Informant challenged acceptance of a police cancellation report in a cheating FIR alleging payment for being sent abroad. The High Court held mere breach of promise and unproven alarm from threats did not constitute cheating or criminal intimidation and dismissed the revision.
This page shows the compact analysis of this judgement. The full analysis — procedural history, issue-by-issue holdings with ratio and obiter, advocates, and paragraph-level evidence for every claim — is being added to the record in batches and will appear here when this judgement has been through it.
2025:HHC:31965
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Revision No. 111 of 2025
Reserved on: 27.8.2025 Date of Decision: 17.9.2025.
Mohinder Pal ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. ...Respondent
Coram
Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla , Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes.
For the Petitioner : M/s Anubhav Chopra and Bhairav Gupta, Advocates. For the Respondent : Mr. Lokender Kutlehria, Additional Advocate General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
Present revision is directed against the order dated 7th November 2024 passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class-4, Shimla (learned Trial Court) vide which a cancellation report submitted by the police in FIR No. 78/17 dated 24th May 2017 was accepted and objections preferred by the petitioner (informant) were rejected. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.)
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informant and the accused are co-owners of the land located at Theog bearing Khasra numbers 153, 154 and 155. The accused and informant’s elder brother, Ashwani Kumar, went to Punjab, and Atul Kumar remained in possession of Khasra number 155. He was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop. A three-story house was constructed on Khasra number 155. Vikas, the younger brother of Atul, resides with his mother on the ground floor, whereas Rampal, the informant’s brother, resides on the two upper floors. Atul Kumar, brother of Ashwani Kumar, was running a shop in the name and style of Krishna Sweet Shop in the building till 2005, and Rampal started running a shop in the same building after 2006. Rampal used to remit ₹10,000 per month to Krishna Devi, mother of the accused and ₹5,000/- to Shivani Devi, wife of Ashok Kumar, after the death of Krishna Devi, with effect from 2006, till 2016. He had paid ₹6,04,000 by means of a demand draft to the accused. A civil suit was also filed between the parties, but was withdrawn. A false FIR was registered against the accused due to a land dispute. Hence, a cancellation report was filed before the Court.
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conjectures. The basic principles of criminal law were brushed aside by the investigating officer. The allegations made by the informant were sufficient to conclude that the accused had induced the informant to pay them money with dishonest intention. The police also seized the demand drafts issued in the name of the accused. They sought clarification from the bank regarding the payment of the money. The informant and his witnesses proved that the money was paid to the accused for sending the informant abroad. The investigating agency concluded that there was a family dispute between the parties, which led to the filing of the false FIR. Similar complaints were also made against the accused in Punjab. Therefore, it was prayed that the cancellation report be rejected and the objection petition be accepted.
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eight years. The result of the investigation showed that there was some dispute between the parties, which led to the filing of the false FIR; hence, the objections were rejected, and the cancellation report was accepted.
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“10. Before adverting to the merits of the contentions, at the outset, it is apt to mention that there are concurrent findings of conviction arrived at by two courts after a detailed appreciation of the material and evidence brought on record. The High Court in criminal revision against conviction is not supposed to exercise the
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jurisdiction like the appellate court, and the scope of interference in revision is extremely narrow. Section 397 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short “CrPC”) vests jurisdiction to satisfy itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed, and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior court. The object of the provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error which is to be determined on the merits of individual cases. It is also well settled that while considering the same, the Revisional Court does not dwell at length upon the facts and evidence of the case to reverse those findings.
Dilipsinh Kishorsinh Rao, (2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294, wherein it was observed at page 695:
14. The power and jurisdiction of the Higher Court under Section 397CrPC, which vests the court with the power to call for and examine records of an inferior court, is for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularities of any proceeding or order made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law or the perversity which has crept in such proceedings.
15. It would be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander [Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460: (2012) 4 SCC (Civ) 687: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 986] , where scope of Section 397 has been considered and succinctly explained as under: (SCC p. 475, paras 12-13)
“ 12 . Section 397 of the Code vests the court with the power to call for and examine the records of an inferior court for the purposes of satisfying itself as to the legality and regularity of any proceedings or order
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made in a case. The object of this provision is to set right a patent defect or an error of jurisdiction or law. There has to be a well-founded error, and it may not be appropriate for the court to scrutinise the orders, which, upon the face of it, bear a token of careful consideration and appear to be in accordance with law. If one looks into the various judgments of this Court, it emerges that the revisional jurisdiction can be invoked where the decisions under challenge are grossly erroneous, there is no compliance with the provisions of law, the finding recorded is based on no evidence, material evidence is ignored, or judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or perversely. These are not exhaustive classes, but are merely indicative. Each case would have to be determined on its own merits.
13 . Another well-accepted norm is that the revisional jurisdiction of the higher court is a very limited one and cannot be exercised in a routine manner. One of the inbuilt restrictions is that it should not be against an interim or interlocutory order. The Court has to keep in mind that the exercise of revisional jurisdiction itself should not lead to injustice ex facie. Where the Court is dealing with the question as to whether the charge has been framed properly and in accordance with law in a given case, it may be reluctant to interfere in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction unless the case substantially falls within the categories aforestated. Even the framing of the charge is a much-advanced stage in the proceedings under CrPC.”
SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 that it is impermissible for the High Court to
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reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusions in the absence of any perversity. It was observed at page 169:
“12. This Court has time and again examined the scope of Sections 397/401 CrPC and the grounds for exercising the revisional jurisdiction by the High Court. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri [State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, (1999) 2 SCC 452: 1999 SCC (Cri) 275] , while considering the scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court, this Court has laid down the following: (SCC pp. 454-55, para 5)
5 . … In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of supervisory jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting a miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an appellate court, nor can it be treated even as a second appellate jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to a gross miscarriage of justice. On scrutinising the impugned judgment of the High Court from the aforesaid standpoint, we have no hesitation in concluding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the conviction of the respondent by reappreciating the oral evidence. …”
13. Another judgment which has also been referred to and relied on by the High Court is the judgment of this Court in Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke [Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao
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Phalke, (2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19] . This Court held that the High Court, in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction, shall not interfere with the order of the Magistrate unless it is perverse or wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material, the order cannot be set aside merely on the ground that another view is possible. The following has been laid down in para 14: (SCC p. 135)
“ 14 . … Unless the order passed by the Magistrate is perverse or the view taken by the court is wholly unreasonable or there is non-consideration of any relevant material or there is palpable misreading of records, the Revisional Court is not justified in setting aside the order, merely because another view is possible. The Revisional Court is not meant to act as an appellate court. The whole purpose of the revisional jurisdiction is to preserve the power in the court to do justice in accordance with the principles of criminal jurisprudence. The revisional power of the court under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC is not to be equated with that of an appeal. Unless the finding of the court, whose decision is sought to be revised, is shown to be perverse or untenable in law or is grossly erroneous or glaringly unreasonable or where the decision is based on no material or where the material facts are wholly ignored or where the judicial discretion is exercised arbitrarily or capriciously, the courts may not interfere with the decision in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction.”
14. In the above case, also a conviction of the accused was recorded, and the High Court set aside [ Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke v. Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan, 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 1753] the order of conviction by substituting its view. This Court set aside the High Court's order, holding that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in substituting its views, and that too without any legal basis.
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“16. It is well settled that in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, the High Court does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings. It is not for the Revisional Court to re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record.
17. As held by this Court in Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH [Southern Sales & Services v. Sauermilch Design and Handels GmbH, (2008) 14 SCC 457] , it is a well-established principle of law that the Revisional Court will not interfere even if a wrong order is passed by a court having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error. The answer to the first question is, therefore, in the negative.”
of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950 as under:
“12. The ingredients of the offence of cheating are as follows:
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2)(a) Fraudulently or dishonestly inducing such person:
(i) to deliver any property to any person, or
(b) Intentionally induces that person to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property.”
v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 823 that mere breach of contract does not amount to cheating if the intention to cheat did not exist in the beginning. It was observed:
“16. Reference was also made to the decision in V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat (2009) 3 SCC 78, and it was observed:
“7. Similar elucidation by this Court in “ V.Y. Jose v. State of Gujarat ” explicitly states that a contractual dispute or breach of contract per se should not lead to the initiation of a criminal proceeding. The ingredient of ‘cheating’, as defined under Section 415 of the IPC, is the existence of a fraudulent or dishonest intention of making an
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initial promise or representation thereof, from the very beginning of the formation of the contract. Further, in the absence of the averments made in the complaint petition, wherefrom the ingredients of the offence can be found out, the High Court should not hesitate to exercise its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. Section 482 of the Cr. P.C. saves the inherent power of the High Court, as it serves a salutary purpose, viz ., a person should not undergo harassment of litigation for a number of years, when no criminal offence is made out. It is one thing to say that a case has been made out for trial and criminal proceedings should not be quashed, but another thing to say that a person must undergo a criminal trial despite the fact that no offence has been made out in the complaint. This Court in V.Y. Jose (supra) placed reliance on several earlier decisions in “ Hira Lal Hari Lal Bhagwati v. CBI ”, “ Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. ”, “ Vir Prakash Sharma v. Anil Kumar Agarwal ” and “ All Cargo Movers (I) (P) Ltd. v. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain ”.”
xxx
18. In Kunti v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2023) 6 SCC 109 , this Court referred to Sarabjit Kaur v. State of Punjab (2023) 5 SCC 360, wherein it was observed that a breach of contract does not give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction. Merely on the allegation of failure to keep a promise will not be enough to initiate criminal proceedings. Thus, the dishonest intention on the part of the party who is alleged to have committed the offence of cheating should be established at the time of entering into the transaction with the complainant; otherwise, the offence of cheating is not established or made out.”
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503. Criminal intimidation
Whoever threatens another with any injury to his person, reputation or property, or to the person or reputation of anyone in whom that person is interested, with intent to cause alarm to that person, or to cause that person to do any act which he is not legally bound to do, or to omit to do any act which that person is legally entitled to do, as the means of avoiding the execution of such threat, commits criminal intimidation.
Explanation- A threat to injure the reputation of any deceased person in whom the person threatened is interested is within this section.
have been within an intent to cause alarm to a person, to do an act, which a person is not legally bound to do or omit to do any
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act which he is legally entitled to do. It was laid down by this Court in Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal Pradesh 2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC) that the complainant should have been alarmed by the threat advanced by the accused to attract Section 506 of IPC. It was observed:
“21. Similarly, before an offence of criminal intimidation can be made out, it must be established prima facie that the accused persons (like petitioners in the present case) intended to cause an alarm to the complainant party, e., Jasbeer Singh. Mere threats, as alleged by him, extended by the petitioners, with a view to deter the complainant from interfering with what the petitioner believed to be his exclusive property, would not constitute an offence of criminal intimidation.”
Vikram Johar v. State of U.P. , (2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 ) wherein it was held at page 209: -
“25. Now, reverting to Section 506, which is an offence of criminal intimidation, the principles laid down by Fiona Shrikhande v. State of Maharashtra, (2013) 14 SCC 44 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 715 have also to be applied when the question of finding out as to whether the ingredients of the offence are made or not. Here, the only allegation is that the appellant abused the complainant. For proving an offence under Section 506 IPC, what are the ingredients which have to be proved by the prosecution? Ratanlal & Dhirajlal on Law of Crimes , 27th Edn., with regard to proof of offence, states the following:
“ … The prosecution must prove:
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( i ) That the accused threatened some person.
( ii ) That such threat consisted of some injury to his person, reputation or property; or to the person, reputation or property of someone in whom he was interested ;
( iii ) That he did so with intent to cause alarm to that person; or to cause that person to do any act which he was not legally bound to do, or omit to do any act which he was legally entitled to do as a means of avoiding the execution of such threat. ” (emphasis supplied)
A plain reading of the allegations in the complaint does not satisfy all the ingredients as noticed above.
had caused an alarm to the complainant or had caused him to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do anything which he would have done but for the threat.
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holding that no case was made out for taking cognisance and summoning the accused.
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant has to bring only two witnesses to support his allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law set into motion. The order of the Magistrate summoning the accused must reflect that he has applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of allegations made in the complaint and the evidence, both oral and documentary, in support thereof, and would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed in bringing a charge home to the accused? It is not that the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of recording of preliminary evidence before the summoning of the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise the evidence brought on record and may even himself put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the allegations or otherwise and then examine if any offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the accused.”
wherein it was observed:
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“20… Further, there has to be a conscious application of mind to these aspects by the Magistrate, as a summoning order has grave consequences of setting criminal proceedings in motion. Though the Magistrate is not required to record detailed reasons, there should be adequate evidence on record to set criminal proceedings into motion. The Magistrate should carefully scrutinise the evidence on record and may even put questions to the complainant/investigating officer, etc., to elicit answers to find out the truth about the allegations. The summoning order has to be passed when the complaint or chargesheet discloses an offence and when there is material that supports and constitutes the essential ingredients of the offence. The summoning order should not be passed lightly or as a matter of course.”
allegations in the FIR and the material in its support were not probable. The informant asserted that he paid the money for the renewal of his passport in the year 2006; however, the passport was due for renewal in the year 2007. Therefore, the complainant had no justification for the payment of money for the renewal of a passport in 2006. Further, the passport is renewed in the passport office, and it is difficult to believe that a person who had obtained the passport would not be aware of this fact and would have paid the money to some third person for the renewal of the passport.
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rejected. The investigation officer has to carry out the investigation fairly, and he is not to favour any party. He has to unearth the truth, and he cannot be faulted for collecting the material in favour of the accused. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in V.K. Sasikala v. State , (2012) 9 SCC 771: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 799 that the investigating officer should exonerate the accused, if any material is found in his favour. It was observed at page 784:
“17. Seizure of a large number of documents in the course of investigation of a criminal case is a common feature. After completion of the process of investigation and before submission of the report to the court under Section 173 CrPC, a fair amount of application of mind on the part of the investigating agency is inbuilt in the Code. Such application of mind is both with regard to the specific offence(s) that the investigating officer may consider to have been committed by the accused and also the identity and particulars of the specific documents and records, seized in the course of investigation, which support the conclusion of the investigating officer with regard to the offence(s) allegedly committed. Though it is only such reports which support the prosecution case that are required to be forwarded to the Court under Section 173(5) in every situation where some of the seized papers and documents do not support the prosecution case and, on the contrary, supports the accused, a duty is cast on the investigating officer to evaluate the two sets of documents and materials collected and, if required, to exonerate the accused at that stage itself ….” (Emphasis supplied)
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with a copy of this judgment.
( Rakesh Kainthla) Judge
17th September, 2025 (Chander)
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the revisional court could interfere with acceptance of the police cancellation report rejecting the informant's objections.
Whether the allegations disclosed offences under Sections 420 and 506/503 read with 120B IPC.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Malkeet Singh Gill v. State of ChhattisgarhRelied on¶9
(2022) 8 SCC 204: (2022) 3 SCC (Cri) 348: 2022 SCC OnLine SC 786 · Who else cites this
State of Gujarat v. Dilipsinh Kishorsinh RaoRelied on¶10
(2023) 17 SCC 688: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1294 · Who else cites this
Kishan Rao v. ShankargoudaRelied on¶11
(2018) 8 SCC 165: (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 544: (2018) 4 SCC (Civ) 37: 2018 SCC OnLine SC 651 · Who else cites this
Sanjaysinh Ramrao Chavan v. Dattatray Gulabrao PhalkeRelied on
(2015) 3 SCC 123: (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 19 · Who else cites this
Bir Singh v. Mukesh KumarRelied on¶12
(2019) 4 SCC 197: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 40: (2019) 2 SCC (Civ) 309: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 13 · Who else cites this
Jupally Lakshmikantha Reddy v. State of A.P.Relied on¶14
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1950 · Who else cites this
Rikhab Birani v. State of U.P.Applied¶24
2025 SCC OnLine SC 823 · Who else cites this
Inder Pratap Singh Versus State of Himachal PradeshRelied on¶18
2003 (1) Crimes 345 (HC)
Vikram Johar v. State of U.P.Relied on¶19
(2019) 14 SCC 207: (2019) 4 SCC (Cri) 795: 2019 SCC OnLine SC 609 · Who else cites this
Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial MagistrateRelied on¶23
(1998) 5 SCC 749 · Who else cites this
V.K. Sasikala v. StateRelied on¶28
(2012) 9 SCC 771: (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 1010: 2012 SCC OnLine SC 799 · Who else cites this
4 provisions across 2 enactments
Mohinder Pal
State of H.P.
Rakesh Kainthla
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
