Rajinder Singh Vs State of Hp

2025:HHC:40792

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Revision No.321 of 2015 Reserved on: 07.10.2025 Date of Decision: 01.12.2025

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Rajinder Singh			....Petiti	oner
	Ve	rsus
State of Himachal Pradesh			....Respo	ndent
Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh K* *Whether approved for report* For the Petitioner For the Respondent/ State	*ainthla,* *ing?¹Ye : Mr.* Adv : Mr. Adv	*Judge.* s Tek ocate. Tarun ocate Ge	Chand Pathak, neral.	Sharma, Deputy

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 01.07.2015 passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla ( learned Appellate Court) vide which judgment of conviction dated 30.11.2013 and order of sentence dated 27.03.2014 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Chopal, District Shimla, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to

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Whether reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes

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in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the police filed a challan against the accused for committing the offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the accused Rajinder Singh was posted as ‘Gramin Dak Sewak’ at Chopal. He misappropriated ₹7200/- sent by the Welfare Department as old age pension to Pinjari Devi (PW-13), Mastoo Devi (PW-14), Kalavati (PW-6), Sundroo (PW-9), Jhami Devi (PW-7) and Subhda (PW-5). This amount was recovered by the Postal department, and a complaint (Ext.PW-1/A) was made to the Police. The police registered the F.I.R. (Ext.PW-19/A). Govind Ram (PW-26) investigated the matter. Pratap Singh (PW-1) produced the receipt of ₹7200/- (Ext.P-1), which was seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). Thumb impression of the accused (Ext.P-21/A-129 to Ext.P-21/A-138) and finger prints of the victims (Ext.P-21/A-1 to Ext.P-21/A-117) were taken and sent to Finger Print Phillaur for comparison. Kuldeep Singh (PW-27) issued the reports (Ext-PW-27/B and Ext.PW-

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27/B-1) stating that the fingerprints of the accused matched the fingerprints purported to have been put by Mastoo Devi (PW-14) on the money order. Statements of the witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigations, the challan was prepared and presented before the Court.

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Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

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summon the accused. When the accused appeared, he was charged with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined twenty-seven witnesses to prove its case. Pratap Singh (PW-1) was posted as a Sub Post Master and handed over the money to the accused for disbursal. Mohar Singh (PW-2), Om Parkash (PW-3), Duni Chand (PW-4) and Purshotam Chauhan (PW-15) are the witnesses to the recovery. Subhda (PW-5), Kalavati (PW-6), Jhami Devi (PW-7), Sundroo (PW-9), Pinjari Devi (PW-13) and Mastoo Devi (PW-14) are the victims and have not supported the prosecution’s case. Ram Dev (PW-8)

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conducted the inquiry after receipt of the complaint regarding the misappropriation of money. Man Singh (PW-10) and Brij Mohan (PW-12) were present during the inquiry. Sushil Kumar (PW-11) produced the money order forms. Lokinder Singh (PW-16) was told about the misappropriation of the pension amount. Bhopinder Singh (PW-17) wrote an application to the department regarding non-disbursal of the amount. Keshu Ram (PW-18) proved the sanction of the old age pension. HC Pritam Singh (PW-19) signed the F.I.R. HC Mohan (PW-20) seized the records. Om Prakash Negi (PW-21) was posted as Executive Magistrate in whose presence thumb impressions were taken. HC Dinesh (PW-22) proved the entry in the daily diary. Hardev Sharma (PW-23) produced the appointment order of the accused. Sohan Singh (PW-24) is a witness to the taking of the thumb impression. SI Dandu Ram (PW-25) and Inspector Govinder Ram (PW26) investigated the matter. Kuldeep Singh (PW-27) compared the thumb impressions.

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., asserted that the victim did not reside within the jurisdiction of the area allotted to the accused.

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Jogindra Devi had paid the amount to the rightful claimants as required. All the witnesses except Subhda (PW-5) stated the truth. Subhda Devi (PW-5) deposed falsely as she was employed by Lokender Negi, with whom the family of the accused had a long-standing enmity. He claimed that he was innocent, and a false case was made against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s evidence proved that the accused was entrusted with money to be disbursed in the area where the victims were residing. The victims were declared hostile, but they admitted that the accused used to distribute their pension. Subhda (PW-5) admitted in her cross-examination that the accused had misappropriated her old-age pension. The defence taken by the accused that Jogindra Devi was disbursing the mail/money orders was not probable. Pratap Singh (PW-1) categorically proved that the accused was entrusted with the disbursement of the mail/money orders in the area where the victims were residing. The expert opinion proved that the thumb impression of the accused matched the thumb impression on

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the money order form of Mastoo Devi (PW-14), which

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corroborated the prosecution’s version that the money was not disbursed to Mastoo Devi (PW-14) and was misappropriated by the accused. The official from the Tehsil Welfare Office proved the sanction of the money. The burden was upon the accused to prove that he had disbursed the money. The accused did not provide any explanation. He had forged the receipt on the money order form. Hence, the learned Trial Court convicted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 409 and 477-A of IPC

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and sentenced him as under:-

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Sections

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Sentences

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409 of IPC The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹2000/- and, in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

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477 of IPC

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The accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years, pay a fine of ₹2000/- and in default of payment of the fine, to further undergo simple imprisonment for three months.

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It was ordered that both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge-II, Shimla (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the accused was posted as Gramin Dak Sewak at the Sub Post Office, Chopal. He was entrusted with ₹7200/-, being the half-yearly payment of old age pension to Pinjari Devi (PW-13), Mastoo Devi (PW-14), Kalavati (PW-6), Surndroo Devi (PW-9), Jhami Devi (PW-7) and Subhda (PW-5). The accused misappropriated the amount and did not disburse it to the beneficiaries. His thumb impression matched the thumb impression purported to have been put by Mastoo Devi (PW-14) on the money order form. Thus, the prosecution has succeeded in proving the misappropriation and forgery by the accused. The learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused. The sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court was adequate, and no interference was required. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision, asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material on record. The prosecution was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and no advantage could have been taken by the weakness of the defence. The plea taken by the accused that Jogindra Devi was a Gramin Dak Sewak was admitted by Subdha Devi (PW-5) in her cross-examination. This part of her cross-examination was ignored by the learned Court below; therefore, it was prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Tek Chand Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Tarun Pathak, Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr Tek Chand Sharma, learned Counsel for the petitioner/accused, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. The victims turned hostile and did not support the prosecution’s case. The learned Courts below relied upon the report of the

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expert, which was not sufficient to convict the accused. The thumb impressions were taken in the presence of the Executive Magistrate, who was not competent to take them. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Mr Tarun Pathak, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, submitted that the report of the fingerprint expert proved that the accused had put the thumb impression of Mastoo Devi (PW-14) on the money order form proving the falsification of the documents by the accused. The victims admitted in their cross-examination that the accused was Gramin Das Sewak, posted in their area, and he had not disbursed the old age pension to them. The prosecution had proved the entrustment, and it was for the accused to prove what happened with the money entrusted to him. He failed to provide any explanation. Learned Courts below had rightly held him guilty, and this Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision petition be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page 207:-

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986 , where the scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised

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arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275 , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavanv. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any

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relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the

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absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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This position was reiterated in Sanjabij Tari v.

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Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was

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observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v.Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

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The present revision has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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Subhda (PW-5) stated that she had not received the pension, but thereafter she received it. She did not know who had disbursed the pension to her. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She admitted that the accused had misappropriated her pension worth ₹1700/-. She stated in her

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cross-examination by learned counsel of defence that she was getting a pension every month, and the accused had not misappropriated her pension.

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The statement of this witness is highly contradictory. She initially stated that the accused Rajinder Singh had not disbursed any pension to her, and thereafter stated in her cross-examination by learned Counsel of defence that the accused had not misappropriated her pension. Thus, she had made a contradictory statement, and no reliance can be placed upon her testimony.

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Kalavati (PW-6) stated that she had received the whole pension. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She denied that the accused had not disbursed the pension of October and November 2005 or that she had made a statement to this effect before the postal authorities. She denied her previous statement recorded by the police. She has not supported the prosecution’s case regarding non-disbursal of old age pension to her, and no advantage can be derived by the prosecution from her testimony.

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Jhami Devi (PW-7) stated that she used to receive a

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pension every month, and the disbursal of the pension never stopped. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She denied that she had not received a pension for six months and made a complaint to this effect. She denied the previous statement recorded by the police. She has not supported the prosecution’s case regarding the non-disbursal of the pension.

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Sundroo (PW-9) stated that she continued to receive a pension. Her pension was never stopped. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She admitted that the pension was disbursed through a money order. She denied that she had received her pension w.e.f. October 2005 till March 2006. She denied that the accused had forged her thumb impression. She could not say whether she had put her thumb impression on the money order, or whether the accused had forged her thumb impression. She denied that she was making a false statement to help the accused. The testimony of this witness also does not prove the prosecution’s case regarding the non-disbursal of the pension to her.

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Pinjari Devi (PW-13) stated that her pension was stopped, but it was released subsequently. She was permitted to be cross-examined. She denied the previous statement recorded by the police. She denied that the accused had misappropriated her pension. The statement of this witness also does not establish the prosecution’s case regarding the non-disbursal of the pension to her.

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Mastoo Devi (PW-14) stated that she used to receive her pension through a money order. She received the pension continuously. She was permitted to be crossexamined. She denied that she had received the pension for three months. She denied that her statement was recorded by an official of the postal department. She denied that she was making a false statement to save the accused. She has also not supported the prosecution’s case, and no advantage can be derived from her testimony.

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Thus, all the victims have not supported the prosecution’s case that the accused had not disbursed the old-age pension to them.

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Learned Trial Court relied upon the complaint made to the postal authorities and held that it is admissible under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act; however, the learned Trial Court overlooked the fact that Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act makes the previous statement admissible to corroborate the testimony of a witness. Thus, the statement admitted under Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act is not a substantive piece of evidence, but it can only be used to corroborate the testimony of a person. Since Mastoo Devi (PW-14) never said that she had not received the pension, therefore, her complaint to the police could not have been taken as a substantive piece of evidence to prove that the pension was not paid to her.

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Similarly, the statement made by her during the investigation conducted by the postal department is also not a substantive piece of evidence and could not have been relied upon to record the conviction.

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Learned Trial Court held that Subhda (PW-5) has supported the prosecution’s case after she was declared hostile. This is a complete misreading of the statement

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because she stated in her cross-examination by learned counsel for the defence that Jogindera Devi was posted in her beat, she used to disburse the pension to her, and the accused had not misappropriated her old age pension. Thus, her testimony in her cross-examination dilutes her statement in the examination-in-chief that the accused had misappropriated her old age pension. Her statement is contradictory, as noticed above and could not have been used to record the conviction.

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The other victims did not support the prosecution’s case; therefore, the prosecution’s version that the accused had not disbursed the old age pension to the victim has not been proved beyond a reasonable doubt by the oral evidence.

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Learned Courts below relied upon the matching of the thumb impression of the accused with the thumb impression purported to have been made by Mastoo Devi (PW-14). When Mastoo Devi had not stated anything about her thumb impression, the matching of the thumb impression was not sufficient to record the conviction. It was laid down in

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Bazari Hajam and Ors. vs. Emperor (20.12.1921 - PATNAHC): MANU/BH/0204/1921 that a person cannot be convicted of forgery based on the statement of a fingerprint expert without any corroboration. It was observed:

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“6. Now the learned Sessions Judge considered the point whether the evidence of the fingerprint expert received any corroboration. He conceded that the appellants could not be convicted without such corroboration but he has recorded a finding to the effect that the evidence of the finger print expert had received corroboration, Now the view of the learned Session's Judge is this: He says, first of all, that the accused are residents of the village with which the executants of the document, that is to say, Ram Prasad and Rim Chandra Pande, are connected. The learned Sessions Judge thinks that this evidence corroborates the testimony of the fingerprint experts. Secondly, the learned Sessions Judge was impressed by the fact that the complainant mentioned the name of the accused very early in the proceedings. He also took that as another corroborating circumstance.

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I wholly disagree with the view of the learned Sessions Judge. This evidence, in my opinion, does not at all corroborate the evidence of the fingerprint expert.”

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It was laid down by the Gauhati High Court in Golap Chandra Mahanta vs. State of Assam (06.05.1988 - GUHC):

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MANU/GH/0164/1988 that the accused cannot be convicted

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based on the report of the fingerprint expert if other corroborative evidence is either absent or doubtful. It was

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held in Musheer Khan v. State of M.P. , (2010) 2 SCC 748: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1100: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 229 that the evidence of a fingerprint expert is not a substantive piece of evidence and it can only be used to corroborate other evidence. It was observed at page 757:

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34. It will be noticed that under the Evidence Act, the word “admissibility” has very rarely been used. The emphasis is on relevant facts. In a way, relevancy and admissibility have been virtually equated under the Evidence Act. But one thing is clear: the evidence of a fingerprint expert is not substantive evidence. Such evidence can only be used to corroborate some items of substantive evidence which are otherwise on record.

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In the present case, the report of the handwriting

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expert is not corroborated. Mastoo Devi has not stated that the fingerprint does not belong to her, and she admitted that she had received her old age pension; hence, the report of the fingerprint expert is not sufficient to convict the accused.

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court erred in convicting the accused, and the learned Appellate Court erred in upholding the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court. Hence, the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below cannot be sustained.

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No other point was urged.

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In view of the above, the present revision is allowed, and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below are ordered to be set aside, and the accused is ordered to be acquitted of the charged offences. The fine amount, if deposited by the petitioner/accused, shall be refunded to him after the expiry of the statutory period of limitation in case of no further appeal, and in case of appeal, it shall be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the petitioner is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the petitioner on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

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