Dismissed¶16

Vikas Sidhu v. State of Hp and Anr.

Himachal Pradesh HC7 Mar 2025CRMMO/85/2025

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

Himachal Pradesh High Court; Cr. MMO 85/2025; Vikas Sidhu v. State of H.P.; quashing of FIR; Section 482 CrPC; Bhajan Lal categories; rape; promise and refusal to marry; prima facie cognizable offence; Karuppudayar reliability genuineness; distinguished Pramod Suryabhan Pawar; Mahesh Damu Khare; B.N. John; Ajay Malik; petition dismissed

What did the court decide?

The FIR's allegations — the petitioner took the victim to a room on the pretext of talking to her and raped her, and subsequently refused to marry the informant — show a prima facie case for the commission of rape. ¶10

Vikas Sidhu Vs State of Hp and Anr. — Writ and Judicial Review | Himachal Pradesh HC (2025)

What the court decided

AI extract

Outcome

Dismissed

¶16

Issue for consideration

Whether the FIR registered against the petitioner on allegations of rape (committed on the pretext of acquaintance/marriage) can be quashed as an abuse of the process of law. +1 more

¶2

Court's answer

¶10

Ratio / Principle

It is impermissible to comment on the truthfulness or falsehood of the allegations at the stage of deciding a quashing petition; the submission that the allegations are false cannot be appreciated at this stage.

¶12

Key takeaways

The circumstances of Pramod Suryabhan Pawar and Mahesh Damu Khare (long-continued physical relationship; accused married/unable to marry) do not exist here: the parties met regarding marriage, the incident is dated the 26th with complaint dated 7.11.2024, and the FIR does not mention a long-continued physical relationship; hence the circumstances of the present case are entirely different from the cited cases.ratio¶14
The FIR discloses the commission of a cognisable offence and cannot be quashed at this stage.ratio¶15
The observations made in the judgment are confined to the disposal of the petition and have no bearing whatsoever on the merits of the case.

Detailed headnote1 paragraphs

High Court of Himachal Pradesh, Shimla (Rakesh Kainthla, Judge) — Cr. MMO No. 85 of 2025, Vikas Sidhu v. State of Himachal Pradesh & another — Quashing of FIR — Rape alleged on the pretext of acquaintance/marriage; petitioner claimed false implication, non-disclosure of ingredients of offence, 100% visual impairment and mala fides. Applying the Bhajan Lal categories (as explained in B.N. John, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7, and reiterated in Ajay Malik, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185), the Court held that the FIR's allegations (victim taken to a hotel room on the pretext of getting acquainted and raped; petitioner later refused to marry) disclose a prima facie cognizable offence; the reliability or genuineness of allegations cannot be examined at the quashing stage (Karuppudayar, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 215); and the case is entirely different from Pramod Suryabhan Pawar, (2019) 9 SCC 608 and Mahesh Damu Khare, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471, since no long-continued physical relationship existed and the parties had met regarding marriage. Petition dismissed; observations confined to the disposal of the petition, with no bearing on the merits.

¶1

2025:HHC:5123

¶2

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

¶3

Cr. MMO No. 85 of 2025 Reserved on: 01.03.2025 Date of Decision: __.03.2025

¶4

Vikas Sidhu ...Petitioner Versus State of Himachal Pradesh and another ...Respondent

¶5

Coram

¶6

Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?¹

¶7

For the petitioner : Mr. Suneel Awasthi, Advocate. : For the Respondents Mr Gautam Sood, Deputy Advocate General.

¶8

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

¶9

The informant/victim made a complaint to the police that her husband had died one year before the complaint. She was known to Jagdish’s wife, posted in Girls School, who told her that her brother-in-law was serving at Shimla and she would get the informant married to him. She introduced the informant to the petitioner. They shared their numbers. The petitioner visited the old bus stand on the 26^th and took the

¶10

1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.

¶11

¶12

2025:HHC:5123

¶13

victim to a room in a hotel on the pretext of getting acquainted with each other. The petitioner raped the informant in the room. He assured the victim to marry her and continued to talk to her. Subsequently, he refused to marry her. The police registered the FIR and conducted the investigation.

¶14

The petitioner filed the present petition seeking to quash the FIR, asserting that its registration constitutes an abuse of the process of law. The petitioner has been falsely implicated. The story propounded by the informant is a bundle of lies, full of inconsistencies and embellishments. The FIR does not disclose the ingredients of the offence. The petitioner is a 100% visually impaired person, and he never stayed with the informant. The FIR was lodged with mala fide intentions. Hence, the petition.

¶15

I have heard Mr. Sunil Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. Gautam Sood, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State.

¶16

Mr Sunil Awasthi, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that there is a distinction between a false promise to marry a person and a breach of promise to marry due to

¶17

¶18

2025:HHC:5123

¶19

circumstances beyond the control of a person. The FIR does not show that the promise made by the petitioner was false from the beginning without any intention to fulfil it. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the FIR be quashed. He relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Pramod Suryabhan Pawar Vs. State of Maharashtra 2019 (9) SCC 608 and Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3471 in support of his submission.

¶20

Mr Gautam Sood, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the respondent-State submitted that the contents of the FIR disclose the commission of rape. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be dismissed.

¶21

I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

¶22

The law relating to quashing of FIR was explained by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.N. John v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 7 as under: -

¶23

“7. As far as the quashing of criminal cases is concerned, it is now more or less well settled as regards the principles to be applied by the court. In this regard, one may refer to the decision of this Court in State of Haryana v. Ch. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, wherein

¶24

¶25

2025:HHC:5123

¶26

this Court has summarized some of the principles under which FIR/complaints/criminal cases could be quashed in the following words:

¶27

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufÏciently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

¶28

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

¶29

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police ofÏcers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶30

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

¶31

¶32

2025:HHC:5123

¶33

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police ofÏcer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

¶34

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufÏcient ground for proceeding against the accused.

¶35

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efÏcacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

¶36

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (emphasis added)

¶37

8. Of the aforesaid criteria, clause no. (1), (4) and (6) would be of relevance to us in this case.

¶38

In clause (1) it has been mentioned that where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused, then the FIR or the complaint can be quashed.

¶39

As per clause (4), where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a

¶40

¶41

2025:HHC:5123

¶42

police ofÏcer without an order dated by the Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155 (2) of the CrPC, and in such a situation, the FIR can be quashed.

¶43

Similarly, as provided under clause (6), if there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the CrPC or the concerned Act under which the criminal proceedings are instituted, such proceeding can be quashed.”

¶44

This position was reiterated in Ajay Malik v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 185 wherein it was observed:

¶45

“8. It is well established that a High Court, in exercising its extraordinary powers under Section 482 of the CrPC, may issue orders to prevent the abuse of court processes or to secure the ends of justice. These inherent powers are neither controlled nor limited by any other statutory provision. However, given the broad and profound nature of this authority, the High Court must exercise it sparingly. The conditions for invoking such powers are embedded within Section 482 of the CrPC itself, allowing the High Court to act only in cases of clear abuse of process or where intervention is essential to uphold the ends of justice.

¶46

9. It is in this backdrop that this Court, over the course of several decades, has laid down the principles and guidelines that High Courts must follow before quashing criminal proceedings at the threshold, thereby pre-empting the Prosecution from building its case before the Trial Court. The grounds for quashing, inter alia , contemplate the following situations : ( i ) the criminal complaint has been filed with mala fides ; ( ii ) the FIR represents an abuse of the legal process; ( iii ) no prima facie offence is made out; ( iv ) the dispute is civil in nature; ( v. ) the complaint contains vague and omnibus allegations; and ( vi ) the parties are willing to settle and compound the dispute amicably ( State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 )

¶47

¶48

2025:HHC:5123

¶49

The present petition is to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

¶50

The FIR mentions that the petitioner took the victim to a room on the pretext of talking to her and raped her. The petitioner subsequently refused to marry the informant. These allegations show a prima facie case for the commission of the rape.

¶51

It was submitted that the allegations are false. This submission cannot be appreciated at this stage. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Karuppudayar v. State, 2025 SCC

¶52

OnLine SC 215 that the Court cannot go into the reliability, genuineness or otherwise of the allegations while deciding a petition for quashing of FIR. It was observed:

¶53

“17. No doubt that the power under Section 482 of the CrPC is required to be exercised sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It is equally settled that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. However, the court would be justified in exercising its discretion if the case falls under any of the clauses carved out by this Court in Paragraph 102 in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra)”

¶54

Hence, it is impermissible to comment about the

¶55

truthfulness or falsehood of the allegations at this stage.

¶56

¶57

2025:HHC:5123

¶58

In Pramod Suryabhan Pawar (supra), the victim had sexual relations with the accused for more than five years on multiple occasions. Subsequently, the accused refused to marry the victim, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the continuous relationship for five years falsified the victim’s version regarding the rape. Similarly, in Mahesh Damu Khare (supra), the accused was married and could not have married the victim; still, the victim entered into a relationship with her. She maintained physical relations for many years, and Hon’ble Supreme Court held that no case of rape was made out.

¶59

These circumstances do not exist in the present case. The accused and the victim met each other regarding their marriage. The accused took her to a room where he raped her. The FIR does not mention that physical relations were maintained between the parties thereafter, which continued for a long time. The date of the incident is mentioned as 26^th and the complaint is dated 7.11.2024. Therefore, the circumstances of the present case are entirely different from the circumstances in the cited cases.

¶60

¶61

2025:HHC:5123

¶62