Prem Lata Vs State of Hp and another

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 538 of 2023 Reserved on: 3.7.2025 Date of Decision: 11.7.2025

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Prem Lata ...Appellant Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents

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Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,*Judge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	*No.*
For the Appellant :	Mr. Rajesh Parmar, Advocate.
For Respondent No.1 :	Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General.
For Respondent No.2 :	Mr. Sandeep Sharma, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment

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dated 12.5.2023, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, District Hamirpur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the respondent No.2 (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for

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convenience.)

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376, 504, 506, and 201 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the victim (name withheld to protect her identity) was taking a bath in 2006 when the accused opened the door. The victim shouted, the accused returned and apologised. He requested the victim not to reveal the incident to any person and assured that he would not repeat such an act. The victim was washing her hands three months after the incident. The accused came and attempted to rape the victim. The victim slapped the accused; however, the accused pulled the salwar of the victim, and the drawstring of the salwar was broken. The wife of the accused came to the spot and she made a complaint to other family members. The accused said that he treated the victim like his mother, and no action was taken in the matter. The husband of the victim went abroad, and the accused started harassing the victim. He started sleeping on the roof, and whenever the victim went to the roof, he would tell her that he liked her; hence, the victim started visiting the roof with her daughter. The accused consumed liquor one day and

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pelted stones at the victim’s door. The victim went to the room to sleep. The accused came and told her that he liked her. When the victim asked the accused to go outside, the accused told her that he simply wanted to meet her. The victim kicked the accused and gave him fist blows; however, the accused hit the victim with something, and she became unconscious. When she regained consciousness, she found that her clothes had been removed. The victim did not reveal the incident to anyone. The accused again asked the victim to meet him, and when she told him that she would narrate the incident to her husband, the accused told her that he had her photographs and he would upload them on the internet. He would also tell the victim’s family members that she had called him. He also threatened to kill the victim and her children. One day, the accused pelted stones at the victim’s door and when she opened the door, she saw the accused. The victim told the accused that she would complain to her family members. The accused started abusing the victim. The victim went to her mother-in-law’s room with her daughter. When her mother-inlaw made the inquiries, the victim told her that the accused had pelted stones at her door and abused her. When the inquiry was made from the accused, the accused denied any incident. The

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victim said that she would report the matter to her husband, but her mother-in-law told her that he had high blood pressure and he would suffer a heart attack. One day, the accused told the victim to talk to her, otherwise he would upload her video on the internet. The accused recorded the conversation, which was disclosed to the family members of the victim. The family members started distrusting the victim. The accused used to abuse the victim, and whenever the victim objected, he would beat her. The accused maintained sexual relations with the victim between 2012 to 2016 by threatening to upload her photographs on the internet and kill her family members. One day, the accused asked the victim to visit his room. He threatened to consume poison and implicate the victim if she refused to comply with his request. When she went to the room of the accused, the accused raped her. The victim’s sister-in-law saw her. The victim told her (sister-in-law) that the accused used to blackmail and abuse her. The victim made a complaint (Ex.PW1/A) to the police.

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The police registered the FIR (Ex.PW7/A). ASI Kulwant Singh (PW12) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the spot map (Ex.PW12/A). The victim produced her

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clothes, which were sealed in a cloth parcel with six seals of seal ‘K’. Seal impression (Ex.PW12/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth. The parcel was seized vide memo (Ex.PW1/B). The seal was handed over to Suram Singh (PW9) after its use. The victim was medically examined by Dr. Shalini Kapoor (PW10), Medical Officer, who found that the victim had no injury. She preserved the samples and issued the MLC (Ex.PW10/A). The accused was medically examined by Dr. B.S. Rana (PW8), who found that there was nothing to suspect that the accused was capable of performing sexual intercourse. He issued the MLC (Ex.PW8/A). The accused produced a bed sheet which was sealed in a parcel with three seals of seal ‘D’. Seal impression (Ex.PW12/B) was taken on a separate piece of cloth, and the seal was handed over to Manoj Kumar after use. The bed sheet was seized vide memo (Ex.PW9/A). The case property was sent to the FSL, and the result of the analysis (Ex.PW7/G) was issued, in which it was mentioned that blood was detected on the underwear of the victim. Human semen was detected on the underwear of the accused. Blood and semen were not found on any of the other exhibits. The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version and after the completion of investigation, the

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challan was prepared and presented before the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P., who committed it for trial to the learned Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. The case was assigned to learned Additional Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, H.P. for disposal as per law.

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Learned Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 376, 504, 506 and 201 of IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined 12 witnesses to prove its case. (PW1) is the victim. (PW2) is the victim’s son. LHHC Rita Kumari (PW3) accompanied the victim to the hospital and brought the samples to the Police Station. HHC Baryam Singh (PW4) accompanied the accused to the hospital and brought the samples to the Police Station. Constable Amit Kumar (PW5) carried the case property to the FSL, but it was returned after raising some objections. HC Santosh Kumar (PW6) carried the case property to FSL. HC Naresh Kumar (PW7) was posted as MHC. Dr. B.S. Rana (PW8) conducted the medical examination of the accused. Suram Singh (PW9) is the witness to recovery. Dr. Shalini Kapoor (PW10) conducted the medical examination of the

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victim. Inspector Satish Kumar (PW11) signed the FIR and applied for the medical examination of the victim. ASI Kulwant Kumar (PW12) conducted the investigation.

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The accused, in his statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He stated that the victim used to ask him to get a divorce from his wife, but he did not do so, and she falsely implicated him. No defence was sought to be adduced by the accused.

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Learned Trial Court held that the matter was reported to the police after a considerable delay. The victim was a major, married and a mother of two children. She knew the accused and continued the relationship for four years without disclosing it to any person. There was a tacit consent, and the prosecution's case was not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Hence, the accused was acquitted.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the victim has filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to appreciate the evidence and law. The delay in filing the FIR was not deliberate. The accused threatened to upload the photographs and videos of

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the victim. The victim narrated the incident to her family members, who asked her to remain silent. The victim could not report the matter to anyone to save her honour and the honour of her family. The learned Trial Court erred in discarding the statement of the victim. The findings recorded by the learned Trial Court regarding the relationship being consensual are incorrect. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed.

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I have heard Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel for the appellant/victim, Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1-State and Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.2/accused.

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Mr. Rajesh Kumar Parmar, learned counsel for the appellant/victim, submitted that the victim could not narrate the incident to anyone due to shame. The accused threatened to kill her and her children. He clicked her photographs and recorded her video. He threatened her to upload them on the internet. The victim complained to her family members, but nobody believed her. The delay is not sufficient to discard the prosecution's case but merely puts the Court on guard. The consent under the threat is no consent. Learned Trial Court erred in holding that the

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relationship was consensual; hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon Satpal Singh v. State of Haryana (2010) 8 SCC 714, State of H.P. v. Prem Singh (2009) 1 SCC 420, Tulsi Dass Kanolkar Vs. State of Goa (2003) 8 SCC 590 and State of Punjab Vs. Gurmeet Singh (1996) 2 SCC 384 in support of his submission.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent No.1-State, adopted the submission of Mr. Rajesh Parmar, learned counsel for the appellant/victim.

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Mr. Sandeep Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent No.2/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of

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acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading of evidence or omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:

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“11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

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“ 29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42)

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‘ 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court, on the evidence before it, may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufficient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc., are not intended to curtail the extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with an acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is a double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly , the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly , the accused, having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.”

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Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“ 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence.

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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A similar view was taken in Bhupatbhai Bachubhai

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Chavda v. State of Gujarat, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 523 , wherein it was

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observed:-

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“ 6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based on the evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to. The Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn the order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible. In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High Court has not addressed itself to the main question.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The victim admitted in her cross-examination that her sister-in-law saw her in the room of the accused, and all the family members started doubting her character. She admitted that she had narrated the entire incident to her family afterwards and had not disclosed the incident to anyone, even to her husband, before that. She admitted that the wife of the accused was not present when she was seen in the room of the accused.

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These admissions clearly show that the incident came to light after she was seen in the room of the accused by her sister-in-law in the absence of the wife of the accused. This incident happened on 16.1.2016 as per her examination-in-chief. She had not reported the matter to anyone before that. Learned Trial Court was justified in holding that the failure to report this fact to any of the family members before she was seen in the room of the accused suggested her consent.

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Mr. Rajesh Parmar, learned counsel for the appellant/victim, contended that the accused had threatened to upload the photographs and videos on the internet, and the consent was under fear/coercion. This submission cannot be

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accepted. The victim stated in her cross-examination that the accused had shown the video to her from a considerable distance, and she had not seen it clearly. Thus, it is apparent from her statement that the accused had her photographs or video is not believable. She saw the video from a distance and could not identify herself. The police did not recover any such photograph or video during the investigation, and her version that her photograph was taken or video was recorded is not corroborated on record. Therefore, in such a situation, she could not have been under threat to upload her photograph/video on the internet and the submission that the consent, if any, was under coercion is not acceptable.

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The victim stated that the accused used to pelt stones at her door, abuse and beat her. It is undisputed that the victim is residing in her home with her family members. No person from the family was examined to corroborate this version. Even the victim’s son did not narrate that he had heard the accused abusing the victim or pelting stones at her door. He simply stated that the victim told her husband that the accused had asked her to visit his room. Hence, his testimony does not support the

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version of the victim that the accused used to threaten and abuse the victim or pelt stones at her door.

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The victim stated that she went to sleep in her mother-in-law’s room after the accused had pelted stones at her door. When her mother-in-law enquired from her, she (the victim) told her about the harassment by the accused. The prosecution did not examine the victim’s mother-in-law to corroborate this version.

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The victim stated that she started visiting the roof with her daughter. The prosecution did not examine her daughter to corroborate this version.

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The samples and clothes were sent to the FSL, but no semen was detected on them except the underwear of the accused. Thus, there is no corroboration from the report of the FSL.

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It was submitted that the testimony of the victim has to be accepted as correct. There can be no dispute with this proposition of law. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Tameezuddin Vs. State (2009) 15 SCC 566 that the testimony of the victim must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that the evidence has to be accepted

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even if the story is improbable and belies logic would be doing violence to the principles of appreciation of evidence. It was observed:-

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9. It is true that in a case of rape the evidence of the prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold that this evidence has to be accepted even if the story is improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very principles which govern the appreciation of evidence in a criminal matter. We are of the opinion that the story is indeed improbable.

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In the present case, the victim remained silent till

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2016 and made the charges of rape after she was seen in the room of the accused by her sister-in-law. She complained of being abused, beaten and pelting stones at her door; however, no witness from the family of the victim was examined to support her version. Even her son did not support these facts. The report of the FSL also did not provide any corroboration of the victim’s testimony. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that the version was inherently improbable and could not have been relied upon. This was a reasonable view taken by the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it.

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It was submitted that the mere delay is not sufficient to doubt the prosecution's case. There can be no dispute with the proposition of law that mere delay cannot be used to make the prosecution's case doubtful; however, the delay would put the

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Court on guard, and the Court has to see the prosecution's evidence carefully. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and therefore, the Court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed:

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"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no evidence at all in this case. The second external check, equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at

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serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

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This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

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Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40 , wherein it was observed: -

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“12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on the merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].”

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A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. ,

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(2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653,

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wherein it was observed on page 182:

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“14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no

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satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version.

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15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

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Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in

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doubting the prosecution's case due to the delay in reporting the matter to the police.

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The judgments cited on behalf of the victim related to the victim’s appreciation and delay in FIR do not apply to the facts of the present case.

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Thus, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and no interference is required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court.

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