Ranjeet Singh Vs Hp Gramin Bank

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Ranjeet Singh Vs. Himachal Pradesh Gramin Bank

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Cr.MP No.5079 of 2025 Cr.Revision No.196 of 2022

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05.12.2025 Present: Applicant-Petitioner in person with Mr. Sanket Sankhyan, Advocate,

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Shri Rahul Pathik, Branch Manager in person with Mr. Anirudh Sharma, Advocate.

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Cr.MP No.5079 of 2025

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The present application has been filed by the applicant-petitioner under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short, ‘NI Act’) for compounding the offence under Section 138 of NI Act.

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The applicant-petitioner was convicted by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bilaspur, HP, vide judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.02.2020, which was affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, HP, vide judgment dated 10.03.2022. He laid challenge to the said judgment dated 10.03.2022 before this Court by way of Criminal Revision No.196 of 2022, which was also dismissed by this Court vide order dated 02.07.2025.

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Today, the parties are present in person and their statements have been recorded. Shri Rahul Pathik, Branch Manager of the complainant-Bank has stated on oath that Now, the Bank has compromised the matter with the applicant/ petitioner/ accused and since there are no dues pending against him with respect to the loan account as he has repaid the entire amount under one time settlement scheme (OTS), against which, he had issued the cheque in question, therefore, the

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Bank has issued ‘No Objection Certificate’ (NOC) and has no objection in case judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.02.2020, passed by the learned Trial Court, upheld by the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, HP, vide judgment dated 10.03.2022 and further affirmed by this Court are quashed and set aside.

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I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and also gone through the material available on record.

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A Division Bench of this Court in Cr.MMO No.188 of

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2025 , titled as Chune Ram Vs. Brikam Chand, decided on 13.11.2025, held in paras-36 and 37 as under:-

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“36. Hence, in view of our aforesaid discussion, we are of the firm opinion that the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C./528 of BNSS is available to be exercised by the High Court for compounding the offence under section 138 of the N.I. Act only with the explicit consent of the complainant or the person aggrieved. In our considered opinion, when parties to the offence under Section 138 of the Act enter into compromise, it should be given effect to under Section 147 of the Act at any stage of the proceedings, even after conviction being finalized by the High Court. The failure to give effect to such compromise would render the import of Section 147 of the Act meaningless. If this Court does not permit compounding of the offence under Section 138 of the Act through Section 147 of the Act on the ground that the conviction has reached its end, it would result in grave injustice being committed against the parties, who would be persuaded to continue a proceeding, which neither party intends or would benefit from. Moreover it would discourage the parties from entering into compromise and would operate against the intention of the Legislature to promote mutual settlement of the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a catena of decisions held that the compensatory aspect of remedy shall have priority over the punitive aspect and the courts should encourage compounding of offences under the NI Act if parties are willing to do so. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also noted the situation that large number of cases involving dishonour of cheques are choking the criminal justice system and putting an unprecedented strain on the judicial functioning. Therefore, in our opinion, if the parties are required to approach the Hon’ble Supreme Court to compound the offence, it will merely

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have the effect of delaying justice and incurring unwarranted expenses upon the parties besides increasing burden on the Supreme Court.

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37.Therefore, we answer the question of law that the power conferred under Section 528 BNSS can always be exercised by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction for compounding the offence under Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and to quash the conviction finally affirmed by the High Court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, when no proceedings are pending before any Court. The reference case is accordingly directed to be placed before the appropriate Bench after obtaining necessary orders from Hon’ble the Chief Justice.”

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Having taken note of the fact that the respondentcomplainant has settled the matter with the petitioner-accused and he has no objection in compounding the offence, therefore, this Court sees no impediment in accepting the prayer made on behalf of the accused-petitioner for compounding of offence while exercising power under Section 147 of the Act as well as in terms of guidelines issued by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Damodar S. Prabhu V. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court has held as under:-

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“10. At present, we are of course concerned with Section 147 of the Act, which reads as follows:-

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“147. Offences to be compoundable– Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every offence punishable under this Act shall be compoundable.”

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At this point, it would be apt to clarify that in view of the nonobstante clause, the compounding of offences under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is controlled by Section 147 and the scheme contemplated by Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter “CrPC”) will not be applicable in the strict sense since the latter is meant for the specified offences under the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

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11. So far as the CrPC is concerned, Section 320 deals with offences which are compoundable, either by the parties without the leave of the court or by the parties but only with the leave of the Court. Sub-section (1) of Section 320 enumerates the offences which 9 are compoundable without the leave of the Court, while subsection (2) of the said section specifies the offences which are compoundable with the leave of the Court.

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12. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is in the nature of an enabling provision which provides for the

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compounding of offences prescribed under the same Act, thereby serving as an exception to the general rule incorporated in sub-section (9) of Section 320 of the CrPC which states that ‘No offence shall be compounded except as provided by this Section’. A bare reading of this provision would lead us to the inference that offences punishable under laws other than the Indian Penal Code also cannot be compounded. However, since Section 147 was inserted by way of an amendment to a special law, the same will override the effect of Section 320(9) of the CrPC, especially keeping in mind that Section 147 carries a non obstante clause.”

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7. In K. Subramanian Vs. R. Rajathi ; (2010) 15

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Supreme Court Cases 352 , it has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court that in view of the provisions contained in Section 147 of the Act read with Section 320 of Cr.P.C., compromise arrived at can be accepted even after recording of the judgment of conviction. Relevant portion of the judgment is reproduced as

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under:-

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“6.T hereafter a compromise was entered into and the petitioner claims that he has paid Rs. 4,52,289 to the respondent. In support of this claim, the petitioner has produced an affidavit sworn by him on 1.12.2008. The petitioner has also produced an affidavit sworn by P. Kaliappan, Power of attorney holder of R. Rajathi on 1.12.2008 mentioning that he has received a sum of Rs. 4,52,289 due under the dishonoured cheques in full discharge of the value of cheques and he is not willing to prosecute the petitioner.

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7.The learned counsel for the petitioner states at the Bar that the petitioner was arrested on 30.7.2008 and has undergone the sentence imposed on him by the trial Court and confirmed by the Sessions Court, the High Court as well as by this Court. The two affidavits sought to be produced by the petitioner as additional documents would indicate that indeed a compromise has taken place between the petitioner and the respondent and the respondent has accepted the compromise offered by the petitioner pursuant to which he has received a sum of Rs.4,52,289. In the affidavit filed by the respondent a prayer is made to permit the petitioner to compound the offence and close the proceedings.

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8. Having regard to the salutary provisions of Section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act read with Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, this Court is of the opinion that in view of the compromise arrived at between the parties, the petitioner should be permitted to compound the offence committed by him under Section 138 of the Code.”

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8. Since, in the instant case, the applicant/petitioner/

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accused after being convicted under Section 138 of the Act, has compromised the matter with the respondent-complainant, prayer

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for compounding the offence can be accepted in terms of the aforesaid judgments passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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Therefore, in view of the detailed discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the application is allowed and matter is ordered to be compounded.

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Accordingly, the present matter is ordered to be compounded and the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 14.02.2020, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bilaspur, HP, affirmed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, HP, vide judgment dated 10.03.2022. and further affirmed by this Court, vide order dated 02.07.2025, are quashed and set-aside and the applicant/petitioner/accused is acquitted of the charge framed against him under Section 138 of NI Act. Bail bonds, if any, stand discharged.

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Undisputedly, the total amount of the cheque is Rs.16,81,425.40, however, the learned counsel for the applicantpetitioner submitted that the applicant is a poor person and the imposition of compounding fee may be reduced.

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In case K. Subramanian vs. R. Rajathi (supra), the Hon’ble Apex Court had issued the guidelines with respect to the imposition of compounding fee, which read as under:-

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“THE GUIDELINES

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(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:

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(a) That directions can be given that the writ of summons be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could make an application for compounding of the offences at the first or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is

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made, compounding may be allowed by the Court without imposing any costs on the accused.

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(b) If the accused does not make an application for compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal Services Authority, or such authority as the Curt deems fit. (c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal, such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs. (d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of the cheque amount.

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25. The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the status quo, valuable time of the court is spent on the trial of these cases and the parties are not liable to pay any court fee since the proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent court can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the proceedings to their logical end.”

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Therefore, taking into consideration the law laid down

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by the Hon’ble Apex Court (supra) and the financial condition of the petitioner, since the competent Courts can reduce the compounding fee with regard to the specific facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is directed to deposit token compounding fee of Rs,10,000/- (rupees four thousand) only with the H.P. State Legal Services Authority, Shimla, H.P., within four weeks from today.

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The application stands disposed of accordinlgy, so also the pendilng miscellaneous application(s), if any.

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( Sushil Kukreja ) Judge

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December 05, 2025 (V.Himalvi)

Ranjeet Singh v. Hp Gramin Bank

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Ranjeet Singh v. Hp Gramin Bank

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