Nirat Singh Vs Sita Devi

2025:HHC:5345

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

Cr. Appeal No. 315 of 2010 Reserved on: 03.03.2025 Date of Decision: 10.03.2025

Nirat Singh Versus Sita Devi and others	...Appellant ...Respondents
Coram
*Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthl*	a,*Judge.*
*Whether approved for reporting?*¹	*Yes.*
For the Appellant :	Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, Advocate.
For the Respondents :	Ms. Kusum Chaudhary, Advocate.

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Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

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The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26.03.2010, passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kullu, District Kullu, H.P., (learned Trial Court), vide which the complaint filed by the appellant (complainant before the learned Trial Court) was dismissed and respondents (accused before learned Trial Court) were acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

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1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

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Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 324 and 506 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). It was asserted that the complainant is an agriculturist and is residing at Village and Post OfÏce Kotla, Sub Tehsil Sainj, District Kullu, H.P. Accused No.1 is the wife of the complainant and accused No.2 and 3 are his sons. They reside in Village Hurla, Sub Tehsil Sainj, District Kullu, H.P. Accused No.1 has inherited the property of her father in Village Hurla where she used to reside with accused No.2 and 3. The complainant is residing in Village Kotla. The accused came to the house of the complainant at Village Kotla on 8.7.2006 at 8.00 PM armed with sticks. They abused and threatened the complainant. They asked the complainant to transfer the property in their names. The complainant refused to do so. The accused gave him a beating with fist blows and sticks. The complainant shouted for help. Smt. Bhadri Devi, Baldev Singh, Tek Singh and Bali Ram reached the spot and rescued the complainant from the accused. The accused ran away from the spot. They threatened the complainant to kill him at a suitable time. The complainant

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sustained injuries on his head and body. He reported the matter to Police Station, Banjar but no action was taken by the police. Hence the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for taking action against the accused.

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The learned Trial Court recorded the preliminary evidence and found sufÏcient reasons to summon the accused. Statements of complainant Nirat Singh (PW1), Baldev Singh (PW2), Tek Singh (PW3) and Bali Ram (PW4) were recorded before framing the charges.

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The learned Trial Court found sufÏcient reasons to frame charges against the accused for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 323 and 506 read with Section 34 of IPC.

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The complainant Nirat Singh (PW1) was recalled for further examination after framing the charges.

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The accused in their statements recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. denied the case of the complainant in its entirety. They claimed that the witnesses deposed against them falsely. Initially, they stated that they wanted to lead defence evidence, however, no evidence was led subsequently.

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Learned Trial Court held that the incident occurred on 8.7.2006 and the complaint was filed on 28.7.2006 after a gap of 20 days. The complainant explained that he had reported the matter to the police but there was no evidence in support of this fact. The delay in filing the complaint would make the case of the complainant suspect. The complainant stated that Bhadri Devi had reached the spot and rescued him from the accused. The statement of Bhadri Devi was not recorded. The complainant admitted that the village had around 80 houses but no person from the vicinity was examined to prove the complainant’s version. No medical evidence was brought on record to corroborate the complainant’s version. Bali Ram (PW4) was related to the complainant. He was residing seven kilometres away from the place of the incident. He was a chance witness and his presence was not satisfactorily established on the spot. The complainant and accused were inimical to each other and the possibility of false implication could not be ruled out. The weapon of offence was not produced before the Court. These facts created reasonable doubt in the complainant’s case. Accordingly, the accused were acquitted.

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Being aggrieved from the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the complainant has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The statements of the complainant’s witnesses were ignored without any justification. Learned Trial Court erred in discarding testimony of Bali Ram (PW4). The accused wanted the complainant to transfer his property in their names and they gave him beatings to compel him to do so. This aspect was ignored by the learned Trial Court. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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I have heard Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Ms. Kusum Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents/accused.

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Mr. S.D. Vasudeva, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The evidence was not properly appreciated and the statements of the complainant’s witnesses were discarded without any justification. Hence, he prayed that

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the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside.

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Ms Kusum Chaudhary, learned counsel for the respondents/accused supported the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court. She submitted that the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court unless there is some perversity in the judgment. There is no such perversity. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed.

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I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

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The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176 that the Court should interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse or is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and no reasonable person could have recorded the acquittal based on the evidence led before the learned Trial Court. It was observed:

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11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4035 , a Bench of this Court to which one of us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the

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legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal against acquittal. It was observed thus:

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“ 38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court in an appeal filed by the State for challenging the acquittal of the accused recorded by the trial court.

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This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471: (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31] encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para 29)

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“ 29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal in the following words: ( Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415: (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325 ], SCC p. 432, para 42)

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‘ 42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding the powers of the appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

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(1) An appellate court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded.

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(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on the exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law.

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(3) Various expressions, such as, “substantial and compelling reasons”, “good and sufÏcient grounds”, “very strong circumstances”, “distorted conclusions”, “glaring mistakes”, etc. are not intended to

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curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of “flourishes of language” to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion.

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(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly , the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly , the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reafÏrmed and strengthened by the trial court.

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(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.’”

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Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378CrPC as follows: (SCC p. 584, para 8)

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“ 8. … 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

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8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

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8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by

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the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

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8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and

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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.”

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Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:

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41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

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41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and

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41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.”

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The present appeal has to be decided as per the

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parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

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The complainant had asserted in the complaint that

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he was rescued by Bhadri Devi and other persons. He had abandoned this version when he was recalled for crossexamination. He specifically stated in his statement dated 3.12.2009 that Bhadri Devi was not present at the time of the incident. This admission falsifies the contents of the complaint that Bhadri Devi was present on the spot and had rescued the complainant from the accused.

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The informant stated that he had reported the matter to the Police Station, Banjar on 9.7.2006, however, no action was taken by the police. He stated in his cross-examination that he had made a written complaint to the police but he had not retained any record with him. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that the complainant had not summoned any record from the Police Station, Banjar to establish his version regarding the making of the complaint. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly held that there was no explanation for the delay in making the complaint before the Court. It was laid down in Mehraj Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication

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and therefore, the court should see the prosecution case with

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utmost care and caution in case of delay. It was observed:

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"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest information regarding the circumstance in which the crime was committed, including the names of the actual culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any. Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment, which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, but danger also creeps in the introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story. With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts generally look for certain external checks. One of the checks is the receipt of the copy of the FIR, called a special report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is alleged to have been recorded unless, of course, the prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by the local Magistrate. The prosecution has led no evidence at all in this behalf. The second external check equally important is the sending of a copy of the FIR along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section 174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend credence to the prosecution case, the details of the FIR and the gist of statements recorded during inquest proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of those details is indicative of the fact that the prosecution story was still in an embryo state and had not been given any shape and that the FIR came to be recorded later on after due deliberations and consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the colour of a

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promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that the same has been ante-timed and had not been recorded till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW 8."

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This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of

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Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40 , wherein it was observed: -

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“12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first information report because of the possibility of a concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide the matter on merits without giving much importance to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay may be condoned if the complainant appears to be reliable and without any motive for implicating the accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973) 3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1 ].”

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A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N. ,

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(2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653

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wherein it was observed at page 182:

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“14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been taken by the appellant urging that there has been no satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to give a

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coloured version of the incident, which is sufÏcient to corrode the credibility of the prosecution version.

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15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been explained, mere delay cannot be sufÏcient to disbelieve the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay should not be considered as fatal forming part of several factors to vitiate the conviction.”

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Therefore, learned Trial Court was justified in doubting the case of the complainant due to the delay in reporting the matter to the Court or the police.

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Bali Ram (PW4) stated that he had gone to Bazar for purchasing household articles. On 8.7.2006, he was going to his home when he heard the cries. He went to the spot and saw that the accused were beating the complainant with sticks and fist blows. When he inquired from them, they replied that the accused was not transferring the land in their names. The accused threatened to kill the complainant in case the land was not transferred in their names by the complainant. He stated in his cross-examination that his house is located at a distance of 6-7 kilometres from the place of the incident. The complainant is his real uncle. This shows that he was a chance witness. It was

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laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Harbeer Singh v. Sheeshpal, (2016) 16 SCC 418: (2017) 4 SCC (Cri) 503: 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1164 that the chance witnesses have a habit of appearing suddenly on the place of incident and thereafter disappearing. Their testimonies should be seen with due care and caution. It was observed at page 427:

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23. The defining attributes of a “chance witness” were explained by Mahajan, J., in Puran v. State of Punjab [Puran v. State of Punjab, (1952) 2 SCC 454: AIR 1953 SC 459: 1953 Cri LJ 1925] . It was held that such witnesses have the habit of appearing suddenly on the scene when something is happening and then disappearing after noticing the occurrence about which they are called later on to give evidence.

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24. In Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B. [Mousam Singha Roy v. State of W.B., (2003) 12 SCC 377: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 429 ], this Court discarded the evidence of chance witnesses while observing that certain glaring contradictions/omissions in the evidence of PW 2 and PW 3 and the absence of their names in the FIR has been very lightly discarded by the courts below. Similarly, Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] and Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107] are authorities for the proposition that deposition of a chance witness, whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful, ought to be discarded. Therefore, for the reasons recorded by the High Court, we hold that PW 5 and PW 6 were chance witnesses and their statements have been rightly discarded.

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It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

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Rajesh Yadav v. State of U.P., (2022) 12 SCC 200: 2022 SCC OnLine

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2025:HHC:5345

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SC 150 that the testimony of a chance witness is to be seen with due care and caution and his presence on the spot should be

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satisfactorily established. It was observed:

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“Chance witness

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29. A chance witness is one who happens to be at the place of occurrence of an offence by chance, and therefore, not as a matter of course. In other words, he is not expected to be in the said place. A person walking on a street witnessing the commission of an offence can be a chance witness. Merely because a witness happens to see an occurrence by chance, his testimony cannot be eschewed though a little more scrutiny may be required at times. This again is an aspect which is to be looked into in a given case by the court. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid position of law which has been clearly laid down by this Court in State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy [State of A.P. v. K. Srinivasulu Reddy, (2003) 12 SCC 660: 2005 SCC (Cri) 817] : (SCC pp. 665-66, paras 12-13)

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“ 12 . Criticism was levelled against the evidence of PWs 4 and 9 who are independent witnesses by labelling them as chance witnesses. The criticism about PWs 4 and 9 being chance witnesses is also without any foundation. They have clearly explained as to how they happened to be at the spot of occurrence and the trial court and the High Court have accepted the same.

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13 . Coming to the plea of the accused that PWs 4 and 9 were “chance witnesses” who have not explained how they happened to be at the alleged place of occurrence, it has to be noted that the said witnesses were independent witnesses. There was not even a suggestion to the witnesses that they had any animosity towards any of the accused. In a murder trial by describing the independent witnesses as “chance witnesses” it cannot be implied thereby that their evidence is suspicious and their presence at the scene doubtful. Murders are not committed with previous notice to witnesses; soliciting their presence. If murder is committed in a dwelling house, the inmates of the house are natural witnesses. If murder is committed in a street, only passersby will be witnesses. Their evidence cannot be brushed aside or viewed with suspicion on the ground that they are mere

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“chance witnesses”. The expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter explaining their presence.”

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30. The principle was reiterated by this Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab [Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab, (2009) 9 SCC 719: (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 107]: (SCC p. 725, paras 21-23)

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“ 21 . In Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P. [Sachchey Lal Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2004) 11 SCC 410: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 105] this Court while considering the evidentiary value of the chance witness in a case of murder which had taken place in a street and a passer-by had deposed that he had witnessed the incident, observed as under:

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If the offence is committed in a street only a passer-by will be the witness. His evidence cannot be brushed aside lightly or viewed with suspicion on the ground that he was a mere chance witness. However, there must be an explanation for his presence there.

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The Court further explained that the expression “chance witness” is borrowed from countries where every man's home is considered his castle and everyone must have an explanation for his presence elsewhere or in another man's castle. It is quite unsuitable an expression in a country like India where people are less formal and more casual, at any rate in the matter of explaining their presence.

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22 . The evidence of a chance witness requires very cautious and close scrutiny and a chance witness must adequately explain his presence at the place of occurrence ( Satbir v. Surat Singh [Satbir v. Surat Singh, (1997) 4 SCC 192: 1997 SCC (Cri) 538], Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab [Harjinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2004) 11 SCC 253: 2004 SCC (Cri) Supp 28], Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala [Acharaparambath Pradeepan v. State of Kerala, (2006) 13 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] and Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh [Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh, (2007) 13 SCC 360 : (2009) 1 SCC

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(Cri) 188] ) . Deposition of a chance witness whose presence at the place of incident remains doubtful should be discarded (vide Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan [Shankarlal v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 10 SCC 632: 2005 SCC (Cri) 579] ).

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23 . Conduct of the chance witness, subsequent to the incident may also be taken into consideration particularly as to whether he has informed anyone else in the village about the incident (vide Thangaiya v. State of T.N. [Thangaiya v. State of T.N., (2005) 9 SCC 650: 2005 SCC (Cri) 1284] ). Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) met the informant Darshan Singh (PW 4) before lodging the FIR and the fact of conspiracy was not disclosed by Gurcharan Singh (PW 18) and Darshan Singh (PW 4). The fact of conspiracy has not been mentioned in the FIR. Hakam Singh, the other witness on this issue has not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the High Court was justified in discarding the part of the prosecution case relating to conspiracy. However, in the fact situation of the present case, the acquittal of the said two coaccused has no bearing, so far as the present appeal is concerned.”

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This witness stated in his cross-examination that he did not know the names of English months and thereafter clarified that the incident had taken place on 8.7.2006. His testimony that he did not know the names of English months and thereafter his statement that the incident had taken place on 8.7.2006 shows that the name of the month was supplied to him by some person. There is nothing to show that he had taken any steps to take the complainant to the hospital. He is the real nephew of the complainant and would have been concerned about the health of his uncle after the beating. Hence, the non-

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taking of the complainant to the hospital will cast doubt on his testimony that he had witnessed the incident and the learned Trial court had rightly discarded his testimony.

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Baldev Singh (PW2) stated that on 8.7.2006, at 8.00 PM, he was going to his home when he heard some noise from the house of Nirat Singh. He visited the spot and saw the accused asking the complainant to transfer the land. They threatened to kill the complainant. Nirat Singh sustained injuries. Tek Singh (PW3) and Bali Ram (PW4) reached the spot and rescued the complainant from the accused. The accused threatened to kill the complainant. He stated in his cross-examination that 100-150 people reached the village on the spot. They advised the accused not to beat the complainant. The accused heeded this advice and left the spot. Houses of Gian Chand, Ved Prakash and Dashmi Ram are located adjacent to the place of incident.

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His testimony regarding the arrival of 100-150 villagers at the spot is not supported by Tek Singh (PW3), who stated in his cross-examination that no other person except him, Bali Ram and Baldev had reached the spot in their presence. This shows that witnesses have given different versions regarding the

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arrival of the witnesses on the spot and this makes their testimonies highly doubtful.

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Baldev Singh (PW2) stated in his cross-examination that the complainant sustained injuries on his head and back. He did not sustain any injury on the chest or the arm. Tek Singh (PW3) on the other hand stated that Nirat Singh sustained injuries on his arm and leg, therefore, both these witnesses have given a different description of the injuries sustained by the complainant which would make their testimonies highly suspect and the learned Trial Court was justified in rejecting their testimonies in these circumstances.

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The learned Trial Court had rightly pointed out that no witness from the vicinity had appeared on the spot which is highly improbable because Baldev Singh (PW2), who was residing at some distance had reached the spot after hearing the cries. It is highly unlikely that the witness residing at a different place would have heard the cries and reached the spot but no person from the immediate vicinity would have reached the spot. Learned Trial Court was justified in adversely commenting upon this circumstance.

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There was no corroboration of the testimony of the informant from the medical evidence. The complainant had sustained various injuries and it is difÏcult to believe that he had not visited any hospital for treatment regarding the injuries sustained by him.

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Therefore, there were various circumstances on record which cast doubt on the complainant’s case. The learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible.

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In view of the above, the present appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

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Records be sent back forthwith. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

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(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 10^th March, 2025 (Chander)

Nirat Singh v. Sita Devi

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Nirat Singh v. Sita Devi

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