A retired forest employee sought arrears of salary arising from work-charge status granted after a prior writ petition. The Court held that the claim was barred by inordinate delay and laches, noting the petitioner had remained silent for years before litigating. The petition was dismissed on this ground.
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
CWPOA No. 559 of 2019 Reserved on: 17.09.2024 Decided on: 20.09.2024
__________________________________________________________ Narpat Ram Petitioner
Versus
State of Himachal Pradesh and another
…Respondents __________________________________________________________
Coram
The Hon'ble Mr. Justice Satyen Vaidya, Judge
1 Whether approved for reporting? Yes
For the petitioner : Mr. Vikas Rajput, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Gobind Korla, Additional Advocate General.
Satyen Vaidya, Judge
Heard both sides.
“(A) That letter dated 7.6.2014 (Annexure P-4) may kindly be quashed and set-aside and respondent may be directed to release the arrears of Rs.1,16,359/- to petitioner in single installment along with up-to-date interest.”
Government of Himachal Pradesh as daily wage Class-IV
1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment?
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employee from 1984 till 16.01.1998, on which date the services of petitioner were regularized. The petitioner continued to work as regular Class-IV employee of the said department till his superannuation on 31.08.2006.
“The petitioner claims the benefit of the decision of the Supreme Court in Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316 and claim work charge status on completion of ten years of daily waged service with 240 days per year. In any case, as rightly pointed out by the learned Deputy Advocate General, there cannot be work charge status prior to 1.1.1994. The claim for regularization will be considered only subject to the availability of vacancies. All these aspects, the petitioner prays, he may be permitted to bring to the notice of the second respondent. It is open to him to do so. In the event of the petitioner filing appropriate representation furnishing his service particulars, the matter will be considered and appropriate action will be taken in accordance with law within four months from the date
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of production of a copy of this judgment along with the representation by the petitioner before the second respondent.
2. The writ petition is disposed of, so also the pending applications, if any.”
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and thereafter he approached this Court by way of CWP No. 9958 of 2012.
“ 27 . The grievance agitated by the respondent did not deserve to be addressed on merits, for doctrine of delay and laches had already visited his claim like the chill of death which does not spare anyone even the one who fosters the idea and nurtures the attitude that he can sleep to avoid death and eventually proclaim “Deo gratias” – ‘thanks to God’.
28 . Another aspect needs to be stated. A writ court while deciding a writ petition is required to remain alive to the nature of the claim and the unexplained delay on the part of the writ petitioner. Stale claims are not to be adjudicated unless non-interference would cause grave injustice. The present case, need less to emphasise, did not justify adjudication. It deserved to be thrown overboard at the very threshold, for the writ petitioner had accepted the order of dismissal for half a decade and cultivated the feeling that he could freeze time and forever remain in the realm of constant present.”
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of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others (2022)
2 SCC 25 wherein it has been held as under:
“ DELAY, LACHES AND ACQUIESCENCE :
20 . The principles governing delay, laches, and acquiescence are overlapping and interconnected on many occasions. However, they have their distinct characters and distinct elements. One can say that delay is the genus to which laches and acquiescence are species. Similarly, laches might be called a genus to a species by name acquiescence. However, there may be a case where acquiescence is involved, but not laches. These principles are common law principles, and perhaps one could identify that these principles find place in various statutes which restrict the period of limitation and create non-consideration of condonation in certain circumstances. They are bound to be applied by way of practice requiring prudence of the Court than of a strict application of law. The underlying principle governing these concepts would be one of estoppel. The question of prejudice is also an important issue to be taken note of by the Court.
LACHES:
21 . The word laches is derived from the French language meaning “remissness and slackness”. It thus involves unreasonable delay or negligence in pursuing a claim involving an equitable relief while causing prejudice to the other party. It is neglect on the part of a party to do an act which law requires while asserting a right, and therefore, must stand in the way of the party getting relief or remedy.
22 . Two essential factors to be seen are the length of the delay and the nature of acts done during the interval. As stated, it would also involve acquiescence on the part of the party approaching the Court apart from the change in position in the interregnum. Therefore, it would be unjustifiable for a Court of Equity to confer a remedy to a party who knocks its doors when his acts would indicate a waiver of such a right. By his conduct, he has put the
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other party in a particular position, and therefore, it would be unreasonable to facilitate a challenge before the Court. Thus, a man responsible for his conduct on equity is not expected to be allowed to avail a remedy.”
12. Recently, in Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley
and others, (2024) SCC Online SC 551 , it has been held
as under:
“ 11 . For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
“56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into
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account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3 SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose.”
12. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corportion Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. It has been further held thereunder:
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“ 6 . Delay or laches is one of the factors which is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the opposite party. Even where fundamental right is involved the matter is still within the discretion of the Court as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185 : AIR 1970 SC 769]. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably.
7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd [(1874) 5 PC 221 : 22 WR 492] (PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. M.R. Meher [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Maharashtra SRTC v. Shri Balwant Regular Motor Service [(1969) 1 SCR 808 : AIR 1969 SC 329]. Sir Barnes had stated:
“Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay of course not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are, the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or
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injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.”
8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84 : AIR 1970 SC 470] that no relief can be given to the petitioner who without any reasonable explanation approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay.
9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal [(1986) 4 SCC 566 : AIR 1987 SC 251] that the High Court in exercise of its discretion does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene and grant relief in exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.”
13. Reiterating the aspect of delay and latches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in the case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held:
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“16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.”
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same is dismissed.
pending miscellaneous application(s), if any.
(Satyen Vaidya) 20th September, 2024. Judge
(GR)
2 issues framed by the court
Whether the petitioner's claim for arrears of salary/work-charge status benefits was barred by delay and laches.
Whether the previous order in CWP No. 9958 of 2012 revived a stale claim that had not been adjudicated on merits.
Colour shows how this judgement treated each authority
Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P.Referred¶22
Mool Raj Upadhyaya vs. State of H.P., 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 316 · Who else cites this
State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and othersRelied on¶34
State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. R.K. Zalpuri and others (2015) 15 SCC 602 · Who else cites this
Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and othersRelied on¶39
Union of India and others vs. N. Murugesan and others (2022) 2 SCC 25 · Who else cites this
Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and othersRelied on¶49
Mrinmoy Maity vs. Chhanda Koley and others, (2024) SCC Online SC 551 · Who else cites this
Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B.Referred¶52
Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 · Who else cites this
Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. ThangappanReferred¶57
Karnataka Power Corporation Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322 · Who else cites this
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali BabuRelied on¶66
Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 · Who else cites this
1 provisions across 1 enactments
Narpat Ram
State of Himachal Pradesh
another
Satyen Vaidya
As recorded by the court registry
Judgements on the same questions, provisions and authorities, from every court
