Chet Ram Vs State

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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Cr. Appeal No. 260 of 2012

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Reserved on: 25.06.2025 Date of Decision: 11.07.2025

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Chet Ram and others Versus State of H.P.			...Appellants ...Respondent
Coram *Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl* *Whether approved for reporting?*¹	a,*Judge.*
For the Appellants :	M/s. Nish Ashok Kum	ant ar,	Khidtta and Advocates.
For the Respondent/State :	Mr. Ajit Advocate G	Sha ener	rma, Deputy al.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 18.06.2000 and order of sentence dated 25.06.2012, passed by learned Sessions Judge, (Special Judge), Shimla (learned Trial Court) in Session Trial No.18-S/7 of 2010 under Section 3 (1) (x) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act (in short SC & ST Act), 1989. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they

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were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 3(1) (v), 3(1)(x) and 3(1)(xiv) of the SC & ST Act. It was asserted that the informant Tara Chand (PW1) made a complaint (Ex.PW1/A) to the police stating that he is a resident of village Mundu, Tehsil Theog, District Shimla, H.P. The village has a joint water spring and a water supply scheme. The house of Chet Ram and the other accused is located adjacent to the informant’s house. The accused belongs to the Rajput caste. They abuse the informant in the name of his caste and do not allow him to take water from the water spring. The informant repaired his house and affixed window panes and tin sheets. Naresh Kumar came to the informant’s house on 20.08.2009 and taunted him for affixing window panes and tin sheets. He abused the informant in the name of his caste and pelted stones at the informant’s house. Tara Devi (PW3) heard the abuses. The informant made a complaint to the police; however, the matter was settled between the parties, and a compromise (Ex.PW6/A) was reduced to writing. Accused Sewa Ram came to the informant’s house on 20.09.2009 and abused him in the name of his caste. The police

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registered the FIR (Ex.PW13/A). Man Singh (PW14) conducted the investigation. He visited the spot and prepared the site plan (Ex.PW14/A). He seized the informant’s caste certificate (Ex.PW1/B) vide memo (Ex.PW1/C). He also obtained a copy of Parivar Register (Ex.PW12/A) from Babu Ram. Hira Nand (PW8) issued the certificate (Ex.PW8/A1 to Ex.PW8/A8) showing the caste of the accused. He issued the Jamabandi (Ex.PW8/B) and Tatima (Ex.PW8/C). The abstract (Ex.PW10/A) showing that the 'Chanal' caste was included in the Scheduled Caste was taken in possession. The statements of witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after the completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Theog, who committed it to learned Special Judge for trial.

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Learned Special Judge charged the accused with the commission of offences punishable under Sections 3 (1) (x) and 3 (1) (xiv) of the SC & ST Act, to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The prosecution examined 14 witnesses to prove its case. Tara Chand (PW1) is the informant. Sandla Devi (PW2) is the informant’s wife. Tara Devi (PW3) is an eyewitness. Surinder

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Singh (PW4) and Kewal Ram (PW5) proved that the accused prevented the daughters of the informant from taking water from the water source. Daulat Ram (PW6) settled the dispute between the parties. Pushpa (PW7) is the informant’s daughter. Hira Nand (PW8) was posted as a Patwari who issued the caste certificate, Jamabandi and tatima. Suraj Singh (PW9) countersigned the caste certificates. Uttam Thakur (PW10) produced the notification of the Scheduled Caste. Constable Kewal Ram Negi (PW11) produced the compromise. Babu Ram (PW12) produced a copy of the Parivar Register of Tara Chand. HC Het Ram (PW13) registered the FIR. Man Singh (PW14) conducted the investigation.

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The accused, in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that Tara Chand is a member of the Scheduled Caste. They admitted that Sandla Devi is his wife, and Bharti Devi and Promila Devi are his daughters. They admitted that there is a natural water source in Village Mundu. They denied that the villagers were taking water from the water source. They claimed that the villagers were taking water from the water supply scheme provided by the IPH Department. They admitted that the copy of the Parivar Register and caste

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certificates were issued by the police. They stated that Naresh Kumar had signed the compromise under pressure, and he had made a complaint against the police. They claimed that a false case was made against them because the informant was not having good terms with the accused. The complainant had produced a false affidavit for the construction of the road before HPPWD, and the accused had filed a complaint with the police regarding the execution of the false certificate. The present FIR was lodged against the accused to coerce them. They had gone to Shimla to meet the DIG regarding the beating of Naresh Kumar. Statements of Mohan Lan (DW1), Kusum Lata (DW2), B.R. Verma (DW3) and Dila Ram (DW4) were recorded in defence.

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Learned Trial Court held that the statement of the informant was duly corroborated by the statements of other prosecution witnesses. The compromise executed by Naresh Kumar also showed the correctness of the complaint made by the informant. The water source was located on the land owned by the State. Accused Chet Ram constructed a water tank on the water source without any right to do so. This was done to prevent the informant and his family members from using the water source. The plea taken by the accused that the villagers are

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depending upon the water supply scheme was not proved because the water supply scheme runs dry during the summer season and is only operational during the rainy season. The accused had abused the informant in the name of his caste and insulted him in public view. The plea of alibi taken by accused Chandu Lal was without any basis because he could have visited the spot even after discharging his duties. The presence of accused Jai Ram and Vinod on the spot was not established. Therefore, the accused Jai Ram and Vinod were acquitted and other accused were convicted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act and they were sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year, pay a fine of ₹ 1,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for one month each for the commission of the aforesaid offence.

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused have filed the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The prosecution witnesses stated that the informant’s daughters were prevented from drawing water from the common water source on 02.09.2009, which is contrary

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to the charge framed by the learned Trial Court. Man Singh (PW14) was not proved to be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police for the investigation of the FIR/offences in question, and there is a violation of mandatory provisions of Rule 7 of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules. The investigation has to be completed within 30 days, and the report has to be submitted to the Superintendent of Police, who shall submit the same to the Director General of Police. The report was not proved to have been submitted to the Director General of Police. The incident dated 20.08.2009 was taken into consideration, which was compromised between the parties on 23.08.2009. A perusal of the compromise shows that there was no dispute regarding the use of foul language by accused Naresh Kumar to stop the informant from taking water from the common water source. Accused Naresh Kumar signed the compromise under pressure. Learned Trial Court wrongly held that the water from the water supply was erratic, and the construction of the water tank by the accused was duly proved on record. The informant had not put his signature on the complaint. There are contradictions regarding the person who

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wrote the complaint. The incident dated 02.09.2009 pertains to accused Sewa Ram, and this fact was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Learned Trial Court held that the daughters of the informant were prevented from taking water from the water source, and this allegation was nowhere made in the complaint made to the police. It was duly proved on record that the accused did not allow the construction of the road through their land, and their signatures were forged by the informant and other persons. The present FIR was lodged against the accused to compel them to allow the construction of the road. Learned Trial Court acquitted accused Jai Ram and Vinod, as their presence on the spot was not established as per the statement of Pushpa (PW7). However, Pushpa (PW7) has also not named accused Chandu Lal. The informant had also complained about the illicit felling of the trees, which was found to be incorrect. Tara Devi (PW3) stated that she had seen the incident, whereas she had told in her statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that she was informed by her husband about the incident. Similarly, Surinder Singh (PW4) admitted in his cross-examination that he was present at Police Station, Theog till 5.00 p.m. with complainant Tara Chand. Village Mundu is located at a distance of about 40-45 km from

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Theog, and it takes about 3-4 hours to reach the village. Therefore, the informant could not have been present on the spot at 5.30 p.m. It was stated before the police that the informant’s daughters were prevented from taking water on 03.03.2009, whereas it was stated in the Court that they were prevented from taking water on 02.03.2009. There was no controversy regarding the construction of the water tank, and learned Trial Court erred in recording this finding. The accused had gone to Shimla on 02.09.2009, and their presence on the spot was not established. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. Nishant Khidtta and Mr. Ashok Kumar, Advocates, learned counsel for the appellants/accused, and Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State.

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Mr. Nishant Khidtta, learned counsel for the appellants/accused, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in convicting and sentencing the accused. The statements of the witnesses were contradictory to the statements made to the police. The learned Trial Court failed to notice the discrepancies

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in the statements. The earlier matter was compromised, and learned Trial Court erred in taking note of the same. There is a violation of Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the SC & ST Rules, which is fatal to the prosecution's case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent/State, supported the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court and submitted that no interference is required with it.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The police had filed a charge sheet before the Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 3(1) (v), 3 (1)(x) and 3 (1)(xiv) of the SC & ST Act. Section 3 (1)(v) prescribes punishment for interference with the enjoyment of the right over land, premises or water. Section 3(1)(x) provides punishment for intentionally insulting or intimidating a member of the SC & ST in any place in public view. 3(1)(xiv) punishes a person who denies a member of the SC or ST any customary right

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or passage, or prevents him from using or having access to a public resort.

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Learned Trial Court had only framed the charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) and 3 (1) (xiv) of the SC & ST Act. It was stated in the charge that the accused had restrained the complainant from taking water from a common water source, humiliated and insulted the complainant in the name of his caste by calling him “Raid Chnal Dagi Chamar Kalechar Dumde” on 02.09.2009 and thereby an offence under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act was committed. Section 3 (1) (x) does not punish a person preventing a member of SC or ST from using the water; therefore, Section 3 (1) (v) should have been mentioned instead of Section 3 (1) (x). Further, it was not permissible to add two counts of charges under one head. It was laid down in Mannalal Khatic v. State, 1966 SCC OnLine Cal 86: AIR 1967 Cal 478: 1967 Cri LJ 1272 that it is impermissible to add two offences under one head of charge. It was observed at page 483:

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14. The accused-appellant was charged for one distinct offence punishable under Section 302 of the Penal Code, 1860, as well as with the other distinct offence punishable under Section 324 of the Penal Code, 1860. So, both offences are not of the same kind since they are not

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punishable with the same amount of punishment under the same section of the Penal Code, 1860. The learned Counsel for the State then relied upon Section 235, Subsection (1) of the Code to justify the joinder of the two distinct offences in one head of charge against the accused-appellant and his trial for two such distinct offences at one trial. A charge is the first notice to the prisoner of the matter whereof he is accused, and it must convey to him with sufficient clearness and certainty what the prosecution intends to prove against him and of which he would have to clear himself . In this case, two distinct offences have been dealt with in one head of charge in two counts against the accused-appellant at one and the same trial. The joinder of two distinct offences in one head of charge and trial of the accused-appellant for two such distinct offences so joined at one and the same trial could be justified only under Section 235, Sub-section (1) of the Cr PC, 1898, if, upon the accusation of facts stated in the two counts in the charge it would have appeared in clear and unmistakable terms that the accused-appellant was concerned in the commission of a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction, committing thereby the two distinct offences with which he was charged and tried at the same trial. The accusation of facts upon which the two counts of distinct offences in the charge had been joined for trial of the accused at one and the same trial, would not show that the acts of murdering Gulab and the act of voluntarily causing hurt to Dayaram either with a knife or a dagger were so connected together as to form the same transaction. In the second count of the charge as framed by the committing Court, there was a clear statement “that while running away after committing the offence in count no. I” the accused appellant committed the offence or charge in count No. 2. But in the Sessions Court the expression aforesaid was omitted from the second count of the charge, when charge was amended.”

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The complainant had specifically stated in the complaint made by him that accused Naresh Kumar had abused him on 20.08.2009. The matter was compromised subsequently. Accused Sewa Ram abused him on 02.09.2009. The accused harassed him, insulted him and prevented him from taking the water from the water source. Thus, he was quite specific in saying that Sewa Ram had abused him on 02.09.2009 in the name of his caste. He specifically stated that only the accused, Sewa Ram, had visited his house on 02.09.2009. Therefore, he never alleged that all the accused had abused him on 02.09.2009. Thus, the learned Trial Court erred in recording the conviction of the present accused regarding the incident dated 02.09.2009.

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Tara Chand (PW1) stated in his examination-in-chief that accused Naresh Kumar visited his house on 20.08.2009 and called him a member of the lower caste. This was not the subject matter of the charge and, therefore, the same was not to be considered by the Court.

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He further stated that on 02.09.2009 accused defamed him by proclaiming him a member of the lower caste. Sandla Devi (PW2) stated that accused Sewa Ram visited the informant’s house on 02.09.2009 and defamed and insulted him

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by proclaiming him to be of a lower caste of Kalecher/'Chanal' in full public view. Tara Devi (PW3) stated that on 02.09.2009, the accused persons had prevented the informant’s daughters from drawing water from the public water source. They insulted and defamed the informant and the members of his family in public view by proclaiming their caste as 'Koli/Chanal'. Surinder Singh (PW4) stated that the daughters of Tara Chand had gone to draw water from the water source, and the accused prevented the daughters from drawing water. They defamed and insulted the daughters of the complainant by proclaiming them members of the lower caste and saying that they had no right to draw water from the water source. Kewal Ram (PW5) stated that he saw the accused preventing the daughters of Tara Chand from drawing water from the water source on 02.09.2009. The accused said that Tara Chand was 'Chanal' by caste, and he and his family members could not draw water from the water source in question. Pushpa (PW7) stated that she and her sister had gone to take water from the water source on 02.09.2009 at 5.00 p.m., accused Naresh, Yash Pal, Hukam Chand, Chet Ram, and Sewa Ram were present at village Bawri. They did not permit Pushpa and her sister to draw water from the water source. They used

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foul language against Pushpa and her sister and said that they were members of the 'Koli/Chanal' community who were not entitled to take water from the water source.

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It is apparent from the statements of the prosecution witnesses that they had deposed about two different incidents. Tara Chand (PW1) and his wife Sandla Devi (PW2) stated that accused Sewa Ram came to their house and insulted them in the name of their caste. The other witnesses deposed about the incident concerning the informant’s daughters. The second incident was never asserted in the complaint. It was not made a subject matter of the charge and could not have been considered.

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Informant, Tara Chand, and his wife, Sandla Devi, deposed about the incident that occurred at their home. No other witness deposed about it. According to the informant and his wife, the accused had visited their house and abused them in the name of their caste. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Swarn Singh versus State, 2008 (8) SCC 435, that when the incident has taken place inside the house, it does not fall under Section 3(1)(x) of the SC&ST Act. It was observed:

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“ 28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which

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was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building and also not in the public view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies. ” (Emphasis supplied)

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This judgment was followed by the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court in Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, (2020) 10 SCC 710,

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and it was held: -

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14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in “any place within public view”. What is to be regarded as “place in public view” had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn a distinction between the expression “public place” and “in any place within public view”. It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends),

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then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view ( sic ) [ Ed. This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh (2008) 8 SCC 435 , at p. 736 d-e , and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:

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“Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view.”]

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15. As per the FIR, the allegations of abusing the informant were within the four walls of her building. It is not the case of the informant that there was any member of the public (not merely relatives or friends) at the time of the incident in the house. Therefore, the basic ingredient that the words were uttered “in any place within public view” is not made out. In the list of witnesses appended to the charge sheet, certain witnesses are named, but it could not be said that those were the persons present within the four walls of the building. The offence is alleged to have taken place within the four walls of the building. Therefore, in view of the judgment of this Court in Swaran Singh [Swaran Singh v. State, (2008) 8 SCC 435: (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527], it cannot be said to be a place within public view as none was said to be present within the four walls of the building as per the FIR and/or charge-sheet.” (Emphasis supplied)

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20. Similar view was taken in Ramesh Chandra Vaishya v.

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State of U.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 668 , wherein it was held: -

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“16. The first F.I.R. registered at the instance of the complainant is silent about the place of occurrence and who, being a member of the public, was present when the appellant is alleged to have hurled caste-related abuses at the complainant. However, on a reading of the second F.I.R. registered at the behest of the appellant, it appears that the incident took place at the house of the appellant.

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17. The first question that calls for an answer is whether it was at a place within public view that the appellant hurled caste-related abuses at the complainant with the intent to

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insult or intimidate with the intent to humiliate him. From the charge sheet dated 21^st January 2016 filed by the I.O., it appears that the prosecution would seek to rely on the evidence of three witnesses to drive home the charge against the appellant of committing offences under sections 323 and 504, IPC and 3(1)(x), SC/ST Act. These three witnesses are none other than the complainant, his wife and their son. Neither the first F.I.R. nor the charge sheet refers to the presence of a fifth individual (a member of the public) at the place of occurrence (apart from the appellant, the complainant, his wife and their son). Since the utterances, if any, made by the appellant were not “ in any place within public view” , the basic ingredient for attracting section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act was missing/absent. We, therefore, hold that at the relevant point in time of the incident (of hurling of caste-related abuse at the complainant by the appellant), no member of the public was present.”

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This position was reiterated in Priti Agarwalla v. State

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(NCT of Delhi), 2024 SCC OnLine SC 973 , wherein it was observed-

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20. The cumulative effect of the structured application to a given situation is that the intentional insult or abuse, coupled with the humiliation, is made in any place within public view. The expression “in any place within public view” has an important role to play in deciding whether the allegation attracts the ingredients of an offence or not, and has been the subject matter of consideration in the following decisions:

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(1) Swaran Singh v. State (2008) 8 SCC 435 -

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“28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a “chamar”) when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building and also not in the public

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view. However, if the offence is committed outside the building, e.g. on a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends), then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression “place within public view” with the expression “public place”. A place can be a private place yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.”

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(2) Daya Bhatnagar v. State2004 SCC OnLine Del 33 . -

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“ 19. The SC/ST Act was enacted with a laudable object to protect vulnerable sections of society. Sub-clauses (i) to (xv) of Section 3(1) of the Act enumerate various kinds of atrocities that might be perpetrated against Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, which constitute an offence. However, Sub-clause (x) is the only clause where even offending “utterances” have been made punishable. The Legislature required ‘intention’ as an essential ingredient for the offence of ‘insult’, ‘intimidation’ and ‘humiliation’ of a member of the Scheduled Casts or Scheduled Tribes in any place within ‘public view’. Offences under the Act are quite grave and provide stringent punishments. Graver is the offence, stronger should be the proof. The interpretation which suppresses or evades the mischief and advances the object of the Act has to be adopted. Keeping this in view, looking at the aims and objects of the Act, the expression “public view” in Section 3(1)(x) of the Act has to be interpreted to mean that the public persons present, (howsoever small number it may be), should be independent and impartial and not interested in any of the parties. In other words, persons having any kind of close relationship or association with the complainant would necessarily get excluded.”

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(3) Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State of Maharashtra (before the High Court of Bombay) 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 15947 -

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“17. The requirement of section 3(1)(x) of the old Act is intentional insult and intimidation with intent to humiliate the person belonging to a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Messages sent on WhatsApp cannot be said to be an act of intentional insult or intimidation or an intent to humiliate in a public place within public view. As such, it is prima facie seen that no offence under the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 is attracted in the case in hand.”

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In the present case, the informant and his wife did not

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state that any member of the public was present in their home when accused Sewa Ram abused them in the name of their caste. The house does not fall within the definition of a public place, and family members are not covered within the definition of the public. Hence, assuming the allegation regarding the accused Sewa Ram visiting the house of the informant and abusing them in the name of their caste is correct, it does not constitute an offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act.

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The complaint did not mention that the accused had prevented the informant’s daughters from taking water from the water source on 02.09.2009. The complaint was made on 03.09.2009, the next day of the incident. The charge was also not framed regarding the accused preventing the informant’s

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daughter from taking water. Therefore, the prosecution never came with the case that the accused had prevented the informant’s daughters from taking water from the water source on 02.09.2009. The prosecution relied upon the generalised allegation that the accused prevented the informant and his family members from taking water from the water source. This allegation was not supported by any details of time, place and date, and it appears that the prosecution projected a very different version in the Court that the daughters of the informant were prevented from taking water from the water source on 02.09.2009 to remove this lacuna. This is also apparent from the fact that the informant exaggerated his version and stated that he was prevented from taking water from the water source on 02.09.2009, whereas it was not his case that he was prevented from taking water.

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Learned Trial Court failed to notice the fact that there was no charge that the informant’s family members were prevented from taking water from the water source, and the charge was that the informant was prevented from taking water from the water source. The purpose of the charge is to make the accused aware of the allegations against him, which he is to

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defend during the trial, and it is impermissible to convict a person without framing the charge.

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Learned Trial Court also relied upon the incident dated 20.08.2009, however, it never formed the subject matter of the charge and could not have been adjudicated.

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It was submitted that no prejudice was caused to the accused by the omission to frame charges, and this is a mere irregularity. This submission cannot be accepted. The accused were never told in the charge that they had to meet out a case that they had prevented the informant’s daughters from taking water from the water source, or regarding the abuses hurled by the accused Naresh. The matter regarding abuses was settled with him, and the accused remained under the belief that they did not have to face conviction for the aforesaid act. The allegation regarding the accused preventing the informant’s daughter did not form part of the complaint. Hence, they were caught by surprise, and the prejudice was writ large.

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Therefore, the allegation made in the FIR that accused Sewa Ram came to the house of the informant and abused him in the name of the caste, which amounted to an offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act, was not proved. The

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allegation that the accused prevented the informant from taking water from the water source was also not proved. The facts found to have been proved by the learned Trial Court regarding the incident dated 20.08.2009 and the informant’s daughters being prevented from filling the water from the water source never formed the subject matter of the charge. These were also not mentioned in the FIR and could not have been relied upon to record the conviction.

¶118

Thus, the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act. Since the case is not proved on facts, therefore, it is not necessary to go into the question whether the provisions of Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the SC & ST Rules are mandatory, and these questions are left open.

¶119

In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed, and the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court are ordered to be set aside. The accused are acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 3 (1) (x) of the SC & ST Act. The fine amount be refunded to the accused after the expiry of the period of limitation, in case no appeal is

¶120

24

¶121

2025:HHC:22615

¶122

preferred, and in case of appeal, the same be dealt with as per the orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶123

In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the appellants/accused are directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/-each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the appellants/accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶124

A copy of this judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

¶125

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶126

11^th July, 2025 (Rupsi)

Chet Ram v. State

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Chet Ram v. State

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