Suresh Kumar Vs Asha Ram

The present revision is directed against the judgment dated 13.09.2024, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge Paonta Sahib, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Appellate Court), vide which the judgment of conviction dated 06.06.2023 and order of sentence dated 15.06.2023 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Shillai, District Sirmour, H.P. (learned Trial Court) were upheld. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in

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Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present revision are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). It was asserted that the complainant and the accused belonged to the same village and they had friendly relations with each other. The accused sought financial help for ₹1,10,000/- from the complainant in May 2014 for constructing his house. The complainant paid ₹60,000/- in cash and ₹50,000/- by cheque to the accused. The accused again demanded ₹50,000/- and the complainant advanced ₹50,000/- vide cheque dated 09.08.2014. The complainant asked the accused to repay the amount in the year 2017. The accused sought time to repay the amount. He executed a promissory note dated 20.03.2017 admitting his liability to pay the borrowed amount of ₹1,60,000/-. He issued a cheque of ₹1,60,000/- on 31.12.2018 to repay the amount. The complainant presented the cheque to the bank, but it was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. The complainant issued a notice to the accused, which was served

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upon him on 06.05.2019. The accused assured to repay the amount but failed to do so. Hence, a complaint was filed to take action against the accused as per the law.

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The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the learned Trial Court put a notice of accusation to the accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

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The complainant examined Yogender Pratap Singh (CW1), Anil Kumar (CW2), Nanak Chand (CW3) and himself (CW4).

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The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., stated that he had received ₹50,000/- through a cheque and returned it. He had issued the cheque as security for the repayment of the money. The complainant misused the cheque. He stated that he wanted to lead the defence evidence. However, no evidence was produced despite repeated adjournments. Hence, the evidence was closed on 05.08.2022.

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Learned Trial Court held that the promissory note proved that the accused had borrowed ₹1,60,000/- from the

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complainant. The accused admitted his signature on the cheque. There is a presumption that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. His evidence was not sufficient to rebut the presumption. Even if the cheque was issued as a security, it will not absolve the accused of the liability. Yogender Pratap Singh (CW1) and Anil Kumar (CW2) proved that ₹1,00,000/- was received by the accused. This falsifies the plea taken by the accused that he had borrowed ₹50,000/-. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’. The accused failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the valid notice of demand. Hence, he was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for six months and pay a compensation of ₹1,67,000/- (₹1,60,000/- as cheque amount and ₹7,000/- as compensation for suffering).

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Being aggrieved by the judgment and order passed by the learned Trial Court, the accused filed an appeal, which was decided by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Paonta Sahib, District Sirmaur (learned Appellate Court). Learned Appellate Court concurred with the findings recorded by the learned Trial Court that the complainant had paid ₹1,00,000/- to the accused

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through two different cheques. The accused executed a promissory note admitting the receipt of ₹1,60,000/-. He took a plea that the cheque was issued as security for the repayment of ₹50,000/-, which plea was incorrect. The issuance of the cheque as a security would also attract liability under Section 138 of the NI Act. The accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. The cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement “funds insufficient”. A notice was duly served upon the accused, and he failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of a valid notice of demand. Hence, the appeal was dismissed.

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Being aggrieved by the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below, the accused has filed the present revision asserting that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed before them. They ignored the defence set up by the accused. The accused had successfully rebutted the presumption attached to the cheque. The complainant had not proved the consideration so alleged by him. The complainant is engaged in the business of money lending without any licence, and the complaint filed by him was not maintainable. Therefore, it was prayed that the present

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revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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I have heard Mr Ravinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner/accused and Mr Prakash Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant.

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Mr Ravinder Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the learned Courts below erred in appreciating the material placed on record. The complainant’s evidence proved that he had advanced ₹1,00,000/- to the accused, and the learned Courts below erred in holding that the complainant had advanced ₹1,60,000/- to the accused. The complainant failed to prove the consideration of the cheque, and the presumption attached to the cheque was rebutted by the complainant’s evidence. The learned Courts below erred in holding that the accused had failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Courts below be set aside.

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Mr Prakash Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent/complainant, submitted that the complainant’s case

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was duly proved by the promissory note executed by the accused in which he had admitted the receipt of ₹1,60,000/- from the complainant. He did not dispute the issuance of the cheque and took a false plea that he had borrowed ₹50,000/- from the complainant. The complainant’s evidence proved that ₹1,00,000/- was advanced to the accused by means of the cheque and ₹60,000/- was advanced in cash. The accused did not lead any evidence to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque. This Court should not interfere with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by learned Courts below while exercising revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of Chhattisgarh , (2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 that a revisional court is not an appellate court and it can only rectify the patent defect, errors of jurisdiction or the law. It was observed at page

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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error that is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.

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This position was reiterated in State of Gujarat v.

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Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC

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1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:

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“14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397 CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.

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15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has

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been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.

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13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”

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It was held in Kishan Rao v. Shankargouda , (2018) 8

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SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:

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“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)

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5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise amount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”

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13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is nonconsideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)

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“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”

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This position was reiterated in Bir Singh v. Mukesh

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Kumar , (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ)

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309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13, wherein it was observed at page 205:

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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.

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17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”

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A similar view was taken in Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S.

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Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

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“27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457 , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

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28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

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The present revision has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The ingredients of the offence punishable under

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Section 138 of the NI Act were explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kaveri Plastics v. Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 as under: -

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“5.1.1. In K.R. Indira v. Dr. G. Adinarayana (2003) 8 SCC 300 , this Court enlisted the components, aspects and the acts, the concatenation of which would make the offence under Section 138 of the Act complete, to be these (i) drawing of the cheque by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker, for payment to another person from out of that account for discharge in whole/in part of any debt or liability, (ii) presentation of the cheque by the payee or the holder in due course to the bank, (iii) returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank for want of sufficient funds to the credit of the drawer or any arrangement with the banker to pay the sum covered by the cheque, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by the payee from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid demanding payment of the cheque amount, and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, of the amount covered by the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the notice.”

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The accused stated in reply to question No.5 in his

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statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr. P.C. that the cheque

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was given for security purposes only. Thus, learned Courts below had rightly held that the issuance of the cheque and signatures on the cheque were not in dispute. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in APS Forex Services (P) Ltd. v.

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Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724 , that when

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the issuance of a cheque and signature on the cheque are not disputed, a presumption would arise that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability. It was observed: -

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“9. Coming back to the facts in the present case and considering the fact that the accused has admitted the issuance of the cheques and his signature on the cheque and that the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured and that even according to the accused some amount was due and payable, there is a presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability. Of course, such a presumption is rebuttable. However, to rebut the presumption, the accused was required to lead evidence that the full amount due and payable to the complainant had been paid. In the present case, no such evidence has been led by the accused. The story put forward by the accused that the cheques were given by way of security is not believable in the absence of further evidence to rebut the presumption, and more particularly, the cheque in question was issued for the second time after the earlier cheques were dishonoured. Therefore, both the courts below have materially erred in not properly appreciating and considering the presumption in favour of the complainant that there exists a legally enforceable debt or liability as per Section 139 of the NI Act. It appears that both the learned trial court as well as the High Court have committed an error in shifting the burden upon the complainant to prove the debt or liability, without appreciating the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act. As observed above, Section 139 of the Act is an example of reverse onus clause and therefore, once the issuance of the cheque has been admitted and even the signature on the cheque has been admitted, there is always a presumption in favour of the

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complainant that there exists legally enforceable debt or liability and thereafter, it is for the accused to rebut such presumption by leading evidence.”

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A similar view was taken in N. Vijay Kumar v.

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Vishwanath Rao N., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 873, wherein it was held as under:

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“6. Section 118 (a) assumes that every negotiable instrument is made or drawn for consideration, while Section 139 creates a presumption that the holder of a cheque has received the cheque in discharge of a debt or liability. Presumptions under both are rebuttable, meaning they can be rebutted by the accused by raising a probable defence.”

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A similar view was taken in Sanjay Sanjabij Tari v.

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Kishore S. Borcar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2069, wherein it was observed:

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“ONCE EXECUTION OF A CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE

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15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by the Respondent No. 1-Accused. This Court is of the view that once the execution of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two-Judge Bench in Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54, have been set aside by a three-Judge Bench in Rangappa (supra).

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16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial transactions.

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17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139 of the NI Act is a rebuttable presumption. However, the initial onus of proving that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197 ].

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Thus, the learned Courts below were justified in

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raising the presumption that the cheque was issued in discharge of the liability for consideration.

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The accused claimed in reply to question No.11 of his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. that he had borrowed ₹50,000/- from the complainant and returned it. This is contrary to the statements of Yogender Pratap Singh (CW1), that ₹50,000/- was paid to the accused vide cheque on 22.05.2014 and Anil Kumar (CW2), that ₹50,000/- was paid to the accused by means of a cheque on 09.08.2014. They are the public officials who deposed on the basis of the record brought by them. Thus, it was duly proved by their testimonies that the complainant had paid ₹1,00,000/- by means of two cheques of ₹50,000/- each to the accused and the plea taken by the accused

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that he had borrowed ₹50,000/- from the complainant is incorrect.

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It was submitted that there is no proof of the payment of ₹60,000/-, and the complainant claimed the payment of ₹1,60,000/-. This submission cannot be accepted. The complainant stated in his affidavit (Ext.CW1/A) that he had paid ₹60,000/- in cash and ₹1,00,000/- by means of two cheques of ₹50,000/- each. The accused had executed a promissory note and a receipt acknowledging the payment of ₹ 1,60,000/-to him. This was duly corroborated by the statement of Nanak Chand (CW3), who stated that the accused executed a promissory note and receipt acknowledging the payment of ₹1,60,000/- by the complainant. He also promised to repay the amount on demand. He stated in his crossexamination that money was not paid in his presence, and he was told about the payment by the accused and Asha Ram (CW4). There is nothing in his cross-examination to show that he was making a false statement. His statement shows the execution of the promissory note in his presence. The promissory note specifically mentioned that the accused had borrowed ₹1,60,000/- from the complainant, out of which

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₹60,000/- was paid in cash and ₹1,00,000/- was paid by means of two cheques of ₹50,000/- each. This receipt and the promissory note corroborate the complainant’s statement that he had lent ₹ 1,60,000/- to the accused.

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The accused stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence. However, he did not produce any evidence, and his evidence was closed by the Court. Thus, the accused has relied upon his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. to prove his defence. It was held in Sumeti Vij v. Paramount Tech Fab Industries, (2022) 15 SCC 689: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 201 that the accused has to lead defence evidence to rebut the presumption and mere denial in his statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is not sufficient. It was observed at page 700:

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“20. That apart, when the complainant exhibited all these documents in support of his complaints and recorded the statement of three witnesses in support thereof, the appellant recorded her statement under Section 313 of the Code but failed to record evidence to disprove or rebut the presumption in support of her defence available under Section 139 of the Act. The statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code is not substantive evidence of defence, but only an opportunity for the accused to explain the incriminating circumstances appearing in the prosecution's case against the accused. Therefore, there is no evidence to rebut the presumption that the cheques were issued for consideration ." (Emphasis supplied)”

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Therefore, the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. was not a legally admissible statement, and the accused cannot derive any advantage from it.

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The complainant denied in his cross-examination that he had taken the cheque as security. He had not agreed to receive any interest from any person. He had advanced the money to 10-12 people. He has advanced the cash to some of the people and paid the money to many people by means of cheque. He had not taken any security from any person.

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It was submitted that the statement of the complainant proves that he was a moneylender. He did not produce any licence to carry out the business of money lending. Therefore, the complaint filed by him is not maintainable. This submission is not acceptable. Section 2(9) of the Registration of Money Lenders Act reads that a moneylender means a person or firm carrying on the business of advancing loans. The term ‘loan’ has been defined as an advance of money or kind with interest. Therefore, it is essential to prove that the person is engaged in a business of advancing money on interest. Learned Appellate Court had rightly held that a single transaction will

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not attract the provisions of the Money Lenders Act. The accused did not lead any evidence to show that the complainant had advanced money on interest to various persons so as to attract the provisions of the Money Lenders Act. It was laid down by this Court in Rajbir Singh Versus Geeta Devi (2019) 2 B.C. 603 that the provisions of the Registration of Money Lenders Act do apply when the complainant had not charged any interest from the persons to whom the money was lent. It was observed:

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“10. The learned trial Magistrate had recorded a conclusion that the complainant was engaged in the business of money lending, hence, in the face of the provisions borne in Section 3 of the H. P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1976, provisions whereof stand extracted hereinafter:-

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"3. Suits and applications by money-lenders barred, unless money- Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of loan or an application by money-lender for the execution of a decree relating to a loan, shall, after the commencement of this Act, be dismissed, unless the moneylender, at the time of institution of the suit or presentation of the application for execution, or at the time of decreeing the suit or deciding the application for execution,-

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(a) is registered; and

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(i) holds a valid licence, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed; or

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(ii) holds a certificate from a Commissioner granted under section 10, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted, or the decree in respect of which the application for execution is presented; or

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(iii) if he is not already a registered and licensed money-lender, satisfies the court that he has applied to the Collector to be registered and licensed and that such application is pending; Provided that in such a case, the suit or application shall not be finally disposed of until the application of the money-lender for registration and grant of the licence pending before the Collector is finally disposed of. "

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(i) Whereunder an unregistered money lender, is, barred, to enforce his claim, against, his borrower by instituting a civil suit or upon rendition of an affirmative decree, he is forbidden, to realize the decretal amount, through his casting an execution petition, before, the executing court concerned, (ii) hence concluded that the amount, borne, in Ex. CW1/A, being not a legally recoverable debt or a legally enforceable debt, thereupon pronounced an order of acquittal upon the respondent/accused. The factual besides evidentiary matrix, for, the learned trial Court, hence, erecting the aforesaid inference, (iii) is, comprised, of the inability, of, the complainant, to, explain the nature of his relationship, with, the accused, (iv) AND also stems, from, his also acquiescing qua his instituting complaint(s), under, Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, against, one Ranjna Devi, and, one Basant Singh, wherewith whom, he has also not explained his relationship. However, the aforesaid conclusions, are mis-founded, and, are apparently surmisally drawn, (v) given the aforesaid Ranjna Devi, and, Basant Singh, not, being cited, as

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witnesses, by the respondent/accused, for, theirs hence rendering testifications, qua their borrowing(s), of, money from the complainant, and, his lending vis-a-vis them, also being accompanied by his charging or levying interest, upon, the principal sum(s). (vi) Also, hence, for their rendering testifications, of, in their making borrowing(s) from the complainant, their holding, no acquaintance with him, and, that in their relevant borrowing(s), from the complainant, theirs being solitarily guided by the factum of his being an unlicensed professional money lender. However, evidence, in regard aforesaid, is grossly amiss hereat, (vii) thereupon, it was in sagacious, for, the learned trial court, to conclude qua the accused, being an unlicensed professional moneylender, and, his charging interest vis-a-vis the money lent by him vis-a-vis the accused, despite, his being wholly unacquainted, with her, or other borrowers. (viii) More so, when PW-2, espouses, hers, being well known, to the respondent/accused, also, when the relevant transaction, occurred, in the presence of the wife of the complainant, besides with the respondent/accused, not making, any testification, qua the relevant borrowings, made by her, from the complainant, being, a sequel of hers, knowing, the complainant to be engaged in the profession, of, money lending. Furthermore, also when, the borrowings, rather made, from, professional money lenders, by the latter's customers, enjoin also an eruption of clinching proof, qua, charging of interest thereon, by the moneylender, (ix) whereas with no evidence surging forth hereat, in the display of the amount, carried in the dishonoured negotiable instrument, also carrying therein, the apt interest levied or charged thereon. Contrarily, with the existence, of, evidence qua the initial borrowings, made by the respondent/accused,

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from, the complainant, rather bearing consonance, with, the amount carried, in the dishonoured negotiable instrument, (x) whereupon, it is apt, to, conclude, of no, interest being charged or levied by the complainant, from, the respondent/accused, in the latter making, hence, borrowings from him. Corollary thereof is, it being unbefitting to conclude, of the complainant, charging or levying, any interest, on the money lent by him to the apposite borrowers AND hence his being not construable to be a money lender.

¶141

It was further held that the provisions of the

¶142

Registration of Money Lenders Act apply to the suits and not to the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed:

¶143

“11. Be that as it may, even if assumingly, the complainant, is construable to be an unregistered or an unlicensed professional money lender, and, even if assumingly, the bar constituted under Section 3 of the H. P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1976, is attracted vis-a-vis the purported business of money lending, carried by the complainant, (i) nonetheless, the bar, is, attracted only, against, institution of a civil suit, and, for realization, through, coercive processes, of, decrees rendered thereon, (ii) the bar obviously, is, not attracted vis-a-vis, the institution of a complaint, under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, (iii) given non existence of any specific explicit mandate therein qua the bar encapsulated therein, vis-a-vis, institution of a civil suit, by any unlicensed money lender, for hence his seeking recovery, of, amounts lent by him, to, his borrowers, also being extendable qua the institution of a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, by a money lender against his borrower. Consequently, omission of existence, of, an explicit

¶144

24

¶145

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apposite exclusionary mandate, in Section 3 of the H. P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1976, against institution, of, a statutory complaint, by a professional money lender against his borrower, also hence, constrains a conclusion, that, mandate thereof, is, unattractable vis-a-vis institution, of a statutory complaint, by a money lender, against his borrowers, (a) unless evidence surges forth, of the apposite lending being provenly, ingrained, with entrenched prohibitive vices, (b) whereupon, alone the lending, would be construable to be, not, a legally recoverable debt nor a legally enforceable debt, (c) whereas, with no evidence hereat, rather surging forth, qua the sums embodied, within, the cheque, hereat carrying, any, entrenched prohibitive vices, thereupon, even if assumingly, the complainant, is, a professional unlicensed money lender, yet the lending made by him vis-a-vis the accused, are, to be construable to be both, a legally recoverable debt besides a legally enforceable debt. (d) More so, when evidently no proof is forthcoming qua the respective borrowings, being made, subject to levying or charging, of interest thereon.”

¶147

This question was again considered by this Court in

¶148

Bal Krishan Rawat Versus Gian Lal 2020 ACD 984, and it was held that a loan advanced based on a cheque falls within the exception and is not barred by the H.P Registration of Money Lending Act. It was observed:

¶149

6(iii) The object of the H.P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, 1976, is to register money-lenders and to regulate their business in Himachal Pradesh. Section 3 of this Act provides that a suit inter alia for recovery of a loan, by a moneylender, shall be dismissed unless the moneylender is registered and licensed as such under the Act. Section 3 runs as under:

¶150

25

¶151

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"3. Suits and applications by moneylenders are barred unless the moneylender is registered and licensed.-

¶153

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other enactment for the time being in force, a suit by a money-lender for the recovery of a loan, or an application by a money-lender for the execution of a decree relating to a loan, shall, after the commencement of this Act, be dismissed, unless the moneylender, at the time of the institution of the suit or presentation of the application for execution, or at the time of decreeing the suit or deciding the application for execution,-

¶154

(a) is registered; and

¶155

(i) holds a valid licence, in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed; or

¶156

(ii) holds a certificate from a Commissioner granted under section 10, specifying the loan in respect of which the suit is instituted, or the decree in respect of which the application for execution is presented; or

¶157

(b) If he is not already a registered and licensed money-lender, he satisfies the court that he has applied to the Collector to be registered and licensed and that such application is pending:

¶158

Provided that in such a case, the suit or application shall not be finally disposed of until the application of the money-lender for registration and grant of the licence pending before the Collector is finally disposed of."

¶159

Thus, a money lender at the time of institution of the suit for recovery of the loan amount should be duly registered as such under the Act and should hold a valid license of money lending as prescribed in the Act. In case a money lender is not registered and licensed under the Act, then he should satisfy the Court that his such application in that regard is pending before the concerned authority, which should be disposed of before the

¶160

26

¶161

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¶162

disposal of the recovery suit. Who is a 'money lender' has been defined in Section 2(9) of the Act as under:

¶163

"2(9) "money-lender" means a person, or a firm, carrying on the business of advancing loans and includes the legal representatives and the successors-in-interest, whether by inheritance, assignment or otherwise, of such person or firm, provided that nothing in this definition shall apply to.

¶164

(a) a person who is the legal representative or is by inheritance the successor-in-interest of the estate of a deceased money-lender, together with all his rights and liabilities if such person -

¶165

(i) winds up the estate of such money-lender:

¶166

(ii) realises outstanding loans;

¶167

(iii) does not renew any existing loan, or advance any fresh loan;

¶168

(b) a bona fide assignment by a money-lender of a single loan to anyone other than the wife or husband of such assignor, as the case may be, or any person who is descended from a common grandfather of the assignor."

¶169

The 'money lender' advances loans. Section 2(8) defines 'loan' in the following manner:-

¶170

"(8) "loan" means an advance, whether secured or unsecured, of money or in kind at interest and shall include any transaction which the court finds to be in substance a loan, but shall not include -

¶171

(a) An advance in kind made by a landlord to his tenant for the purposes of husbandry:

¶172

Provided that the market value of the return does not exceed the market value of the advance as estimated at the time of advance;

¶173

(b) a deposit of money or other property in a Post Office Savings Bank, or any other Bank, or with a

¶174

27

¶175

2025:HHC:43472

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company, or with a co-operative society, or with any employer, as security from his employees;

¶177

(c) a loan to or by, or a deposit with, any society or association registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (21 of 1860) or under any other enactment;

¶178

(d) a loan advanced by or to the Central Government or any State Government or by or to any local body or panchayat under the authority of the Central Government or any State Government;

¶179

(e) a loan advanced by a bank, a co-operative society or a company, whose accounts are subject to audit by a certified auditor under the Companies Act, 1956, (1 of 1956) or under any other law for the time being in force;

¶180

(f) a loan advanced by a trader to a trader, in the regular course of business, in accordance with trade usage;

¶181

(g) an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (26 of 1881) other than a promissory note."

¶182

6(iv) Definition of 'loan' assumes significance in determining the applicability of the H.P. Registration of Money Lenders Act, to the facts of the case. Not all kinds of loans are covered under Section 2(8) of the Act. Reference in this regard can be made to the following para from titled Gajanan and Others vs. Seth Brindaban, (1970) 2 SCC 360, where provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Moneylenders Act were being considered:-

¶183

"5........"Moneylender" as defined in cl. (v) of S. 2 means a person who, in the regular course of business, advances a loan as defined in this Act, and it includes his legal representatives and successors in interest. "Loan" as defined in cl. (vii) means an

¶184

28

¶185

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¶186

actual advance, whether of money or in kind, at interest, and it includes any transaction which the court finds to be in substance a loan. It does not include inter alia an advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument other than a promissory note.........."

¶187

Advances/loans falling within the exceptions (a) to (g) of Section 2(8) fall outside the ambit of the Act. Advancing such kinds of loans, which fall within the exceptions carried out in Section 2(8) of the Act, would not make a person a moneylender in terms of the H.P. Registration of Money Lenders Act. Such a person, who has advanced loans, which are covered within the exceptions of Section 2(8) of the Act, is not required to be registered or licensed under the Act as a money-lender. Suit for recovery of the loan amount, falling in the exceptions (a) to (g) of Section 2(8) of the Act, therefore, cannot be held as not maintainable for want of registration and license as a moneylender under the Act. In the facts of the case, the concurrent factual findings of both the learned Courts below are that various recovery suits had been instituted by the plaintiff in different Courts. This fact had even been acknowledged by the plaintiff in his statement. However, there was no evidence either led by the defendant in support of issue No. 6 or available in any other form before the learned Courts below to conclude that various cases instituted by the plaintiff in different Courts were for recovery of that kind of loan, which was included in the definition of 'loan' under Section 2(8) of the Act. For want of specific evidence in that regard, there could be a possibility that all the recovery suits statedly preferred by the plaintiff were for recovery of those loans, which fell within the exceptions (a) to (g) of Section 2(8) of the Act and, therefore, were excluded from the applicability of the Act. It is also to be borne in mind that the instant case for recovery of the amount was based on a loan advanced in lieu of a cheque. 'Cheque', as per Section 16 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, is a bill of exchange

¶188

29

¶189

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¶190

and falls within the definition of 'Negotiable Instrument' as spelt out in Section 13 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. An advance made on the basis of a negotiable instrument as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act falls in category (g) of the exceptions to the definition of 'loan' under Section 2(8) of the H.P. Registration of Money Lenders Act. In such a scenario, an instant suit for recovery of the amount cannot be held to be not maintainable for want of the plaintiff's registration and license as a money-lender. Findings of learned Courts below to the contrary, therefore, are not sustainable. Point is answered accordingly.”

¶191

Therefore, the complaint cannot be dismissed on the

¶192

ground that the complainant is a moneylender, and he does not have any license for money lending.

¶193

The accused claimed that he had returned the amount to the complainant. However, he has not filed any receipt regarding the payment of money to the complainant. The complainant denied in his cross-examination that the accused had returned the amount taken by him through a cheque. A denied suggestion does not amount to any proof, and no advantage can be derived from it.

¶194

Even otherwise, the promissory note and the receipt clearly prove that the accused had borrowed ₹1,60,000/- from the complainant. The accused failed to prove the repayment of ₹1,60,000/- to the complainant. Therefore, the complainant

¶195

30

¶196

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¶197

was had sufficient authority with him to present the cheque. It laid down by this Court in Hamid Mohammad Versus Jaimal Dass 2016 (1) HLJ 456 , that even if the cheque is issued towards the security, the accused is liable. It was observed:

¶198

“9. Submission of learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the revisionist that the cheque in question was issued to the complainant as security, and on this ground, the criminal revision petition is rejected as being devoid of any force for the reasons hereinafter mentioned. As per Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881, if any cheque is issued on account of other liability, then the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 would be attracted. The court has perused the original cheque, Ext. C-1 dated 30.10.2008, placed on record. There is no recital in the cheque Ext. C-1, that cheque was issued as a security cheque. It is well-settled law that a cheque issued as security would also come under the provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881. See 2016 (3) SCC page 1 titled Don Ayengia v. State of Assam & another . It is well-settled law that where there is a conflict between former law and subsequent law, then subsequent law always prevails.”

¶199

It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

¶200

Sampelly Satyanarayana Rao vs. Indian Renewable Energy Development Agency Limited 2016(10) SCC 458 that issuing a cheque towards security will also attract the liability for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was observed: -

¶201

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¶202

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¶203

“10. We have given due consideration to the submission advanced on behalf of the appellant as well as the observations of this Court in Indus Airways Private Limited versus Magnum Aviation Private Limited (2014) 12 SCC 53 with reference to the explanation to Section 138 of the Act and the expression “for the discharge of any debt or other liability” occurring in Section 138 of the Act. We are of the view that the question of whether a post-dated cheque is for “discharge of debt or liability” depends on the nature of the transaction. If on the date of the cheque, liability or debt exists or the amount has become legally recoverable, the Section is attracted and not otherwise .

¶204

Reference to the facts of the present case clearly shows that though the word “security” is used in clause 3.1(iii) of the agreement, the said expression refers to the cheques being towards repayment of instalments. The repayment becomes due under the agreement, the moment the loan is advanced, and the instalment falls due. It is undisputed that the loan was duly disbursed on 28th February 2002, which was prior to the date of the cheques. Once the loan was disbursed and instalments had fallen due on the date of the cheque as per the agreement, the dishonour of such cheques would fall under Section 138 of the Act. The cheques undoubtedly represent the outstanding liability.

¶205

Judgment in Indus Airways (supra) is clearly distinguishable. As already noted, it was held therein that liability arising out of a claim for breach of contract under Section 138, which arises on account of dishonour of a cheque issued, was not by itself at par with a criminal liability towards discharge of acknowledged and admitted debt under a loan transaction. Dishonour of a cheque issued for the discharge of a later liability is clearly covered by the statute in question. Admittedly, on the date of the cheque, there was a debt/liability in praesenti in terms of the loan agreement, as against the case of Indus Airways (supra), where the purchase order had been cancelled, and a cheque issued towards advance payment for the pur-

¶206

32

¶207

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¶208

chase order was dishonoured. In that case, it was found that the cheque had not been issued for the discharge of liability but as an advance for the purchase order, which was cancelled. Keeping in mind this fine, but the real distinction, the said judgment cannot be applied to a case of the present nature, where the cheque was for repayment of a loan instalment which had fallen due, though such a deposit of cheques towards repayment of instalments was also described as “security” in the loan agreement. In applying the judgment in Indus Airways (supra), one cannot lose sight of the difference between a transaction of the purchase order which is cancelled and that of a loan transaction where the loan has actually been advanced, and its repayment is due on the date of the cheque.

¶209

The crucial question to determine the applicability of Section 138 of the Act is whether the cheque represents the discharge of existing enforceable debt or liability, or whether it represents an advance payment without there being a subsisting debt or liability. While approving the views of different High Courts noted earlier, this is the underlying principle as can be discerned from the discussion of the said cases in the judgment of this Court.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶210

This position was reiterated in Sripati Singh v. State of

¶211

Jharkhand, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1002: AIR 2021 SC 5732 , and it was

¶212

held that a cheque issued as security is not waste paper and a complaint under section 138 of the NI Act can be filed on its dishonour. It was observed:

¶213

“17. A cheque issued as security pursuant to a financial transaction cannot be considered a worthless piece of paper under every circumstance. 'Security' in its true sense is the state of being safe, and the security given for a loan is something given as a pledge of payment. It is

¶214

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¶215

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¶216

given, deposited or pledged to make certain the fulfilment of an obligation to which the parties to the transaction are bound. If in a transaction, a loan is advanced and the borrower agrees to repay the amount in a specified timeframe and issues a cheque as security to secure such repayment; if the loan amount is not repaid in any other form before the due date or if there is no other understanding or agreement between the parties to defer the payment of the amount, the cheque which is issued as security would mature for presentation and the drawee of the cheque would be entitled to present the same. On such a presentation, if the same is dishonoured, the consequences contemplated under Section 138 and the other provisions of the NI Act would flow.

¶217

When a cheque is issued and is treated as 'security' towards repayment of an amount with a time period being stipulated for repayment, all that it ensures is that such a cheque, which is issued as 'security, cannot be presented prior to the loan or the instalment maturing for repayment towards which such cheque is issued as security. Further, the borrower would have the option of repaying the loan amount or such financial liability in any other form, and in that manner, if the amount of the loan due and payable has been discharged within the agreed period, the cheque issued as security cannot thereafter be presented. Therefore, the prior discharge of the loan or there being an altered situation due to which there would be an understanding between the parties is a sine qua non to not present the cheque which was issued as security. These are only the defences that would be available to the drawer of the cheque in proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Therefore, there cannot be a hard and fast rule that a cheque, which is issued as security, can never be presented by the drawee of the cheque. If such is the understanding, a cheque would also be reduced to an 'on-demand promissory note', and in all circumstances, it would only be civil litigation to recover the amount, which is not the intention of the statute.

¶218

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¶219

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¶220

When a cheque is issued even though as 'security' the consequence flowing therefrom is also known to the drawer of the cheque and in the circumstance stated above if the cheque is presented and dishonoured, the holder of the cheque/drawee would have the option of initiating the civil proceedings for recovery or the criminal proceedings for punishment in the fact situation, but in any event, it is not for the drawer of the cheque to dictate terms with regard to the nature of litigation.”

¶221

Therefore, the learned Courts below had rightly held

¶222

that the accused cannot escape from the liability on the ground that he had issued the cheque as security to the complainant.

¶223

Thus, the pleas taken by the accused that he had borrowed ₹50,000/- and had issued a security cheque were not proved and the learned Courts below had rightly held that the cheque was issued in discharge of the legal liability and the accused has failed to rebut the presumption attached to the cheque under Sections 139 and 118(a) of the NI Act.

¶224

The complainant stated that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. This is duly corroborated by the dishonour memo (Ext.CW1/D), wherein the reason for the dishonour was mentioned as ‘insufficient funds’. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mandvi Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. Nimesh B. Thakore , (2010) 3 SCC

¶225

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¶226

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¶227

83: (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 625: (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1: 2010 SCC OnLine SC 155 that the memo issued by the Bank is presumed to be correct and the burden is upon the accused to rebut the presumption. It was observed at page 95:

¶228

“24. Section 146, making a major departure from the principles of the Evidence Act, provides that the bank's slip or memo with the official mark showing that the cheque was dishonoured would, by itself, give rise to the presumption of dishonour of the cheque, unless and until that fact was disproved. Section 147 makes the offences punishable under the Act compoundable.”

¶229

In the present case, no evidence was produced to

¶230

rebut the presumption, and the learned Courts below had rightly

¶231

held that the cheque was dishonoured with an endorsement ‘funds insufficient’.

¶232

The complainant stated in his proof affidavit that he had sent a legal notice (Ext.CW1/F) to the accused. The complainant produced the Track Consignment Report (Ext.CW1/H), which shows that the item was delivered to the accused on 06.05.2019. Thus, his plea that the notice was duly served upon the accused was duly proved. In any case, it was laid down in C.C. Allavi Haji vs. Pala Pelly Mohd. 2007(6) SCC 555, that the person who claims that he had not received the notice has to pay the amount within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the

¶233

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¶234

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¶235

summons from the Court and in case of failure to do so, he cannot take the advantage of the fact that notice was not received by him. It was observed:

¶236

“It is also to be borne in mind that the requirement of giving notice is a clear departure from the rule of Criminal Law, where there is no stipulation of giving notice before filing a complaint. Any drawer who claims that he did not receive the notice sent by post, can, within 15 days of receipt of summons from the court in respect of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, make payment of the cheque amount and submit to the Court that he had made payment within 15 days of receipt of summons (by receiving a copy of the complaint with the summons) and, therefore, the complaint is liable to be rejected. A person who does not pay within 15 days of receipt of the summons from the Court along with the copy of the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, cannot obviously contend that there was no proper service of notice as required under Section 138, by ignoring statutory presumption to the contrary under Section 27 of the G.C. Act and Section 114 of the Evidence Act . In our view, any other interpretation of the proviso would defeat the very object of the legislation. As observed in Bhaskaran’s case (supra), if the giving of notice in the context of Clause (b) of the proviso was the same as the receipt of notice, a trickster cheque drawer would get the premium to avoid receiving the notice by adopting different strategies and escape from the legal consequences of Section 138 of the Act.” (Emphasis supplied)

¶237

The accused did not claim that he had repaid the

¶238

amount to the complainant; therefore, it was duly proved on record that the accused had failed to repay the amount despite the receipt of the notice.

¶239

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¶240

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¶241

Therefore, it was duly proved before the learned Trial Court that the accused had issued a cheque to discharge his legal liability, the cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’, and the accused failed to repay the money despite the receipt of a notice of demand. Hence, all the ingredients of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act were duly satisfied, and the learned Trial Court had rightly convicted the accused for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act.

¶242

Learned Trial Court sentenced the accused to undergo simple imprisonment for six months. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bir Singh v. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 138 that the penal provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is deterrent in nature. It was observed at page 203:

¶243

“6. The object of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is to infuse credibility into negotiable instruments, including cheques, and to encourage and promote the use of negotiable instruments, including cheques, in financial transactions. The penal provision of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is intended to be a deterrent to callous issuance of negotiable

¶244

38

¶245

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¶246

instruments such as cheques without serious intention to honour the promise implicit in the issuance of the same.” 45. Therefore, the sentence of six months is not

¶247

excessive.

¶248

Learned Trial Court ordered to pay compensation of ₹1,67,000/- (1,67,000/- as the cheque amount and ₹7000/- as the compensation for suffering). The cheque was issued on 31.12.2018. The sentence was imposed on 15.06.2025 after the lapse of 4 and ½ years. The complainant lost the interest that he would have gained by investing the money. He had incurred the legal expenses for prosecuting the complaint before the learned Trial Court and the learned Appellate Court. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalamani Tex v. P. Balasubramanian, (2021) 5 SCC 283: (2021) 3 SCC (Civ) 25: (2021) 2 SCC (Cri) 555: 2021 SCC OnLine SC 75 that the Courts should uniformly levy a fine up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest at the rate of 9% per annum. It was observed at page 291: -

¶249

As regards the claim of compensation raised on behalf of the respondent, we are conscious of the settled principles that the object of Chapter XVII of NIA is not only punitive but also compensatory and restitutive. The provisions of NIA envision a single window for criminal liability for the dishonour of a cheque as well as civil

¶250

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¶251

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¶252

liability for the realisation of the cheque amount. It is also well settled that there needs to be a consistent approach towards awarding compensation, and unless there exist special circumstances, the courts should uniformly levy fines up to twice the cheque amount along with simple interest @ 9% p.a. [ R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260, para 20: (2012) 1 SCC (Civ) 79: (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 520 ] ”

¶253

Thus, the amount of ₹ 7,000/- awarded as

¶254

compensation on the cheque amount of ₹ 1,60,000/- is inadequate, but no appeal has been preferred against the inadequacy of the sentence; hence, no interference is required with the sentence imposed by the learned Trial Court.

¶255

No other point was urged.

¶256

In view of the above, the present revision fails and it is dismissed and so are the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.

¶257

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge

¶258

15^th December, 2025 (Nikita)

Suresh Kumar v. Asha Ram

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