Munish Soni Vs State of Hp

For the Petitioner	: Mr. Athrav Sharma, Advocate.
For the Respondent-	: Mr. Lokender Kutlehria,
State	Additional Advocate General, with HC Sunny Sharma, IO, PS Haroli, District Una,

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The petitioner has filed the present petition for seeking pre-arrest bail in FIR No.97/25 dated 16.06.2025 registered at Police Station Haroli, Tehsil Haroli, District Una, H.P for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 64, 78, 351 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023 (for short “BNS”) and Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (for short “IT Act”).

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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It has been asserted that, as per the prosecution, the petitioner and the informant were in a consensual relationship. The petitioner refused to meet the informant’s demand of ₹ 12,00,000/-, and she filed a false complaint against the petitioner. The petitioner had earlier filed a petition for seeking pre-arrest bail, which was dismissed by the learned Sessions Judge, Una, on 24.06.2025. The petitioner filed a bail petition, which was registered as Cr.MP (M) No.1526/25 and was dismissed on 14.07.2025. The petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition as SLP (Cr.) No.11295/2025. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner withdrew the petition on 04.11.2025 with liberty to approach the Competent Court for the grant of bail. The petitioner subsequently filed a bail petition before the learned Sessions Judge, which was dismissed on 24.11.2025. The status report shows that the police have not sought the custodial interrogation. Two persons were found to be involved in the commission of the offence. The Instagram ID was being operated by one minor and the petitioner. The status report mentioned that the photographs were sent to Nikhil Sharma, but this statement is incorrect because the Internet Protocol Detail Records (IPDR) data only shows the ID of the person using the social media

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platform and does not confirm the sending of the material. Learned Sessions Judge erred in dismissing the bail petition by accepting the contents of the status report as correct. The petitioner had a consensual relationship with the informant. He had paid various amounts to her from time to time. The informant demanded ₹12,00,000/- which the petitioner was unable to pay; hence, she filed a false complaint against the petitioner. The photographs do not show the petitioner. Petitioner’s mobile phone and Laptop have already been seized by the police. There are material contradictions in the FIR and the statements. The petitioner is married, and his wife delivered a baby. She requires the petitioner’s support. The petitioner would abide by the terms and conditions, which the Court may impose upon him, hence, the petition.

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The State filed a status report, asserting that the victim was in a relationship with the petitioner. She went to a room with the petitioner, where he clicked her photographs. He started threatening the victim to upload her photographs on social media. The victim also talked to the petitioner’s wife, but she did not take any action. The petitioner uploaded the victim’s photographs on social media. Police investigated the matter and seized 10 screenshots, copies of the visitor’s

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register of Sahil Plaza Hotel, the petitioner’s mobile phone and his laptop. The petitioner joined the investigation as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. His medical examination was conducted. His blood sample was preserved. The Medical Officer issued a report that there was nothing to suggest that the petitioner was unable to perform sexual intercourse. The mobile phone and the laptop have been sent to RFSL Dharamshala for the retrieval of data. The petitioner disclosed during the interrogation that photographs were sent by Nikhil Sharma to him on 02.05.2025, and he had forwarded these photographs to the victim’s maternal aunt on her asking on 15.06.2025. Nikhil Sharma revealed during the interrogation that he had not uploaded the photographs. He had obtained photographs while chatting on Instagram. Tanuj Katoch revealed during the investigation that four photographs were stolen from his mobile phone. One photograph depicted the status of Tanuj Katoch. Police seized the mobile phone of Tanuj. Police traced the Instagram ID to a minor, who revealed that this ID was prepared by the petitioner. The petitioner and the minor were using it. The mobile phone was seized by the police, and five Instagram IDs were found to be operated through it, including the disputed ID. The victim revealed that

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two photographs were taken by the petitioner in Hotel Sahil Plaza. The investigation is continuing, and the results from RFSL are awaited. The petitioner is involved in the commission of a heinous offence. He would intimidate the witnesses and would abscond if released on bail; hence, it was prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have heard Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner is innocent and he was falsely implicated. No allegation of rape was made by the informant in the FIR. She introduced the allegations of rape in her statement recorded under Section 183 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS). The photographs were sent to the petitioner by Nikhil Sharma. The Instagram ID was operated by the minor; the petitioner has no role in the commission of the offence. Therefore, he prayed that the petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. He relied upon the judgment of Punjab & Haryana High Court in CRM-M-10868 & 20326-2023, titled as Vaneet Sachdeva vs State of Punjab (2023: PHHC:069665), and judgment of

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High Court of Bombay (Aurangabad Bench) in Criminal Application No.1130 of 2006, titled as Nikhil vs State of Maharastra 2006 ALL MR (Cri)1595, in support of his submission.

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Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Learned Additional Advocate General for the respondent-State, submitted that the petitioner is involved in the commission of a crime. He would intimidate the witnesses in case of his release on bail; therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the Bar and have gone through the records of the case carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24: (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 509: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1143 that arrest is a part of the investigation procedure. The power of pre-arrest bail is extraordinary and should be exercised sparingly. It was observed:

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“69. Ordinarily, an arrest is a part of the procedure of the investigation to secure not only the presence of the accused but also several other purposes. Power under Section 438 Cr.P.C. is an extraordinary power, and the same has to be exercised sparingly. The privilege of prearrest bail should be granted only in exceptional cases.

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The judicial discretion conferred upon the court has to be properly exercised after application of mind as to the nature and gravity of the accusation; the possibility of the applicant fleeing justice, and other factors to decide whether it is a fit case for the grant of anticipatory bail. Grant of anticipatory bail to some extent interferes with the sphere of investigation of an offence, and hence, the court must be circumspect while exercising such power for the grant of anticipatory bail. Anticipatory bail is not to be granted as a matter of rule, and it has to be granted only when the court is convinced that exceptional circumstances exist to resort to that extraordinary remedy.”

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This position was reiterated in Srikant Upadhyay

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v. State of Bihar, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 282, wherein it was held:

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“25. We have already held that the power to grant anticipatory bail is extraordinary. Though in many cases it was held that bail is said to be a rule, it cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be said that anticipatory bail is the rule. It cannot be the rule, and the question of its grant should be left to the cautious and judicious discretion of the Court, depending on the facts and circumstances of each case. While called upon to exercise the said power, the Court concerned has to be very cautious, as the grant of interim protection or protection to the accused in serious cases may lead to a miscarriage of justice and may hamper the investigation to a great extent, as it may sometimes lead to tampering or distraction of the evidence. We shall not be understood to have held that the Court shall not pass interim protection pending consideration of such application as the Section is destined to safeguard the freedom of an individual against unwarranted arrest, and we say that such orders shall be passed in eminently fit cases.”

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It was held in Pratibha Manchanda v. State of

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Haryana, (2023) 8 SCC 181: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 785

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that the Courts should balance individual rights, public interest and fair investigation while considering an application for pre-arrest bail. It was observed:

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“21. The relief of anticipatory bail is aimed at safeguarding individual rights. While it serves as a crucial tool to prevent the misuse of the power of arrest and protects innocent individuals from harassment, it also presents challenges in maintaining a delicate balance between individual rights and the interests of justice. The tightrope we must walk lies in striking a balance between safeguarding individual rights and protecting public interest. While the right to liberty and presumption of innocence are vital, the court must also consider the gravity of the offence, the impact on society, and the need for a fair and free investigation. The court's discretion in weighing these interests in the facts and circumstances of each case becomes crucial to ensure a just outcome.”

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It was held in Devinder Kumar Bansal v. State of Punjab, (2025) 4 SCC 493: 2025 SCC OnLine SC 488

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that pre-arrest bail can be granted in exceptional circumstances where the Court is of the view that the petitioner was falsely implicated in the case, and the presumption of innocence cannot be a reason to grant bail. It was observed at page 501:

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“21. The parameters for the grant of anticipatory bail in a serious offence like corruption are required to be satisfied. Anticipatory bail can be granted only in exceptional circumstances where the court is prima facie of the view that the applicant has been falsely implicated in the crime or the allegations are politically motivated or are frivolous. So far as the case at hand is concerned, it

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cannot be said that any exceptional circumstances have been made out by the petitioner-accused for the grant of anticipatory bail, and there is no frivolity in the prosecution.

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22. In the aforesaid context, we may refer to a pronouncement in CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy [CBI v. V. Vijay Sai Reddy, (2013) 7 SCC 452: (2013) 3 SCC (Cri) 563] , wherein this Court expressed thus: (SCC p. 465, para 34)

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“34. While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusation, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy itself as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. It is not expected, at this stage, to have the evidence establishing the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” (emphasis in original and supplied)

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23. The presumption of innocence, by itself, cannot be the sole consideration for the grant of anticipatory bail. The presumption of innocence is one of the considerations that the court should keep in mind while considering the plea for anticipatory bail. The salutary rule is to balance the cause of the accused and the cause of public justice. Over-solicitous homage to the accused's liberty can, sometimes, defeat the cause of public justice.

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The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The contents of the status report show that the petitioner took the victim to Hotel Sahil Plaza, where he had maintained sexual relations with her and clicked her photographs. Two photographs were uploaded subsequently on Instagram, which were identified by the victim as the ones that were taken in the Hotel Sahil Plaza by the petitioner. The photographs corroborate the victim’s testimony that the accused had sexual relations with her.

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It was submitted that the petitioner had not uploaded the photographs on social media. Prima facie, this submission is unacceptable. The photographs were in the mobile phone of the petitioner, and only he can explain how the photographs were uploaded to social media. The ID, on which these photographs were uploaded, was being operated by the minor and the petitioner. The fact that the petitioner was operating the ID and the photographs were in his possession can lead to the only inference that the petitioner had uploaded the photographs.

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The police added Section 67 of the IT Act. It was submitted that the photographs do not fulfil the

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requirements of Section 67 of the IT Act. This Court has seen the photographs, and they depict sexually explicit content; therefore, the offence would prima facie fall within Section 67A and not within Section 67 of the IT Act. Hence, the judgments in Vaneet Sachdeva’s case (supra) and Nikhil’s case (supra) dealing with Section 67 of the IT Act would not apply to the present case.

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It was submitted that the custodial interrogation of the petitioner is not required, and the petitioner is entitled to bail. This submission is only stated to be rejected. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Sumitha Pradeep v. Arun Kumar C.K., (2022) 17 SCC 391: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1529 that pre-arrest bail cannot be granted because the charge sheet has been filed or the custodial interrogation is not required. It was observed at page 397:

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10. It may be true, as pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for Respondent 1, that the chargesheet has already been filed. It will be unfair to presume on our part that the investigating officer does not require Respondent 1 for custodial interrogation for further investigation.

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11. Be that as it may, even assuming it is a case where Respondent 1 is not required for custodial interrogation, we are satisfied that the High Court ought not to have granted discretionary relief of anticipatory bail.

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Therefore, the petitioner cannot be held entitled to bail simply because the police have not mentioned in the status report that the petitioner’s custodial interrogation is necessary in the present case.

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It was submitted that the victim had made false allegations against the petitioner because he had refused to provide her ₹12,00,000/-. This submission will not help the petitioner. There are sufficient circumstances on record to corroborate the victim’s testimony. The police seized the record from Hotel Sahil Plaza, wherein an entry in the petitioner’s name was made. Police also seized the photographs, in which the petitioner and the victim were found in a compromising position. The victim complained of rape in her statement made to the learned Magistrate. Thus, the plea that a false complaint was made by the victim to pressurize the petitioner cannot be accepted.

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The allegations made against the petitioner are serious. These involve the raping the victim and uploading her photographs on social media. Hence, keeping in view the gravity of the offence, the petitioner is not entitled to prearrest bail.

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