Section 151 of CPC for providing police assistance to enforce the order dated 26.12.2025 deserves to be allowed.

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It is ordered that, SHO Police Station Bhoranj, District Hamirpur, H.P. be directed to comply with the order dated 26.12.2025 and he can take the assistance of the revenue authority to do the needful on the spot. Consequently, after setting aside the impugned order dated 17.03.2026 the application filed by the present petitioner/plaintiff under Section 151 of CPC for

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providing police assistance to enforce the order dated 26.12.2025

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is allowed.

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