Dismissed¶169

Abhi Kumar v. State of Hp

NDPS Act – Regular bail – Commercial quantity

Himachal Pradesh HC9 Jul 2025CRMPM/974/2025

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Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Bail denied under S.37 ND&PS Act: Abhi Kumar, in custody since 11.10.2023 in FIR No. 295 of 2023 (Sections 20 & 29, ND&PS Act, PS Sadar Kullu, District Kullu) involving 3.519 Kg charas and 110.572 kgs cannabis seeds; Court held prima facie conscious possession and failure to satisfy the twin conditions of S.37; request to direct conclusion of trial within six months also rejected. Cr. MP(M) No. 974 of 2025, decided 09.07.2025 (Rakesh Kainthla, J.).

What did the court decide?

The petitioner, found outside the tent with cannabis plants while charas and cannabis seeds were recovered from the tent, is prima facie in possession; once possession is found, the burden shifts on him to establish that the possession was not conscious. ¶69

Abhi Kumar Vs State of Hp — Narcotics (NDPS) | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶169

Issue for consideration

Whether the petitioner is entitled to regular bail despite being found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas, i.e., whether the twin conditions of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act are satisfied. +2 more

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Court's answer

Possession of 3.519 Kg of charas being a commercial quantity, the rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the case.

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Ratio / Principle

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Key takeaways

Non-apprehension of Ramu, the person alleged to have employed the petitioner, does not help the petitioner; his possession of the charas is not taken away merely because the employer was not found.ratio¶70
The petitioner, prima facie found in possession of the commercial quantity of charas with nothing to show that he would not commit an offence if released on bail, has failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.ratio¶149
A direction to the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of six months is not permissible; constitutional courts should not normally fix time-bound schedules for disposal of cases.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

NDPS Act – Regular bail – Commercial quantity – Petitioner found outside tent with cannabis plants; 3.519 Kg charas and 110.572 kgs cannabis seeds recovered from tent at Rajhak Thach – Prima facie possession established; burden to disprove conscious possession lies on accused (Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan) – Non-apprehension of alleged employer 'Ramu' does not dilute possession – Commercial quantity attracts rigours of S.37 ND&PS Act; twin conditions (opportunity to Public Prosecutor; reasonable grounds to believe accused not guilty and unlikely to re-offend) not satisfied – Bail refused – Alternative prayer to direct Trial Court to conclude trial within six months declined; Constitutional Courts should not ordinarily fix time-bound schedules (M. Gopalakrishnan; Shaikh Uzma Feroz Hussain; Allahabad High Court Bar Assn.) – Petition dismissed (Rakesh Kainthla, J.).

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2025:HHC:21857

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. MP(M) No. 974 of 2025

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Reserved on: 04.07.2025 Date of Decision: 09.07.2025

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Abhi Kumar ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh ...Respondent

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Coram

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Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge.

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Whether approved for reporting?¹ No.

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For the Petitioner : Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, Advocate. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General,

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking regular bail in FIR No. 295 of 2023, dated 11.10.2023, registered for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 20 and 29 of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act (in short ‘the ND&PS Act’) at Police Station Sadar Kullu, District Kullu, H.P.

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It has been asserted that the petitioner has been in

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custody since 11.10.2023. The allegations against the petitioner are

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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false. The prosecution's case is highly improbable. The petitioner has no role in the commission of crime. There is no link evidence to connect the petitioner with the commission of a crime. The prosecution has examined five witnesses out of 15 cited by it, and there is no possibility of an early conclusion of the trial. The petitioner has spent one year and seven months in custody, and he is entitled to bail because his right to a speedy trial is being violated. Hence, the petition.

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The petition is opposed by filing a status report asserting that the police party was on patrolling duty on 11.10.2023. The police reached Rajhak Thach at noon. They associated Sher Singh. After some distance, the police saw two tents with huge quantities of cannabis plants and some people. The police started walking towards the tents. All of them gathered near one tent. The police enquired about the reason, but they could not give any satisfactory answer. The police went inside the tent and found one carry bag containing 3.519 Kgs of charas. The police seized the charas. The police also searched the tents and found 5 bags containing the seeds of cannabis. The total weight of the seeds was found to be 110.572 kgs. The police also seized the seeds. The police made enquiries from the accused, and they revealed

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that one person named Ramu had employed them to extract cannabis on a daily wage. The police sent the charas to FSL, and as per the report of analysis, the exhibit was an extract of cannabis and a sample of charas. The challan was prepared and presented before the Court on 30.12.2023. The prosecution has cited 16 witnesses, out of whom the statements of five witnesses have been recorded. The matter was listed for recording the statements of prosecution witnesses on 27.05.2025. Hence, the status report.

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I have heard Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the Petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Yashveer Singh Rathore, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. Ramu, who is stated to have employed the petitioner, was not examined by the prosecution, and there is no evidence on record to connect the petitioner with the commission of crime. The petitioner has been behind the bars for the last one year and seven months. The prosecution has only examined five witnesses out of the sixteen cited by it. The right to a speedy trial of the petitioner is being violated; hence, he prayed that the

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present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He submitted in the alternative that directions be issued to the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial within six months.

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Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, submitted that the petitioner was found in possession of a commercial quantity of charas and the rigours of Section 37 of the ND&PS Act apply to the present case. The petitioner has not satisfied the twin conditions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. The prosecution has already examined five witnesses, and there is no delay in the progress of the trial. Hence, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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The parameters for granting bail were considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajwar v. Waseem (2024) 10 SCC 768: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 974, wherein it was observed at page 783: -

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“Relevant parameters for granting bail

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26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of

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obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [ Chaman Lal v. State of U.P . , ( 2004) 7 SCC 525: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1974]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan [Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1977]; Masroor v. State of U.P. [Masroor v. State of U.P., (2009) 14 SCC 286 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1368]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee [Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 765]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. [Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., (2014) 16 SCC 508 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi)[Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 12 SCC 129 : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 425]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar [Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 558] . ]

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This position was reiterated in Ramratan v. State of

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M.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3068, wherein it was observed as under: -

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“12. The fundamental purpose of bail is to ensure the accused's presence during the investigation and trial. Any conditions imposed must be reasonable and directly related to this objective. This Court in Parvez Noordin Lokhandwalla v. State of Maharastra (2020) 10 SCC 77 observed that though the competent court is empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. The relevant observations are extracted herein below:

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“14. The language of Section 437(3) CrPC, which uses the expression “any condition … otherwise in the interest of justice” has been construed in several decisions of this Court. Though the competent court is

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empowered to exercise its discretion to impose “any condition” for the grant of bail under Sections 437(3) and 439(1)(a) CrPC, the discretion of the court has to be guided by the need to facilitate the administration of justice, secure the presence of the accused and ensure that the liberty of the accused is not misused to impede the investigation, overawe the witnesses or obstruct the course of justice. Several decisions of this Court have dwelt on the nature of the conditions which can legitimately be imposed both in the context of bail and anticipatory bail.” (Emphasis supplied)

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13. In Sumit Mehta v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2013) 15 SCC 570 , this Court discussed the scope of the discretion of the Court to impose “any condition” on the grant of bail and observed in the following terms: —

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“15. The words “any condition” used in the provision should not be regarded as conferring absolute power on a court of law to impose any condition that it chooses to impose. Any condition has to be interpreted as a reasonable condition acceptable in the facts permissible in the circumstance, and effective in the pragmatic sense, and should not defeat the order of grant of bail. We are of the view that the present facts and circumstances of the case do not warrant such an extreme condition to be imposed.” (Emphasis supplied)

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14. This Court, in Dilip Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2021) 2 SCC 779 , laid down the factors to be taken into consideration while deciding the bail application and observed:

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“ 4. It is well settled by a plethora of decisions of this Court that criminal proceedings are not for the realisation of disputed dues. It is open to a court to grant or refuse the prayer for anticipatory bail, depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case. The factors to be taken into consideration while considering an application for bail are the nature of the accusation and the severity of the punishment in the case of conviction and the

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nature of the materials relied upon by the prosecution; reasonable apprehension of tampering with the witnesses or apprehension of threat to the complainant or the witnesses; the reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the time of trial or the likelihood of his abscondence; character, behaviour and standing of the accused; and the circumstances which are peculiar or the accused and larger interest of the public or the State and similar other considerations. A criminal court, exercising jurisdiction to grant bail/anticipatory bail, is not expected to act as a recovery agent to realise the dues of the complainant, and that too, without any trial.” (Emphasis supplied)

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This position was reiterated in Shabeen Ahmed versus State of U.P., 2025 SCC Online SC 479.

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The present petition has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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As per the status report, the police found the petitioner with cannabis plants outside the tent along with the other accused. The police recovered the charas from the tent. The police also recovered five bags of cannabis seeds from the tent. The fact that the petitioner was found with the cannabis plants and that the charas and the cannabis seeds were found in the tent can lead to a prima facie conclusion, at this stage, that he was in possession of the cannabis. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan , (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC

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(Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237, that a person is in possession if he is in a position to exercise control over the article. It was observed on page 111:

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25. We shall deal with each of these circumstances in turn. The respondent has been accused of an offence under Section 8 of the NDPS Act, which is punishable under Sections 21, 27-A, 29, 60(3) of the said Act. Section 8 of the Act prohibits a person from possessing any narcotic drug or psychotropic substance. The concept of possession recurs in Sections 20 to 22, which provide for punishment for offences under the Act. In Madan Lal v. State of H.P. [Madan Lal v. State of H.P., (2003) 7 SCC 465: 2003 SCC (Cri) 1664 ] this Court held that: (SCC p. 472, paras 19-23 & 26)

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“ 19 . Whether there was conscious possession has to be determined with reference to the factual backdrop. The facts which can be culled out from the evidence on record are that all the accused persons were travelling in a vehicle and as noted by the trial court they were known to each other and it has not been explained or shown as to how they travelled together from the same destination in a vehicle which was not a public vehicle.

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20 . Section 20( b ) makes possession of contraband articles an offence. Section 20 appears in Chapter IV of the Act, which relates to offences for possession of such articles. It is submitted that in order to make the possession illicit, there must be a conscious possession.

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21 . It is highlighted that unless the possession was coupled with the requisite mental element, i.e. conscious possession and not mere custody without awareness of the nature of such possession, Section 20 is not attracted.

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22 . The expression “possession” is a polymorphous term which assumes different colours in different contexts. It may carry different meanings in contextually different backgrounds. It is impossible, as was observed in Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja [Supt. & Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, W.B. v. Anil Kumar Bhunja, (1979) 4 SCC 274: 1979 SCC (Cri) 1038 ] to work out a completely logical and precise definition of “possession” uniform[ly] applicable to all situations in the context of all statutes.

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23 . The word “conscious” means awareness about a particular fact. It is a state of mind which is deliberate or intended.

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26 . Once possession is established, the person who claims that it was not a conscious possession has to establish it, because how he came to be in possession is within his special knowledge. Section 35 of the Act gives a statutory recognition of this position because of the presumption available in law. Similar is the position in terms of Section 54, where also presumption is also available to be drawn from possession of illicit articles.”

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26. What amounts to “conscious possession” was also considered in Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab [Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2010) 9 SCC 608 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1431 ], where it was held that the knowledge of possession of contraband has to be gleaned from the facts and circumstances of a case. The standard of conscious possession would be different in the case of a public transport vehicle with several persons as opposed to a private vehicle with a few persons known to one another. In Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan [Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, (2015) 6 SCC 222: (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 881] , this Court also observed that the term “possession” could mean

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physical possession with animus; custody over the prohibited substances with animus; exercise of dominion and control as a result of concealment; or personal knowledge as to the existence of the contraband and the intention based on this knowledge.

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Therefore, the petitioner cannot claim that he was not

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in possession when he was found outside the tent with the cannabis plants and the recovery of charas and cannabis seed was effected from the tents . Once the petitioner is found in possession, the burden would shift upon him to establish that the possession was not conscious.

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It was submitted that Ramu has not been apprehended, and there is no evidence that the petitioner was employed by Ramu. This submission will not help the petitioner. The petitioner was in possession of the charas and if the person employing him was not found, his possession would not be taken away.

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The petitioner was found in possession of 3.519 Kg of charas, which is a commercial quantity; therefore, the rigours of Section 37 of the NDPS Act apply to the present case. Section 37 of the NDPS Act provides that in an offence involving commercial quantity, the Court should be satisfied that the accused is not

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guilty of the commission of an offence and is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Section 37 of the NDPS Act reads as under:

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“37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable. – (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)—

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(a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable;

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(b) no person accused of an offence punishable for offences under section 19 or section 24 or section 27A, and also for offences involving commercial quantity, shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless–

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(i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and

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(ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

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(2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force, on granting of bail.”

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This Section was interpreted by the Hon'ble Supreme

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Court in Union of India Versus Niyazuddin & Another (2018) 13 SCC

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738 and it was held that in the absence of the satisfaction that the

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accused is not guilty of an offence and he is not likely to commit an

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offence while on bail, he cannot be released on bail. It was observed:

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“7. Section 37 of the NDPS Act contains special provisions with regard to the grant of bail in respect of certain offences enumerated under the said Section. They are :

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(1) In the case of a person accused of an offence punishable under Section 19,

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(2) Under Section 24,

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(3) Under Section 27A and

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(4) Of offences involving commercial quantity.

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The accusation in the present case is with regard to the fourth factor, namely, commercial quantity. Be that as it may, once the Public Prosecutor opposes the application for bail to a person accused of the enumerated offences under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, in case, the court proposes to grant bail to such a person, two conditions are to be mandatorily satisfied in addition to the normal requirements under the provisions of the Cr.P.C. or any other enactment.

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(1) The court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person is not guilty of such an offence;

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(2) that person is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.”

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This position was reiterated in State of Kerala Versus Rajesh, AIR 2020 SC 721, wherein it was held:

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“19. This Court has laid down broad parameters to be followed while considering the application for bail moved by the accused involved in offences under the NDPS Act. In Union of India vs. Ram Samujh and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 429 , it has been elaborated as under:-

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"7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits the murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. The reason may be the large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier vs. Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa, (1990) 1 SCC 95) as under:

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With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on society as a whole, Parliament, in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing Act 81 of 1985 specifying

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mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.

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To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely,

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(i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and

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(ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied. The High Court has not given any justifiable reason for not abiding by the aforesaid mandate while ordering the release of the respondent accused on bail. Instead of attempting to take a holistic view of the harmful socio-economic consequences and health hazards which would accompany trafficking illegally in dangerous drugs, the court should implement the law in the spirit with which Parliament, after due deliberation, has amended."

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The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 of the CrPC but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37, which commences with the non-obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of the commission of an offence under the Act unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application, and the second is that the Court must be satisfied that there are

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reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such an offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates.

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The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”

¶113

A similar view was taken in Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan, (2021) 10 SCC 100: (2021) 3 SCC (Cri) 721: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1237 wherein it was observed at page 110:

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“21. Under Section 37(1)( b )( ii ), the limitations on the grant of bail for offences punishable under Sections 19, 24 or 27-A and also for offences involving a commercial quantity are:

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( i ) The Prosecutor must be given an opportunity to oppose the application for bail; and

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(ii) There must exist “reasonable grounds to believe” that: ( a ) the person is not guilty of such an offence; and ( b ) he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail.

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22. The standard prescribed for the grant of bail is “reasonable ground to believe” that the person is not guilty of the offence. Interpreting the standard of “reasonable grounds to believe”, a two-judge

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Bench of this Court in Shiv Shanker Kesari [ Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari, (2007) 7 SCC 798: (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 505 ], held that: (SCC pp. 801-02, paras 7-8 & 10-11)

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“ 7 . The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is “reasonable grounds”. The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged, and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify the recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged.

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8 . The word “reasonable” has in law the prima facie meaning of reasonable in regard to those circumstances of which the actor, called on to act reasonably, knows or ought to know. It is difficult to give an exact definition of the word “reasonable”.

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‘ 7 . … Stroud's Judicial Dictionary , 4th Edn., p. 2258 states that it would be unreasonable to expect an exact definition of the word “reasonable”. Reason varies in its conclusions according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual, and the times and circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up the old scholastic logic sounds now like the jingling of a child's toy.’

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[See MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar [MCD v. Jagan Nath Ashok Kumar, (1987) 4 SCC 497], SCC p. 504, para 7 and Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. [Gujarat Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd., (1989) 1 SCC 532 ]]

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10 . The word “reasonable” signifies “in accordance with reason”. In the ultimate analysis, it is a question of fact whether a particular act is reasonable or not, depends on the circumstances in a given situation. (See Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. [Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Kamla Mills Ltd. (2003) 6 SCC 315 ]

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11 . The court, while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act, is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose, essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail, that the court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.”

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(emphasis supplied)

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23. Based on the above precedent, the test which the High Court and this Court are required to apply while granting bail is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused has not committed an offence and whether he is likely to commit any offence while on bail. Given the seriousness of offences punishable under the NDPS Act and in order to curb the menace of drug trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for the grant of bail under the NDPS Act have been prescribed.”

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This position was reiterated in Narcotics Control Bureau

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v. Mohit Aggarwal, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 891, wherein it was observed:

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“11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non-obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 to be kept in mind, but the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 37 are also to be factored in. The conditions imposed in subsection (1) of Section 37 are that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused person for release and (ii) if such an application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.

¶137

12. The expression “ reasonable grounds ” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “ Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” (2004) 3 SCC 549 , a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus:—

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“7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance so far as the present accused-respondent is concerned, are the satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The

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reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added]

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13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for discussion in “ State of Kerala v. Rajesh” (2020) 12 SCC 122 and this Court has observed as below:

¶143

“20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires the existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence . In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.”[emphasis added]

¶144

14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe that the accused person would not have committed such an offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid satisfaction is an additional consideration that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.

¶145

We may clarify that at the stage of examining an application for bail in the context of Section 37 of the Act, the Court is not required to record a finding that the accused person is not guilty. The Court is also not expected to weigh the evidence for arriving at a finding as to whether the accused has committed an offence under the NDPS Act or

¶146

¶147

2025:HHC:21857

¶148

not. The entire exercise that the Court is expected to undertake at this stage is for the limited purpose of releasing him on bail. Thus, the focus is on the availability of reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offences that he has been charged with and that he is unlikely to commit an offence under the Act while on bail.

¶149

In the present case, the petitioner was prima facie found in possession of the commercial quantity of charas and there is nothing to show that he would not commit the offence if released on bail. Thus, he has failed to satisfy the requirements of Section 37 of the NDPS Act.

¶150

It is submitted that a direction be issued to the learned Trial Court to conclude the trial within a period of six months. This is not permissible. It was laid down in M. Gopalakrishnan v. Pasumpon Muthuramalingam, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1968, that any order of expediting the hearing might upset the calendar and schedule of the subordinate Court, and might result in assigning an unwarranted priority to that particular case over and above other cases pending in that Court. It was observed: -

¶151

“4. Looking to the nature of the order passed by the High Court, we are not inclined to grant leave to appeal in this matter but feel impelled to observe that ordinarily, before passing any such order for expeditious proceedings in a particular case (which might appear to be rather innocuous), it would be appropriate for the higher Court to appreciate that any such order for one case, without cogent

¶152

¶153

2025:HHC:21857

¶154

and extremely compelling reasons, might upset the calendar and schedule of the subordinate Court; might result in assigning an unwarranted priority to that particular case over and above other cases pending in that Court; and progression of such other cases might suffer for no reason and none of the faults of the litigants involved therein.”

¶155

This position was reiterated in Shaikh Uzma Feroz Hussain

¶156

vs. State of Maharashtra Writ Petition Criminal no. 587 of 2023 decided on 10.11.2023 (SC) wherein it was observed:

¶157

“We are of the view that since every High Court and every Court in the country has a huge pendency, the Constitutional Court should avoid the temptation of fixing a time-bound schedule for the disposal of any case before any Court unless the situation is extraordinary.”

¶158

A similar view was taken in the Allahabad High Court Bar

¶159

Assn. v. State of U.P., (2024) 6 SCC 267: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 207

¶160

wherein it was observed:

¶161

41. Therefore, constitutional Courts should not normally fix a time-bound schedule for the disposal of cases pending in any Court. The pattern of pendency of various categories of cases pending in every Court, including High Courts, is different. The situation at the grassroots level is better known to the judges of the concerned Courts. Therefore, the issue of giving out-of-turn priority to certain cases should be best left to the concerned Courts. The orders fixing the outer limit for the disposal of cases should be passed only in exceptional circumstances to meet extraordinary situations.

¶162

42. There is another important reason for adopting the said approach. Not every litigant can easily afford to file proceedings in the Constitutional Courts. Those litigants

¶163

¶164

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¶165

who can afford to approach the constitutional Courts cannot be allowed to take undue advantage by getting an order directing out-of-turn disposal of their cases while all other litigants patiently wait in the queue for their turn to come. The Courts, superior in the judicial hierarchy, cannot interfere with the day-to-day functioning of the other Courts by directing that only certain cases should be decided out of turn within a time frame. In a sense, no Court of law is inferior to the other. This Court is not superior to the High Courts in the judicial hierarchy. Therefore, the Judges of the High Courts should be allowed to set their priorities on a rational basis. Thus, as far as setting the outer limit is concerned, it should be best left to the concerned Courts unless there are very extraordinary circumstances.

¶166

Therefore, no direction can be issued to conclude the trial

¶167

within a period of six months. However, this Court hopes and trusts that the learned Trial Court shall deal with the matter as expeditiously as possible in the circumstances of the case.

¶168

24. No other point was urged.

¶169

In view of the above, the present petition fails and the same is dismissed.

¶170

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶171

9^th July, 2025 (ravinder)

Abhi Kumar v. State of Hp

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Abhi Kumar v. State of Hp

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