State of H.P. Vs Mohan Singh Alias Sethi

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State of H.P. versus Mohan Singh @ Sethi

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Cr. Appeal No.4016 of 2013 Reserved on 23.02.2026

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26.02.2026 Present: Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State.

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Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, Advocate, for the applicant/respondent/convict.

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The parties have been heard on the quantum of

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sentence.

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Mr. Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State, submitted that the negligence of the respondent/convict led to the loss of life of a person. The offences of rash and negligent driving of vehicles are increasing, and a deterrent view should be taken to prevent the commission of similar offences.

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Mr. Sanjay Jaswal, learned counsel for the respondent/convict, submitted that the incident occurred in the year 2011. 15 years have passed since then. The respondent/convict has been suffering from bladder cancer since 2012 and is undergoing treatment. Therefore, he prayed that a lenient view be taken. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Parkash Chandra Agnihotri versus State of Madhya Pradesh 1990 STPL 3728 SC , Surendran versus Sub Inspector of Police Criminal Appeal No. 536 of 2021 decided on 30.06.2021 and Abdul

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Sattar versus State of Karnatka Department of Home and Anr. Review petition Criminal No. 45337 of 2025 decided on 05.02.2026 in support of his submissions.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It has been proved on record that the respondent/convict was driving the vehicle in a negligent manner, which led to the loss of life of a young child. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Dalbir Singh Versus State of Haryana (2000) 5 SCC 82 that a deterrent sentence is to be awarded to a person convicted of rash or negligent driving. It was observed:

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“11. Courts must bear in mind that when any plea is made based on S. 4 of the PO Act for application to a convicted person under S. 304-A of I.P.C., road accidents have proliferated to an alarming extent, and the toll is galloping up day by day in India and that no solution is in sight nor suggested by any quarters to bring them down. When this Court lamented two decades ago that "more people die of road accidents than by most diseases, so much so the Indian highways are among the top killers of the country, the saturation of accidents was not even half of what it is today. So V. R. Krishna Iyer, J., has suggested in the said decision, thus :

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"Rashness and negligence are relative concepts, not absolute abstractions. In our current conditions, the law under S. 304-A, I.P.C. and under the rubric of negligence, must have due regard to the fatal frequency of rash driving of heavy-duty vehicles and speeding menaces."

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In State of Karnataka v. Krishna alias Raju (1987) 1 SCC 538 this Court did not allow a sentence of fine, imposed on a driver who was convicted under S. 304-A, I.P.C. to remain in force although the High Court too had confirmed the said sentence when an accused was convicted of the offence of driving a bus callously and causing the death of a human being. In that case, this Court enhanced the sentence to rigorous imprisonment for six months besides imposing a fine.

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Bearing in mind the galloping trend in road accidents in India and the devastating consequences of visiting the victims and their families, Criminal Courts cannot treat the nature of the offence under S. 304-A, I.P.C. as attracting the benevolent provisions of S. 4 of the PO Act. While considering the quantum of sentence to be imposed for the offence of causing death by rash or negligent driving of automobiles, one of the prime considerations should be deterrence. A professional driver pedals the accelerator of the automobile almost throughout his working hours. He must constantly inform himself that he cannot afford to have a single moment of laxity or inattentiveness when his leg is on the pedal of a vehicle in locomotion. He cannot and should not take a chance thinking that rash driving need not necessarily cause an accident, or even if any accident occurs it need not necessarily result in the death of any human being, or even if such death ensues he might not be convicted of the offence, and lastly, that even if he is convicted he would be dealt with leniently by the Court. He must always keep in mind the fear psyche that if he is convicted of the offence of causing the death of a human being due to his callous driving of a vehicle, he cannot escape from a jail sentence. This is the role which the Courts can play, particularly at the level of trial Courts, for lessening the high rate of motor accidents due to the callous driving of automobiles.”

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A similar view was taken in State of Punjab v.

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Balwinder Singh , (2012) 2 SCC 182 , wherein it was held: -

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“13. It is a settled law that sentencing must have a policy of correction. If anyone has to become a good driver, they must have better training in traffic laws and moral responsibility, with special reference to the potential injury to human life and limb. Considering the increased number of road accidents, this Court, on several occasions, has reminded the criminal courts dealing with the offences relating to motor accidents that they cannot treat the nature of the offence under Section 304-A IPC as attracting the benevolent provisions of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. We fully endorse the view expressed by this Court in Dalbir Singh [(2000) 5 SCC 82: 2004 SCC (Cri) 1208] .

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Similarly, the judgment in State of Punjab v.

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Saurabh Bakshi, (2015) 5 SCC 182: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 751: 2015

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SCC OnLine SC 278 , wherein it was observed at page 196:

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“25. Before parting with the case, we are compelled to observe that India has a disreputable record of road accidents. There is a nonchalant attitude among the drivers. They feel that they are the “Emperors of all they survey”. Drunkenness contributes to careless driving, where other people become their prey. The poor feel that their lives are not safe, the pedestrians think of uncertainty, and the civilised persons drive in constant fear, but are still apprehensive about the obnoxious attitude of the people who project themselves as “larger than life”. In such circumstances, we are bound to observe that the lawmakers should scrutinise, relook and revisit the sentencing policy in Section 304-A IPC. We say so with immense anguish.”

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In Prakash Chand (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme

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Court awarded a fine of ₹2,000/-. In Abdul Sattar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court imposed a fine of ₹3,00,000/in exercise of the discretion conferred under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. In Surendran (supra), the

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offences were punishable under Sections 279 and 338 of the IPC.

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The Hon’ble Supreme Court had exercised the discretion conferred upon it under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which discretion is not available to this Court. Further, this Court is bound by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the deterrent sentence has to be awarded in cases of rash and negligent driving causing the death of a person. The Hon’ble Supreme Court deprecated the practice of enhancing the compensation and reducing the sentence in Parameshwari v. State of T.N., 2026 SCC OnLine SC 209 and observed:

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“31. The practice of enhancing the compensation payable to the victim and reducing the sentence, especially in cases of grave offence, is dangerous as it might send a wrong message to society that the offenders/accused persons can absolve themselves from their liability by merely paying a monetary consideration.

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32. Compensation payable to the victim is only restitutory in nature, and it cannot be considered as equivalent to or a substitute for punishment. Punishment is punitive in nature, and its object is to create an adequate deterrence against the said crime and to send a social message to the miscreants that any violation of the moral turpitude of society would come with consequences, which cannot merely be “ purchased by money ”.

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Therefore, it is not possible to award the fine

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without awarding any imprisonment.

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However, the fact that the petitioner was initially acquitted and was convicted by this Court after the lapse of 15 years from the date of the incident also cannot be ignored. The medical condition of the respondent/convict also has to be taken into consideration while awarding the sentence.

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Considering these circumstances and the nature of the offence, the respondent/convict is sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months, pay a fine of ₹500/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for 30 days for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 279 of IPC. He is also sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for 9 months, pay a fine of ₹5000/-, and in default of payment of fine to undergo further simple imprisonment for three months for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC. Both the substantive sentences of imprisonment shall run concurrently. The period of imprisonment, if any, undergone by the respondent/convict during investigation and trial would be set off from the substantive sentences of imprisonment. The respondent/convict will surrender within one month to serve the sentence imposed upon him,

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failing which the learned Trial Court shall take appropriate steps to execute the sentence as per law.

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