Sunil Kumar Vs State of Hp

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 17.01.2013 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Chamba, District Chamba, vide which the judgment of conviction dated 29.11.2010 and order of sentence dated 30.11.2010 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Dalhousie, District Chamba, H.P. were upheld. ( Parties shall

¶11

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶12

P a g e | 2 2025:HHC:21724

¶13

hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

¶14

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition are that police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Sections 181 and 184 of Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). It was asserted that Chanchalo Devi (PW1) and her daughterin-law, Shanti Devi (since deceased), were returning from Hatli Forest with grass on 12.07.2004. They reached Bari-ka-More at 6:30 pm, when a vehicle bearing registration No.HP-01-8734came from Nainikhad at a high speed. The vehicle hit the informant Chanchalo Devi and Shanti Devi. They sustained injuries. They were taken to the hospital; however, Shanti Devi succumbed to her injuries. The matter was reported to the police. Anentry (Ext. PW6/A) was recorded in the Police Station. ASI Onkar Singh visited the spot to verify the correctness of the information. He recorded the statement of Chanchalo Devi (Ext. PW1/A), which was sent to the police station where FIR (Ext. PW7/A) was registered. He filed an application for obtaining the MLC of the injured. Dr. Gorakhnath conducted the medical examination of Chanchalo

¶15

P a g e | 3 2025:HHC:21724

¶16

Devi and found that she had sustained multiple injuries, which could have been caused within less than six hours. He referred her to a higher institution. The inquest on the dead body was conducted. The post-mortem examination of Shanti Devi was conducted by Dr. Maan Singh (PW3), who issued a report of postmortem examination (Ext. PW3/A) stating that the cause of death was head injuries. ASI Onkar Singh visited the spot and prepared the site plan. He seized the vehicle bearing registration No.HP-018734 along with the documents vide memo (Ext. PW2/A). The mechanical examination of the vehicle was conducted by Satish Kumar (PW5), who found that there was no mechanical defect in the vehicle which could have led to the accident. He issued the report (Ext. PW5/A). The photographs of the dead body (Ext. P1 and P2), whose negatives are Ext. P3 and P4 were taken by Bharat Bhushan (PW4). The statements of remaining witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.

¶17

The learned Trial Court put the notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 337, 338 and 304A of the IPC and Sections 181 of the

¶18

P a g e | 4 2025:HHC:21724

¶19

MV Act, to which the accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

¶20

The prosecution examined 7 witnesses to prove its case. Chanchalo Devi (PW1) is the eyewitness. Ravikant (PW2) is the witness to the seizure memo. Maan Singh (PW3) conducted the post-mortem examination of Shanti Devi. Bharat Bhushan (PW4) took the photographs. Satish Kumar (PW5) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. LC Veena Devi (PW6) proves the entry in the daily diary. SI-Vijay Singh (PW7) signed the FIR.

¶21

The accused in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that he was innocent and was falsely implicated. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused.

¶22

Learned Trial Court held that the accused was driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. He took the vehicle to the extreme side of the road and hit the informant and her daughterin-law. The informant sustained multiple injuries, and Shanti Devi succumbed to the injuries. The accident was caused due to the negligence of the accused; hence, he was convicted of the

¶23

P a g e | 5 2025:HHC:21724

¶24

commission of offences punishable under Sections 279, 338 and

¶25

304A of the IPC and was sentenced as under::-

¶26

	Sections	Imprisonment
Under IPC	Section 279 of the	To undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹ 200/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days.
Under IPC	Section 338 of the	To undergo simple imprisonment for six months, pay a fine of ₹ 500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days.
Under IPC	Section 304A of the	To undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹ 500/-, and in default of payment of fine, to undergo further simple imprisonment for seven days.

¶27

Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Chamba (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was negligently driving the vehicle. He drove the vehicle to the extreme side of the road. Sufficient space was available on the Highway. This constituted negligence of the accused. His negligence caused injuries to the informant and the

¶28

P a g e | 6 2025:HHC:21724

¶29

death of Shanti Devi. He was rightly convicted and sentenced by the learned Trial Court; hence, the appeal was dismissed.

¶30

Being aggrieved from the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition asserting that no witness deposed that the accused acted rashly or negligently, and the petitioner could not have been convicted in the absence of any such evidence. Driving a vehicle at a high speed does not establish the negligence of a person. No witness has disclosed the approximate speed of the vehicle. The mere fact that the road in question was broad was not sufficient to infer negligence. The learned Courts below failed to appreciate the material on record. Chanchalo Devi (PW1) categorically stated that she had seen the vehicle from a distance of 10 meters, and the visibility was restricted to only 5 to 10 feet. She had also heard the sound of the horn, which shows that the accused had taken due care and caution by blowing the horn. The material witnesses were examined, and an adverse inference should be drawn against the prosecution. Therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed, and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below be set aside.

¶31

P a g e | 7 2025:HHC:21724

¶32

I have heard Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

¶33

Mr. Nitin Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and was falsely implicated. No witness deposed about the approximate speed of the vehicle, and learned Courts below erred in holding that the high speed is equivalent to negligence. The high speed is distinct from negligence, and there was no evidence of negligence. The informant stated on oath that she was walking towards the right side of the road, which is contrary to the prosecution's case that the victim/informant was walking on the left side of the road. This makes the whole case of the prosecution doubtful. The accused had blown the horn, and the informant suddenly appeared in the middle of the road. There was no negligence on the part of the accused; therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of this Court in Manohar Lal vs. State of HP, passed in Cr. Revision No. 4115 of 2013 decided on 28.05.2025 and by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State

¶34

P a g e | 8 2025:HHC:21724

¶35

of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, in support of his submission.

¶36

Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State, submitted that the learned Courts below had rightly held that the vehicle was being driven towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident, therefore, the negligence of the accused was duly established; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶37

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶38

It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207: -

¶39

“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision

¶40

P a g e | 9 2025:HHC:21724

¶41

is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

¶42

This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

¶43

Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

¶44

“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

¶45

15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

¶46

“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate

¶47

P a g e | 10 2025:HHC:21724

¶48

for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

¶49

13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even framing of charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

¶50

16. This Court in the aforesaid judgment in Amit Kapoor case [ Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ] has also laid down principles to be considered for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 particularly in the context of prayer for quashing of charge framed under Section 228CrPC is sought for as under : ( Amit Kapoor case [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 ], SCC pp. 482-83, para 27)

¶51

“ 27 . Having discussed the scope of jurisdiction under these two provisions, i.e. Section 397 and Section 482 of the Code, and the fine line of jurisdictional distinction, it

¶52

P a g e | 11 2025:HHC:21724

¶53

will now be appropriate for us to enlist the principles with reference to which the courts should exercise such jurisdiction. However, it is not only difficult but inherently impossible to state such principles with precision. At best and upon objective analysis of various judgments of this Court, we are able to cull out some of the principles to be considered for proper exercise of jurisdiction, particularly, with regard to quashing of charge either in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 397 or Section 482 of the Code or together, as the case may be:

¶54

27.1 . Though there are no limits to the powers of the Court under Section 482 of the Code but the more the power, the more due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking these powers. The power of quashing criminal proceedings, particularly, the charge framed in terms of Section 228 of the Code, should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.

¶55

27.2 . The Court should apply the test as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made from the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith prima facie establish the offence or not. If the allegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable that no prudent person can ever reach such a conclusion, and where the basic ingredients of a criminal offence are not satisfied, then the Court may interfere.

¶56

27.3. The High Court should not unduly interfere. No meticulous examination of the evidence is needed for considering whether the case would end in conviction or not at the stage of framing of charge or quashing of charge.

¶57

¶58

27.9. Another very significant caution that the courts have to observe is that it cannot examine the facts, evidence and materials on record to determine whether there is sufficient material on the basis of which the case

¶59

P a g e | 12 2025:HHC:21724

¶60

would end in a conviction; the court is concerned primarily with the allegations taken as a whole whether they will constitute an offence and, if so, is it an abuse of the process of court leading to injustice.

¶61

¶62

27.13 . Quashing of a charge is an exception to the rule of continuous prosecution. Where the offence is even broadly satisfied, the Court should be more inclined to permit continuation of prosecution rather than its quashing at that initial stage. The Court is not expected to marshal the records with a view to decide admissibility and reliability of the documents or records, but is an opinion formed prima facie.”

¶63

17. The revisional court cannot sit as an appellate court and start appreciating the evidence by finding out inconsistencies in the statement of witnesses, and it is not legally permissible. The High Courts ought to be cognizant of the fact that the trial court was dealing with an application for discharge.”

¶64

It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC

¶65

165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed on page 169:

¶66

“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the ground for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

¶67

P a g e | 13 2025:HHC:21724

¶68

“ 5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

¶69

13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

¶70

“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting

¶71

P a g e | 14 2025:HHC:21724

¶72

aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

¶73

14. In the above case, also conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [ Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.

¶74

This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

¶75

“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

¶76

17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457] , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong

¶77

P a g e | 15 2025:HHC:21724

¶78

order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

¶79

The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶80

The victim-Chanchalo Devi (PW1), stated that she and her daughter-in-law were returning from the jungle carrying grass. A Tata Sumo came at a high speed and hit them. She sustained injuries, and her daughter-in-law died in the accident. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. She admitted in her cross-examination that she could not tell the approximate speed of the vehicle. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed:

¶81

“Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath dey was struck by the

¶82

P a g e | 16 2025:HHC:21724

¶83

bus, though not: from the front side of the bus as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.”

¶84

This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs.

¶85

Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held:

¶86

“Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.”

¶87

This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal Latest

¶88

H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging

¶89

rashness or negligence. It was observed: -

¶90

“It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.”

¶91

P a g e | 17 2025:HHC:21724

¶92

21. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh

¶93

Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: -

¶94

“Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.”

¶95

Thus, the accused cannot be held liable based on the

¶96

statement of a witness that he was driving the vehicle at a high speed, and the prosecution has to establish a specific negligence of the accused.

¶97

Chanchalo Devi (PW1) stated that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. This is not sufficient to convict the accused. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed :

¶98

“It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact

¶99

P a g e | 18 2025:HHC:21724

¶100

that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 24. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), wherein it was held:

¶101

“It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.”

¶102

Therefore, the statement of the witness that the driver was negligent by itself, without anything more, does not constitute legally admissible evidence upon which a reliance can be placed by the Court of law to base its judgment.

¶103

Chanchalo Devi (PW1) stated in her cross-examination that she was walking towards her right-hand side. The vehicle was coming from the opposite side, which means that the accused was driving the vehicle towards the left-hand side of the road.

¶104

The Central Government has framed the Rules of the Road Regulations, 1989, to regulate the movement of traffic. Rule 2 provides that the driver of a vehicle shall drive the vehicle as close to the left side of the road as may be expedient and shall allow all the traffic which is proceeding in the opposite direction to pass on his right side. Statement of Chanchalo Devi (PW1) shows that the accused was driving the vehicle towards the left side of the

¶105

P a g e | 19 2025:HHC:21724

¶106

Road; hence, the prosecution's case that the accused was driving the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road, which was the proximate cause of the accident, is not proved.

¶107

Both the learned Courts below proceeded on the basis that the accused was driving the vehicle at a high speed, and he hit the informant by taking the vehicle to the extreme left side of the road. This is not correct in view of the statement of the informant. The prosecution did not examine the Investigating Officer to prove the site plan and the position existing on the spot. Thus, the prosecution’s case that the accused had hit the informant and her daughter-in-law by driving the vehicle towards the wrong side of the road has not been proved.

¶108

Therefore, both the learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused was negligent because he was driving the vehicle towards the left side of the road. They failed to notice the statement of the informant that she was walking on the right side of the road, and the vehicle came from the opposite side, which shows that the accident occurred towards the left side of the accused. Thus, the judgments and order passed by learned Courts

¶109

P a g e | 20 2025:HHC:21724

¶110

below are contrary to the evidence on record and cannot be sustained.

¶111

In view of the above, the present revision is allowed and the judgments and order passed by learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside. The accused is ordered to be acquitted of the charged offences. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner, be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

¶112

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in an event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

¶113

P a g e | 21 2025:HHC:21724

¶114