Dismissed

Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Another v. Rajeev Kumar and Another

Himachal Pradesh HC11 Dec 2024CWP/3640/2024

Case brief

AI extract

What is this about?

The High Court dismissed writ petitions challenging Labour Court awards granting back wages to terminated employees. The Court held that the 'no work no pay' principle does not apply where the employer illegally prevented willing employees from joining duty, and the petitioner failed to prove the respondents were gainfully employed during the interim period.

What did the court decide?

Petitions dismissed; no illegality found in impugned orders granting back wages; 'no work no pay' principle rejected due to employer's fault in preventing joining.

Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of… — Pension and Retirement Benefits | Himachal Pradesh HC (2024)

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2024:HHC:14788

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA

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CWP Nos. 4843, 3640, 4712, 4723, 4724, 4725, 4726, 4727, 4728, 4729, 4730, 4731, 4844 and 4845 of 2024 Date of Decision: 11.12.2024

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_____________________________________________________________________ 1. CWP No. 4843 of 2024 Dr. Y.S.P.U.H.F and Anr. ……...Petitioners Versus Joginder Singh and Anr. …....Respondents 2. CWP No. 3640 of 2024 Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Anr. ……...Petitioners Versus Rajeev Kumar and Anr. …....Respondents 3. CWP No. 4712 of 2024 Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Anr. ……...Petitioners Versus Subhash Chand and Anr. …....Respondents 4. CWP No. 4723 of 2024 Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Anr. ……...Petitioners Versus Raj Kumar and Anr. …....Respondents 5. CWP No. 4724 of 2024 Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Anr. ……...Petitioners

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Anil Kumar and Anr.	Versus	…....Respondents
6. CWP No. 4725 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Ho Sanjay Mohammad and Anr.	rticulture and Fo Versus	restry and Anr. ……...Petitioners …....Respondents
7. CWP No. 4726 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University	Versus	……...Petitioner
Madan Lal and Anr.		…....Respondents
8. CWP No. 4727 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University	Versus	……...Petitioner
Manjeet Kumar and Anr.		…....Respondents
9. CWP No. 4728 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University	Versus	……...Petitioner
Dev Raj and Anr.		…....Respondents
10. CWP No. 4729 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University	Versus	……...Petitioner
Rajeev Kumar and Anr.
11. CWP No. 4730 of 2024

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Dr. Y.S. Parmar University Suresh Kumar and Anr.		Versus	……...Petitioner …....Respondents
12. CWP No. 4731 of 2024
Dr. Y.S. Parmar University		Versus	……...Petitioner
Joginder Singh and Anr.			…....Respondents
13. CWP No. 4844 of 2024
Dr. Y.S.P.U.H.F and Anr.		Versus	……...Petitioners
Vipan Kumar and Anr.			…....Respondents
14. CWP No. 4845 of 2024
Dr. Y.S.P.U.H.F and Anr.		Versus	……...Petitioners
Rajesh Kumar and Anr.			…....Respondents
Coram
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sande	ep Shar	ma, Judge.
Whether approved for repo	rting?	Yes.
For the Petitioner(s):Mr.	Ramesh	Chand Sh	arma, Advocate.
For the Respondents:Mr. Kira ______________________________	Rahul n Negi, _________	Mahajan, Advocates, ____________	Mr. Sunil Kumar and Ms. for respondent No.1. ________________________

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Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral)

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Since common questions of facts as well as law are involved in the above captioned cases coupled with the fact that similar relief has been claimed in all the cases, all these matters were heard together and are being disposed of vide common order.

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2. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with orders dated 25.9.2023 passed by the learned Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, whereby application Nos. 131/2021, 132/2021, 133/2021, 134/2021, 135/2021, 136/2021 137/2021, 138/2021, 139/2021, 140/2021, 141/2021, 142/2021, 143/2021 and 144/2021 filed under Section 33-C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (in short the “Act”) read with Section 151 CPC filed by the respondents, praying therein to determine their wages from the date of award to till the date of their reinstatement, on the basis of minimum wages fixed by the State Government from time to time, alongwith 12% interest from the due date, till realization of the amount, came to be allowed, petitionerUniversity has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, praying therein to set aside aforesaid order.

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3. Precisely, the grouse of the petitioners, as has been highlighted in the petition and further canvassed by Mr. Ramesh Chand Sharma,

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learned counsel for the petitioner is that court below, while passing impugned awards has failed to appreciate the evidence in its right perspective, as a result thereof, findings contrary to the record and detrimental to the interest of the petitioner-University have come to the fore. He, while making this court peruse evidence adduced on record at the behest of the petitioner-University vehemently argued that once respondents themselves admitted that after passing of award, they had not given joining physically on 4.6.2018/12.7.2021, rather same were sent through speed post, there was no occasion, if any, for the learned tribunal to accept the prayer made on their behalf to order payment of wages on the basis of minimum wages fixed by the State Government from the alleged date of joining submitted through speed post, rather they ought to have been granted such wages from the date they physically gave joining.

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4. For having bird’s eye view, facts, which may be relevant for the adjudication of the cases at hand are that on account of their illegal termination, respondents in above captioned cases raised industrial dispute before the competent authority, who while exercising power under Section 10(1) of the Act, referred the dispute to the Labour Court-cumIndustrial Tribunal. Reference made in the case of one Mr. Anil Kumar (Ref No. 12/2015) is reproduced herein below:

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"Whether time to time termination of the services of Shri Anil Kumar S/O Shri Krishan Chand, V.P.O. Jol Sappar, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. during year 2011 to year 2012 by (i) the Director, Institute of Biotechnology & Environmental Sciences, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Neri, District Hamirpur, H.P. (Principal Employer) (ii) the Registrar, Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture & Forestry, Nauni, District Solan, H.P. (Principal Employer) without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and thereafter his services were transferred to the contractor company i.e. M/S Shimla Cleanways without his knowledge w.e.f. 17:07- 2013 where he worked till 08-092014 and was again terminated w.e.f. 09-09-2014 by the Contractor, M/S Shimla Cleanways, Sahibu Niwas, New Shimla H.P. (Contractor Company), without complying with the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is legal and justified? If not, what amount of back wages, seniority, past service benefits and compensation the above worker is entitled to form the above employers?”

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5. Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal vide award dated

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24.4.2018, answered the reference in affirmative and directed the petitioner-University to reengage the respondents forthwith. Tribunal below also held respondents to be in continuous uninterrupted service from the date of their initial engagement and held that the breaks given by the petitioner-University being fictional in nature shall have no effect on the seniority and continuity in service of the respondents and seniority shall be reckoned from their initial dates of engagement, however they shall be entitled to such benefit without back wages.

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6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with impugned awards passed by the Tribunal below, petitioner herein approached the writ court by way of CWP No. 2612 of 2018 (alongwith connected matters), titled The Dean, College of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri and Anr. v. Shri Rajeev Kumar and Anr ., but fact remains that same were dismissed on 13.11.2018.

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7. Immediately after passing of the aforesaid judgment, respondent sent communications to the petitioner-University, thereby submitting their joining pursuant to awards passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, however, petitioner herein instead of permitting respondents to give joining preferred to file SLP before the Hon’ble Apex Court, however same was also dismissed.

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8. Since despite respondents having submitted joining, petitioner refused to permit the respondents to resume duties, they were compelled to approach the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal by way of applications under Section 33-C (2) of the Act praying therein to determine the wages from the date of award till the date of reinstatement on the basis of minimum wages fixed by State Government alongwith 12 % interest, which prayer came to be allowed vide separate orders dated 25.9.2023. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings, praying therein to set-aside aforesaid order.

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9. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the records.

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10. It is not in dispute that award dated 24.4.2018, passed in reference Nos. 6/2015, 7/2015, 8/2015, 9 of 2015 10/2015, 11/2015, 12/2015, 13/2015, 14/2015, 15/2015, 16/2015, 17/2015, 44/2015 and 62/2015 by the learned Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal, whereby direction came to be issued to the petitioner to re-instate the respondents with continuity in service but without back wages, has attained finality on account of dismissal of SLP filed by the petitioner laying therein challenge to order dated 13.11.2018, passed by this Court in CWP No. 2612 of 2018 (alongwith connected matters).

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11. Bare perusal of pleadings as well as evidence adduced on record clearly reveals that there is no dispute that after passing of award dated 24.4.2018, respondents herein by way of letter sent through Speed Post had given their joining, but such prayer of their was not accepted, rather at that juncture, petitioner preferred to file writ petition in this Court laying therein challenge to award dated 24.4.2018.

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12. Since the evidence adduced on record before the Tribunal below by both the parties is on similar lines, as such, for the sake of brevity and clarity, evidence from the record of CWP No. 4843 of 2024 is being discussed.

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13. Respondent Joginder Singh in support of his case examined himself as AW1 and tendered his evidence by way of affidavit Ext.AW1/D. In his Examination-in-Chief, he affirmed all the averments made in the application. In evidence. he also tendered in evidence copy of award dated 24.4.2018 Ext.AW1/B, copy of joining report Ext.AW1/C, copy of judgment of High Court Ext.AW1/D, copy of representation Ext.AW1/E and copy of order passed in SLP by the Hon’ble Apex Court Ext.AW1/F. In his crossexamination, respondent admitted that he joined his services on 21.5.2020 and signed document Ext.R/A. He also admitted that he had moved an application on 17.3.2020 for joining duty on the basis of judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court and is in service w.e.f. 21.5.2020 and getting salary regularly. Though respondent in his cross-examination admitted that he submitted his joining report on 21.5.2020, but denied that he had not reported to join duty prior to 21.5.2020. He also admitted that he also filed execution petition, which was withdrawn on account of the fact that at the relevant time, petitioner had taken a plea that matter was pending adjudication before the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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14. With a view to refute the claim of the respondents, petitioner examined Dean of College Dr. Som Dev Sharma. Afore witness tendered his evidence by way of affidavit i.e. Ext.RW1/A, wherein he deposed that petitioner university after completing codal formalities decided to reengage

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the respondent as per judgment dated 13.11.2018, passed by the High Court, sent to Dean of College of Horticulture and Forestry, Neri, for implementation. He deposed that after passing of judgment dated 13.11.2018, by the Hon’ble Apex Court, petitioner University decided to file review petition against the judgment dated 13.11.2018, but same was dismissed on 3.5.2019. He stated that petitioner University filed SLP before the Hon’ble Apex Court against the judgment dated 3.5.2019, but same was dismissed on 2.12.2019. Afore material witness adduced on record by the petitioner-University categorically deposed that after exhausting all the remedies available to the petitioner university under the law, petitioner reengaged the respondents on 21.5.2020. He deposed that respondents could not be reengaged before 21.5.2020, on account of pendency of the petition before the Hon’ble Apex Court.

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15. If the cross-examination conducted by this witness is perused in its entirety, it clearly reveals that respondent Joginder Singh had submitted his joining by way of post on 4.12.2018, but such prayer at the relevant time was not accepted. Though this witness denied that after passing of award, respondents reported for the duty personally at the time of submitting joining report, but he nowhere disputed factum with regard to receipt of communication dated 4.12.2018, sent by the respondents thorough speed post, rather this witness admitted that respondent had

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submitted his joining Ex.AW1/C through speed post. He denied that respondent had submitted his joining report through speed post since his joining report submitted personally by him was not accepted. This witness admitted that University did not call the respondents to join duty through speed post for the reason that petitioner-university had laid challenge to the award before the High Court. He deposed that petition was decided by the High Court on 3.11.2018, but he is not aware that on 4.12.2018, respondent otherwise had submitted the joining report in the office of Registrar and it was received in the office of the Registrar. While fairly admitting that award passed by the Tribunal was not stayed by the High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court, this witness further admitted that no joining report was submitted by the respondent and others after passing of the judgment by the High Court.

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16. Careful perusal of evidence adduced on record by the respective parties clearly reveals that respondent Joginder Singh had submitted his joining report to the petitioner-University on 4.6.2018. Though afore witness admitted in his cross-examination that he had submitted his joining report physically on 21.5.2020, but there is no denial to the fact that prior to his having given joining physically, he had approached the petitioner-university by way of communication dated 4.6.2018, receipt whereof stands duly admitted by the petitioner university.

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17. Dr. Som Raj Sharma, RW1, in his examination-in-Chief though stated that respondents did not visit the university personally to join the duty after passing of the award, but in his cross-examination categorically admitted that respondents had sent the joining report through speed post. True it is that in the case at hand, there is nothing to suggest that respondent herein had physically joined on 4.6.2018, rather as per his own statement, he made himself available for joining physically on 21.5.2020, but at the same time, there is nothing on record to suggest that after receipt of communication dated 4.6.2018 (Ext.PW1/C) communication, if any, was sent by the petitioner in response thereof calling upon respondents to join duties, rather as per own case of the petitioner, as has been stated by Mr. Som Raj Sharma RW1, petitioner university instead of accepting the joining given by the respondents through speed post decided to file writ petitions before this Court which ultimately came to be dismissed.

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18. Despite receipt of copy of award sent by the respondents vide speed post dated 4.6.2018, petitioner herein failed to reengage the respondents as per award dated 24.4.2018, passed by the learned Labour Court. Since execution of the award passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal was never stayed by this Court, there was no occasion, if any, for the petitioner university not to reengage the respondents, rather

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they should have been reengaged immediately from the date of passing of the award.

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19. Evidence adduced on record clearly reveals that though respondents herein were ready and willing to join the duty and in that regard, they had actually approached the petitioner by way of letter dated 4.6.2018, sent through speed post, but yet petitioner neither reengaged respondents nor called them to join their duties. Petitioner kept on waiting till the final disposal of the SLP by the Hon’ble Apex Court, which came to be dismissed on 2.12.2019. After passing of order dated 2.12.2019, respondents again approached the department, but ultimately, they were permitted to rejoin on 21.5.2020.

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20. Though Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that joining, if any, given by way of speed post is of no consequence, especially when there is nothing on record to suggest that after passing of award by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal, which never came to be stayed by the High Court, respondents herein were ever prevented by the petitioner from joining, however, this Court is not persuaded to agree with afore submission of Mr. Sharma for the reason that once factum with regard to receipt of communication dated 4.6.2018, sent through speed post is not denied by the petitioner coupled with the fact that petitioner-university was in the know of award dated 24.4.2018

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passed by the Labour Court cum Industrial Tribunal and its prayer for interim relief, thereby staying the operation of award was rejected by this Court, it had no option but to call upon the respondents to give joining. As has been discussed herein above, though there is no convincing evidence suggestive of the fact till 4.12.2018, respondents herein had made themselves available for joining physically but bare perusal of communication dated 4.6.2018 clearly reveals that respondents were keen to join duty and in that regard, they had taken steps by sending joining by post to the petitioner, but yet they were not permitted to join, rather were made to wait till disposal of SLP filed by the petitioner University.

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21. Though Mr. Sharma, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that since respondents herein never worked for the period qua which they have been granted back wages, principle of “ no work no pay ” ought to have been applied by the Tribunal, but this court finds no force in the aforesaid submission of Mr. Sharma, for the reason that principle of “no work no pay ” would not apply in the case at hand, since admittedly, in the cases at hand, after passing of the award dated 24.4.2018, respondents herein had become eligible for reengagement and by way of communications dated 4.6.2018, they had expressed their intention to join duties coupled with the fact that petitioner herein permitted the respondents to join after disposal of the SLP preferred by it,

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this Court has no hesitation to conclude that petitioner itself had not permitted the respondents to join and if it is so, it cannot be permitted, at this stage, to resort to principle of “ no work no pay ”.

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22. Had petitioner University, after receipt of communication dated 4.6.2018, called upon the respondents to join and had respondents failed to join, principle of “ no work no pay ” could have been applied in the cases at hand, but in the cases at hand, there is ample evidence, as detailed herein above, to show that though respondents herein expressed keenness to rejoin the duties pursuant to award passed by the Tribunal, but on one pretext or the other, they were not permitted to join. If it is so, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below, while allowing application under Section 33 (C) the Act, thereby issuing direction to the petitioner to grant wages to the respondents w.e.f. 4.6.2018, till their reengagement on various dates, as per minimum wages prescribed under Minimum Wages Act, at the relevant time.

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23. Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah (2007) 7 SCC 689 , relevant paras whereof read as under:

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“33. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. It is true that while granting a relief in favour of a party, the Court must consider the relevant provisions of law and issue appropriate directions keeping in view such provisions. There may, however, be

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cases where on the facts and in the circumstances, the Court may issue necessary directions in the larger interest of justice keeping in view the principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Take a case, where ex facie injustice has been meted out to an employee. In spite of the fact that he is entitled to certain benefits, they had not been given to him. His representations have been illegally and unjustifiably turned down. He finally approaches a Court of Law. The Court is convinced that gross injustice has been done to him and he was wrongfully, unfairly and with oblique motive deprived of those benefits. The Court, in the circumstances, directs the Authority to extend all benefits which he would have obtained had he not been illegally deprived of them. Is it open to the Authorities in such case to urge that as he has not worked (but held to be illegally deprived), he would not be granted the benefits? Upholding of such plea would amount to allowing a party to take undue advantage of his own wrong. It would perpetrate injustice rather than doing justice to the person wronged.

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34.We are conscious and mindful that even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is 'no work no pay'. In appropriate cases, however, a Court of Law may, nay must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The Court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The Court may in the circumstances, direct the Authority to grant him all benefits considering 'as if he had worked'. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a Court of Law and if such directions are issued by a Court, the Authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case).

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The bald contention of the appellant-Board, therefore, has no substance and must be rejected.”

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24. Reliance is also placed upon judgment passed by the High Court of Chhatisgarh at Bilaspur in Rajendera Sharma, through Shri Bhudhar Prasad Sharma v. State of Chhattisgarh, through the Secretary, Ministry of Home Department and Ors. 2021 SCC OnLine

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2812 , relevant paras whereof are reproduced herein below:

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“7. The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Bihar and others v. Kripa Nand Singh and another (2014) 14 SCC 375, has observed that 'No Work No Pay' is the rule and 'No Work Yet Pay' is the exception. It was pointed out that exception would apply only when employee is compelled (compulsory waiting period) not to attend his duty without any violation or without any fault on his part.

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The Supreme Court in the matter of State of Uttar Pradesh and others v. Madhav Prasad Sahrma (2011) 2 SCC 212) has held that principle of 'No Work No Pay' cannot be applied as a rule of thumb. Full back wages in certain 1 (2007) 11 SCC 488 2 (2014) 14 SCC 375 3 (2011) 2 SCC 212 circumstances may be justified particularly when promotion is wrongly denied.

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Similarly, in the matter of Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah (2007) 7 SCC 689, the Supreme Court has reiterated that principle of 'No Work No Pay' is not absolute in a given case, if it is that the person was willing to work but he was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so, the Court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering "as if he had worked".”

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25. High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Pepsu

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Road Transport Corporation and Anr v. P.O. Industrial Tribunal and

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Anr 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 4177 , has held as under:

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“4. The tribunal, vide separate order dated 20.03.2019 and 15.03.2019 impugned in the petitions, on the basis of evidence led by the parties, held that there was no dispute amongst the parties that after the publication of the award on 16.04.2014, the workman submitted joining report Ex. W-3 in the office of petitioner No. 2 on 07.05.2014 followed by numerous reminders to both petitioners but was taken back on duty only 29.07.2015. The Tribunal held that joining report submitted by the workman to petitioner No. 2 was admitted not only in the written reply but also by MW-1 Rajpal Singh in his affidavit Ex. MW-1/A, thus it was apparent that although the workman was willing to perform duty after the passing of the award and that he was not taken back on duty till 29.07.2015 and on the aforesaid basis, held that the conduct of the management clearly revealed that it was not inclined to take back the workman on duty whereas the workman was interested in joining duty as soon as possible, therefore, the principle of “no work no pay” would not apply. Reliance was placed by the Tribunal on the decision in Panipat Cooperative Sugar Mills Limited v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ambala , 2011 (4) SCT 17 (P&H). In said case, the Labour Court found denial of employment to the workmen at the relevant time unjustified, consequentially, the workmen entitled for payment of wages for the period they were unjustly denied employment. Challenge to the order granting wages to the workmen, was dismissed and maintainability of the claim application under Section 33-C (2) of the Act upheld by relying upon a Division Bench judgment

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in CWP No. 18810 of 1995. Relevant extract of the decision in CWP No. 18810 of 1995 is reproduced as under:—

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“It is a settled proposition of law that where the services of the workman are illegally terminated without justification, he is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages……… Instead of implementing the award in letter and spirit, they chose not to pay back wages to which respondent No. 2 (workman) was entitled”. Hon'ble Punjab and Haryana High Court made exception to the rule of ‘no work, no pay’ by holding that

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“It would be perfectly legitimate to make exception to situation when the person was willing to work but was not allowed to work, to be treated ‘as if he had worked’, as noted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board v. C. Muddaiah, 2007 (4) SCT 452 : 2007 (5) Recent Apex Judgments (RAJ) 573 : (2007) 7 SCC 689”.

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Hon'ble Apex Court in Commissioner, Karnataka Housing Board's case (Supra), held that:

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“Even in absence of statutory provision, normal rule is “no work no pay”. In appropriate cases, however, a court of law may, may must, take into account all the facts in their entirety and pass an appropriate order in consonance with law. The court, in a given case, may hold that the person was willing to work but he was illegally and unlawfully not allowed to do so. The court may in the circumstances, direct the authority to grant him all benefits considering “as if he had worked”. It, therefore, cannot be contended as an absolute proposition of law that no direction of payment of consequential benefits can be granted by a court of law and if such directions are issued by a court, the authority can ignore them even if they had been finally confirmed by the

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Apex Court of the country (as has been done in the present case)”.

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5. Reliance was also placed by the Tribunal on the decision in Zila Parishad, Gurdaspur v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur , 2004 (2) RSJ, 725 wherein the department failed to provide duty to the workman from 29.12.1975 to 03.07.1979 due to no fault of the workman and the application by the workman u/S 33-C (2) of the Act for wages for the aforementioned period was allowed by the Labour Court, while the writ petition filed by the management was dismissed.

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26. Though Mr. Sharma, also attempted to argue that since during aforesaid period, respondents were gainfully employed, they could not be otherwise granted wages, however such plea of him being totally contrary to the record, deserves outright rejection because there is nothing on record to suggest that evidence, if any, ever came to be led on record by the petitioner institute to suggest that during the period, for which wages were claimed by the respondents, respondents were gainfully employed. Once petitioner University, being employer failed to lead cogent and convincing evidence that the respondents herein, were gainfully employed during the period, for which they have been allowed wages under the Minimum Wages Act, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the court below while passing impugned order.

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27. Reliance in this regard is placed upon judgment passed in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya

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(D.Ed.) and others (supra), wherein Hon’ble Apex Court has held that denial of back wages would amount to indirectly punishing the employee and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay backwages and where an employer wants to deny back-wages to an employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, it is required to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period, the employee was gainfully employed. Since in the cases at hand, petitioner failed to prove factum of gainful employment, if any of the respondents during the period in question, no illegality can be said to have been committed by the Tribunal below, while holding respondents entitled for back wages.

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28. Consequently, in view of the detailed discussion made herein above as well as law taken into consideration, this Court finds no illegality or infirmity in the impugned order(s) and as such, present petitions fail and are dismissed accordingly.

Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Another v. Rajeev Kumar and Another

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Dr. Y.S. Parmar University of Horticulture and Forestry and Another v. Rajeev Kumar and Another

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